European Aviation Safety Agency
Notice of Proposed Amendment 2017-03
In-flight recording for light aircraft
RMT.0271 (MDM.073(a)) and RMT.0272 (MDM.073(b))
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) addresses safety and regulatory harmonisation issues related to the need of
in-flight recordings for accident investigation and accident prevention purposes. 12 safety recommendations were
addressed to the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) by 7 safety investigation authorities, recommending an in-flight
recording capability for light aircraft models which are outside the scope of the current flight recorder carriage
requirements. In addition, new Standards (recently introduced in ICAO Annex 6) require the carriage of lightweight flight
recorders for light aeroplanes and light helicopters.
The specific objectives of this rulemaking task are to:
— enhance the identification of safety issues affecting light aircraft by means of data recorded in flight;
— achieve harmonisation with ICAO Annex 6;
— produce a proportionate regulation which takes into account the General Aviation Road Map; and
— identify avenues other than requiring in-flight recording equipment.
This NPA proposes to mandate the carriage of lightweight flight recorders for some categories of light aeroplanes and
light helicopters when they are commercially operated and manufactured 3 years after the date of application of the
amending regulation. In addition, this NPA proposes to promote the voluntary installation of in-flight recording
equipment for all other light aeroplanes and light helicopters and for all balloons.
The proposed changes are expected to increase safety with limited economic and social impacts.
Action area: Aircraft tracking, rescue operations, and incident/accident investigations
Affected rules: Annex I (Definitions),
Annex III (Part-ORO),
Annex IV (Part-CAT), and
Annex VIII (Part-SPO) to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air Operations;
Decision 2012/015/R;
Decision 2014/017/R;
Decision 2014/015/R;
Decision 2014/018/R
Affected stakeholders: Aircraft operators; aircraft manufacturers; aircraft pilots; safety investigation authorities; competent
authorities
Driver: Safety; safety recommendations; Rulemaking group: Yes
legal obligation (ICAO Standards)
Impact assessment: Full Rulemaking Procedure: Standard
25.7.2014 3.4.2017 2018/Q1 2018/Q4 2018/Q4
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Table of contents
Table of contents
1. About this NPA ..................................................................................................................................... 4
1.1. How this NPA was developed....................................................................................................................4
1.2. How to comment on this NPA ...................................................................................................................4
1.3. The next steps ...........................................................................................................................................4
2. In summary — why and what ............................................................................................................... 5
2.1. Why we need to change the rules — issue/rationale ...............................................................................5
2.2. What we want to achieve — objectives....................................................................................................5
2.3. How we want to achieve it — overview of the proposals ........................................................................6
2.3.1. Changes to the Air Operations requirements ....................................................................................6
2.3.2. Promotion of in-flight recording ........................................................................................................7
2.4. What are the expected benefits and drawbacks of the proposals ...........................................................8
2.4.1. Summary of the impact assessment (refer to Chapter 4) .................................................................8
2.4.2. Proposal retained for aeroplanes and helicopters ............................................................................8
2.4.3. Proposal retained for balloons ..........................................................................................................9
3. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail .................................................................................... 10
3.1. Draft Regulation (Draft EASA opinion) ....................................................................................................10
3.1.1. Draft resulting text ..........................................................................................................................10
3.1.2. Rationale .........................................................................................................................................17
3.2. Draft Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) (Draft EASA decision) ...23
3.2.1. Draft resulting text..........................................................................................................................23
3.2.2. Rationale .........................................................................................................................................37
4. Impact assessment (IA) ....................................................................................................................... 43
4.1. What is the issue .....................................................................................................................................44
4.1.1. Definition of the issue ......................................................................................................................44
4.1.2. Safety risk assessment .....................................................................................................................50
4.1.3. Who is affected ................................................................................................................................61
4.1.4. How could the issue/problem evolve ..............................................................................................62
4.2. What we want to achieve — objectives..................................................................................................63
4.3. How it could be achieved — options ......................................................................................................64
4.3.1. Requiring, facilitating or promoting ................................................................................................64
4.3.2. The options ......................................................................................................................................65
4.4. Methodology and data ............................................................................................................................69
4.4.1. Methodology applied.......................................................................................................................69
4.4.2. Data collection .................................................................................................................................70
4.5. What are the impacts ..............................................................................................................................70
4.5.1. Safety impact ...................................................................................................................................70
4.5.2. Environmental impact .....................................................................................................................75
4.5.3. Social impact ....................................................................................................................................76
4.5.4. Economic impact..............................................................................................................................78
4.5.5. General aviation and proportionality issues....................................................................................87
4.5.6. Impact on better regulation and harmonisation .............................................................................89
4.6. Conclusion ...............................................................................................................................................93
4.6.1. Comparison of options ....................................................................................................................93
4.7. Monitoring and evaluation......................................................................................................................99
4.7.1. Monitoring implementation ............................................................................................................99
4.7.2. Evaluating the effectiveness of options (after implementation) ....................................................99
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Table of contents
5. Proposed actions to support implementation.................................................................................... 101
6. References ....................................................................................................................................... 102
6.1. Affected regulation ...............................................................................................................................102
6.2. Affected decisions .................................................................................................................................102
6.3. Other reference documents ..................................................................................................................102
7. Appendices ...................................................................................................................................... 103
7.1. Appendix A: Comparison of European Air Operations rules and provisions of ICAO Annex 6 .............103
7.2. Appendix B: Statistics of accidents and serious incidents.....................................................................113
7.3. Appendix C: Safety recommendations related to in-flight recording for light aircraft .........................116
7.4. Appendix D: Promoting the benefits of in-flight recording for light aircraft ........................................126
7.4.1. Potential benefits of in-flight recording for stakeholders .............................................................126
7.4.2. The privacy issue ............................................................................................................................130
7.5. Appendix E: Systematic studies of investigation reports ......................................................................133
7.5.1. General principles applied for conducting the studies ..................................................................133
7.5.2. Study 1 ...........................................................................................................................................134
7.5.3. Study 2 ...........................................................................................................................................138
7.5.4. Study 3 ...........................................................................................................................................142
7.5.5. Study 4 ...........................................................................................................................................144
7.6. Appendix F: Alternatives to dedicated in-flight recording equipment .................................................147
7.6.1. Identified alternative solutions......................................................................................................147
7.6.2. Assessment of the alternative solutions........................................................................................148
7.6.3. Recommendations for alternative solutions .................................................................................149
7.7. Appendix G: Results of the survey on cost and benefits of dedicated in-flight recording....................162
7.8. Appendix H: General principles of the safety risk assessment .............................................................171
7.8.1. Common methodology used for the safety risk assessment ........................................................171
7.9. Appendix I: Requirements related to indications of instruments on board aeroplanes and helicopters
175
7.9.1. Aeroplanes .....................................................................................................................................175
7.9.2. Helicopters .....................................................................................................................................177
7.10. Appendix J: Examples of in-flight recording systems ............................................................................178
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1. About this NPA
1. About this NPA
1.1. How this NPA was developed
EASA developed this NPA in line with Regulation (EC) No 216/20081 (the ‘Basic Regulation’) and the
Rulemaking Procedure2. This rulemaking activity is included in the EASA Rulemaking and Safety
Promotion Programme for 2017-20213 under RMT.0271 (former task number MDM.073(a) & (b)). The
text of this NPA has been developed by EASA based on the input of the Rulemaking Group RMT.0271 &
RMT.0272. It is hereby submitted to all interested parties4 for consultation.
1.2. How to comment on this NPA
Please submit your comments using the automated Comment-Response Tool (CRT) available at
http://hub.easa.europa.eu/crt/5.
The deadline for submission of comments is 3 July 2017.
1.3. The next steps
Following the closing of the public commenting period, EASA will review all comments and decide on
the need to set up a review group to assist EASA in providing answers to the comments.
Based on the comments received, EASA will develop an opinion containing the proposed amendments
to Regulation (EU) No 965/20126 on Air Operations. The opinion will be submitted to the European
Commission, which will use it as a technical basis in order to prepare an EU regulation.
Following the adoption of the regulation, EASA will issue a decision containing the related acceptable
means of compliance (AMC)/guidance material (GM).
The comments received, and the EASA responses thereto, will be reflected in a comment-response
document (CRD). The CRD will be annexed to the opinion.
1
Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules
in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC,
Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1467719701894&uri=CELEX:32008R0216).
2
EASA is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 52(1) of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008. Such a
process has been adopted by the EASA Management Board (MB) and is referred to as the ‘Rulemaking Procedure’. See MB Decision
No 18-2015 of 15 December 2015 replacing Decision 01/2012 concerning the procedure to be applied by EASA for the issuing of
opinions, certification specifications and guidance material (http://www.easa.europa.eu/the-agency/management-
board/decisions/easa-mb-decision-18-2015-rulemaking-procedure).
3
https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/rulemaking-programmes/rulemaking-and-safety-promotion-programme-2017-2021
4
In accordance with Article 52 of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008, and Articles 6(3) and 7) of the Rulemaking Procedure.
5
In case of technical problems, please contact the CRT webmaster (
[email protected]).
6
Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures
related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296,
25.10.2012, p. 1) (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R0965&rid=1).
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2. In summary — why and what
2. In summary — why and what
2.1. Why we need to change the rules — issue/rationale
Since 2010, accidents and serious incidents that occur over the territory of an EASA Member State (MS)
must be subject to safety investigation. However, almost all categories of light aircraft fall outside the
scope of current requirements to carry flight recorders. In the absence of data on the aircraft condition
and operation, it can be very difficult to reconstruct the sequence of events that led to an accident or a
serious incident; knowing the sequence of events though is essential for defining actions in order to
prevent future occurrences.
This is why recent Standards in ICAO Annex 6 prescribe, for some categories of light aeroplanes and
helicopters operated for commercial air transport (CAT), the carriage of in-flight recording equipment.
In addition, 12 safety recommendations related to in-flight recording for light aeroplanes and
helicopters were addressed to EASA by several safety investigation authorities.
Finally, CAT statistics indicate a significantly higher rate of accidents with balloons compared to
aeroplanes and helicopters, which raises the question of the need for in-flight recording on-board
balloons with a large passenger capacity.
Several studies of safety investigation reports were performed in order to assess the expected benefit
of in-flight recording for preventing accidents through facilitation of safety investigations. The
conclusion of these studies is that in-flight recording brings moderate benefit, so that requirements
applying to all kinds of light aircraft would not be proportionate. Hence, rulemaking should be focused
on those light aircraft used for commercial operations and capable of transporting several passengers.
Besides rulemaking, the potential safety benefit of facilitating and promoting voluntary installation of
in-flight recording equipment was also identified.
Note: See Chapter 4, Section 4.1, for detailed explanations.
2.2. What we want to achieve — objectives
The overall objectives of the EASA system are defined in Article 2 of the Basic Regulation. This proposal
will contribute to the achievement of the overall objectives by addressing the issues outlined in
Section 2.1 above and in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.
The specific objectives of this proposal are to:
— enhance the identification and prevention of safety issues affecting light aircraft by means of
data recorded in flight;
— achieve harmonisation with ICAO Standards in Annex 6, Parts I, II and III;
— produce a proportionate regulation which takes into account the General Aviation Roadmap;
and
— identify avenues other than requirements for in-flight recording equipment.
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2. In summary — why and what
2.3. How we want to achieve it — overview of the proposals
2.3.1. Changes to the Air Operations requirements
Note: The proposed changes to the implementing rules, AMC and GM are presented in detail in
Chapter 3.
2.3.1.1. New concepts and definitions
The concept of ‘flight recorder’ is extended to in-flight recording equipment for light aircraft, which
requires limited crash protection. This makes the introduction of definitions for ‘flight recorder’, ‘flight
data recorder’ (FDR) and ‘cockpit voice recorder’ (CVR) necessary in Annex I to the Air Operations
Regulation.
The new concept of flight recorders now encompasses ‘crash-protected’ flight recorders and
‘lightweight’ flight recorders. A crash-protected flight recorder is capable of withstanding very severe
crash conditions such as those encountered during some accidents of large aeroplanes and large
helicopters (FDRs and CVRs are crash-protected flight recorders). A lightweight flight recorder is
designed to meet less demanding crash-protection requirements, and therefore it can be lighter.
2.3.1.2. New recording requirements for commercial operations with light aeroplanes and light helicopters
New rules are created in Annex IV (Part-CAT) and in Annex VIII (Part-SPO) to Regulation (EU)
No 965/2012. These rules require that aeroplanes and helicopters which:
— are commercially operated;
— are manufactured on or after [date of application of the amending regulation + 3 years];
— are not specified by the current Part-CAT and Part-SPO requirements on carrying flight data
recorders; and
— have an MOPSC of more than 9 (for aeroplanes) or are turbine-engined with an MCTOM of
2 250 kg or more (for aeroplanes and helicopters),
be equipped with a flight recorder which records flight data and/or images that are sufficient to
determine the flight path and the aircraft speed (ground speed or indicated airspeed). The flight
recorder shall have a minimum recording duration of 10 hours and an automatic start-and-stop logic.
AMC are created in order to provide the operational performance objectives for the new flight
recorder carriage requirements. The AMC specify the flight parameters to be recorded and the
operational performance target for these flight parameters. The AMC also specify the information to
be captured if recording images is preferred to recording flight parameters. Furthermore, the AMC also
recommend that the operational performance of the flight recorder meet the specifications laid down
in industry standards (EUROCAE Document 155 or EUROCAE 112 or equivalent standards recognised by
EASA).
2.3.1.3. Continued serviceability of the flight recorder
Paragraph (b) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 and related AMC and GM are amended in order to address the
serviceability aspects when a flight recorder is installed on a light aeroplane or a light helicopter. In
summary, three kinds of checks are expected to be performed on flight recorders:
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2. In summary — why and what
— inspection of the recording to check the quality and completeness of the recorded data (already
applicable to crash-protected flight recorders and required for lightweight flight recorders);
— daily use of the means for preflight check of the flight recorders for proper operation (already
applicable to crash-protected flight recorders and required for lightweight flight recorders);
— calibration check of some flight parameters (only applicable to FDRs).
Paragraphs (c) and (d) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 are amended to take into account the new flight recorder
carriage requirements.
The same amendments are made to SPO.GEN.145 and to related AMC.
2.3.1.4. Protection of image recordings
Paragraph (f) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 is amended in order to address the protection of image recordings:
— reference is added to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on General Data Protection7;
— images of the flight crew compartment recorded by a flight recorder may only be used for the
following purposes:
as stipulated in Regulation (EU) No 996/2010;
to maintain or improve safety (in which case a procedure related to the handling of
images and the consent of all crew members is required); or
to ensure flight recorder serviceability (in which case protecting the privacy of images is
required and no other use is allowed except serviceability).
AMC are created to address the use of flight crew compartment images recorded by a flight recorder.
These AMC follow the same principles as the already adopted AMC, which address the use of CVR
recordings.
2.3.2. Promotion of in-flight recording
The retained options include promoting the benefit of in-flight recording, in particular:
— the recording of flight parameters, images and audio in the flight crew compartment for
aeroplanes and helicopters; and
— the recording of trajectory parameters, as well as images of the basket interior for balloons.
While it is not within the scope of this NPA to produce material for such promotion activities,
Appendix D presents the potential benefits which could be promoted to industry and identifies factors
that may limit the effectiveness of any future promotion activity.
7
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data
Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1)
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&qid=1487864197230&from=EN).
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2. In summary — why and what
2.4. What are the expected benefits and drawbacks of the proposals
2.4.1. Summary of the impact assessment (refer to Chapter 4)
With regard to aeroplanes and helicopters, the following options were considered:
— Option A.1: Promote the recording of basic flight parameters, audio and/or a view of the
instruments panel for all models of light aeroplanes and light helicopters and for all types of
operation (no change to the rules).
— Option A.2: Strictly transpose ICAO Standards in Annex 6 for newly manufactured light turbine-
engined aeroplanes and newly manufactured light turbine-engined helicopters operated for CAT.
— Option A.3: Transpose ICAO Standards in Annex 6 with some differences:
include aeroplanes which have an MOPSC of more than 9;
include commercial specialised operations (SPO) in addition to CAT; and
do not require the recording of audio.
— Option A.4: Implement Options A.1 and A.3 together.
With regard to balloons, the following options were considered:
— Option B.1: Promote fitting balloons with means to record trajectory parameters and images
from the basket interior (no change to the rules).
— Option B.2: Require newly manufactured balloons used in commercial operations and with an
MCTOM of 3 000 kg or more to be fitted with equipment recording the balloon’s trajectory
parameters and images from the basket interior.
— Option B.3: Implement Options B.1 and B.2 together.
Considering proportionality and cost, it was not found appropriate to develop options for sailplanes.
Regarding aeroplanes and helicopters, Option A.4 is the preferred one because it combines safety
promotion (Option A.1) and rulemaking (Option A.3). Option A.4 has a significant positive safety impact
while limiting the economic impact and impact on general aviation, and it is proportionate.
Regarding balloons, the rulemaking options (Option B.2 and B.3) have a negative impact on general
aviation and proportionality issues, which outweighs the safety benefit. Hence, despite its just slightly
positive safety impact, Option B.1 (safety promotion) is the preferred one.
Note: Significant increases, compared to current levels, in the MCTOM and/or passenger capacity of
balloons that are commercially operated have the potential to cause a number of fatalities in the
aircraft and on the ground comparable to that of large aircraft. Therefore, the trade-off between safety
benefit and impact on economic and proportionality issues would need to be assessed again.
2.4.2. Proposal retained for aeroplanes and helicopters
The proposal combines:
— a requirement to record a small set of flight parameters for certain categories of aeroplanes and
helicopters; and
— promotion of in-flight recording for all other light aeroplanes and helicopters.
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2. In summary — why and what
This proposal is expected to have a medium positive to very positive impact on safety (by supporting
official safety investigations and operational safety monitoring), a slightly positive impact on rules
harmonisation (better alignment with ICAO Annex 6), limited social impact (if a framework is adopted
for the protection of images of the flight crew compartment), moderate economic impact
(requirement limited to CAT and commercial SPO and to newly manufactured aircraft), and no impact
on proportionality issues (requirement limited to turbine-engined aircraft with an MCTOM of 2 250 kg
or more and aeroplanes with an MOPSC of more than 9).
2.4.3. Proposal retained for balloons
The proposal is to promote fitting balloons with means to record trajectory parameters and images
from the basket interior (no change to the rules). No rule change is proposed for balloons.
This proposal is expected to have a slightly positive safety impact and no other type of impact.
Note: For the full impact assessment, please refer to Chapter 4.
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3. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail
3. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail
The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text, new or amended text as shown below:
— deleted text is struck through;
— new or amended text is highlighted in grey;
— an ellipsis ‘[…]’ indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged.
3.1. Draft Regulation (Draft EASA opinion)
3.1.1. Draft resulting text
3.1.1.1. Annex I (Definitions)
ANNEX I
Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII
(23) ‘cockpit voice recorder (CVR)’ means a crash-protected flight recorder using a combination of
microphones and other audio and digital inputs to collect and record the aural environment of the flight crew
compartment and communications to, from and between the flight crew members;
(50) ‘Flight data recorder (FDR)’ means a crash-protected flight recorder using a combination of data providers
to collect and record parameters that reflect the state and performance of the aircraft;
(50a) ‘flight recorder’ means any type of recorder installed on the aircraft for the purpose of facilitating
accident/incident safety investigations.
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3. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail
3.1.1.2. Annex IV (Part-CAT)
ANNEX IV
COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS
[PART-CAT]
SUBPART A
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
SECTION 1
Motor-powered aircraft
CAT.GEN.MPA.195 Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use
[...]
(b) The operator shall conduct operational checks and evaluations of the flight recorders flight data
recorder (FDR) recordings, cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recordings and data link recordings to ensure
the their continued serviceability of the recorders.
(c) The operator shall save the recordings for the period of operating time of the FDR as required by
CAT.IDE.A.190 or, CAT.IDE.A.191, CAT.IDE.H.190 or CAT.IDE.H.191 (as applicable), except that, for the
purpose of testing and maintaining the FDR, up to one hour of the oldest recorded material at the time
of testing may be erased.
(d) When flight parameters are recorded by a flight recorder, Tthe operator shall keep and maintain up-to-
date documentation that presents the necessary information to convert FDR raw data into parameters
expressed in engineering units.
[...]
(f) Without prejudice to Regulations (EU) No 996/20108 and (EU) 2016/6799 of the European Parliament
and of the Council:
[...]
8
Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and
prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC (OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, p. 35).
9
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data
Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).
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3. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail
(2) FDR recordings or data link recordings Flight parameters or data-link messages recorded by a
flight recorder shall only be used for purposes other than for the investigation of an accident or an
incident which is subject to mandatory reporting, if such records are:
(i) used by the operator for airworthiness or maintenance purposes only; or
(ii) de-identified; or
(iii) disclosed under secure procedures.
(3) Images of the flight crew compartment recorded by a flight recorder shall not be disclosed or
used except for ensuring the flight recorder serviceability, or if:
(i) a procedure related to the handling of images is in place;
(ii) all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned have given their prior consent;
and
(iii) these images are used only for maintaining or improving safety.
(3a) When images of the flight crew compartment recorded by a flight recorder are inspected for
ensuring the serviceability of the flight recorder, then:
(i) these images shall not be disclosed or used for purposes other than for ensuring the flight
recorder serviceability; and
(ii) if body parts of crew members are likely to be visible on the images, the operator shall
ensure the privacy of these images.
SUBPART D
INSTRUMENTS, DATA, EQUIPMENT
SECTION 1
Aeroplanes
CAT.IDE.A.191 Recording of flight parameters on light aeroplanes
(a) Turbine-engined aeroplanes with an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more and aeroplanes with an MOPSC of more
than 9 shall be equipped with a flight recorder if:
(1) they are not specified in CAT.IDE.A.190, and
(2) they are first issued with an individual CofA on or after [date of application of the amending
regulation + 3 years].
(b) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall record flight data and/or images sufficient to determine the
flight path and aircraft speed.
(c) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall be capable of retaining the flight data or images during at least
the preceding 10 hours.
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3. Proposed amendments and rationale in detail
(d) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall start automatically to record the data prior to the aeroplane
being capable of moving under its own power and shall stop automatically after the aeroplane is
incapable of moving under its own power.
(e) If the flight recorder referred to in (a) records images of the flight crew compartment, then an erasure
function shall be provided which can be operated by the commander and which modifies the recording
of these images made before the operation of this function, so that they cannot be retrieved using
normal replay or copying techniques.
SECTION 2
Helicopters
CAT.IDE.H.191 Recording of flight parameters on light helicopters
(a) Turbine-engined helicopters with an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more shall be equipped with a flight
recorder if:
(1) they are not specified in CAT.IDE.H.190; and
(2) they are first issued with an individual CofA on or after [date of publication of the Regulation +
3 years].
(b) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall record flight data and/or images sufficient to determine the
flight path and aircraft speed.
(c) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall be capable of retaining the flight data or images during at least
the preceding 10 hours.
(d) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall start automatically to record the data prior to the helicopter
being capable of moving under its own power and shall stop automatically after the helicopter is
incapable of moving under its own power.
(e) If the flight recorder referred to in (a) records images of the flight crew compartment, then an erasure
function shall be provided which can be operated by the commander and which modifies the recording
of these images made before the operation of this function, so that they cannot be retrieved using
normal replay or copying techniques.
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3.1.1.3. Annex VIII (Part-SPO)
ANNEX VIII
SPECIALISED OPERATIONS
[Part-SPO]
SUBPART A
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
SPO.GEN.145 Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use —
operations with complex motor-powered aircraft
[...]
(b) The operator shall conduct operational checks and evaluations of the flight recorders flight data
recorder (FDR) recordings, cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recordings and data link recordings to ensure
the their continued serviceability of the recorders.
(c) The operator shall save the recordings for the period of operating time of the FDR as required by
SPO.IDE.A.145 or, SPO.IDE.A.146, SPO.IDE.H.145 or SPO.IDE.H.146 (as applicable), except that, for the
purpose of testing and maintaining the FDR, up to 1 hour of the oldest recorded material at the time of
testing may be erased.
(d) When flight parameters are recorded by a flight recorder,Tthe operator shall keep and maintain up-to-
date documentation that presents the necessary information to convert FDR raw data into parameters
expressed in engineering units.
[...]
(f) Without prejudice to Regulations (EU) No 996/2010 and (EU) 2016/679, and except for ensuring the CVR
serviceability,
(1) CVR recordings shall not be disclosed or used unless:
[...]
(g2) FDR recordings or data link recordingsFlight parameters or data-link messages recorded by a flight
recorder shall only be used for purposes other than for the investigation of an accident or an
incident that is subject to mandatory reporting if such records are:
(1i) used by the operator for airworthiness or maintenance purposes only;
(2ii) de-identified; or
(3iii) disclosed under secure procedures.
(3) Images of the flight crew compartment recorded by a flight recorder shall not be disclosed or
used except for ensuring the flight recorder serviceability, or if:
(i) a procedure related to the handling of images is in place;
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(ii) all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned have given their prior consent;
and
(iii) these images are used only for maintaining or improving safety.
(3a) When images of the flight crew compartment recorded by a flight recorder are inspected for
ensuring the serviceability of the flight recorder, then:
(i) these images shall not be disclosed or used for purposes other than ensuring the flight
recorder serviceability; and
(ii) if body parts of crew members are likely to be visible on the images, the operator shall
ensure the privacy of these images.
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SUBPART D
INSTRUMENTS, DATA, EQUIPMENT
SECTION 1
Aeroplanes
SPO.IDE.A.146 Recording of flight parameters on light aeroplanes
(a) Turbine-engined aeroplanes with an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more and aeroplanes with an MOPSC of
more than 9 shall be equipped with a flight recorder if:
(1) they are not specified in SPO.IDE.A.145;
(2) they are commercially operated; and
(2) they are first issued with an individual CofA on or after [date of publication of the Regulation +
3 years].
(b) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall record flight data and/or images sufficient to determine the
flight path and aircraft speed.
(c) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall be capable of retaining the flight data or images during at least
the preceding 10 hours.
(d) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall start automatically to record the data prior to the aeroplane
being capable of moving under its own power and shall stop automatically after the aeroplane is
incapable of moving under its own power.
(e) If the flight recorder referred to in (a) records images of the flight crew compartment, then an erasure
function shall be provided which can be operated by the pilot-in-command and which modifies the
recordings of images in the flight recorder made before the operation of this function, so that they
cannot be retrieved using normal replay or copying techniques.
SECTION 2
Helicopters
SPO.IDE.H.146 Recording of flight parameters on light helicopters
(a) Turbine-engined helicopters with an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more shall be equipped with a flight
recorder if:
(1) they are not specified in SPO.IDE.H.145;
(2) they are commercially operated; and
(3) they are first issued with an individual CofA on or after [date of publication of the Regulation +
3 years].
(b) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall record flight data and/or images sufficient to determine the
flight path and aircraft speed.
(c) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall be capable of retaining the flight data or images during at least
the preceding 10 hours.
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(d) The flight recorder referred to in (a) shall start automatically to record the data prior to the helicopter
being capable of moving under its own power and shall stop automatically after the helicopter is
incapable of moving under its own power.
(e) If the flight recorder referred to in (a) records images of the flight crew compartment, then an erasure
function shall be provided which can be operated by the pilot-in-command and which modifies the
recordings of images made before the operation of this function, so that they cannot be retrieved using
normal replay or copying techniques.
3.1.2. Rationale
3.1.2.1. Annex I (Definitions)
While there was no definition of the term ‘flight recorder’, it was used in the Air Operations rules to
designate crash-protected flight recorders required to be carried on-board large aircraft, such as the
flight data recorder or the cockpit voice recorder. Crash-protected flight recorders are capable of
withstanding very severe crash conditions and they can record a wealth of data from multiple sensors
and sources. However, in the recent amendments to ICAO Annex 6, the term ‘flight recorder’
encompasses lightweight equipment as well, which meets less demanding crash-protection
requirements and records only a smaller set of data.
Hence, a definition of ‘flight recorder’ is introduced for clarification in Annex I to Regulation (EU)
No 965/2012. This definition complies with the concept used in ICAO Annex 6. It is also consistent with
the definition of a flight recorder in Regulation (EU) No 996/201010. As a consequence, the provisions
applicable to the preservation of the recordings after an accident or a serious incident become de facto
applicable to the recordings of lightweight flight recorders as well (please refer to
AMC2 ORO.MLR.100(q), AMC3 ORO.MLR.100(g), AMC4 ORO.MLR.100(a)(A)(11),
CAT.GEN.MPA.105(a)(10), CAT.GEN.MPA.195(a), SPO.GEN.107(a)(9), and SPO.GEN.145(a)).
In addition, definitions of ‘flight data recorder’ and ‘cockpit voice recorder’ are introduced in order to
provide a clear understanding of these types of flight recorders and avoid confusion with lightweight
flight recorders.
3.1.2.2. Annex IV (Part-CAT) and Annex VIII (Part-SPO)
3.1.2.2.1 New recording requirements for commercial operations with light aeroplanes and light
helicopters
A new rule CAT.IDE.A.191 is created in Annex IV (Part-CAT) to Commission Regulation (EU)
No 965/2012, Subpart D (Instruments, data, equipment), Section 1 (Aeroplanes), which is entitled
‘Flight parameters recording on light aeroplanes’.
— In this new rule, it is required that aeroplanes which:
are manufactured on or after [date of application of the amending regulation +
3 years];
10
Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the investigation and
prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC (OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, p. 35).
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are of a model not specified in CAT.IDE.A.190 (which covers aeroplanes with an
MCTOM of over 5 700 kg and multi-engined turbine-powered aeroplanes with an
MOPSC of more than 9); and
have an MOPSC of more than 9 or are turbine-engined with an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or
more,
shall be equipped with a flight recorder. This flight recorder may be crash-protected or lightweight
(while CAT.IDE.A.190 requires the carriage of a flight data recorder which per definition is crash-
protected).
— It is also required that the flight recorder record flight data or images sufficient to determine
the flight path and aircraft speed. Indeed, the lightweight flight recorder models available on
the market record, as a minimum, images of the aircraft instruments, or
3D-position and acceleration data provided by dedicated GNSS receiver and accelerometric
sensors: in both cases, the recorded information is sufficient to determine the flight path and
aircraft speed.
— A minimum recording duration of 10 hours is required in order to ensure that the flight
recorder is capable of recording a complete flight on the aeroplane models that are within the
scope of CAT.IDE.A.191.
— In order to prevent the use of unreliable technologies and facilitate the processing of recorded
data in case of an accident investigation, the flight recorder is required to use a digital method
of recording and storing the data, such as the one used in all modern models of lightweight
flight recorders. This requirement forbids, for example, the use of photographic film to record
images.
— The flight recorder is required to have an automatic start-and-stop logic in order to ensure
recording as soon as the aeroplane is capable of moving under its own power. In practice, it is
sufficient for the flight recorder to be capable of detecting when the aircraft engine delivers
power.
— If the flight recorder records images of the flight crew compartment, then:
an erasure function shall be provided, which can be operated by the commander, in
order to modify the recordings of images in the flight recorder so that they cannot be
retrieved using normal replay or copying techniques. This is to allow the flight crew to
protect their privacy by making the recording of images inaccessible using normal
techniques after an uneventful flight. The decision to activate this function is to be
made by the commander because they are responsible for the preservation of flight
recorder recordings (refer to CAT.GEN.MPA.105). However, this function does not
erase recorded data which can still be retrieved using special techniques available to
the equipment manufacturer and/or safety investigation authorities. This is consistent
with the specifications of ED-155 for the recording of images (refer to ED-155, Part III
Airborne Image Recording Systems, paragraph III-2.1.11) and also identified as
necessary by the Flight Recorder Specific Working Group (FLIRECSWG) of ICAO.
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A new rule CAT.IDE.H.191 is created in Part-CAT, Subpart D, Section 2 (Helicopters), which is entitled
‘Flight parameters recording on light helicopters’.
— In this rule, it is required that helicopters which:
are manufactured on or after [date of application of the amending regulation +
3 years];
are of a model not specified in CAT.IDE.H.190 (which covers helicopters with an
MCTOM of over 3 175 kg); and
are turbine-engined with an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more,
shall be equipped with a flight recorder. This flight recorder may be crash-protected or
lightweight.
— This rule also requires that the flight recorder record flight data or images sufficient to
determine the flight path and aircraft speed.
— A minimum recording duration of 10 hours is required in order to ensure that the flight
recorder is capable of recording a complete flight on most light helicopter models that are
within the scope of CAT.IDE.A.191.
— Similar to CAT.IDE.A.191, the flight recorder is required to use a digital method of recording
and storing the data.
— Similar to CAT.IDE.A.191, the flight recorder is required to have an automatic start-and-stop
logic.
— Similar to CAT.IDE.A.191, if the flight recorder records images, then an erasure function shall
be provided.
A new rule SPO.IDE.A.146 is created in Annex VIII (Part-SPO) to Commission Regulation (EU)
No 965/2012), Subpart D (Instruments, data, equipment), Section 1 (Aeroplanes), which is entitled
‘Flight parameters recording on light aeroplanes’.
— In this rule, it is required that aeroplanes which:
are manufactured on or after [date of application of the amending regulation +
3 years];
are used for commercial SPO operations;
are of a model not specified in SPO.IDE.A.145 (which covers aeroplanes with an
MCTOM of more than 5 700 kg); and
have an MOPSC of more than 9 or are turbine-engined with an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or
more,
shall be equipped with a flight recorder. This flight recorder may be crash-protected or
lightweight.
— This rule also requires that the flight recorder record flight data or images sufficient to
determine to flight path and aircraft speed.
— Similar to CAT.IDE.A.191, a minimum recording duration of 10 hours is required.
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— Similar to CAT.IDE.A.191, the flight recorder is required to use a digital method of recording
and storing the data, and to have an automatic start-and-stop logic.
— Similar to CAT.IDE.A.191, if the flight recorder records images, then an erasure function shall
be provided.
A new rule SPO.IDE.H.146 is created in Part-SPO, Subpart D, Section 2 (Helicopters), which is entitled
‘Flight parameters recording on light helicopters.
— In this point, it is required that helicopters which:
are manufactured on or after [date of application of the amending regulation +
3 years];
are used for commercial SPO operations;
are of a model not specified in SPO.IDE.H.145 (which covers helicopters with an
MCTOM of over 3 175 kg); and
are turbine-engined with an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more,
shall be equipped with a flight recorder. This flight recorder may be crash-protected or
lightweight.
— This rule also requires that the flight recorder record flight data or images sufficient to
determine to flight path and aircraft speed.
— Similar to CAT.IDE.H.191, a minimum recording duration of 10 hours is required.
— Similar to CAT.IDE.H.191, the flight recorder is required to use a digital method of recording
and storing the data, and to have an automatic start-and-stop logic.
— Similar to CAT.IDE.A.191, if the flight recorder records images, then an erasure function shall
be provided.
3.1.2.2.2 Continued serviceability of the flight recorder
Paragraph (b) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 is amended to cover the requirements of the new CAT.IDE.A.191 or
CAT.IDE.H.191.
Indeed, experience with crash-protected flight recorders installed on large aircraft has shown that
without rules the continued serviceability of the flight recorders is not consistently addressed. Flight
recorders are considered ‘maintenance-significant items’ in accordance with the MSG-3 methodology;
however, the instructions for continued serviceability vary — in particular, they do not always include
checking of the quality of the recorded data (i.e. that the values of flight parameters are reasonable
and consistent with each other, and that images are of sufficient quality to be able to read instrument
indications). In addition, since a flight recorder failure has no effect on the safe conduct of the flight,
repairing it is not considered priority if it is not required by law.
Paragraph (c) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 is amended to cover the requirements of the new CAT.IDE.A.191
and CAT.IDE.H.191.
Paragraph (d) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 is amended to include lightweight flight recorders in the
requirement to maintain the flight parameters decoding documentation up to date. Up-to-date
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decoding documentation is essential for investigation purposes and for checking the quality of the
recorded flight parameters.
The wording of SPO.GEN.145 is amended in a similar manner to CAT.GEN.MPA.195.
3.1.2.2.3 Protection of image recordings
Since compliance with CAT.IDE.A.191 and CAT.IDE.H.191 may be achieved by recording images of the
flight crew compartment, and since the crew members may appear entirely or partly on these images,
paragraph (f) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 has been amended in order to address the protection of such
image recordings.
The introduction of a rule to frame the handling of image recordings is necessary in accordance with
Standard 6.1 in Appendix 3 of ICAO Annex 19 (Second Edition, applicable on 7 November 2019): ‘States
shall, through national laws and regulations, provide specific measures of protection regarding the
confidentiality and access by the public to ambient workplace recordings.’
In addition, a Standard restricting the use of audio and airborne image recordings was adopted
recently11 for inclusion in Chapter 3 of ICAO Annex 6 Part I (Tenth Edition, Amendment 40-B, applicable
on 7 November 2019). The rules proposed in subparagraph (f)(3) and (f)(3a) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195
implement this ICAO Standard for airborne image recordings.
Hence the following principles are proposed:
— If images of the flight crew compartment contain parts of the bodies of crew members, they
could be considered personal data. In that case, European operators will have to comply with
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on General Data Protection when it becomes applicable (on
25 May 2018). Therefore, reference to this Regulation is added besides reference to Regulation
(EU) No 996/2010, in paragraph (f).
— Similar to the recordings of the cockpit voice recorder, images of the flight crew compartment
recorded by a flight recorder may not be used for purposes other than:
as stipulated in Regulation (EU) No 996/2010;
maintaining or improving safety; or
ensuring the flight recorder serviceability.
— Similar to the recordings of the cockpit voice recorder, when images of the flight crew
compartment recorded by a flight recorder are used for maintaining of improving safety, then:
a procedure for the handling of these images shall be in place; and
all crew members concerned shall have given their prior consent.
11
Text of this ICAO Standard:
‘3.3.4 States shall not allow the use of recordings or transcripts of CVR, CARS, Class A AIR and Class A AIRS for purposes other than
the investigation of an accident or incident as per Annex 13 except where the recordings or transcripts:
a) are related to a safety-related event identified in the context of a safety management system; are restricted to the relevant
portions of a de-identified transcript of the recording; and are subject to the protections accorded by Annex 19;
b) are sought for use in criminal proceedings not related to an event involving an accident or incident investigation and are subject
to the protections accorded by Annex 19; or
c) are used for inspections of flight recorder systems as provided in Section 7 of Appendix 8.’
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— Similar to the recordings of the cockpit voice recorder, when images of the flight crew
compartment recorded by a flight recorder are used for ensuring the serviceability of this flight
recorder,
the operator shall ensure the privacy of these images (except if there is no body part of
crew members visible on the images) and
these images shall not be disclosed or used for purposes other than ensuring the flight
recorder serviceability.
In that case, it is not practical to request each time the prior consent of the crew. However, if
such a recording is inspected for serviceability, it shall not be disclosed or used for other
purposes.
Note:
Subparagraphs (f)(3) and (f)(3a) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 only address images of the flight crew
compartment. Hence, images of other parts of the aircraft are not within the scope of these
subparagraphs. In addition, images captured ‘at the back’ of electronic flight instrument displays
(reproducing an exact copy of the information presented on the display) are also not within the
scope of these subparagraphs.
The new rules CAT.IDE.A.191 and CAT.IDE.H.191 require that if the flight recorder records images of
the flight crew compartment, an erasure function be provided. Indeed, the flight crew should be given
the technical possibility to erase the recording after an uneventful flight, as a measure to protect their
privacy. Modern flight recorders allow the retrieval of data even after activation of the erasure
function using special tools, which are usually reserved for the equipment manufacturer and/or safety
investigation authorities.
Paragraph (f) of SPO.GEN.145 is amended to address the protection of recorded images of the flight
crew compartment.
The new rules SPO.IDE.A.146 and SPO.IDE.H.146 require that if the flight recorder records images of
the flight crew compartment, an erasure function be provided (in a manner similar to CAT.IDE.A.191
and CAT.IDE.H.191).
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3.2. Draft Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) (Draft EASA
decision)
3.2.1. Draft resulting text
3.2.1.1. Draft AMC & GM to Definitions
GM16 Annex I Definitions
FLIGHT RECORDER
A flight recorder may be crash-protected or lightweight. Crash-protected flight recorders are capable of
withstanding very severe crash conditions such as those encountered during some accidents of large
aeroplanes and large helicopters. Lightweight flight recorders are usually designed to meet less
demanding crash-protection requirements, which allows them to be lighter.
3.2.1.2. Draft AMC & GM to Part-ORO (Annex III)
ANNEX III
ORGANISATION REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR OPERATIONS
[PART-ORO]
SUBPART AOC
AIR OPERATOR CERTIFICATION
AMC1 ORO.AOC.130 Flight data monitoring — aeroplanes
[...]
(l) Airborne systems and equipment used to obtain FDM data should range from an already installed full
quick access recorder (QAR), in a modern aircraft with digital systems, to a basic crash-protected flight
recorder in an older or less sophisticated aircraft.
[...]
AMC3 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — general
CONTENTS — CAT OPERATIONS
[...]
11 HANDLING, NOTIFYING AND REPORTING ACCIDENTS, INCIDENTS AND OCCURRENCES AND USING THE CVR
RECORDING
[...]
(g) Procedures for the preservation of recordings of the flight recorders following an accident or a serious
incident or when so directed by the investigating authority. These procedures should include:
(1) a full quotation of paragraph (a) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195(a); and
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(2) instructions and means to prevent inadvertent reactivation, repair or reinstallation of the flight
recorders by personnel of the operator or of third parties, and to ensure that flight recorder
recordings are preserved for the needs of the investigating authority.
3.2.1.3. Draft AMC & GM to Part-CAT (Annex IV)
ANNEX IV
COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS
[Part-CAT]
SUBPART A
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
SECTION 1
Motor-powered aircraft
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection
and use
INSPECTIONS AND CHECKS OF RECORDINGS
Whenever a flight recorder is required to be carried:
[...]
(b) when a flight recorder, other than an FDR, is carried on an aircraft in order to ensure compliance with
CAT.IDE.A.191 or CAT.IDE.H.191, the operator should perform an inspection of the recording of this
flight recorder at time intervals not exceeding 2 years.
(cb) [...]
(dc) when installed, the aural or visual means for preflight checking of the flight recorders for proper
operation should be used on each day whenevery day the aircraft is used. When no such means is
available for a flight recorder, the operator should perform an operational check of this flight recorder
at time intervals not exceeding 150 flight hoursseven calendar days of operation.
(ed) [...]
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and
use
INSPECTION OF THE FLIGHT RECORDERS’ RECORDINGS
[...]
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(d) The inspection of flight data recorded by a lightweight flight recorder usually consists of the following:
(1) making a copy of the complete recording file;
(2) converting the recording to parameters expressed in engineering units in accordance with the
documentation required to be held;
(3) examining a whole flight in engineering units to evaluate the validity of all mandatory parameters.
When applicable, each parameter should be expressed in engineering units and checked for
different values of its operational range for reasonableness — for this purpose, some parameters
may need to be inspected at different flight phases; and
(4) retaining the most recent copy of the complete recording file and the corresponding recording
inspection report that includes references to the documentation required to be held.
(e) The inspection of recorded images usually consists of the following:
(1) checking that the flight recorder operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording;
(2) examining, where practicable and in compliance with paragraph (f) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195, a
sample of images recorded in different flight phases for evidence that the images of each camera
are of a quality sufficient for reading the instruments’ indications; and
(3) preparing and retaining an inspection report.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(1) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection
and use
USE OF CVR RECORDINGS FOR MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING SAFETY
(a) The procedure related to the handling of cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recordings should be written in a
document which should be signed documented and signed by all parties (airline managementaircraft
operator, crew member representatives nominated either by the union or the crew themselves,
maintenance personnel representatives if applicable). This procedure should take into account
Regulation (EU) 2016/67912 and, as a minimum, define:
[...]
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection
and use
USE OF IMAGE RECORDINGS FOR MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING SAFETY
(a) The procedure laid down in point (f)(3)(i) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 should be documented and signed by all
parties involved (aircraft operator, crew member representatives nominated either by the union or the
crew themselves, maintenance personnel representatives if applicable). This procedure should take into
account Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and, as a minimum, define the following aspects:
12
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data
Protection Regulation) (OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1).
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(1) an access and security policy that restricts access to the image recordings to authorised persons
identified by their position;
(2) a retention policy and accountability, including the measures to ensure the security of the image
recordings and their protection from misuse;
(3) a description of the uses made of the image recordings;
(4) the participation of flight crew member representatives in the assessment of the image
recordings;
(5) the conditions under which advisory briefing or remedial training should take place; this should
always be carried out in a constructive and non-punitive manner; and
(6) the conditions under which actions other than advisory briefing or remedial training may be taken
for reasons of gross negligence or significant continuing safety concern.
(b) Each time a recording file containing images of the flight crew compartment is read out for purposes
other than ensuring the serviceability of the flight recorder, the operator should retain, and when
requested, provide the competent authority with:
(1) information on the use made (or the intended use) of the recording file; and
(2) evidence that the crew members concerned consented to the use made (or the intended use) of
the flight crew compartment images.
(c) The safety manager or the person identified by the operator to fulfil this role should be responsible for
the protection and use of the recordings of flight crew compartment images, as well as the assessment
of issues and their transmission to the manager(s) responsible for the process concerned.
(d) In case a third party is involved in the use of recordings of flight crew compartment images, contractual
agreements with this third party should, when applicable, cover the aspects enumerated in (a) and (b).
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3a) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection
and use
IMAGE RECORDING INSPECTION FOR ENSURING SERVICEABILITY
(a) When an inspection of recorded images of the flight crew compartment is performed for ensuring the
serviceability of the flight recorder and any body part of a crew member is likely to be visible on these
images:
(1) the privacy of the image recordings should be ensured (e.g. by locating the replay equipment in a
separated area);
(2) access to the replay equipment should be restricted to authorised persons;
(3) provisions should be made for the secure storage of the image recording medium, the image
recording files and copies thereof;
(4) the image recording files and copies thereof should be destroyed not earlier than 2 months and
not later than 1 year after completion of the image recording inspection; images that do not
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contain any body part of a person may be retained for enhancing the image recording inspection
(e.g. for comparing image quality); and
(5) only the accountable manager of the operator and, when identified to comply with ORO.GEN.200,
the safety manager should be entitled to request a copy of the image recording files.
(b) The conditions enumerated in (a) should also be complied with if the inspection of the image recording
is subcontracted to a third party. The contractual agreements with the third party should explicitly cover
these aspects.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and
use
FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT
If there are no compartments to physically segregate the flight crew from the passengers during the flight, the
‘flight crew compartment’ should be understood, in paragraph (f) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195, as the area including:
(a) the flight crew seats;
(b) aircraft and engine controls;
(c) aircraft instruments;
(d) windshield and windows used by the flight crew to get an external view while seated at their duty
station; and
(e) circuit breakers accessible by the flight crew while seated at their duty station.
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SUBPART D
INSTRUMENTS, DATA, EQUIPMENT
SECTION 1
Aeroplanes
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191 Recording of flight parameters on light aeroplanes
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
(a) The flight recorder may record images or flight data, or a combination thereof.
(b) If the flight recorder records flight data, it should record at least the following parameters:
(1) relative time count,
(2) pitch attitude or pitch rate,
(3) roll attitude or roll rate,
(4) heading (magnetic or true) or yaw rate,
(5) latitude,
(6) longitude,
(7) positioning system: estimated error (if available),
(8) pressure altitude or altitude from a positioning system,
(9) time,
(10) ground speed,
(11) positioning system: track (if available),
(12) normal acceleration,
(13) longitudinal acceleration, and
(14) lateral acceleration.
(c) If the flight recorder records images, it should capture views of the main instrument displays at the pilot
station, or at both pilot stations when the aeroplane is certified for operation with a minimum crew of
two pilots. The recorded image quality should allow reading the following indications during most of the
flight:
(1) magnetic heading,
(2) time,
(3) pressure altitude,
(4) indicated airspeed,
(5) vertical speed,
(6) turn and slip,
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(7) attitude,
(8) Mach number (if displayed), and
(9) stabilised heading.
(d) If the flight recorder records flight data and images, each flight parameter listed in (b) should be
recorded as flight data or by means of images.
(e) The flight parameters listed in (b), which are recorded as flight data, should meet the performance
specifications (range, sampling intervals, accuracy limits and resolution in read-out) as defined in the
relevant table of EUROCAE Document 112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash
Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, or EUROCAE Document ED-155 (Minimum
Operational Performance Specification for Lightweight Flight Recording Systems) dated July 2009, or any
later equivalent standard accepted by EASA.
(f) The operational performance requirements for the flight recorder should be those laid down in:
(1) EUROCAE Document ED-155 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for lightweight
flight recorders; or
(2) EUROCAE Document 112 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for crash-protected
flight recorders.
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.191 Recording of flight parameters on light aeroplanes
ADDITIONAL USEFUL INFORMATION
While only flight data or images sufficient to determine the flight path and aircraft speed are required to be
recorded, experience has shown that recording information related to the positions of flight controls and an
external view is very useful for analysing incidents or accidents.
SECTION 2
Helicopters
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191 Recording of flight parameters on light helicopters
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
(a) The flight recorder may record images or flight data, or a combination thereof.
(b) If the flight recorder records flight data, it should record at least the following parameters:
(1) relative time count,
(2) pitch attitude or pitch rate,
(3) roll attitude or roll rate,
(4) heading (magnetic or true) or yaw rate,
(5) latitude,
(6) longitude,
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(7) positioning system: estimated error (if available),
(8) pressure altitude or altitude from a positioning system,
(9) time,
(10) ground speed,
(11) positioning system: track (if available),
(12) normal acceleration,
(13) longitudinal acceleration, and
(14) lateral acceleration.
(c) If the flight recorder records images, it should capture views of the main instrument displays at the pilot
station, or at both pilot stations when the aeroplane is certified for operation with a minimum crew of
two pilots. The recorded image quality should allow reading the following indications during most of the
flight:
(1) magnetic or true heading,
(2) time (if presented on the front instrument panel),
(3) pressure altitude,
(4) indicated airspeed,
(5) vertical speed,
(6) slip,
(7) outside air temperature,
(8) attitude (if displayed), and
(9) stabilised heading (if displayed).
(d) If the flight recorder records flight data and images, each flight parameter listed in (b) should be
recorded as flight data or by means of images.
(e) The flight parameters listed in (b), which are recorded as flight data, should meet the performance
specifications (range, sampling intervals, accuracy limits and resolution in read-out) as defined in the
relevant table of EUROCAE Document 112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash
Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, or EUROCAE Document ED-155 (Minimum
Operational Performance Specification for Lightweight Flight Recording Systems) dated July 2009, or any
later equivalent standard accepted by EASA.
(f) The operational performance requirements for the flight recorder should be those laid down in:
(1) EUROCAE Document ED-155 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for lightweight
flight recorders; or
(2) EUROCAE Document 112 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for crash-protected
flight recorders.
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GM1 CAT.IDE.H.191 Recording of flight parameters on light helicopters
ADDITIONAL USEFUL INFORMATION
While only flight data or images sufficient to determine the flight path and aircraft speed are required to be
recorded, experience has shown that recording information related to the positions of flight controls and an
external view is very useful for analysing incidents and accidents.
3.2.1.4. Draft AMC & GM to Part-SPO (Annex VIII)
ANNEX VIII
SPECIALISED OPERATIONS
[PART-SPO]
AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(b) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use
INSPECTIONS AND CHECKS OF RECORDINGS
Whenever a flight recorder is required to be carried:
[...]
(b) When a flight recorder, other than an FDR, is carried on an aircraft in order to ensure compliance with
SPO.IDE.A.146 or SPO.IDE.H.146, the operator should perform an inspection of the recording of this
flight recorder at time intervals not exceeding 2 years.
(cb) [...]
(dc) When installed, the aural or visual means for preflight checking of the flight recorders for proper
operation should be used every day on each day the aircraft is used. When no such means is available
for a flight recorder, the operator should perform an operational check of this flight recorder at time
intervals not exceeding 150 flight hoursseven calendar days of operation.
(ed) [...]
GM1 SPO.GEN.145(b) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use
INSPECTION OF THE FLIGHT RECORDERS’ RECORDINGS
[...]
(d) The inspection of flight data recorded by a lightweight flight recorder usually consists of the following:
(1) making a copy of the complete recording file;
(2) converting the recording to parameters expressed in engineering units in accordance with the
documentation required to be held;
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(3) examining a whole flight in engineering units to evaluate the validity of all mandatory parameters;
when applicable, each parameter should be expressed in engineering units and checked for
different values of its operational range for reasonableness — for this purpose, some parameters
may need to be inspected at different flight phases; and
(4) retaining the most recent copy of the complete recording file and the corresponding recording
inspection report that includes references to the documentation required to be held.
(e) The inspection of recorded images usually consists of the following:
(1) checking that the flight recorder operates correctly for the nominal duration of the recording;
(2) examining, where practicable and in compliance with paragraph (f) of SPO.GEN.145, a sample of
images recorded in different flight phases for evidence that the images of each camera are of a
quality sufficient for reading the instruments’ indications; and
(3) preparing and retaining an inspection report.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection
and use
USE OF CVR RECORDINGS FOR MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING SAFETY
(a) The procedure related to the handling of cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recordings should be written in a
document which should be documented and signed by all parties (airlineaircraft operator, crew
members, maintenance personnel if applicable). This procedure should take into account Regulation
(EU) 2016/679 and, as a minimum, define: [...]
AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(f)(3) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and
use
USE OF IMAGE RECORDINGS FOR MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING SAFETY
(a) The procedure indicated in point (f)(3)(i) of SPO.GEN.145 should be documented and signed by all
parties (aircraft operator, crew members, maintenance personnel if applicable). This procedure should
take into account Regulation (EU) 2016/679 and, as a minimum, define the following aspects:
(1) an access and security policy that restricts access to the image recordings to authorised persons
identified by their position;
(2) a retention policy and accountability, including the measures to ensure the security of the image
recordings and their protection from misuse;
(3) a description of the uses made of the image recordings.
(b) Each time a recording file containing images of the flight crew compartment is read out for purposes
other than to ensure the serviceability of the flight recorder, the operator should retain and, when
requested, provide the competent authority with:
(1) information on the use made (or the intended use) of the recording file; and
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(2) evidence that the flight crew members concerned consented to the use made (or the intended
use) of the flight crew compartment images.
(c) The safety manager or the person identified by the operator to fulfil this role should be responsible for
the protection and use of the recordings of flight crew compartment images, as well as the assessment
of issues and their transmission to the manager(s) responsible for the process concerned.
(d) In case a third party is involved in the use of recordings of flight crew compartment images, contractual
agreements with this third party should, when applicable, cover the aspects enumerated in (a) and (b).
AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(f)(3a) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and
use
IMAGE RECORDING INSPECTION FOR ENSURING SERVICEABILITY
(a) When an inspection of recorded images of the flight crew compartment is performed to ensure the
serviceability of the flight recorder and any body part of a crew member is likely to be visible on these
images:
(1) the privacy of the image recordings should be ensured (e.g. by locating the replay equipment in a
separated area);
(2) access to the replay equipment should be restricted to authorised persons;
(3) provisions should be established for the secure storage of the image recording medium, the
image recording files and copies thereof;
(4) the image recording files and copies thereof should be destroyed not earlier than 2 months and
not later than 1 year after completion of the image recording inspection. Images that do not
contain any body part of a person may be retained for enhancing the image recording inspection
(e.g. for comparing image quality); and
(5) only the accountable manager of the operator and, when identified to comply with ORO.GEN.200,
the safety manager should be entitled to request a copy of the image recording files.
(b) The conditions enumerated in (a) should also be complied with if the inspection of the image recording
is subcontracted to a third party. The contractual agreements with the third party should explicitly cover
these aspects.
GM1 SPO.GEN.145(f) Handling of flight recorder recordings: preservation, production, protection and use
FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT
If there are no compartments to physically segregate the flight crew from the passengers during the flight, the
‘flight crew compartment’ should be understood in paragraph (f) of SPO.GEN.145 as the area including:
(a) the flight crew seats;
(b) aircraft and engine controls;
(c) aircraft instruments;
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(d) windshield and windows used by the flight crew to get an external view while seated at their duty
station; and
(e) circuit breakers accessible by the flight crew while seated at their duty station.
SUBPART D
INSTRUMENTS, DATA, EQUIPMENT
SECTION 1
Aeroplanes
AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.146 Recording of flight parameters on light aeroplanes
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
(a) The flight recorder may record images or flight data, or a combination thereof.
(b) If the flight recorder records flight data, it should record at least the following parameters:
(1) relative time count,
(2) pitch attitude or pitch rate,
(3) roll attitude or roll rate,
(4) heading (magnetic or true) or yaw rate,
(5) latitude,
(6) longitude,
(7) positioning system: estimated error (if available),
(8) pressure altitude or altitude from a positioning system,
(9) time,
(10) ground speed,
(11) positioning system: track (if available),
(12) normal acceleration,
(13) longitudinal acceleration,
(14) lateral acceleration.
(c) If the flight recorder records images, it should capture views of the main instrument displays at the pilot
station, or at both pilot stations when the aeroplane is certified for operation with a minimum crew of
two pilots. The recorded image quality should allow reading the following indications during most of the
flight:
(1) magnetic heading,
(2) time,
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(3) pressure altitude,
(4) indicated airspeed,
(5) vertical speed,
(6) turn and slip,
(7) attitude,
(8) Mach number (if displayed), and
(9) stabilised heading.
(d) If the flight recorder records flight data and images, each flight parameter listed in (b) should be
recorded as flight data or by means of images.
(e) The flight parameters listed in (b), which are recorded as flight data, should meet the performance
specifications (range, sampling intervals, accuracy limits and resolution in read-out) as defined in the
relevant table of EUROCAE Document 112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash
Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, or EUROCAE Document ED-155 (Minimum
Operational Performance Specification for Lightweight Flight Recording Systems) dated July 2009, or any
later equivalent standard accepted by EASA.
(f) The operational performance requirements for the flight recorder should be those laid down in:
(1) EUROCAE Document ED-155 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for lightweight
flight recorders; or
(2) EUROCAE Document 112 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for crash-protected
flight recorders.
GM1 SPO.IDE.A.146 Recording of flight parameters on light aeroplanes
ADDITIONAL USEFUL INFORMATION
While only flight data or images sufficient to determine the flight path and aircraft speed are required to be
recorded, experience has shown that recording information related to the position of flight controls and an
external view is very useful for analysing incidents and accidents.
SECTION 2
Helicopters
AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.146 Recording of flight parameters on light helicopters
OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
(a) The flight recorder may record images or flight data, or a combination thereof.
(b) If the flight recorder records flight data, it should record at least the following parameters:
(1) relative time count,
(2) pitch attitude or pitch rate,
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(3) roll attitude or roll rate,
(4) heading (magnetic or true) or yaw rate,
(5) latitude,
(6) longitude,
(7) positioning system: estimated error (if available),
(8) pressure altitude or altitude from a positioning system,
(9) time,
(10) ground speed,
(11) positioning system: track (if available),
(12) normal acceleration,
(13) longitudinal acceleration, and
(14) lateral acceleration.
(c) If the flight recorder records images, it should capture views of the main instrument displays at the pilot
station, or at both pilot stations when the aeroplane is certified for operation with a minimum crew of
two pilots. The recorded image quality should allow reading the following indications during most of the
flight:
(1) magnetic or true heading,
(2) time (if presented on the front instrument panel),
(3) pressure altitude,
(4) indicated airspeed,
(5) vertical speed,
(6) slip,
(7) outside air temperature,
(8) attitude (if displayed),
(9) stabilised heading (if displayed).
(d) If the flight recorder records flight data and images, each flight parameter listed in (b) should be
recorded as flight data or by means of images.
(e) The flight parameters listed in (b), which are recorded as flight data, should meet the performance
specifications (range, sampling intervals, accuracy limits and resolution in read-out) as defined in the
relevant table of EUROCAE Document 112 (Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Crash
Protected Airborne Recorder Systems) dated March 2003, or EUROCAE Document ED-155 (Minimum
Operational Performance Specification for Lightweight Flight Recording Systems) dated July 2009, or any
later equivalent standard accepted by EASA.
(f) The operational performance requirements for the flight recorder should be those laid down in:
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(1) EUROCAE Document ED-155 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for lightweight
flight recorders; or
(2) EUROCAE Document 112 or any later equivalent standard accepted by EASA for crash-protected
flight recorders.
GM1 SPO.IDE.H.146 Recording of flight parameters on light helicopters
ADDITIONAL USEFUL INFORMATION
While only flight data or images sufficient to determine the flight path and aircraft speed are required to be
recorded, experience has shown that recording information related to the position of flight controls and an
external view is very useful for analysing incidents and accidents.
3.2.2. Rationale
3.2.2.1. AMC & GM to Definitions
A new GM indicates that a flight recorder can be ‘crash-protected’ or ‘lightweight’, and it defines these
terms.
3.2.2.2. AMC & GM to Annex III (Part-ORO)
Minor editorial corrections are made to AMC1 ORO.MLR.100 and AMC3 ORO.MLR.100.
3.2.2.3. AMC & GM to Annex IV (Part-CAT) and Annex VIII (Part-SPO)
3.2.2.3.1 AMC & GM to the new recording requirements
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191 is created to provide the operational performance requirements of the flight
recorder required in CAT.IDE.A.191.
— In the case where the flight recorder records flight data, AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191(b) specifies what
flight parameters should be recorded in order to ensure that sufficient information is recorded
to determine the aircraft flight path and speed. The listed flight parameters are already required
to be recorded by the FDR, but they can also be obtained by means of dedicated sensors
(accelerometric sensors and GNSS receiver), in the case where there is no flight data acquisition
unit or if a stand-alone recorder is preferred.
— In the case where the flight recorder records images, AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191(c) specifies that views
of the main instrument displays at the pilot station(s) should be captured, and that the recorded
images should allow reading the instruments’ indications. In addition, a list of indications to be
captured is provided. These indications correspond to instruments required on-board all
aeroplanes in accordance with CAT.IDE.A.125 (operations under VFR by day) and CAT.IDE.A.130
(operations under IFR or at night), hence they can be captured by images (refer to Appendix I for
more information). When the indication may not be required under some types of operation,
then the indication should be recorded ‘if displayed’.
— AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191(a) allows combining the recording of images and flight data, at the
operator’s convenience. However, the flight parameters recommended in
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AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191(b) do not contain the same information as the indications recommended
to be recorded by means of images in AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191(c). To resolve this discrepancy and
ensure that a minimum data subset is recorded whatever the elected solution is,
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191(d) recommends that when both flight data and images are recorded, each
flight parameter listed in AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191(b) is recorded as flight data or by means of
images.
— AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191(e) clarifies the applicable flight parameter performance when flight data is
recorded, taking into account that the operator may choose to record the data on a crash-
protected FDR or on a lightweight aircraft data recording system (ADRS). The performance of
flight parameters should then meet the applicable performance specifications (i.e. range,
sampling intervals, accuracy limits and resolution in read-out) either given by Table II-A.1 of
EUROCAE Document 112 (ED-112) dated 2003, or by Table II-B.1 of EUROCAE Document 155
(ED-155) dated 2009. This is consistent with the flight parameter performance prescribed in
ICAO Annex 6 Part I. It should be noted that although ED-112 was superseded by ED-112A in
2013, compliance with ED-112 is still considered acceptable: this is because the flight parameters
performance provided by ED-112 is considered sufficient for investigation purposes in the case
of a light aircraft.
— AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191(f) recommends that the operational performance of the flight recorder
should in any case meet the specifications of either ED-155 or ED-112. This is consistent with the
operational performance prescribed for flight recorders in ICAO Annex 6 Part I, which refers to
ED-112 and ED-155. In addition, EUROCAE standards are the reference industry standards in the
Air Operations rules applicable to crash-protected flight recorders (see for instance
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.190), as well as in the CS-ETSO addressing flight data recorders (ETSO-C124b),
airborne image recorders (ETSO-C176) and lightweight flight recorders (ETSO-2C197).
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191 is created to provide the operational performance requirements of the flight
recorder required in CAT.IDE.H.191.
— Similar to AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191, AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191 specifies what flight parameters should be
recorded when flight data is recorded and what instrument indications should be captured if
images are recorded (based on the indications required to be displayed in accordance with
CAT.IDE.H.125 and CAT.IDE.H.130 (refer to Appendix I for more information).
— Similar to AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191, AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191 allows combining the recording of images
and flight data; however, in that case, each flight parameter listed in AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191(b) is
recorded as flight data or by means of images.
— Similar to AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191, AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191 refers to ED-112 and ED-155 with regard to
the performance of the flight parameters and the operational performance of the flight
recorder.
AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.146 is created to provide the operational performance requirements of the flight
recorder required in SPO.IDE.A.146. AMC1 SPO.IDE.A.146 has the same content as
AMC1 CAT.IDE.A.191.
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AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.146 is created to provide the operational performance requirements of the flight
recorder required in SPO.IDE.A.146. AMC1 SPO.IDE.H.146 has the same content as
AMC1 CAT.IDE.H.191.
GM1 CAT.IDE.A.191 is created to encourage operators to record more data than what is strictly related
to flight path and aircraft speed. In particular, the operator may also want to consider recording the
position of the flight controls and an external view. This would make the recordings more complete
and, therefore, more useful for an operator which would like to use them to analyse its incidents.
GM1 CAT.IDE.H.191, GM1 CAT.IDE.A.146 and GM1 CAT.IDE.H.146 are created for the same purpose.
3.2.2.3.2 Continued serviceability of the flight recorder
The wording of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) and GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) is amended in order to
address the flight recorder’s serviceability when a flight recorder is installed in order to comply with
CAT.IDE.A.191 or CAT.IDE.H.191.
— Indeed, experience with crash-protected flight recorders (FDRs and CVRs) has shown that in
industry there is widespread over-reliance on the built-in test feature of flight recorders: such a
feature can detect internal failures of the equipment, but not problems with the quality of
recorded data (e.g. it will not tell if the values of a recorded flight parameter are realistic or if
recorded audio is intelligible). As a result, safety investigation authorities have repeatedly
pointed at recordings of bad quality and other issues (refer to Notice of Proposed Amendment
2013-26 ‘Amendment of requirements for flight recorders and underwater locating devices’13
and to EASA Safety Information Bulletin 2009-28R1 ‘Flight Data Recorder and Cockpit Voice
Recorder Systems Serviceability’14).
— ICAO Annex 6 Part I prescribes in its Appendix 8 three kinds of checks to be performed by the
operator:
inspection of the recording at time intervals of 1 or 2 years for the FDR and the CVR
(5 years for data-link recording);
daily use of the means for preflight checking of the flight recorders for proper operation;
calibration check of some flight parameters recorded by the FDR.
— These ICAO Standards were transposed in AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) for crash-protected flight
recorders and they are also considered regarding the serviceability of lightweight flight
recorders.
— However, since the cost impact of maintenance tasks should remain proportionate for light
aircraft, a less constraining framework is proposed for a flight recorder installed in order to
comply with CAT.IDE.A.191 or CAT.IDE.H.191, when it is not a FDR:
Recording inspection at time intervals of 2 years (paragraph (a) of
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b)).
13
https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendments/npa-2013-26
14
http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/2009-28R1
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o Given that just a dozen of flight parameters are required to be recorded, this
inspection is expected to be completed much faster than for a FDR where up to 80
flight parameters are required to be recorded, depending on the aircraft model and
the date of manufacture.
o In addition, paragraph (d) of GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) only recommends a
reasonableness check of the flight parameters, as this check is qualitative and
therefore less complex and time-consuming than a correlation test.
o The new paragraph (e) of GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) is created to address the
inspection of recorded images. In that case, given the potential privacy aspect of
images, it is not recommended to make a copy of the recording file or to retain the
recorded images. In the case of images, the primary purpose is to verify that the
images are of a quality sufficient for reading the instruments’ indications, and this in
various flight phases.
Daily use of the means for preflight checking of the flight recorder for proper operation
(paragraph (c) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b)). This operational check may be performed
by the flight crew within a few seconds at the first flight of the day.
o If, however, no means for preflight checking of the flight recorder is available, an
operational check should be performed at time intervals not exceeding 150 flight
hours, instead of previously ‘7 calendar days of operation’. Indeed ‘days of
operation’ is not commonly used metrics. 150 flight hours correspond to more than
7 days of operation, assuming that the aircraft is operated 21 hours per day (case of
large aeroplanes which are flying most of the time). For a light aircraft which is
usually less used, the operational check can be performed at longer time intervals.
When the operator installs an FDR in order to comply with CAT.IDE.A.191 or CAT.IDE.H.191, it is
recommended to perform the same operational checks and evaluations as for an FDR installed on a
large aeroplane or a large helicopter.
The wording of AMC1 SPO.GEN.145(b) and GM1 SPO.GEN.145(b) is amended similarly to
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b) and GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(b).
3.2.2.3.3 Protection of audio and image recordings
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(1), which addresses the use of CVR recordings for maintaining or
improving safety, is amended to recommend that account is taken of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 in the
procedure related to the handling of CVR recordings, in the case where the CVR is used for maintaining
or improving safety. This reference to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 is made so that the operator ensures
that the procedure is consistent with this Regulation.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3) is created to address the use of flight crew compartment images
recorded by a flight recorder for maintaining or improving safety. The provisions of this AMC are
similar to those of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(1).
— Paragraph (a) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3) recommends that the procedure related to the
handling of recordings of flight crew compartment images be documented and signed by all
parties, so that it can be checked that all internal stakeholders are aware of this procedure.
Subparagraph (a) also recommends that Regulation (EU) 2016/679 should be considered when
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drafting this procedure. This is for the operator to ensure that the procedure is consistent with
this Regulation.
— In addition:
Subparagraph (a)(1) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3) limits the access to recorded images
to specifically authorised persons.
Subparagraph (a)(2) recommends that retention of recorded images be addressed by a
policy and accountability, which specifically includes measures to ensure the protection of
recordings.
In order to facilitate oversight of the appropriate use of recorded images,
subparagraph (a)(3) recommends that the aircraft operator explain in the procedure what
use is intended to be made of the images.
In order to promote fair assessment of recorded images in case of safety concern, three
subparagraphs are created, which are consistent with the existing provisions applicable to
flight data monitoring (FDM) programmes in AMC1 ORO.AOC.130(k).
Subparagraph (a)(4) recommends that the procedure specify how flight crew member
representatives will be involved in the assessment of recorded images. Indeed, it is a good
practice to request the participation of a flight crew member in the analysis of images.
Subparagraphs (a)(5) and (a)(6) recommend that the procedure detail, in the case where a
safety issue is confirmed, the conditions for determining a corrective action. Such a
framework provides for more transparency and trust within the aircraft operator, and it
can be checked by the competent authority.
— The objective of paragraph (b) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3) is to ensure that, in the case
where a recording file containing images of body parts is read out, the competent authority may
check the use of this recording file.
— Paragraph (c) recommends that the safety manager or the person identified by the operator to
fulfil this role be responsible for the protection and use of flight crew compartment images, as
well as the assessment and transmission of issues. This is consistent with the fact that the use of
recorded images is allowed only for safety purposes or to ensure the flight recorder
serviceability except when Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 applies (refer to
CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3)).
— Paragraph (d) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3) recommends that when a third party is involved
in the use of recorded images, contractual agreements with this third party should, when
applicable, cover the aspects enumerated in paragraphs (a) and (b). This is to ensure that even if
part of the handling of recorded images is subcontracted, the necessary precautions for the
protection of data privacy will be taken by the third party.
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3a) is created to address the use of flight crew compartment images
recorded by a flight recorder for ensuring serviceability. It follows principles similar to
those of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(1a), which addresses the recording inspection of the CVR for
ensuring serviceability. However, the conditions enumerated in paragraph (a) of
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3a) are only applicable when a body part of a crew member is visible on
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the images, otherwise the recorded images have no privacy content and can be handled in a manner
similar to FDR data.
— Subparagraph (a)(1) of AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3a) recommends that replays are conducted
under conditions that ensure the privacy of recordings required by CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3a).
— Subparagraph (a)(2) recommends to restrict access to the replay equipment in order to ensure
that the use of this equipment is controlled.
— Subparagraphs (a)(3) and (a)(4) are related to the protection of the recording medium and the
recording files read out from this recording medium. They recommend secure storage of the
recording medium and the recording files, as well as destruction of the recording files in a given
timeframe, except for images retained for the purpose of enhancing the recording inspection.
The recording files should not be destroyed immediately in order to permit an independent
check of the quality of the recorded images, if necessary. However, a maximum retention time
of the recording files is also recommended, as they contain sensitive information.
— Subparagraph (a)(5) designates the accountable manager and the safety manager of the
operator as the only persons entitled to request a copy of a recording file. This is meant to
ensure control of the recorded images and it is consistent with AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3).
Except for ensuring serviceability, the only permitted use during day-to-day operations is for
maintaining and improving safety, and in that case, in accordance with
AMC1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f)(3), the safety manager should be responsible for the use and
protection of the CVR recordings.
— Paragraph (b) covers the cases where the CVR recording inspection is subcontracted to a third
party.
GM1 CAT.GEN.MPA.195(f) is created to provide for a common understanding of images of the ‘flight
crew compartment’, when there are no compartments segregating the flight crew from the
passengers.
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Note:
In this chapter, the following terms are used:
— ‘Crash-protected flight recorder’ means any type of recorder installed in the aircraft and
recording in a crash-survivable recording medium for the purpose of facilitating
accident/incident safety investigations. Crash-protected flight recorders comprise one or more
of the following systems: a flight data recorder (FDR), a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), an airborne
image recorder (AIR), and/or a data-link recorder (DLR).
— ‘Lightweight flight recorder’ means a system installed in the aircraft and recording in a robust
recording medium primarily for the purpose of facilitating accident/incident safety
investigations. Lightweight flight recorders comprise one or more of the following systems: an
aircraft data recording system (ADRS), a cockpit audio recording system (CARS), an airborne
image recording system (AIRS), and/or a data-link recording system (DLRS).
— ‘In-flight recording’ means recording by an airborne system of data that can be easily used to
reconstruct the history of the flight for the purpose of a safety investigation. In-flight recording
solutions include but are not limited to crash-protected flight recorders and lightweight flight
recorders, and they do not necessarily rely on dedicated equipment.
— ‘Light aeroplane’ means an aeroplane of a maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) of
5 700 kg or less.
— ‘Light helicopter’ means a helicopter of an MCTOM of 3 175 kg or less.
— ‘Large aeroplane’ means an aeroplane of an MCTOM of more than 5 700 kg.
— ‘Large helicopter’ means a helicopter of an MCTOM of more than 3 175 kg.
— ‘Complex aeroplane’ means an aeroplane:
with an MCTOM of more than 5 700 kg; or
certificated for a maximum passenger seating configuration of more than 19; or
certificated for operation with a minimum crew of at least two pilots; or
equipped with one or more turbojet engines or two or more turboprop engines.
— ‘Complex helicopter’ means a helicopter certificated:
for a maximum take-off mass of more than 3 175 kg; or
for a maximum passenger seating configuration of more than nine or
for operation with a minimum crew of at least two pilots.
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4.1. What is the issue
4.1.1. Definition of the issue
4.1.1.1. The need for investigation
In the absence of recording of the aircraft condition and operation, it can be very difficult to
reconstruct the sequence of events that led to an accident or a serious incident. Moreover, this
sequence of events is essential for defining actions in order to prevent future occurrences. Many
investigations of aircraft accidents and serious incidents are hindered by the absence of accurate data
on what happened.
The analysis of other types of evidence (witness statements, accident site examination, etc.) is usually
time-consuming and does not provide such complete and accurate data as in-flight recording does.
Since 2010, almost all accidents and serious incidents that occur over the territory of an EASA MS must
be subject to safety investigation15. However, many aircraft categories and types of operation fall
outside the scope of current requirements to carry a crash-protected flight recorder. Those are for
instance:
— aeroplanes with an MCTOM of 5 700 kg or less (hereinafter called ‘light aeroplanes’);
— helicopters with an MCTOM of 3 175 kg or less (hereinafter called ‘light helicopters’);
— balloons; and
— sailplanes.
In effect, more than 80 % of the occurrences requiring a safety investigation and that happened in
2012, 2013 or 2014 with aircraft registered in an EASA MS involved a light aeroplane, a light helicopter,
a sailplane or a balloon (please refer to Appendix B, which presents statistics of accidents and serious
incidents of aircraft registered in EASA MSs between 2012 and 2014).
4.1.1.2. The drivers
Note: This section presents the developments which triggered the initial decision of EASA to assess the
need for extending in-flight recording requirements to lighter aircraft. Hence, ‘drivers’ should
not be understood as the rationale for the proposals contained in Chapter 3 of this NPA — they
are rather the facts that triggered the programming of RMT.0271.
4.1.1.2.1 ICAO Standards
The Standards recently introduced in ICAO Annex 6, Part I and Part III, prescribe that future light
turbine-engined aeroplanes and helicopters operated for CAT shall be equipped with a means to
record flight data and, under certain conditions, a means to record cockpit audio. Hence, current EU
rules are not fully in line with the ICAO Standards applicable to in-flight recording. Appendix A provides
a comparison of ICAO Standards and EU Air Operations rules related to in-flight recording.
15
Refer to Articles 3 and 5 of Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the
investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil aviation and repealing Directive 94/56/EC (OJ L 295, 12.11.2010,
p. 35).
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4.1.1.2.2 Safety recommendations
12 safety recommendations addressed to EASA recommend the introduction of in-flight recording for
light aeroplanes and helicopters and these safety recommendations are within the scope of RMT.0271.
These safety recommendations were issued in the framework of official safety investigations of 10
accidents. Below is the list of safety recommendations with reference information on the accidents:
— Safety Recommendation FINL-2014-001 (Cessna 206 registered OH-AAA, 8.11.2012);
— Safety Recommendation FRAN-2009-008 (Beech C90 registered F-GVPD, 18.10.2006);
— Safety Recommendation FRAN-2013-012 (Cessna 208 registered F-OIXZ, 5.9.2010);
— Safety Recommendation HUNG-2008-002 (Eurocopter EC135 registered HA-ECE, 31.7.2008);
— Safety Recommendation NETH-2012-001 (Pilatus PC12 registered PH-RUL, 16.10.2009);
— Safety Recommendation NORW-2012-010 (Aerospatiale AS350 registered LN-OXC, 4.7.2011);
— Safety Recommendation SPAN-2012-011 (Swearingen SA226 registered EC-GDG, 18.2.1998);
— Safety Recommendation UNKG-2005-101 (Bell 206 registered G-BXLI, 22.1.2005);
— Safety Recommendation BELG-2015-001 (Pilatus PC6 registered OO-NAC, 19.10.2013);
— Safety Recommendation UNKG-2015-035 (Eurocopter EC135 registered G-SPAO, 29.11.2013);
— Safety Recommendation FRAN-2016-045 (TBM700 registered N129AG, .6.8.2014);
— Safety Recommendation FRAN-2016-046 (TBM700 registered N129AG, 6.8.2014).
In addition, 16 safety recommendations related to in-flight recording for light aeroplanes and light
helicopters were issued by safety investigation authorities of the EASA MSs to authorities other than
EASA.
With regard to the 12 safety recommendations addressed to EASA, it should be noted that:
— 7 out of the 12 safety recommendations concern CAT operations or parachuting activities, while
5 safety recommendations do not specify the type of operation;
— 7 out of 11 accidents involved aeroplanes and 4 involved helicopters;
— 10 out of 11 accidents involved a turbine-engined aircraft; and
— 9 out of 11 accidents involved a light aeroplane or a light helicopter with an MCTOM of 2 250 kg
or more.
With regard to the 16 safety recommendations addressed to the EASA MSs:
— 13 out of the 16 safety recommendations concern CAT operations, aerial work, police or
parachuting activities, while 3 safety recommendations do not specify the type of operation;
— 7 out of 16 safety recommendations were issued after an accident or a serious incident which
involved an aeroplane, and 9 safety recommendations after an accident or a serious incident
which involved a helicopter;
— 15 out of 16 safety recommendations were issued after an accident or a serious incident
involving a turbine-engined aircraft; and
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— 13 out of 16 safety recommendations were issued after an accident or a serious incident
involving a light aeroplane or a light helicopter with an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more.
Hence, the focus of European safety investigation authorities seems to be rather on light aeroplanes
and light helicopters equipped with turbine engines, used for CAT or SPO operations, and have an
MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more.
Appendix C presents safety recommendations that have been issued by European safety investigation
authorities since 2000 and relate to in-flight recording for light aircraft. Most of these safety
recommendations address CAT operations with light aeroplanes and light helicopters.
4.1.1.2.3 Commercial operations with balloons
When considering CAT operations, lighter-than-air aircraft are involved in a number of accidents of the
same order of magnitude as aeroplanes and helicopters16. The accumulated time of CAT operations
with balloons registered in EASA MSs — being much less than the accumulated time of CAT operations
with aeroplanes and helicopters — leads to conclude that there is a much higher rate of accidents per
flight hour for balloons than for aeroplanes and helicopters. This is also consistent with the figures
presented in Appendix 2 of the EASA Opinion No 01/201617: the accident rate per flight is found to be
around 6 × 10-5 for balloons, while for aeroplanes it is around 4 × 10-6. Furthermore, almost all CAT
operations with balloons are actually commercial passenger transport operations, and some balloon
models are certified to carry more than 9 passengers.
This shifts the focus on balloons with large passenger capacity, since there are aeroplane models and
helicopter models with comparable or smaller passenger capacity that are required to carry crash-
protected flight recorders (FDRs and CVRs) in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air
Operations. For example:
— all models of multi-engined turbine-powered aeroplanes with an MOPSC of 9;
— all helicopter models with an MCTOM close to 3 175 kg, which typically have an MOPSC of 7 to
10.
Note: International operations with balloons are not covered by the ICAO Annexes.
4.1.1.3. Scope of the issue
The need for in-flight recording is assessed for aircraft categories which are within the scope of the
European Air Operations rules, namely: aeroplanes, helicopters, sailplanes and balloons. Aircraft which
belong to a category listed in Annex II of Regulation (EC) No 216/200818 (the Basic Regulation) are not
16
In accordance with the statistics of Appendix B, when considering aircraft operated for commercial air transport and registered in
the EASA MSs, there were 30 accidents with balloons operated between 2012 and 2014, which corresponds to about 10 accidents
per year. Meanwhile, there were 25 accidents with aeroplanes and 13 accidents with helicopters in average per year over the
decade 2002–2011.
17
EASA Opinion No 01/2016 ‘Revision of the European operational rules for balloons’ proposes a simpler and more proportionate air
operations regulatory framework for balloons. For this purpose, this Opinion proposes the extraction of the operational rules for
balloons from Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, except for the authority requirements specified in Annex II (Part-ARO), and the issue of
a new regulation on operational rules for balloons.
18
The aircraft categories enumerated in Annex II of Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 are historic aircraft, experimental aircraft, amateur-
built aircraft, aircraft that have been in the service of a military force, very light aeroplanes and helicopters, powered parachutes,
gyroplanes, very light sailplanes, and unmanned aerial vehicles.
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within the scope of the European Air Operations rules. In addition, aeroplanes and helicopters of
models already subject to crash-protected flight recorder carriage requirements in accordance with
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air Operations are outside the scope of RMT.0271 & RMT.027219.
Table 1 presents a summary of the aircraft categories that are within the scope of RMT.0271 &
RMT.0272 and of the safety drivers.
19
For example, the extension of the requirement for an FDR to be carried on helicopters with an MCTOM of over 3 175 kg and first
issued with an individual CofA before 1 August 1999 is outside the scope of RMT.0271 & RMT.0272.
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Table 1: Scope of RMT.0271 & RMT.0272
Aircraft category Applicable Part Aircraft within the scope of RMT.0271 & RMT.0272 Drivers for change
of the Air OPS
rules
Aeroplanes not Annex IV Light aeroplanes with an MOPSC of less than 9 or not multi- — ICAO Standard for the recording of basic flight parameters
designated by (Part-CAT) engined turbine-powered — ICAO Standard for the recording of audio
Annex II of the
— Safety recommendations addressed to EASA and to EASA
Basic Regulation
MSs recommending in-flight recording for CAT operations
Annex VI — Light aeroplanes — ICAO Recommended Practice for light turbine-engined
(Part-NCC) — Aeroplanes with an MCTOM of less than 27 000 kg for the aeroplanes
recording of audio
Annex VIII — Light aeroplanes (either complex or non-complex and — ICAO Recommended Practice for light turbine-engined
(Part-SPO) used for commercial SPO) aeroplanes
— Aeroplanes with an MCTOM of less than 27 000 kg for the — Safety recommendations addressed to EASA and to EASA
recording of audio MSs recommending in-flight recording for SPO
Annex VII All aeroplanes — ICAO Recommended practice for light turbine-engined
(Part-NCO) aeroplanes
Helicopters not Annex IV Light helicopters — ICAO Standard for the recording of basic flight parameters
designated by (Part-CAT) — Safety recommendations addressed to EASA and to EASA
Annex II of the MSs recommending in-flight recording for CAT operations
Basic Regulation
Annex VI — Light helicopters — No driver identified
(Part-NCC) — Helicopters with an MCTOM of up to 7 000 kg for the
recording of audio
Annex VIII — Light helicopters (either complex or non-complex and — Safety recommendations addressed to EASA MSs
(Part-SPO) used for commercial operations) recommending in-flight recording for SPO
— Helicopters with an MCTOM of less than 7 000 kg for the
recording of audio
Annex VII All helicopters — No driver identified
(Part-NCO)
Balloons and hot- Basic All balloons — No driver identified
air airships not requirements
designated by (BAS)
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Aircraft category Applicable Part Aircraft within the scope of RMT.0271 & RMT.0272 Drivers for change
of the Air OPS
rules
Annex II of the Additional All balloons — Significantly higher accident rate for passenger air
Basic Regulation requirements transport operations than for aeroplanes and helicopters
for commercial — Aeroplanes and helicopters with a passenger capacity of
operations 10 or more and performing CAT operations are required
(ADD) to carry an FDR and a CVR
Sailplanes and Annex IV All sailplanes — No driver identified
powered sailplanes (Part-CAT)
not designated by Annex VIII All sailplanes — No driver identified
Annex II of the (Part-SPO)
Basic Regulation Annex VII All sailplanes — No driver identified
(Part-NCO)
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4.1.2. Safety risk assessment
4.1.2.1. Principles of assessing the safety risk
Benefits for accident prevention
The need for in-flight recording for investigation purposes should be assessed in light of its ultimate
objective which is to improve aviation safety in the long term, i.e. decrease in the number of accidents.
Therefore, when assessing the need for in-flight recording, the key criterion is the extent to which in-
flight recording may contribute to accident prevention by providing information otherwise difficult to
obtain.
However, when the accident causes are already known, accident prevention might be better served by
measures other than recording data in flight.
Possible uses for other than safety investigation
Beyond the use by safety investigation authorities, in-flight recording may contribute to accident
prevention through:
— operational safety monitoring (e.g. flight data monitoring);
— better data for the continuing airworthiness of products;
— engine or gearbox health monitoring; and
— dissuading against unnecessary risk-taking by pilots (because pilot actions are recorded).
Possible uses other than directly serving safety investigation are presented in detail in Appendix D.
The proposed approach to assess safety risks
One common method to assess safety risks is to apply a conventional method of risk assessment, such
as the one reflected, for instance, in CS 23.1309 ‘Equipment, systems and installations’. In simple
terms, this approach is based on a two-dimensional risk assessment, where one dimension is related to
the frequency of a failure (from ‘frequent’ to ‘extremely improbable’) and the other dimension reflects
the potential severity of a failure (from ‘no effect’ to ‘catastrophic’).
In-flight recording is not meant for the safe conduct of the flight, and recording failure or absence of
recorded data has no effect on the safe continuation of a flight. The conventional method of risk
assessment is simply not appropriate because its focus is limited on the safe completion of one
individual flight following a system failure. It excludes a macroscopic approach to safety which consists
in taking safety-effective actions based on data collected from day-to-day operations or from serious
incidents and accidents.
In the case of in-flight recording equipment, the safety risk to be assessed is related to the non-realised
safety benefit for an operator (when recorded data could be used for FDM or safety management) or
for authorities (when recorded data would be useful to investigate a safety occurrence). In the absence
of recorded data, it would be difficult to timely identify some of the hazards and, subsequently, to help
preventing future accidents where these hazards will occur again.
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No one-size-fits-all safety risk assessment
The safety risk assessment should take into account the category of aircraft and the type of operation
considered because, for instance:
a) the acceptable level of safety risk is not the same when considering CAT operations and general
aviation (refer to Appendix H for the principles of safety risk assessment);
b) the potential severity of an accident varies depending on aircraft passenger capacity (number of
fatalities on board) or the aircraft mass (number of ground fatalities and level of damage on the
ground).
Therefore, even when considering only the safety aspects, the risk assessment cannot be the same for
all categories of aircraft and for all types of operation considered.
4.1.2.2. Principle of proportionality
In the case of light aircraft, the general principle of proportionality is of utmost importance.
Requirements should be commensurate with the capability of those to which they apply. In particular,
the principles of the General Aviation Road Map20 should be observed to ensure that any proposed
requirement will be manageable in the context of non-commercial operations.
In practice, this means for in-flight recording the following:
— When considering non-commercial operations, it is essential to have requirements that are easy
to understand and implement, with an acceptable economic impact. The economic impact is not
limited to purchase and certification costs, but also encompasses operational procedures and
maintenance aspects. In addition, a possible new requirement on safety equipment should not
be considered in isolation but together with all other requirements already applicable. This is
because requirements are competing for limited human and financial resources.
— Also, the recording of data with potential privacy content involves appropriate protection of the
recordings, which translates into additional constraints in use (protection and retention of data,
access policy, etc.). These constraints might be difficult to manage in the context of recreational
activities and private flights.
— When considering the carriage of equipment on light aircraft, the mass of the equipment, its
power consumption and size are critical aspects to be considered. For these aspects, not only
the recording equipment per se, but also the dedicated sensors and controls and the installation
kit should be considered.
4.1.2.3. Preliminary safety targets
Due to the diversity of aircraft categories and types of operation considered in the framework of
RMT.0271 & RMT.0272, a unique level of in-flight recording equipment cannot be considered for all
possible cases. It is, therefore, proposed to define four levels of equipment for in-flight recording,
independently of the considerations about the best way to reach this level of equipment (through
rulemaking, safety promotion, or both):
20
Refer to http://easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/general-aviation/general-aviation-road-map.
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1. High: the data collected should be exhaustive and allow getting a good picture of the sequence
of events that occurred in the flight crew compartment. At least flight parameters related to the
engines, to flight controls and to all essential aircraft systems should be recorded, including
audio (and data-link communications, when applicable). The operational performance
specifications of the dedicated in-flight recording equipment should be based on highly
demanding industry standards (e.g. EUROCAE Documents ED-112 or ED-112A).
2. Medium: the data collected should help reconstruct the sequence of events that occurred in the
flight deck and they should be collected by dedicated in-flight recording equipment; however, it
is acceptable that only a reduced set of flight parameters is recorded or that audio is not
recorded. Basic flight parameters related to aircraft attitude and trajectory and/or audio should
be collected. Other means of collecting data, such as by means of image recording of the
instruments, could be acceptable. The in-flight recording equipment may also fulfil other
functions than recording data for investigation purposes; however, its operational performance
specifications should be based on recognised industry standards (e.g. EUROCAE Document
ED-155, ED-112 or ED-112A).
3. Low: the data collected should provide useful information for reconstructing a reliable history of
the flight, which is the first step of a safety investigation. Typically, data computed by a GNSS
receiver (aircraft position, ground speed, track and altitude) would serve this purpose, but
alternative solutions could be acceptable. The collection of data would not need to be
performed by dedicated equipment, and the data could also be transmitted to the ground in lieu
of being recorded on board, or the aircraft could be tracked from the ground. The solution
would, however, need to meet some minimum operational performance specifications.
4. None: not enough justification to require or promote in-flight recording.
When applying the principle of proportionality across categories of aircraft and types of operations,
the following approach is proposed:
— The target level of equipment should be higher for commercial operations and lower for non-
commercial operations; and
— The target level of equipment should be the highest for large aeroplanes (above 5 700 kg
MCTOM) and large helicopters (above 3 175 kg MCTOM), followed by light complex aeroplanes
and helicopters, followed by non-complex aircraft (light non-complex aeroplanes and light non-
complex helicopters, as well as balloons and sailplanes).
Based on this principle and the drivers identified in Section 4.1.1 (see Table 1), a preliminary mapping
of target levels of equipment is presented in Tables 2A, 2B and 2C.
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Note: As regards balloons, EASA Opinion No 01/2016 proposes to move all provisions related to
balloons from Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 to a new regulation. Unlike for other categories of
aircraft, the balloons provisions would be organised into two subparts under Part-BOP (Balloon
Operations): Subpart BAS (Basic Requirements) and Subpart ADD (Additional Requirements for
Commercial Operations).
Table 2A: Preliminary target levels of in-flight recording equipment for aeroplanes and helicopters
Target level of equipment Large aeroplanes and large helicopters Light aeroplanes and light helicopters
(applicable Part of Air
OPS rules)
CAT operations ‘High’ (already covered by the Air OPS High for multi-engined turbine-
rules). powered aeroplanes with MOPSC > 9
(Part-CAT)
(already covered by the Air OPS rules).
‘None’ to ‘high’ for other aircraft
categories depending on aircraft
complexity and passenger capacity (e.g.
‘none’ for a small piston-engined
aircraft capable of carrying just one
passenger, may be ‘high’ if the aircraft
is complex and/or carries a large
number of passengers).
Commercial SPO ‘High’ for aeroplanes with an MCTOM ‘None’ to ‘medium’ depending on
exceeding 27 000 kg and helicopters aircraft complexity and passenger
(Part-SPO)
with an MCTOM exceeding 7 000 kg capacity.
(already covered by the Air OPS rules).
‘Medium’ for aeroplanes with an
MCTOM between 5 700 and 27 000 kg
and helicopters with an MCTOM
between 3 175 and 7 000 kg (already
covered by the Air OPS rules).
Non-commercial ‘High’ for aeroplanes with an MCTOM ‘None’ to ‘medium’ depending on
operations exceeding 27 000 kg and helicopters aircraft complexity and passenger
with an MCTOM exceeding 7 000 kg capacity.
(Part-NCC or Part-NCO)
(already covered by the Air OPS rules).
‘Medium’ for aeroplanes with an
MCTOM between 5 700 and 27 000 kg
and helicopters between 3 175 and
7 000 kg (already covered by the Air
OPS rules).
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Table 2B: Preliminary target levels of in-flight recording equipment for sailplanes
Target level of equipment Sailplanes
(applicable Part of the Air
OPS rules)
CAT operations ‘None’ to ‘low’ (e.g. ‘none’ if just one passenger can be carried, and could be ‘low’
if several passengers can be carried)
(Part-CAT)
Commercial SPO ‘None’ to ‘low’
(Part-SPO)
Non-commercial ‘None’ to ‘low’
operations
(Part-NCO)
Table 2C: Preliminary target levels of in-flight recording equipment for balloons
Target aircraft Balloons
Basic requirements ‘None’ to ‘low’ (non-commercial operations with balloons).
(Part-BOP, Subpart BAS)
Additional requirements ‘None’ to ‘medium’ depending on passenger capacity (e.g. ‘none’ for a balloon
for commercial capable of carrying a small number of passengers, and may be ‘medium’ for
operations balloons which transport a large number of passengers).
(Part-BOP, Subpart ADD)
4.1.2.4. Assessing the safety risk
Limitations of an assessment based on safety recommendations
While the several safety recommendations related to in-flight recording should be carefully
considered, basing the safety risk assessment only on their review is not sufficient for the following
reasons:
— Such safety recommendations were mainly triggered by the lack of data to analyse and explain
the accidents, while the need for in-flight recording should be assessed against the ultimate
objective of a safety investigation, which is to improve aviation safety. It is not obvious that if
data had been available to facilitate those accident investigations (for which safety
recommendations related to in-flight recording were issued and contributory factors could have
been subsequently better identified), this would have resulted in corrective actions to prevent
future accidents.
— There are many more cases where the absence of reliable data has hindered the investigation
than those which have triggered a safety recommendation. It is not common practice among
safety investigation authorities to issue a safety recommendation each time they are missing
important data (except in the case of accidents with the largest category of aircraft).
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— The majority of the safety recommendations were issued before Regulation (EU) No 996/2010
made the investigation of all accidents and serious incidents occurring over the territory of a MS
mandatory (except for Annex II aircraft). In the past, some safety investigation authorities chose
to investigate only occurrences that happened during CAT operations or only when the aircraft
MCTOM or occupancy was above a given threshold.
— The majority of the safety recommendations were issued at a time when there was no industry
standard for lightweight flight recorders, and very few such systems were offered on the market.
The only available concept was that of conventional, ED-112-compliant, crash-protected flight
recorders, which are relatively heavy and expensive and not designed for light aircraft.
Therefore, it was not felt justified by investigators to issue safety recommendations for aircraft
other than aeroplanes and helicopters operated for CAT. Almost half of the safety
recommendations presented in Appendix C had been issued before ED-155 was published in
2009.
— Most of the safety recommendations are rather generic in their nature, i.e. they do not target a
specific category of aircraft nor do they specify what information should be recorded.
Studying safety investigation reports
In order to better assess the safety risks caused by the absence of in-flight recording, and not just rely
on safety recommendations, it was decided to systematically study investigation reports. The studies
were performed by EASA in coordination with the RMT.0271 & RMT.0272 Rulemaking Group.
The objective of these studies was to collect evidence of the actual contribution brought by recorded
data for the identification and resolution of safety issues. Two approaches were combined in these
studies: the first approach was focused on hindrance to investigations due to the absence of reliable
data (assessment by the negative), while the second aimed to assess the benefits brought by in-flight
recording and tentatively determined to what extent these benefits could be transposed to a
dedicated in-flight recording function (assessment by the positive).
In total, four studies were performed. For each study, a study set of investigation reports
corresponding to a given period of time was extracted and systematically reviewed using a grid of
predefined questions (i.e. no cherry-pick selection of the study case).
Study 1 aimed to assess to what extent facts can be established, causes determined, and safety issues
identified during safety investigations of accidents involving light aeroplanes, light helicopters, balloons
or sailplanes. This included questions on:
— the establishment of the final trajectory of the aircraft;
— the identification of the sequence of aviation occurrences;
— the need for test and research activities, and whether they could have been rendered
unnecessary by in-flight recording; and
— the mention by the investigation that causes could not be established due to the lack of data.
For this study, a sample of 81 safety investigation reports of accidents which occurred between 2009
and 2012 was analysed.
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Study 2 aimed to infer what factual data could be obtained from in-flight recording equipment based
on positive evidence. Therefore, all accident reports selected for Study 2 mentioned recordings which
were retrieved and analysed (the ‘recordings’ were performed by equipment installed on the aircraft,
devices brought by persons on board, as well as recordings made outside the aircraft).
Study 2 included questions such as:
— whether the recording helped to establish a more reliable sequence of the events that led to the
accident;
— whether the recording helped to identify the contributory factors;
— whether the recording was eventually useful to identify corrective actions (i.e. safety
recommendations or actions performed by stakeholders to address a safety issue identified by
the investigation); and
— what kind of recording (flight parameters, audio, image, etc.) would have provided equivalent
information.
For this study, a sample of 48 safety investigation reports of accidents that occurred between 2010 and
2012 was analysed.
Study 3 aimed to assess whether the CVR carriage requirements should be as stringent in Part-NCC and
Part-SPO as they are in Part-CAT. In practice, Study 3 was restricted to studying the benefit of CVR
recording for helicopters with an MCTOM between 3 175 and 7 000 kg (subject to carry a CVR when
operated under Part-CAT, but not under Part-SPO or Part-NCC), since it was found that for aeroplanes,
aligning the CVR carriage requirements across the Parts would, in practice, mean equipping very few
aircraft and therefore bring little safety benefit.
Study 3 included questions such as:
— whether the CVR recording helped to establish a more reliable sequence of events that led to
the accident;
— whether the CVR recording helped to identify the contributory factors; and
— whether the CVR recording was eventually useful to identify corrective actions.
For this study, a sample of 5 safety investigation reports of helicopter accidents that occurred between
2007 and 2011 was analysed.
Study 4 aimed to assess what factual data could be obtained from image recordings based on positive
evidence. Therefore, all accident reports analysed in the context of this study mentioned image
recordings taken from inside the aircraft, which were retrieved and analysed. Study 4 was an extension
of Study 2, because the latter did not cover enough cases of image recordings and therefore it was felt
that a dedicated study was needed.
Study 4 included questions such as:
— whether the image recording helped to establish a more reliable sequence of events that led to
the accident;
— whether the image recording helped to identify the causes;
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— what kind of information was obtained thanks to the image recording (indications of
instruments, non-verbal communication, meteorological conditions, etc.); and
— whether the image recording was eventually useful to identify corrective actions.
For this study, a sample of 20 safety investigation reports of accidents that occurred between 2011 and
2014 was analysed.
Details on each of these studies are presented in Appendix E.
Results of the studies
The following general results could be obtained from Studies 1, 2, 3 and 4:
1. When considering light aeroplanes, light helicopters, sailplanes and balloons:
— Trajectory reconstruction is attempted in most investigations, but only a third get
sufficient data to establish a complete final trajectory. The best sources for trajectory data
seem to be GNSS receivers (widely used on sailplanes) and radar tracks (often recorded in
the case of aeroplanes and helicopters).
— A third of investigations perform test and research activities. These activities aim to obtain
information that usually cannot be obtained with just a trajectory. Only an extensive set of
flight parameters (such as those recorded by an FDR) could deliver the data that would
allow saving on test and research activities in most cases. A reduced set of flight
parameters (such as the ones recorded by an ADRS) would have been helpful in half of the
cases.
— In accordance with Study 2, for half of the analysed recordings, the extracted data could
have been provided by flight parameters, except for balloons, where images seem to be
more relevant.
— For the majority of investigations where an image recording is retrieved and analysed
(15 out of 20 in accordance with Study 4), the recording helps to determine significant
events or significant contributory factors by providing information:
on what was displayed by the aircraft instruments; and
on the aircraft location and its environment.
— Most investigation reports establish some causes and contributory factors; however, a
quarter of the reports do not establish a complete sequence of aviation occurrence,
irrespective of the availability of a recording.
— Less than half of the investigation reports mention a corrective action (safety
recommendation or other kind of corrective action taken by any of the involved parties):
18 out of 48 reports for Study 2, and 4 out of 20 reports for Study 4. In the case of
sailplanes, it is even less than a quarter.
— The recording was actually found to be useful for identifying corrective actions in only a
small proportion of investigations (actions taken by stakeholders or recommended by
safety investigation authorities): 6 out of 48 reports for Study 2, and 1 out of 20 reports
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for Study 4. In most investigation reports, no explicit link was made between the
information obtained from the recording and the corrective actions.
2. When considering CVRs installed on helicopters with an MCTOM between 3 175 and 7 000 kg
(Study 3):
— For all investigation reports analysed, the CVR was instrumental in determining some
significant events or significant contributory factors, in particular:
information on chronology and timeline;
information on communication and CRM;
information on the application of procedures and checklists; and
information on alarms and technical failures.
— However, a link to corrective actions (safety recommendations or other) was not clearly
demonstrated.
In conclusion, while recordings indisputably provide useful data for reconstructing trajectories
and flight instrument indications, as well as determining some significant events or significant
contributory factors, their potential benefits for accident prevention seems moderate because
they do not significantly influence the number of corrective actions. The reasons for this can be,
among other things:
— The fact that corrective actions generally address safety findings which are established on
the analysis of several sources of data. It is then difficult to assess a posteriori the
contribution of a given source (here, in-flight recording) to the identification of corrective
actions.
— The fact that (when considering general aviation with light aircraft) most accident causes
are recurrent, well-known, and often related to errors made by the pilot-in-command
(inadequate flight preparation, fuel mismanagement, non-compliance with the Rules of
the Air, excessive risk-taking, etc.). In this context, there is often no scope to make specific
safety recommendations.
Quantifying the safety risk
Two dimensions are considered for assessing the safety risk associated with the absence of in-flight
recording:
— severity, i.e. how many lives could be saved in the best case by timely identifying a hazard
thanks to recorded data; and
— frequency, i.e. how often after an accident or a serious incident an in-flight recording would
provide data in order to understand the causes that would otherwise be difficult to identify and
that can be addressed by corrective actions before they cause a fatal accident.
Severity
When considering light aviation where the number of potential fatalities caused by an accident is
limited, the severity of an accident would not exceed ‘hazardous’ (i.e. a limited number of serious or
fatal injuries; refer to Appendix H, Table H.2). Therefore, the corresponding severity is also considered
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to be limited to ʻhazardous’ because the number of lives saved and of serious injuries prevented will be
limited.
Frequency
The frequency is proposed to be assessed on the basis of the number of fatal accidents prevented
thanks to data provided by an in-flight recording in a previous accident or serious incident.
Therefore, one needs first to assess the proportion of accidents and serious incidents bearing a
contributory factor that could only be identified with the help of in-flight recording. In addition, this
contributory factor should be useful for identifying corrective actions. Based on the results of the
studies of investigation reports (in particular Study 2 and Study 4), it is estimated that for less than
10 % of the accidents and serious incidents involving a light aircraft, a corrective action is identified.
P is the proportion of accidents and serious incidents for which a corrective action is identified, and it is
assumed that P = 10 %.
It is assumed that a proportion C of the corrective actions identified during the investigation of an
accident or a serious incident that occurred in year (N) prevents future accidents from occurring in year
(N + 1). The value of C is arbitrarily set at 20 %.
Statistics presented in Appendix B also show that around 10 % of the accidents occurring with light
aeroplanes, light helicopters, balloons and sailplanes are fatal.
With these assumptions, the number of fatal accidents prevented in year (N + 1), assuming that I(N)
investigations are performed in year (N), is:
F = I(N) × P × C × 0.1
Assuming that:
— 100 000 light aircraft are fitted with in-flight recording equipment (roughly the size of the
European fleet: see Table 4);
— 1 % of these light aircraft were involved in accidents or serious incidents in year N, which were
investigated, i.e. I(N) = 100 000 × 0.01 = 1 000 (roughly the number of accidents per year with
light aeroplanes, light helicopters, balloons and sailplanes: see Appendix B);
— In P = 10 % of the investigations, a corrective action was identified;
— C = 20 % (i.e. 20 % of the corrective actions identified in year (N) prevent an accident in year
(N + 1));
— 10 % of the prevented accidents in year (N + 1) would have been fatal,
then the number of fatal accidents prevented in the following year is:
F = 1 000 × 0.1 × 0.2 × 0.1 = 2 fatal accidents prevented in year (N + 1) from 1 000 investigations in year
N, for which in all cases in-flight recording was available. Therefore, the proposed safety benefit
frequency is considered equivalent to a risk frequency level which is qualified as ‘remote’ (refer to
Table H.1 of Appendix H).
Also, the annual number of fatal accidents for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014 was in average more
than 80 when considering all light aeroplanes, light helicopters, balloons and sailplanes. This is 20 times
more than the theoretical number of accidents prevented per year in the example above. This shows
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that equipping all light aircraft registered in Europe and within the scope of RMT.0271 & RMT.0271
with in-flight recording equipment would actually result in just a moderate reduction of the number of
fatal accidents per year.
Safety risk level
Based on the above, the safety risk caused by the absence of in-flight recording on-board light aircraft
has a ‘remote’ frequency level and a ‘hazardous’ severity level. The level of safety risk associated with
the absence of in-flight recording on-board light aircraft, based on Table H.3 of Appendix H, is
considered ‘medium’.
4.1.2.5. Consolidated safety targets
Knowing that the safety risk level associated with the absence of in-flight recording on board light
aircraft is not higher than medium, the preliminary target levels of equipment presented in Tables 2A,
2B and 2C can be refined. Tables 3A, 3B and 3C present consolidated target levels of equipment.
Table 3A: Consolidated mapping of target levels of equipment for in-flight recording for aeroplanes
and helicopters
Target level of Large aeroplanes and large helicopters Light aeroplanes and light helicopters
equipment
(applicable Annex of
Regulation (EU) No
965/2012 on Air
Operations)
Annex IV ‘High’ (already covered by the Air OPS ‘High’ for multi-engined turbine-powered
rules) aeroplanes with an MOPSC of more than
(Part-CAT)
9 (already covered by the Air OPS rules).
‘Medium’ for turbine-engined aeroplanes
with an MCTOM equal to or greater than
2 250 kg, and for aeroplanes with an
MOPSC of more than 9.
‘Medium’ for turbine-engined helicopters
with an MCTOM equal to or greater than
2 250 kg.
‘None’ to ‘low’ for other light aeroplanes
and light helicopters.
Annex VIII ‘High’ for aeroplanes with an MCTOM ‘Medium’ for turbine-engined aeroplanes
exceeding 27 000 kg and helicopters with with an MCTOM equal to or greater than
(Part-SPO)
an MCTOM exceeding 7 000 kg (already 2 250 kg, and for aeroplanes with an
covered by the Air OPS rules). MOPSC of more than 9.
Medium for aeroplanes with an MCTOM ‘Medium’ for turbine-engined helicopters
between 5 700 and 27 000 kg and with an MCTOM equal to or greater than
helicopters between 3 175 and 7 000 kg 2 250 kg.
(already covered by the Air OPS rules).
‘None’ to ‘low’ for other light aeroplanes
and light helicopters.
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Annex VI ‘High’ for aeroplanes with an MCTOM ‘None’ to ‘low’ for other light aeroplanes
exceeding 27 000 kg and helicopters with and light helicopters.
(Part-NCC)
an MCTOM exceeding 7 000 kg (already
or Annex VII covered by the Air OPS rules).
(Part-NCO) ‘Medium’ for aeroplanes with an MCTOM
between 5 700 and 27 000 kg and
helicopters between 3 175 and 7 000 kg
(already covered by the Air OPS rules).
Table 3B: Consolidated mapping of target levels of equipment for in-flight recording for sailplanes
Target level of equipment (applicable Annex of the Air OPS rules) Sailplanes
Annex IV (Part-CAT) ‘None’
Annex VIII (Part-SPO) ‘None’
Annex VI (Part-NCC) and Annex VII (Part-NCO) ‘None’
Table 3C: Consolidated mapping of target levels of equipment for in-flight recording for balloons
Target aircraft Balloons
Basic requirements (Part-BOP, Subpart BAS) ‘None’
Additional requirements for commercial operations ‘Low’ if MCTOM is equal to or greater
than 3 000 kg (corresponds to a
(Part-BOP, Subpart ADD)
passenger capacity of more than 13).
‘None’ to ‘low’ otherwise.
4.1.3. Who is affected
4.1.3.1. Stakeholders
The stakeholders affected by this issue are:
— manufacturers of light aeroplanes, light helicopters, sailplanes or balloons;
— commercial operators of light aeroplanes, light helicopters, sailplanes or balloons;
— non-commercial operators of light aeroplanes, light helicopters, sailplanes or balloons;
— private pilots and aircraft owners;
— safety investigation authorities of EASA MSs; and
— EASA and competent authorities of MSs (regulators).
4.1.3.2. Affected fleet
To date, there is unfortunately no common standard agreed between the EASA MSs for fleet data
collection; every EASA MS uses different rules for collecting and categorising data on light aircraft
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under their registry. As a result, assessing total numbers of light aircraft registered in the EASA MSs is
almost impossible.
A tentative assessment made for three MSs (France, Germany and the United Kingdom) gave the
results presented in Table 4. Given that light aircraft registered in these three MSs account for around
half of the accidents that occurred with light aircraft registered in the EASA MSs, one may assume that
doubling the fleet numbers gives a rough estimate of the number of aircraft potentially impacted by
RMT.0271 & RMT.0272.
Note: For balloons, the fleet data provided in Opinion No 01/2016 was used.
Table 4: Fleet numbers — light aircraft
Total number in year 2013 for Roughly estimated number in year
France, Germany and the United 2013 for all EASA MSs
Aircraft category
Kingdom (rounded to the nearest
hundred)
Light aeroplanes
23 200 46 400 (double)
(MCTOM ≤ 5 700 kg)
Light helicopters
2 700 5 400 (double)
(MCTOM ≤ 3 175 kg)
Sailplanes 15 800 31 600 (double)
Balloons 2 800 6 000 (Opinion No 01/2016)
Total 44 500 89 400
4.1.4. How could the issue/problem evolve
If the requirements for flight recorder carriage are not changed for commercial operations, the gap in
the understanding of large aircraft and light aircraft accident causes and in the identification of
relevant safety actions will grow. Indeed, more and more data are collected and analysed by operators
of large aeroplanes and large helicopters on a day-to-day basis (for flight data monitoring, condition
monitoring, continuing airworthiness). In addition, the capabilities of flight recorders required to be
installed on large aircraft are being enhanced (e.g. with data-link recording, the advent of very long
recording duration CVRs). Consequently, the gap in knowledge is expected to grow between large
aircraft and light aircraft.
Because of this, while one can expect that the level of safety will further increase for commercial
operators of large aircraft thanks to the increase of recorded data, it may still remain at a lower level
for commercial operators of light aircraft (operated under Part-CAT or Part-SPO) in spite of the
demanding requirements they have to comply with anyway in terms of equipment, procedures, and
training. Also, side safety benefits of continuously recording data (such as dissuasion against risk-taking
by pilots, favouring retrospective occurrence reporting or earlier detection of performance issues with
engines or systems) will not be reaped. These diverging trends are problematic when considering in
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particular the transportation of fare-paying passengers, as the general public may rightfully expect an
equivalent level of safety when they are travelling, whatever the aircraft used.
One should also not rely on coincidental recordings from portable electronic devices (portable GNSS
receiver, action camera, smartphone) to replace dedicated in-flight recording, because the data
formats used by these devices are proprietary and data is encrypted; this makes retrieval of any useful
data very challenging when the device is damaged (often the case after an accident). Also retrieving
data from these devices on a day-to-day basis for operational purposes is difficult for technical and
privacy reasons. The manufacturers of these electronic devices usually provide little assistance to the
investigation authorities.
When considering non-commercial operations with light aircraft (covered by Part-NCC and Part-NCO),
the absence of dedicated in-flight recording equipment will probably not make any significant
difference safety-wise. Since the regulatory framework set by Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air
Operations (Part-SPO, Part-NCC and Part-NCO) is much less stringent for light aircraft, a higher level of
risk-taking is considered acceptable. Also refer to Appendix H for considerations related to general
aviation.
It is also not expected that in-flight recording data would make a significant difference for accident
prevention, because most causes of accidents affecting light aircraft used for general aviation are often
recurrent and well-known. In that case, accident prevention might be better served by other measures
than recording flight data (for instance, enhancing the design of aircraft control or instruments,
improving procedures, specific training, etc.).
In addition, non-commercial operators and private owners usually have limited financial capacity.
In this case, in-flight recording equipment may bring limited side benefits for the cost of fitting and
maintaining it serviceable. Please refer also to the principle of proportionality presented in
Section 4.1.2.
Finally, it should be noted that Regulation (EU) 2016/118521 introduced a new requirement for all pilots
of aircraft carrying a serviceable transponder to ‘operate the transponder at all times during flight,
regardless of whether the aircraft is within or outside airspace where SSR is used for ATS purposes’
(refer to Appendix F). Since most light aeroplanes and helicopters operated under Part-NCO are fitted
with a transponder in order to be able to fly through airspace where it is required, one may expect that
in the future a radar track will almost always be available after an accident of such aircraft, hence
facilitating the reconstruction of the flight’s history.
4.2. What we want to achieve — objectives
The operational objectives of this proposal are to:
— enhance the identification and prevention of safety issues affecting light aircraft by means of
data recorded in flight;
— achieve harmonisation with ICAO Standards in Annex 6 Parts I, II and II;
21
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1185 of 20 July 2016 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012 as
regards the update and completion of the common rules of the air and operational provisions regarding services and procedures in
air navigation (SERA Part C) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 730/2006 (OJ L 196, 21.7.2016, p. 3).
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— produce a proportionate regulation which takes into account the General Aviation Roadmap;
and
— identify avenues other than requirements for in-flight recording equipment.
4.3. How it could be achieved — options
4.3.1. Requiring, facilitating or promoting
When a target level of equipment cannot be achieved by introducing a new requirement due to cost
impact and proportionality considerations despite the recognised safety benefit, then other ways to
achieve it may facilitate or promote the installation of equipment.
In this context, ‘facilitate’ means modifying the regulatory framework so that in-flight recording
equipment can be installed following a faster and cheaper approval process. ‘Promote’ means
communicating the benefits of installing in-flight recording equipment in order to get buy-in from the
industry and pilots.
4.3.1.1. Facilitating the installation of in-flight recording equipment
Voluntary installation of equipment recording data, audio or images can be facilitated by allowing it to
be performed under a standard change, such as the one defined by the Certification Specifications for
Standard Changes and Standard Repairs (CS-STAN). An installation performed under CS-STAN does not
require an approval process if it is validated by an aircraft certificate of release to service (in
accordance with Part-M, M.A.801) issued by the appropriate certifying staff.
The equipment for which the installation could be facilitated includes:
— video cameras;
— GNSS receivers;
— in-flight recording system when it relies on dedicated sensors (camera, GNSS receiver,
accelerometer, etc.);
— transponder (because it allows the recording of a radar track on the ground).
The objective of RMT.0690 (NPA 2016-17 ‘Regular update of certification specifications for standard
changes & standard repairs (CS-STAN)’22, published on 7 December 2016) is to update CS-STAN. The
tasks under RMT.0690 include the introduction in Subpart B of the CS-STAN (standard changes) of
items addressing the installation of video camera mountings, of a GNSS receiver and of a transponder.
They also include the creation of a new item addressing the installation of an in-flight recording
system.
The update of CS-STAN is outside the scope of this rulemaking task.
4.3.1.2. Promoting in-flight recording equipment
In order for the promotion of in-flight recording equipment to be successful, benefits other than
facilitating official safety investigations should be put forward. Indeed, from the perspective of small
operators, pilots and aircraft owners, the probability of an accident is very remote; consequently, they
22
Available at https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendment/npa-2016-17.
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are more inclined to invest in equipment that has a more direct impact on safety (e.g. an anti-collision
system) than in in-flight recording equipment. Among other things, the benefits of in-flight recording
equipment could be promoted among operators, flight schools and aero clubs in order to monitor the
safe and cost-effective use of aircraft, prevent excessive risk-taking, and support training.
More details on the potential benefits of in-flight recording and the stakeholders which could be
receptive to promotion of in-flight recording are presented in Appendix D.
4.3.2. The options
Due to the fact that the context and the drivers are very different when considering aeroplanes,
helicopters, sailplanes and balloons, different sets of policy options were established depending on the
aircraft category. Table 5A and Table 5B present these options.
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Table 5A: Selected policy options for light aeroplanes and light helicopters
Option No Short title Description
A.0 Do nothing Baseline option (no change to the rules and no promotion); risks
remain as outlined in the issue analysis.
A.1 Safety Promote the recording of basic flight parameters, audio and/or a
promotion view of the instruments panel for all models of light aeroplanes and
light helicopters and for all types of operations (no change to the
rules).
A.2 ICAO Annex 6 Strictly transpose ICAO Standards in Annex 6 for newly manufactured
light turbine-engined aeroplanes and newly manufactured light
turbine-engined helicopters operated for CAT.
A.3 ICAO Annex 6 Transpose ICAO Standards in Annex 6 with the following differences:
with — With regard to aeroplanes, the applicability set is newly
differences manufactured aeroplanes which have an MOPSC of more than 9
or which are turbine-engined and have an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or
more;
— The requirement to record basic flight parameters on board
aeroplanes and helicopters is also applicable to commercial SPO;
— Recording of audio is not required.
A.4 Combined Option A.1 + Option A.3
solution
Option A.0 means no change to the current rules and no promotion action.
Option A.1 means promoting the benefits of recording flight parameters, interactions between the
pilots and the aircraft by means of a camera, as well as audio in the flight crew compartment.
Promotion could take, for example, the form of a leaflet or of information on the EASA website.
Option A.2 means strictly transposing the Standards of ICAO Annex 6 Parts I and III for lightweight flight
recorders into Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air Operations. This means:
— newly manufactured turbine-engined light aeroplanes operated for CAT are required to record
basic flight parameters by means of an FDR, an ADRS, a Class C airborne image recorder (AIR) or
a Class C airborne image recording system (AIRS) (ICAO Standard 6.3.1.2.1 of Annex 6 Part I);
— newly manufactured turbine-engined light aeroplanes operated for CAT,
which have an MCTOM of more than 2 250 kg; and
which are certified for operation with a minimum crew of at least two pilots,
are required to record audio by means of a CVR or a CARS (ICAO Standard 6.3.2.1.1 of Annex 6 Part I);
and
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— newly manufactured turbine-engined light helicopters operated for CAT, which have an MCTOM
of more than 2 250 kg, are required to record basic flight parameters by means of an FDR, an
ADRS, a Class C AIR or a Class C AIRS (ICAO Standard 4.3.1.2.4 of Annex 6 Part III, Section II).
Option A.3 means transposing the Standards in ICAO Annex 6 Parts I and III and adapting them to
capture aeroplanes with an MOPSC exceeding 9 and turbine-engined aeroplanes with an MCTOM of
2 250 kg or more, and to capture commercial SPO. In addition, the ICAO Standard prescribing the
recording of audio for light aeroplanes is not transposed. This means:
— newly manufactured light aeroplanes operated for CAT or commercial SPO, which in addition:
have an MOPSC of more than 9; or
are turbine-engined and have an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more,
are required to record basic flight parameters (by means of an FDR, an ADRS, a Class C AIR or a Class C
AIRS);
— newly manufactured turbine-engined light helicopters operated for CAT or commercial SPO,
which have an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more, are required to record basic flight parameters (by
means of an FDR, an ADRS, a Class C AIR or a Class C AIRS).
Option A.4 means implementing Options A.1 and A.3 together.
Table 5B: Selected policy options for balloons
Option No Short title Description
B.0 Do nothing Baseline option (no change to the rules and no promotion); risks
remain as outlined in the issue analysis.
B.1 Safety Promote the fitment of balloons with means to record trajectory
promotion parameters and images from the basket interior (no change to the
rules).
B.2 Record position Require newly manufactured balloons used in commercial
and images operations and with an MCTOM of 3 000 kg or more to be fitted
with equipment recording the balloon’s trajectory parameters and
images from the basket interior.
B.3 Combined Option B.1 + Option B.2.
solution
Option B.0 means no change to the current rules and no promotion action.
Option B.1 means promoting the benefits of recording trajectory parameters (i.e. three-dimensional
position and, when available, speed and track), as well as images of the basket interior (capturing a
view of the normal position of the pilot and the passengers in the balloon). This may be performed by
dedicated in-flight recording equipment or by equipment with another purpose: GNSS receiver with a
recording function, flight tracking system, etc. Promotion could take, for example, the form of a leaflet
or of information on the EASA website.
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Option B.2 means that all newly manufactured balloons used in commercial operations and with an
MCTOM of 3 000 kg or more (corresponding to a passenger capacity of more than 13 on most balloon
models) are required to record, in the balloon or on the ground, trajectory parameters (i.e. three-
dimensional position and, when available, speed and track) and images of the basket interior
(capturing a view of the normal position of the pilot and the passengers in the balloon). This may be
performed by dedicated in-flight recording equipment, or by equipment with another purpose. The
requirement proposed by Option B.2 is performance-based (not prescriptive) and allows, for instance,
that the data is recorded on the ground.
However, two conditions are defined for a solution to be considered acceptable (see also Appendix F):
a) If data is recorded on board, a non-volatile memory medium is used; and
b) Information sufficient to recover and decode the recorded data files is provided to safety
investigation authorities, also in the case where chip-level recovery is needed (equipment is
damaged in the accident).
Option B.3 means implementing options B.1 and B.2 together.
Tables 6A and 6B show how the options address the consolidated target level of equipment presented
in Tables 3A and 3C.
Table 6A: Target levels of equipment and identified options for aeroplanes and helicopters
Target level of equipment Light aeroplanes and light helicopters Options
(applicable Annex of
Regulation (EU) No
965/2012 on Air
Operations)
Annex IV ‘High’ for multi-engined turbine-powered (Already covered by the
(Part-CAT) aeroplanes with an MOPSC of more than 9 (already Air OPS rules)
covered by the AirOPS rules).
‘Medium’ for turbine-engined aeroplanes with an Option A.2 or
MCTOM equal to or greater than 2 250 kg, as well Option A.3
as for aeroplanes with an MOPSC of more than 9.
‘Medium’ for turbine-engined helicopters with an Option A.2 or
MCTOM equal to or greater than 2 250 kg. Option A.3
‘None’ to ‘low’ for other light aeroplanes and light Option A.1
helicopters.
Annex VIII ‘Medium’ for turbine-engined aeroplanes with an Option A.3
(Part-SPO) MCTOM equal to or greater than 2 250 kg, as well
as for aeroplanes with an MOPSC of more than 9.
‘Medium’ for turbine-engined helicopters with an Option A.3
MCTOM equal to or greater than 2 250 kg.
‘None’ to ‘low’ for other light aeroplanes and light Option A.1
helicopters.
Annex VI (Part-NCC) or ‘None’ to ‘low’ for other light aeroplanes and light Option A.1
Annex VII (Part-NCO) helicopters.
Table 6B: Target levels of equipment and identified options for balloons
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Target aircraft Balloons Options
Basic requirements (Part-BOP, Subpart BAS) ‘None’ Option B.0
Additional requirements for commercial ‘Low’ if MCTOM is 3 000 kg Option B.2
operations (Part-BOP, Subpart ADD) or more (corresponds to a
passenger capacity of more
than 13).
‘None’ to ‘low’ otherwise. Option B.1
4.4. Methodology and data
4.4.1. Methodology applied
The methodology applied for this IA is the multi-criteria analysis (MCA) which allows comparing all
options by scoring them against a set of criteria.
MCA covers a wide range of techniques that aim to combine a range of positive and negative impacts
into a single framework to allow easier comparison of scenarios. Essentially, it applies cost-benefit
thinking to cases where there is a need to present impacts that are a mixture of qualitative,
quantitative, and monetary data, and where there are varying degrees of certainty. The MCA key steps
generally include:
— establishing the criteria to be used to compare the options (these criteria should be measurable,
at least in qualitative terms);
— attributing weight to each criterion to reflect its relative importance to the decision to be taken;
— scoring how well each option meets the criteria (the scoring needs to be relative to the baseline
scenario);
— ranking the options by combining their respective weights and scores; and
— performing sensitivity analysis on the scoring to test the robustness of the ranking.
The criteria used to compare the options were derived from the Basic Regulation and the IA guidelines
developed by EASA and in line with the principles of better regulation issued by the European
Commission. The principal objective of EASA is to ‘establish and maintain a high uniform level of safety’
(Article 2(1) of the Basic Regulation). As additional objectives, the Basic Regulation identifies
environmental, economic, proportionality, and harmonisation aspects, which are reflected below.
For the scoring of the impacts, a simple scale ranging from – 5 (very negative) to + 5 (very positive) is
used to indicate the positive and negative impacts. The intermediate impact values are:
— – 3 (medium negative),
— – 1 (slightly negative),
— 0 (neutral),
— + 1 (slightly positive), and
— + 3 (medium positive).
This was found to be a simple way to assess the impacts. In addition, each criterion (safety, economic,
environmental, etc.) was attributed an equal weight.
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4.4.2. Data collection
EASA’s accident databases have been used to collect statistics on accidents and serious incidents with
light aircraft, as well as safety recommendations related to in-flight recording.
In addition, four studies were performed by EASA in order to assess the potential safety benefits of in-
flight recording for light aircraft. The results of these four studies are summarised in Section 4.1.2.
The detailed results of these studies are presented in Appendix E.
With regard to the cost, operational impact and benefits of in-flight recording systems, EASA launched
a survey from 7 May to 9 June 2015. The survey was focused on aircraft systems which are
permanently installed on light aeroplanes and light helicopters, and whose primary function is to
record data, audio or images for later analysis or investigation. The survey was addressed to the EASA
advisory bodies and to equipment manufacturers. 12 organisations responded (8 aircraft
manufacturers, 6 equipment manufacturers, and 1 aircraft owner). The results of this survey are
presented in Appendix G.
4.5. What are the impacts
4.5.1. Safety impact
Option A.0: Do nothing
The safety impact of Option A.0 is expected to be negative for commercial operations and neutral for
non-commercial operations (refer to Section 4.1.4). However, only a small proportion of light
aeroplanes and light helicopters are used for commercial operations.
Hence, the overall impact of Option A.0 is considered slightly negative (– 1).
Option A.1: Safety promotion
When considering Option A.1, the arguments for promoting the recording of basic flight parameters
are the ones presented in Table D.1 of Appendix D. The arguments for promoting the recording of
cockpit audio are presented in Table D.2 of Appendix D. The arguments for promoting the recording of
images are presented in Table D.3 of Appendix D. Table D.4 of Appendix D presents the potential
incentives for the various categories of stakeholders.
However, a number of factors may limit the effectiveness of promoting in-flight recording:
1) While organisations (aircraft operators, aero clubs, training organisations) may see benefits of
equipping their aircraft with in-flight recording equipment, this may not be the case for
individual aircraft owners if there is no return on investment.
2) Another possible hindrance is the protection of in-flight recordings, in particular audio and image
recordings, because of their intrinsic privacy content. While a minimum level of protection
should be required to avoid misuse, this could in turn make in-flight recording less interesting for
day-to-day use, and therefore difficult to promote.
3) Given the limited financial capacity of the target audience and the small size of the aircraft,
promotion of in-flight recording is more likely to be convincing if the advocated concept is less
prescriptive and can be implemented with equipment primarily designed for other purposes
(such as navigation equipment). On the other hand, this would have to be balanced with safety
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investigation needs (e.g. the memory should not be volatile, the data should not be encrypted,
decoding documentation should be available, etc.). Reconciling these two objectives could be
challenging.
4) The operational constraints and maintenance cost of installed equipment should be as low as
possible. A fit-and-forget approach should be made possible. The equipment should also not be
required to be maintained serviceable when it is installed on a voluntary basis, as this would
work against promotion. This in return may affect the availability and consequently the safety
benefits of the equipment.
It should be noted that CS-STAN could be amended to allow recording equipment to be installed under
a standard change (refer to NPA 2016-17, published on 7 December 2016). Indeed, the cost of
certifying the installation of such equipment is a major cost contributor. Given the limited financial
capacity of operators and owners of light aeroplanes and helicopters, this change in the CS-STAN is
important for the effective promotion of recording equipment. On the other hand, if a supplemental
type certificate (STC) is required to install the in-flight recording equipment, most likely the
certification cost will discourage voluntary installation. When a new part or appliance is installed on an
aircraft, except when it is ELA1 or ELA2 aircraft, this requires an authorised release certificate (EASA
Form 1) that only a production organisation approval (POA) holder is entitled to issue (refer to Part-21,
points 21.A.163 and 21.A.307), unless an equivalent form recognised by bilateral agreements23 is used.
In practice, this means that aeroplanes with an MCTOM above 2 000 kg and helicopters with an
MCTOM above 600 kg or turbine-engined, or more than 2 occupants, require an EASA Form 1 when a
new part or appliance is installed. However, EASA RMT.0018 & RMT.0571 ‘Installation of parts and
appliances that are released without an EASA Form 1 or equivalent’24 should relax the conditions to
allow aircraft release after installation of new parts and appliances without an EASA Form 1. This would
make it possible for more categories of light aeroplanes and helicopters to benefit from the exemption
of EASA Form 1.
In addition, while promotion activities might create an incentive for aircraft operators as well as flight
schools and aero clubs to install dedicated in-flight recording equipment, the incentive for individual
aircraft owners and private pilots is not strong. Therefore, the safety impact of Option A.1 is expected
to be overall medium positive (+ 3) if rules are amended to allow installation of in-flight recording
equipment under a standard change and without an EASA Form 1, slightly positive (+ 1) if installation of
in-flight recording equipment is possible by means of a minor change, and neutral (0) if the installation
requires an STC. For the purpose of scoring, a middle score is retained (+ 1) corresponding to a
slightly positive impact.
23
For example, FAA Form 8130-3 or TCCA Form 24-0078.
24
http://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/rulemaking-subjects/installation-parts-and-appliances-are-released-without-easa
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Option A.2: ICAO Annex 6
Option A.2 would affect newly manufactured turbine-engined light aeroplanes and newly
manufactured turbine-engined light helicopters operated for CAT.
— When considering the transposition of ICAO Standard 6.3.1.2.1 of Annex 6 Part I:
In accordance with Table B.2 of Appendix B, between 2012 and 2014 there were 134 accidents
with aeroplanes registered in the EASA MSs, with an MCTOM of less than 5 700 kg and used for
commercial operations (CAT or aerial work). In 5 out of these 134 accidents, the aeroplane was
operated for CAT and of a model subject to FDR carriage in accordance with Part-CAT,
CAT.IDE.A.190 (multi-engined turbine-powered and MOPSC of more than 9). In the same period,
there were 12 accidents of a model subject to recording flight parameters in accordance with
Standard 6.3.1.2.1 of Annex 6 Part I. Hence, the safety benefit of transposing Standard 6.3.1.2.1
is considered slightly positive: (12 – 5) = 7 additional accidents are captured (5 %) out of 134.
— When considering the transposition of ICAO Standard 6.3.2.1.1 of Annex 6 Part I:
For aeroplanes, transposing this Standard would in practice mean equipping few aircraft and
therefore that would bring very little safety benefit. Indeed, transposing ICAO Standard 6.3.2.1.1
would mean adding a requirement for those aeroplanes which are:
single-engined turbine-powered, with an MCTOM between 2 250 and 5 700 kg and
certified for operation with a minimum crew of at least two pilots: no aircraft model in this
category is known; and
multi-engined turbine-powered, with an MOPSC of 9 or less, with an MCTOM between
2 250 and 5 700 kg and certified for operation with a minimum crew of at least two pilots.
Few aircraft models belong to this category (Beech 90, Raytheon 390, Piper PA42, Cessna
Citation I). Between 2006 and 2014, there were only 4 accidents involving aircraft of such
models registered in an EASA MS and operated for CAT out of 377 accidents with light
aeroplanes used for commercial operations (1 %), with 12 fatalities in total.
Hence, the safety benefit of transposing Standard 6.3.2.1.1 is considered negligible.
Refer to Table 7 for the comparison between current CVR requirements and ICAO Standard 6.3.2.1.1.
— When considering the transposition of ICAO Standard 4.3.1.2.4 of Annex 6 Part III, Section II:
In accordance with Table B.3 of Appendix B, between 2012 and 2014 there were 58 accidents
with helicopters operated commercially, with an MCTOM of less than 3 175 kg. None of these
helicopters were required to carry a crash-protected flight recorder or any kind of in-flight
recording system in accordance with the current Air Operations rules. In the same period, there
were 5 accidents with helicopters operated for CAT and of a model within the scope of
Standard 6.3.1.2.1 of Annex 6 Part I (turbine-engined helicopters with an MCTOM of over
2 250 kg and operated for CAT). Hence, the safety benefit of transposing Standard 6.3.1.2.1 is
considered slightly positive: 5 additional accidents are captured (8 %) out of 58.
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Table 7: Comparison between ICAO Annex 6 Part I and Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air
Operations with regard to recording audio on aeroplanes with an MCTOM of less than
5 700 kg and operated for CAT
Reference regulation CVR/CARS carriage requirement for aeroplanes with an MCTOM of
5 700 kg or less
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 CVR required if:
Part-CAT, CAT.IDE.A.185 — multi-engined turbine-powered aeroplanes,
— MOPSC > 9, and
— first issued with an individual CofA on or after 1 January 1990.
ICAO Annex 6 Part I CVR or CARS prescribed if:
Standard 6.3.2.1.1 — turbine-engined aeroplanes,
— MCTOM > 2 250 kg,
— certified for operation with a minimum crew of at least two
pilots, and
— application for type certificate on or after 1 January 2016.
In conclusion, the safety impact of Option A.2 is considered overall slightly positive (+ 1).
Option A.3: ICAO Annex 6 with differences
— When considering aeroplanes:
In accordance with to Table B.2 of Appendix B, between 2012 and 2014 there were 27 accidents
with aeroplanes used for commercial operations, and which either were turbine-engined with an
MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more or had an MOPSC of more than 9. Hence, the safety impact for
aeroplanes is considered slightly to medium positive: (27 – 5) = 22 accidents are captured (16 %)
out of 134.
— When considering helicopters:
In accordance with Table B.3 of Appendix B, there were 14 accidents with turbine-engined
helicopters with an MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more and used for commercial operations. Hence, the
safety impact for helicopters is considered medium positive: 14 accidents are captured (24 %)
out of 58.
Hence, compared to Option A.2, Option A.3 captures 3 times more historical accidents with aeroplanes
(22 instead of 7) and 3 times more accidents with helicopters (14 instead of 5).
In conclusion, the safety impact of Option A.3 is considered medium positive (+ 3).
Option A.4: Combined solution
Option A.4 combines Option A.1 and Option A.3, i.e. promotion and requirement for an extended set
of aircraft models compared to Option A.2. Therefore, the safety impact of Option A.4 is expected to
be overall very positive (+ 5) if the rules are amended to allow for the installation of in-flight recording
equipment under a standard change and without an EASA Form 1, and medium positive (+ 3)
otherwise. For the purpose of scoring, a middle score of + 4 is retained (corresponding to medium
positive to very positive impact).
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4.5.1.1. Safety impact for balloons
Option B.0
The safety impact of Option B.0 is expected to be negative for commercial operations and neutral for
non-commercial operations (refer to Section 4.1.4). However, only a small proportion of balloons are
used for commercial operations.
Hence, the overall impact of Option B.0 is considered slightly negative (– 1).
Option B.1: Safety promotion
Similar to Option A.1, promoting the recording of trajectory parameters and images has some
limitations. When considering Option B.1, the arguments for promoting the recording of trajectory
parameters are the ones presented in Table D.1 of Appendix D. The arguments for promoting the
recording of images of the basket interior are presented in Table D.3 of Appendix D.
Table D.4 presents the potential incentives for the various categories of stakeholders.
It should be noted that CS-STAN could be amended to allow video cameras and GNSS receivers to be
installed under a standard change. This would reduce the cost of certifying the installation of such
equipment. In addition, all balloons are ELA1 or ELA2 aircraft, therefore the installation of new parts
and appliances may be done without the issue of an EASA Form 1 if the conditions described in Part-21,
21.A.307(c)25, are fulfilled.
In summary, promotion is expected to create an incentive for some balloon operators, as well as
balloon clubs, to install dedicated in-flight recording equipment because it would allow better
monitoring of compliance with procedures and of the airworthiness of the aircraft, and would dissuade
pilots from taking excessive risks. However, the incentive for individual balloon owners is not
considered strong. Therefore, the safety impact of Option B.1 is expected to be overall slightly
positive.
Option B.2: Record position and images
In accordance with Table B.4 of Appendix B, there were 32 accidents and serious incidents with
balloons registered in the EASA MSs and operated for commercial operations between 2012 and 2014.
4 of them involved a balloon with an MCTOM of 3 000 kg or more. Therefore, the safety impact of
Option B.2 is expected to be slightly positive (+ 1): 4 accidents are captured (12 %) out of 32.
Option B.3: Combined solution
Option B.3 combines Option B.1 and Option B.2, i.e. promotion and requirement. The cumulated safety
impact is considered medium positive (+ 3).
25
These conditions are:
‘1. not life-limited, nor part of the primary structure, nor part of the flight controls;
2. manufactured in conformity to applicable design;
3. marked in accordance with Subpart Q;
4. identified for installation in the specific aircraft;
5. to be installed in an aircraft for which the owner has verified compliance with the conditions 1 through 4 and has accepted
responsibility for this compliance.’
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4.5.1.2. Summary of safety impact
Table 8A: Comparative safety impact for aeroplanes and helicopters
Option A.0 Option A.1 Option A.2 Option A.3 Option A.4
Safety
impact –1 +1 +1 +3 +4
Negative impact — negligible Strictly Larger Combines the
on commercial effect if the transposing the proportion of safety benefits of
operations, and installation ICAO Standards accidents A.1 and A.3:
requires an would result in a covered than — medium
no impact on
STC; small proportion with Option A.2 positive if the
non-commercial of accidents installation
— slightly
operations covered by in- requires an
positive if
installation flight recording STC;
can be made — very positive if
under a minor the
change installation
approval; can be made
— medium under a minor
positive if the change
installation approval or by
can be made means of a
by means of a standard
standard change
change and
without an
EASA Form 1
Table 8B: Comparative safety impact for balloons
Option B.0 Option B.1 Option B.2 Option B.3
Safety
impact –1 +1 +1 +3
Negative impact Small proportion Combines the
on commercial of accidents and safety benefits of
operations, and serious incidents B.1 and B.2
covered by in-
no impact on
flight recording
non-commercial
operations
4.5.2. Environmental impact
Whichever the option, it has no foreseeable environmental impact: the environmental impact is
considered neutral (0).
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4.5.3. Social impact
Option A.0
The social impact of Option A.0 is expected to be neutral (0).
Option A.1
Fitting a light aeroplane or a light helicopter with equipment capable of recording audio or images may
raise questions related to the protection of pilot privacy. The current Air Operations rules only address
the protection of the FDR recording and the CVR recording (refer to Appendix D).
However, with Option A.1, every aircraft operator and aircraft owner remains free to install or not such
equipment.
Therefore, the social impact of Option A.1 is considered neutral (0).
Option A.2
Fitting a light aeroplane or a light helicopter with equipment capable of recording audio or images may
raise questions related to the protection of pilot privacy. The current Air Operations rules only address
the protection of the FDR recording and the CVR recording (refer to Appendix D).
In order to mitigate this issue, it is proposed that:
— images of the flight crew compartment recorded by a flight recorder (crash-protected or
lightweight) cannot be used for purposes other than maintaining or improving safety, or
ensuring the flight recorder serviceability;
— if such images are disclosed or used for maintaining or improving safety, then:
the flight crew shall give their prior consent, and
a procedure related to the handling of images shall be in place;
— when such images are inspected for ensuring the serviceability of the flight recorder:
these images shall not be disclosed or used for purposes other than for ensuring the flight
recorder serviceability, and
if body parts of flight crew members may appear on the images, the operator shall ensure
the privacy of these images.
Assuming that such principles are transcribed into rules, the social impact is considered slightly
negative (– 1).
Option A.3
Assuming that principles such as those proposed in Option A.2 are transcribed into rules, the social
impact is considered slightly negative (– 1).
Option A.4
Assuming that principles such as those proposed in Option A.2 are transcribed into rules, the social
impact is considered slightly negative (– 1).
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4.5.3.1. Social impact for balloons
Option B.0
The social impact of Option B.0 is expected to be neutral (0).
Option B.1
Fitting balloons with equipment capable of recording images of the occupants inside the basket may
raise questions related to the protection of privacy. The current Air Operations rules only address the
protection of the FDR recording and the CVR recording (refer to Appendix D).
However, with Option B.1, balloon operators or balloon owners remain free to install or not such
equipment, and it is assumed that they will make their decision also taking into account the social
impact at their level.
Therefore, the social impact of Option B.1 is considered neutral (0).
Option B.2
Fitting balloons with equipment capable of recording images of the occupants inside the basket may
raise questions related to the protection of privacy. The current Air Operations rules only address the
protection of the FDR recording and the CVR recording when installed on an aeroplane or a helicopter
(refer to Appendix D).
In order to mitigate this issue:
— images of the basket cannot be used for purposes other than maintaining or improving safety, or
ensuring equipment serviceability;
— if such images are disclosed or used for maintaining or improving safety, then the flight crew and
the passengers shall give their prior consent; and
— when such images are inspected for ensuring the serviceability of the equipment:
these images shall not be disclosed or used for purposes other than ensuring the
equipment serviceability, and
if parts of the bodies of flight crew members or of passengers might appear on the
images, the operator shall ensure the privacy of these images.
Assuming that such principles are transcribed into rules, the social impact is considered slightly
negative (– 1).
Option B.3
Assuming that principles such as those proposed in Option B.2 are transcribed into rules, the social
impact is considered slightly negative (– 1).
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4.5.3.2. Summary of the social impact
Table 9A: Comparative social impact for aeroplanes and helicopters
Option A.0 Option A.1 Option A.2 Option A.3 Option A.4
Social impact 0 0 –1 –1 –1
Aircraft Limited impact Same as Option Combines the
operators and if audio and A.2 for images social impact of
aircraft owners image A.1 and A.3
are free to recordings are No social
make decisions protected by impact if only
with no social rules flight data are
impact recorded
Table 9B: Comparative social impact for balloons
Option B.0 Option B.1 Option B.2 Option B.3
Social impact 0 0 –1 –1
Balloon Limited impact Combines the
operators and if image social impact of
balloon owners recordings are B.1 and B.2
are free to protected by
make decisions rules
with no social
impact
4.5.4. Economic impact
Note: For the purpose of the economic impact assessment, ‘recurring cost’ means cost occurring once
for each individual aircraft concerned.
Option A.0
The economic impact of Option A.0 is expected to be neutral (0).
Option A.1
Option A.1 would result in a number of stakeholders voluntarily installing some kind of in-flight
recording equipment when it is economically reasonable. There is no direct economic benefit from
installing an in-flight recording system (refer to Appendix D for the identified benefits). On the other
hand, since each aircraft owner or aircraft operator may choose or not to install such equipment in
accordance with to Option A.1, it is expected that they will perform such installation only when this is
economical for them. For these reasons, the economic impact of Option A.1 is considered
neutral (0).
From the safety investigation authorities’ perspective, Option A.1 would result in more investigations
where an in-flight recording of the sequence of events is available. This would accelerate the
investigations, in particular by saving on test and research (refer to Study 1, presented in
Appendix E). Study 1 also showed that test and research are performed in about a quarter of the
investigations of light aircraft accidents, and in only half of the cases where test and research were
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performed would a limited set of flight parameters (such as those recorded by a lightweight flight
recorder) be sufficient to avoid performing test and research.
Hence, the overall economic impact of Option A.1 for safety investigation authorities is expected to be
slightly positive (+ 1).
Option A.2
In accordance with the survey on cost, operational impact and benefits of in-flight recording systems
(refer to Appendix G), implementing Option A.2 for the aeroplanes and helicopters involved would
result in the cost presented in Table 10A.
These results consider the cost of an STC and the cost of a minor change. If the equipment could be
installed under a standard change not requiring approval (performed in accordance with CS-STAN) and
not requiring the issue of an EASA Form 1, then the non-recurring cost would be significantly reduced.
Table 10B presents a summary of the fees levied for a standard STC and for a minor change, for light
aeroplanes and light helicopters, as set by Regulation (EU) No 319/201426. Table 10B shows that for the
categories of aeroplanes and helicopters considered, the fees for an STC may be up to EUR 5 000.
In addition, an STC usually requires an in-depth demonstration by the applicant, which adds costs.
Based on the results of the survey presented in Appendix G, it is assumed that the cost for design,
testing and certification ranges between EUR 100 000 and 300 000 in the case where an STC is
required.
If the installation of in-flight recording equipment could be performed under a minor change (hence
not requiring an STC), the certification fees would be below EUR 1 000. In addition, the other cost for
the certification demonstration could be reduced by several tens of thousands of euros (given that the
certification efforts would be much less). It is assumed that the cost for design, testing and certification
ranges between EUR 10 000 and 50 000 in the case where a minor change approval is required. Further
to that, a minor change is a change that has no appreciable effect ‘on the mass, balance, structural
strength, reliability, operational characteristics, noise, fuel venting, exhaust emission, or other
characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the product’ (refer to Part-21, point 21.A.91). Hence, the
installation of equipment performed under a minor change is expected to be simple and therefore to
require limited efforts in terms of design and testing. Consequently, design and test costs are also
expected to be reduced compared to the installation of equipment that requires an STC.
If a standard installation of the in-flight recording equipment (under CS-STAN) was made possible, then
there would be no cost for installation certification.
Given that Option A.2 is only applicable to aeroplanes and helicopters manufactured after a given date
in the future, it is assumed that in practice this option will be implemented by aircraft manufacturers
which will offer it as an option upon aircraft delivery (as it is already the case for some aircraft models).
One may assume that a manufacturer is best positioned to play on scales in order to get a low unit
purchase price and to distribute the installation design, test and certification costs over a large number
of individual aircraft. In addition, for forward-fit, there is no additional cost generated by aircraft
downtime, and the number of hours needed to install the equipment is reduced compared to a
26
Commission Regulation (EU) No 319/2014 of 27 March 2014 on the fees and charges levied by the European Aviation Safety
Agency, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 593/2007 (OJ L 93, 28.3.2014, p. 58).
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retrofit. For example, assuming that the equipment interacts with some aircraft systems in order to
retrieve data, so that its installation is considered complex and requires three 8-hour days at
100 EUR/working hour, then the corresponding cost is EUR 2 400. If, on the other hand, the equipment
does not interact with the aircraft systems, then one 8-hour day could be assumed, which corresponds
to EUR 800 of installation cost. It is assumed that the installation cost ranges between EUR 500 and
3 000.
Table 10A: Main cost items of installing a lightweight flight recorder compliant with EUROCAE
Document 155 (in accordance with the survey) during production (no retrofit) —
(year 2016)
Cost item Range of cost in EUR Recurring or non- Comment
recurring cost
Unit purchase price from 4 000 to 8 000 Recurring Unit price depends on
equipment model and
effect scale
Installation design, From 100 000 to 300 000 Non-recurring This cost depends on the
installation test and when installed on newly complexity of the
installation certification manufactured aircraft installation
(assuming that the
installation requires an
STC)
Installation design, 10 000 to 50 000 Non-recurring Example of cost for a
installation test and minor change
installation certification
(assuming that the
installation requires a
minor change approval)
Equipment installation 500 to 3 000 Recurring The equipment is
forward-fitted during the
aircraft production by the
aircraft manufacturer: no
aircraft downtime and
reduced number of man-
hours compared to a
retrofit
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Table 10B: Fees levied by EASA for various categories of light aeroplanes and light helicopters
(year 2016)
Aircraft category Type of certification approval Fee levied by EASA (in EUR)
Aeroplane with an MCTOM of less Standard STC 5 140
than 5 700 kg and considered a
high-performance aircraft
Minor change 890
Aeroplane with an MCTOM over Standard STC 2 030
2 000 kg and up to 5 700 kg and not
considered a high-performance
aircraft
Minor change 290
Aeroplane with an MCTOM up to Standard STC 1 160
2 000 kg and not considered a high-
performance aircraft
Minor change 290
Rotorcraft, medium Standard STC 4 640
Minor change 460
Rotorcraft, small Standard STC 3 480
Minor change 460
Table 11 shows that the range of cost per individual aircraft is high, between less than EUR 5 000 and
more than EUR 20 000. Table 11 also shows that the type of approval required makes a significant
difference: if an STC is required, then the total cost per individual aircraft can vary from a factor of one
to three or more depending on whether a large series of aircraft is produced. On the other hand, if only
a minor change is required or if the equipment can be installed under a standard change, the cost per
individual aircraft remains below EUR 10 000 and the influence of scale effect is much less.
Hence, the economic impact is considered medium negative (– 3) if an STC is required, and slightly
negative (– 1) if it is not. A middle score of – 2 (medium to slightly negative) is retained.
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Table 11: Example of cost computation of installing a lightweight flight recorder compliant with
EUROCAE Document 155 based on different scenarios (year 2016 price)
Conditions Total cost per individual aircraft Comment
Cost for installation design, test and Cost = 6 000 + 300 000 / 20 + 3 000 STC with high cost, small series
certification is EUR 300 000 (STC
= EUR 24 000
required)
Small series (20 aircraft)
Unit price is EUR 6 000
Installation cost is EUR 3 000
(complex installation)
Cost for installation design, test and Cost = 4 000 + 200 000 / 200 +3 000 STC with median cost, large series
certification is EUR 200 000 (STC
= EUR 8 000
required)
Large aircraft series (200 aircraft)
Unit price is EUR 4 000
Installation cost is EUR 3 000
(complex installation)
Cost for installation design, test and Cost = 4 000 + 20 000 / 20 + 500 Minor change with higher cost,
certification is EUR 20 000 (minor small series
= EUR 5 500
change)
Small series (20 aircraft)
Unit price is EUR 6 000
Installation cost is EUR 500 (non-
complex installation)
Cost for installation design, test and Cost = 4 000 + 20 000 / 200 + 500 Minor change with lower cost, large
certification is EUR 20 000 (minor series
= EUR 4 600
change)
Large aircraft series (200 aircraft)
Unit price is EUR 4 000
Installation cost is EUR 500 (non-
complex installation)
No cost for installation design and Cost = 6 000 + 500 Standard change (no certification
test (standard installation under cost, very reduced design and test
= EUR 6 500
CS-STAN) cost), small series
Small series (20 aircraft)
Unit price is EUR 6 000
Installation cost is EUR 500 (non-
complex installation)
No cost for installation design and Cost = 4 000 + 500 Standard change (no certification
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test (standard installation under = EUR 4 500 cost, very reduced design and test
CS-STAN) cost), large series
Large series (200 aircraft)
Unit price is EUR 4 000
Installation cost is EUR 500 (non-
complex installation)
With regard to safety investigation authorities, the economic impact is considered slightly positive
(+ 1), similar to Option A.1.
Option A.3
The categories of aircraft considered are slightly different from those considered for Option A.2, but
this difference is not expected to have any influence. Hence the economic impact for the industry is
also considered medium negative (– 3) if an STC is required, and slightly negative (– 1) if it is not.
A middle score of – 2 (medium to slightly negative) is retained.
With regard to safety investigation authorities, the economic impact is considered slightly positive
(+ 1), similar to Option A.1.
Option A.4
The economic impact of Option A.4 for industry, being a combination of Option A.1 (no economic
impact) and Option A.3 (economic impact medium negative), is expected to be medium negative
(– 3) if an STC is required and slightly negative (– 1) if it is not. A middle score of – 2 (medium to
slightly negative) is retained.
With regard to safety investigation authorities, the economic impact is considered medium positive
(+ 3), since this Option combines Option A.1 and Option A.3, and it is expected that more aircraft will
be equipped with in-flight recording equipment than in any of the other options considered.
4.5.4.1. Economic impact for balloons
Option B.0
The economic impact of Option B.0 is expected to be neutral (0).
Option B.1
Option B.1 would result in some stakeholders voluntarily installing video cameras and equipment
capable of recording or transmitting the balloon’s 3-D position, when this is economically reasonable.
There are no direct economic benefits from installing such equipment (refer to Appendix D for the
identified benefits). On the other hand, since each balloon owner or balloon operator may choose
either to install such equipment or not, it is expected that they will perform such installation when this
is economical for them. For these reasons, the economic impact of Option B.1 is considered
neutral (0).
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Option B.2
Option B.2 implies the mandatory installation of a camera and of a means to record or transmit the
trajectory of large balloons which are operated commercially. In addition, for the recordings to be
useful in case of an accident or a serious incident, the equipment should meet at least the following
two conditions (see also Section 4.3.2):
(a) if data is recorded on board, a non-volatile memory medium is used; and
(b) information sufficient to recover and decode the recorded data files is provided to safety
investigation authorities.
Many video camera or GNSS receiver models already fulfil condition (a), and fulfilling condition (b)
means that the equipment manufacturer should provide the investigation authorities with information
sufficient to allow them retrieving the files. Hence, Option B.2 would not require the development of
new equipment. In addition, the equipment needed for Option B.2 can be stand-alone, compact, and it
is not expected to interact with other balloon equipment.
It is planned to include in CS-STAN items allowing the installation of camera mountings and of a GNSS
receiver under a standard change.
If, however, a minor change approval is required:
— the certification fees for a minor change is EUR 300 (see Table 12B);
— similar to aeroplanes and helicopters, it is assumed that the cost for design, testing and
certification varies between EUR 10 000 and 50 000.
Given that Option B.2 is only applicable to balloons manufactured after a given date in the future, it is
assumed that, in practice, this option will be implemented by balloon manufacturers which will offer it
as a standard option. Hence, the equipment installation cost will be reduced. EUR 500 is assumed for
the installation itself (installation is non-complex).
On the other hand, large balloons are sold in small series, so that the installation design and test cost
cannot be distributed over a large number of models.
Table 12A presents examples of costs. Assuming a series of 10 balloons and that the cost for design,
test and certification is EUR 20 000 (minor change), the individual cost per balloon of Option B.2 would
then be 2 000 + 20 000 / 10 + 500 = EUR 4 500. Assuming that the installation can be performed as a
standard change, then whatever the size of the balloon series, the individual cost of Option B.2 would
then be 2 000 + 500 = EUR 2 500.
Therefore, the economic impact is considered slightly negative (– 1).
Note: When compared with the balloon purchase price and the revenue brought in per flight, the
cost figures mentioned above are still significant. This aspect is taken into account in the
impact on proportionality issues (see Section 4.4.5).
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Table 12A: Example of main cost items of installing means, during balloon production, to record
images of the basket and balloon position (no retrofit)
Cost item Range of cost Recurring or non- Comment
recurring cost
Unit purchase price of EUR 2 000 Recurring Equipment relies on
equipment recording standard and small
images of the basket components (camera +
interior and trajectory GNSS receiver or flight
data tracker)
Installation design, test EUR 10 000 to 50 000 if Non-recurring Equipment does not
and certification the installation is made interact with balloon
under a minor change equipment: no STC is
approval required
EUR 0 if the installation is
made under a standard
change
Installation of the EUR 500 Recurring The equipment is
equipment on the aircraft forward-fitted during the
aircraft production by the
aircraft manufacturer: no
aircraft downtime and
reduced number of man-
hours compared to a
retrofit
Table 12B: Fees levied by EASA for balloons
Aircraft category Type of certification approval Fee levied by EASA (in EUR)
Balloons Standard STC 460
Minor change 290
Option B.3
As Option B.3 is a combination of Option B.1 (no economic impact) and Option B.2 (economic impact
medium negative), the economic impact of Option B.3 is expected to be slightly negative (– 1).
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4.5.4.2. Summary of economic impact
Table 13A: Comparative economic impact for aeroplanes and helicopters
Option A.0 Option A.1 Option A.2 Option A.3 Option A.4
0 0 for industry – 2 for industry – 2 for industry – 2 for industry
Economic
impact
Aircraft Impact is Impact is Combines the
operators and medium medium economic
aircraft owners negative if STC negative if STC impact of A.1
are free to is required, is required, and A.3
make decisions slightly slightly
with no negative negative
economic otherwise otherwise
impact
+1 for +1 for +1 for +1 for
authorities authorities authorities authorities
In-flight In-flight In-flight In-flight
recording recording recording recording
equipment equipment equipment equipment
accelerates accelerates accelerates accelerates
investigation investigation investigation investigation
Table 13B: Comparative economic impact for balloons
Option B.0 Option B.1 Option B.2 Option B.3
Economic
0 0 –1 –1
impact
Balloon No STC, can Combines the
operators and rely on cheap economic
balloon owners equipment impact of B.1
are free to already used and B.2
make decisions for recreational
with no activities
economic
impact
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4.5.5. General aviation and proportionality issues
4.5.5.1. Impact of the options for aeroplanes and helicopters
Option A.0
The impact of Option A.0 is expected to be neutral (0).
Option A.1
Option A.1 is about promoting (not requiring) the installation of in-flight recording systems on
aeroplanes and helicopters. In accordance with Option A.1, aircraft manufacturers, aircraft operators
and aircraft owners remain free to install or not such systems. Hence, the impact of Option A.1 is
neutral (0).
Option A.2
Option A.2 affects turbine-engined light aeroplanes and turbine-engined light helicopters with unit
price typically ranging from EUR 1 500 000 to 5 000 000, and Option A.2 is applicable to CAT operations
only.
Option A.2 includes a requirement to record basic flight parameters (by means of an FDR, ADRS or
Class C AIR or AIRS) on board turbine-engined aeroplanes operated for CAT without any MCTOM or
MOPSC threshold. Hence, potentially turboprop aeroplane models with an MCTOM of less than
2 250 kg (such as Pilatus PC6, Cessna 206, Piper PA46 and PA34) could be subject to such a
requirement if they were operated for CAT. While the cost of installing the equipment (between
EUR 4 000 and 25 000; see Section 4.4.4) is low when compared to the purchase price of such aircraft
models, their limited passenger capacity (e.g. only 5 passengers for the Cessna 206 or the Piper PA46)
results in limited revenue per flight.
Therefore, the overall impact of Option A.2 is considered slightly negative (– 1).
Option A.3
Option A.3 only includes turbine-engined aeroplanes and helicopters with an MCTOM of more than
2 250 kg and aeroplanes with an MOPSC of more than 9. Hence, Option A.3 does not affect those
aeroplane and helicopter models which are usually operated for recreational activities, or whose
passenger capacity is very small.
Unlike Option A.2, Option A.3 encompass, in addition to CAT operations, commercial SPO, i.e. aerial
work activities which are remunerated and are either available to the public or performed under a
contract between the aircraft operator and a customer that has no control over the operator. In
summary, the stakeholders affected by Option A.3 are commercial operators selling passenger tickets
or services related to aerial work activities.
Hence, the overall impact of Option A.3 is considered neutral (0).
Option A.4
The impact of Option A.4, being a combination of Option A.1 (no impact) and Option A.3 (neutral), is
expected to be neutral (0).
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4. Impact assessment (IA)
4.5.5.2. Impact of the options for balloons
Option B.0
The impact of Option B.0 is expected to be neutral (0).
Option B.1
Option B.1 is about promoting (not requiring) the recording of the balloon position and of images of
the basket interior. In accordance with Option B.1, balloon manufacturers and balloon operators
remain free to install equipment to record this data. Hence, the impact of Option B.1 is considered
neutral (0).
Option B.2
Option B.2 only covers commercial operators of large balloons (MCTOM of 3 000 kg corresponding to
an envelope volume of 10 000 cubic meters or more) typically capable of transporting more than
13 passengers. Option B.2 is limited to newly manufactured balloons (no retrofit).
The individual purchase price of a balloon with an MCTOM of 3 000 kg typically varies from
EUR 100 000 to 200 000. Hence, the impact on proportionality is considered medium because of the
cost of installing the equipment (between EUR 2 000 and 4 000; see Section 4.4.4), while low in the
absolute, is still high when compared to the purchase price of the balloon.
With regard to practical implementation, the equipment would probably have to rely on a stand-alone
battery since there is no source of power on a conventional balloon. Such battery might have to be
recharged or replaced often mainly because of the power consumption of a camera. However, given
that typically several hours elapse between two successive flights with a balloon, this is not considered
adding an operational constraint. Hence, the operational impact of Option B.2 is expected to be
negligible.
For these reasons, the overall impact of Option B.2 is considered overall medium negative (– 3).
Option B.3
As Option B.3 is a combination of Option B.1 (no impact) and Option B.2 (impact medium negative), its
impact is expected to be medium negative (– 3).
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4. Impact assessment (IA)
4.5.5.3. Summary of impact on general aviation and proportionality issues
Table 14A: Impact for aeroplanes and helicopters
Option A.0 Option A.1 Option A.2 Option A.3 Option A.4
Impact on
general
aviation and 0 0 –1 0 0
proportionality
issues
Aircraft Impact on very Does not Combines the
operators and light turboprop impact impacts of A.1
aircraft owners aeroplanes turboprop and A.3 on
are free to aeroplanes of general
make decisions less than aviation and
with no impact 2 250 kg proportionality
issues
Table 14B: Comparative impact for balloons
Option B.0 Option B.1 Option B.2 Option B.3
Impact on general
aviation and
proportionality 0 0 –3 –3
issues
Balloon operators Captures only large Combines the
and balloon balloons operated economic impact
owners are free to commercially; of B.1 and B.2
make decisions however, the cost
with no impact is still significant
when compared
with balloon
purchase price and
revenue from
flights
4.5.6. Impact on better regulation and harmonisation
4.5.6.1. Impact of the options for aeroplanes and helicopters
Option A.0
The impact of Option A.0 is expected to be neutral (0).
Option A.1
Option A.1 is about promoting (not requiring) the installation of in-flight recording systems on
aeroplanes and helicopters. Hence, the impact of Option A.1 on rules harmonisation and better
regulation is considered neutral (0).
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4. Impact assessment (IA)
Option A.2
Option A.2 is about fully transposing ICAO Standards of Annex 6 Part I and III related to lightweight
flight recorders. Hence, it would improve the harmonisation of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air
Operations with ICAO Standards.
Option A.2 would not simplify the existing Air Operations rules. It would actually make the rules
applicable to aeroplanes with an MCTOM between 2 250 and 5 700 kg more complex, with multiple
cases depending on the type and the number of engines, the number of passengers, and the number
of pilots required (see Table 15A).
Option A.2 would not make the rules applicable to helicopters more complex (see Table 15B).
Option A.2 would not contradict the General Aviation Safety Strategy and Roadmap since only aircraft
used for CAT operation are within the scope of this Option.
Hence, the overall impact of Option A.2 on rules harmonisation and better regulation is considered
slightly positive (+ 1).
Table 15A: Summary of in-flight recording requirements applicable to newly manufactured
aeroplanes operated for CAT, if Option A.2 is elected (the new requirements appear in
bold)
MCTOM < 2 250 kg 2 250 ≤ MCTOM ≤ 5 700 kg MCTOM > 5 700 kg
Not turbine- NIL — NIL FDR and CVR required
engined in all cases
Turbine-engined Record basic flight — If multi-engined turbine-powered FDR and CVR required in
parameters (by means and MOPSC of more than 9: FDR all cases
of an FDR or an ADRS or and CVR required
a Class C AIR or AIRS) — If turbine-engined and certified
for operation with two or more
pilots: record basic flight
parameters by means of an FDR
or an ADRS or a Class C AIR or
AIRS) and record audio (by
means of a CVR or CARS)
— In all other cases: record basic
flight parameters only (by means
of an FDR or an ADRS or a Class C
AIR or AIRS)
Table 15B: Summary of in-flight recording requirements applicable to newly manufactured
helicopters operated for CAT, if Option A.2 is elected (the new requirements appear in
bold)
MCTOM < 2 250 kg 2 250 ≤ MCTOM ≤ 3 175 kg MCTOM > 3 175 kg
Not turbine- NIL NIL FDR and CVR required
engined in all cases
Turbine-engined NIL Record basic flight parameters (by FDR and CVR required in
means of an FDR or an ADRS or a all cases
Class C AIR or AIRS)
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4. Impact assessment (IA)
Option A.3
Option A.3 is about introducing requirements which are not fully transposing ICAO Standards in
Annex 6 Part I and III related to lightweight flight recorders. Hence, the harmonisation of the Air
Operations rules with the ICAO Standards would be less improved with Option A.3 than with
Option A.2.
On the other hand, compared to Option A.2, Option A.3 introduces less complexity into the Air
Operations rules applicable to aeroplanes with an MCTOM between 2 250 and 5 700 kg.
With regard to helicopters, there is no difference between Option A.2 and Option A.3.
Option A.3 would not contradict the General Aviation Safety Strategy and Roadmap since only
commercial operations and aircraft models which are not commonly used for recreational activities are
within the scope of this Option.
Therefore, the impact of Option A.3 is considered slightly positive (+ 1).
Table 16A: Summary of in-flight recording requirements applicable to aeroplanes if Option A.3 is
selected (the new requirements appear in bold)
MCTOM < 2 250 kg MCTOM between 2 250 and 5 700 kg MCTOM > 5 700 kg
No turbine If MOPSC > 9 PAX: If MOPSC > 9 PAX: Record basic flight FDR and CVR
engine Record basic flight parameters (by means of an FDR or required in all
parameters an ADRS or a Class C AIR or AIRS) cases
One turbine (by means of an FDR Record basic flight parameters
engine or an ADRS or a (by means of an FDR or an ADRS or a
Class C AIR or AIRS) Class C AIR or AIRS)
Multiple If MOPSC > 9: FDR and CVR required
turbine
engines
Option A.4
As Option A.4 is a combination of Option A.1 (no impact) and Option A.3 (impact slightly positive), its
impact is expected to be slightly positive (+ 1).
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4. Impact assessment (IA)
4.5.6.2. Impact of the options for balloons
Option B.0
The impact of Option B.0 is expected to be neutral (0).
Option B.1
Option B.1 is about promoting (not requiring) the installation of in-flight recording systems on
aeroplanes and helicopters. Hence, the impact of Option B.1 on rules harmonisation and better
regulation is considered neutral (0).
Option B.2
Option B.2 would not improve the harmonisation with the ICAO Standards since these do not address
international operations with balloons.
With regard to compliance, Option B.2 requires specifying a few conditions to increase the likelihood
that the recorded data will be retrieved in case of an accident (see Section 4.3.2). This could be done
by means of an acceptable means of compliance (AMC).
Overall, Option B.2 would make the balloon rules slightly more complex, while efforts have been made
recently to simplify as much as possible the balloon rules (refer to EASA Opinion No 01/2016).
Hence, the impact of Option B.2 on rules harmonisation and better regulation is considered
slightly negative (– 1).
Option B.3
As Option B.3 is a combination of Option B.1 (no impact) and Option B.2 (slightly negative), its impact is
expected to be slightly negative (– 1).
4.5.6.3. Summary of impact on better regulation and harmonisation
Table 17A: Impact for aeroplanes and helicopters
Option A.0 Option A.1 Option A.2 Option A.3 Option A.4
Impact on
better
regulation and 0 0 +1 +1 +1
harmonisation
Promotion, no Fully Partially Combines the
impact on transposes transposes the impact of A.1
regulations ICAO ICAO Standards and A.3 on
Standards; better
however, regulation and
makes the harmonisation
rules slightly
more complex
with multiple
conditions
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4. Impact assessment (IA)
Table 17B: Comparative impact for balloons
Option B.0 Option B.1 Option B.2 Option B.3
Impact on
better
regulation and 0 0 –1 –1
harmonisation
Promotion, no Does not Combines the
impact on improve rule impacts of B.1
regulations harmonisation and B.2 on
and does not better
follow the regulation and
intent of harmonisation
Opinion
No 01/2016 to
simplify the
rules for
balloons
4.6. Conclusion
4.6.1. Comparison of options
The strengths and weaknesses of each option are presented in Table 18A (for aeroplanes and
helicopters) and Table 18B (for balloons).
In conclusion, when considering aeroplanes and helicopters, Option A.2 (strictly transpose ICAO
Standards into requirements) would result in limited safety benefits, which would not outweigh the
economic impact and the impact on proportionality issues. Option A.3 (transpose ICAO Standards with
some differences) would result in somewhat greater safety benefits for a similar economic impact and
impact on proportionality issues than Option A.2 would. Option A.1 (promote the recording of basic
flight parameters, audio and/or a view of the instruments panel) would bring limited safety benefits,
and would have no other kind of impact. Hence, Option A.4 (which is a combination of Option A.1 and
Option A.3) seems to be the best option. It should also be noted that the overall score of any option
may vary depending on whether the in-flight recording system installation would require an STC
approval, a minor change approval or if the installation could be performed under CS-STAN.
With regard to balloons, Option B.1 (promote the installation of means to record the trajectory and
images from the basket interior) would bring limited safety benefits, and would have no other kind of
impact. Option B.2 (mandate means to record trajectory parameters and images from the basket
interior for balloons with an MCTOM of 3 000 kg or more) would result in limited safety benefits, which
would not outweigh the economic impact and the impact on proportionality issues. In addition, it
would introduce more requirements while the intent of EASA Opinion No 01/2016 is to simplify the
requirements for balloon operations. Option B.3, which combines Option B.1 and Option B.2, would
overall bring slightly more safety benefits than Option B.2 would — however, still not outweighing the
negative economic impact nor the negative impact on proportionality issues and rules complexity.
Therefore, B.1 seems to be the only appropriate option at this stage.
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4. Impact assessment (IA)
Table 18A: Detailed comparison of impacts between the various options for aeroplanes and helicopters
Option Option A.0 Option A.1 Option A.2 Option A.3 Option A.4
Promote the recording Strictly transpose ICAO Transpose ICAO Option A.1 + Option
of basic flight Standards in Annex 6 for Standards in Annex 6 A.3
parameters, audio newly manufactured with the following
light turbine-engined differences:
and/or a view of the
aeroplanes and newly — With regard to
instruments panel for
manufactured light aeroplanes, the
all models of light
turbine-engined applicability set is
aeroplanes and light helicopters operated for newly
helicopters and for all CAT. manufactured
Baseline option (no types of operation (no aeroplanes which
change to the rules change to the rules). have an MOPSC of
and no promotion); more than 9 or
Option description
risks remain as which are turbine-
outlined in the issue engined and have
an MCTOM of
analysis
2 250 kg or more.
— The requirement to
record basic flight
parameters on
board aeroplanes
and helicopters is
also applicable to
commercial SPO.
— Recording of audio
is not required.
Safety impact –1 +1 +1 +3 +4
Negative impact on — No effect if the Strictly transposing Larger proportion of Combines the safety
commercial installation the ICAO Standards accidents covered benefits of A.1 and
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4. Impact assessment (IA)
Option Option A.0 Option A.1 Option A.2 Option A.3 Option A.4
operations, no impact requires an STC; would result in a small than in Option A.2 A.3: medium effective
on non-commercial — Slightly effective if proportion of if the installation
operations installation can be accidents covered by requires an STC; very
performed under a
in-flight recording effective if the
minor change
approval; installation can be
— Medium effective if performed under a
the installation can minor change
be performed by approval or by means
means of a of a standard change
standard change
and without an
EASA Form 1
Environmental impact 0 0 0 0 0
No impact on No impact on No impact on No impact on
environment environment environment environment
Social impact 0 0 –1 –1 –1
Aircraft operators and Reduced social Same as for Option Combines the social
aircraft owners are impact, assuming that A.2 for images impact of A.1 and A.3
free to make decisions some requirements
No social impact if
with no social impact are introduced to
only flight data is
protect audio and
recorded
image recordings
Economic impact 0 0 for industry – 2 for industry – 2 for industry – 2 for industry
Aircraft operators and Impact is medium Impact is medium Combines the
aircraft owners are negative if STC is negative if STC is economic impact of
free to make decisions required, slightly required, slightly A.1 and A.3
with no economic negative otherwise negative otherwise
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4. Impact assessment (IA)
Option Option A.0 Option A.1 Option A.2 Option A.3 Option A.4
impact
+ 1 for authorities + 1 for authorities + 1 for authorities + 3 for authorities
In-flight recording In-flight recording In-flight recording In-flight recording
equipment equipment equipment equipment
accelerates accelerates accelerates accelerates
investigation investigation investigation investigation
Impact on general
aviation and 0 0 –1 0 0
proportionality issues
Aircraft operators and Impact on turboprop Does not impact on Combines the impacts
aircraft owners are below 2 250 kg turboprop aeroplanes on general aviation
free to make decisions below 2 250 kg and proportionality of
with no impact A.1 and A.3
Impact on better
regulation and 0 0 +1 +1 +1
harmonisation
Promotion, no impact Fully transposes the Partially transposes Combines the impacts
on regulations ICAO Standards; the ICAO Standards on general aviation
however, it makes the and proportionality of
rules complex with A.1 and A.3
multiple conditions
Total score (assuming – 1 +1 –2 +1 +2
all impact dimensions
have a weight of 1)
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4. Impact assessment (IA)
Table 18B: Detailed comparison of impacts between the various options for balloons
Option Option B.0 Option B.1 Option B.2 Option B.3
Promotes the fitment of Requires newly manufactured Option B.1 + Option B.2
balloons with means to record balloons operated for
trajectory parameters and commercial operations and
Baseline option (no change to
images from the basket with an MCTOM of 3 000 kg or
the rules and no promotion);
Option description interior (no change to the more to be fitted with
risks remain as outlined in the
rules). equipment recording the
issue analysis
balloon trajectory parameters
and images from the basket
interior.
Safety impact –1 +1 +1 +3
Negative impact on Small proportion of accidents Combines the safety benefits
commercial operations, no and serious incidents covered of B.1 and B.2
impact on non-commercial by in-flight recording
operations
Environmental impact 0 0 0 0
No impact on environment No impact on environment No impact on environment
Social impact 0 0 –1 –1
Balloon operators and balloon Limited social impact if image Combines the social impact of
owners are free to make recordings are protected B.1 and B.2
decisions with no social
impact
Economic impact 0 0 –1 –1
Balloon operators and balloon No STC, can rely on cheap Combines the economic
owners are free to make equipment already used for impact of B.1 and B.2
decisions with no economic recreational activities
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4. Impact assessment (IA)
Option Option B.0 Option B.1 Option B.2 Option B.3
impact
Impact on general aviation
0 0 –3 –3
and proportionality issues
Balloon operators and balloon Captures only large balloons Combines the economic
owners are free to make operated commercially; impact of B.1 and B.2
decisions with no impact however, the cost is still high
when compared with balloon
purchase price and revenue
from flights
Impact on better regulation
0 0 –1 –1
and harmonisation
Promotion, no impact on Does not improve rule Combines the economic
regulations harmonisation and does not impact of B.1 and B.2
follow the intent of Opinion
No 01/2016 to simplify the
rules for balloons
Total weight (assuming all –1 +1 –5 –3
impact dimensions have a
weight of 1)
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4. Impact assessment (IA)
4.7. Monitoring and evaluation
Monitoring and evaluation is a continuous and systematic process of data collection and analysis about
the implementation and effectiveness of a rule or activity. It generates factual information for future
evaluations and impact assessments and helps to identify implementation problems.
The options retained by this IA are basically the following two categories:
1) Safety promotion: promoting the voluntary installation of in-flight recording equipment (Option
A.1 for aeroplanes and helicopters, and Option B.1 for balloons); and
2) Equipment requirements: mandating the carriage of lightweight flight recorders (Option A.3,
only applicable to aeroplanes and helicopters).
4.7.1. Monitoring implementation
With regard to the first category of options (safety promotion), it is proposed to monitor their impact
by means of a survey conducted 1 year after initiating safety promotion in order to check:
— how many stakeholders have been reached by the safety promotion activities;
— what are the most and the least convincing arguments of the safety promotion material; and
— how many stakeholders have decided to install in-flight recording equipment as a consequence
of the safety promotion activities.
With regard to the second category of options (equipment requirements), no monitoring is considered
necessary because Option A.3 is about mandating the installation of equipment which is already
commercially available on newly manufactured, light aeroplanes and helicopters. Hence, no technical
implementation issue is expected.
4.7.2. Evaluating the effectiveness of options (after implementation)
All retained options serve the common objective of increasing the overall ratio of light aeroplanes, light
helicopters and balloons which are fitted with in-flight recording equipment. The evaluation should
consist in assessing whether the increase of the level of equipage has contributed to enhancing safety
for light aircraft, either directly (by making the use of light aircraft safer and better monitored by
operators, flight schools, aero clubs, etc.) or indirectly (by facilitating more in-depth investigations and
the identification of more effective corrective actions).
The evaluation of the effectiveness could be done by category of aircraft (aeroplanes, helicopters,
balloons) because of the fundamental differences in the way of piloting, the operational context and
the stakeholders involved.
Hence, it is proposed to check, for each category of light aircraft (light aeroplanes, light helicopters,
and balloons):
— whether the carriage of in-flight recording equipment makes the day-to-day use of the aircraft
safer; and
— whether the investigations of accidents and serious incidents involving light aircraft can identify
causes (otherwise unknown or not well understood) thanks to in-flight recording equipment, and
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4. Impact assessment (IA)
determine corrective actions with more significant influence on the prevention of future
accidents.
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5. Proposed actions to support implementation
5. Proposed actions to support implementation
EASA is committed to providing support for the implementation of the new rules. The range of
activities developed in this regard will vary depending on the complexity of the rules, the affected
stakeholders, as well as on the amount and type of resources allocated by stakeholders to ensure
compliance with the new rules.
The feedback from stakeholders is crucial in determining the type of activities that will be developed.
In this respect, any constructive feedback provided via different communication channels (e.g. regular
meetings with the EASA advisory bodies, development of frequently asked questions published on the
EASA website, or a combination of the above) will be taken into consideration once the new rules are
applicable.
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6. References
6. References
6.1. Affected regulation
— Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements
and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC)
No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296, 25.10.2012, p. 1), as last
amended
6.2. Affected decisions
— Decision N° 2012/015/Directorate R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24th October
2012 on Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Commission Regulation (EU)
No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative
procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European
Parliament and of the Council (Guidance Material to Annex I — Definitions)
— Decision 2014/017/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting
Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-ORO of Regulation (EU)
No 965/2012 and repealing Decision 2012/017/R of 24 October 2012 ‘AMC and GM to Part-ORO
— Issue 2’
— Decision 2014/015/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting
Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-CAT of Regulation (EU)
No 965/2012 and repealing Decision 2012/018/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of
24 October 2012 (‘AMC and GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2’)
— Decision 2014/018/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting
Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-SPO of Regulation (EU)
No 965/2012 (‘AMC and GM to Part-SPO’)
6.3. Other reference documents
— ICAO Annex 6, Part I (Amendment 38)
— ICAO Annex 6, Part II (Amendment 33)
— ICAO Annex 6, Part III (Amendment 19)
— EASA Research Project ‘Investigation of the technical feasibility and safety benefit of a light
aeroplane operational Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) system’, dated 16 December 2008
— European General Aviation Strategy, dated 30 August 2012
— EASA Management Board meeting 04/2012 of 11 December 2012, working paper 9a: Roadmap
for Regulation of GA.
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7. Appendices
7. Appendices
7.1. Appendix A: Comparison of European Air Operations rules and provisions of ICAO Annex 6
Table A.1 presents a comparative of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air Operations and the provisions
of ICAO Annex 6 related to in-flight recording capability for CAT with aeroplanes.
Table A.2 presents a comparative of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air Operations and the provisions
of ICAO Annex 6 related to in-flight recording capability for CAT with helicopters.
Table A.3 presents a comparative of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air Operations and the provisions
of ICAO Annex 6 related to in-flight recording capability for aeroplanes used for types of operation
other than CAT.
Table A.4 presents a comparative of Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air Operations and the provisions
of ICAO Annex 6 related to in-flight recording capability for helicopters used for types of operation
other than CAT.
Note: In ICAO Annex 6 Part III, the MCTOM break for crash-protected flight recorder carriage
requirements is set at 3 180 kg, while in Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 on Air Operations it is set
at 3 175 kg.
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7. Appendices
Table A.1: CAT aeroplanes
Aeroplanes operated for CAT
Function Reference text MCTOM over 5 700 kg MCTOM up to 5 700 kg
Flight parameters Regulation (EU) FDR required if: FDR required if:
No 965/2012 — first issued with an individual CofA on or after — multi-engined turbine-powered, and
Part-CAT 1 June 1990, or
— MOPSC of more than 9, and
— turbine-engined.
— first issued with an individual CofA on or after
1 April 1998.
ICAO Annex 6 Part I FDR required if: FDR or ADRS or Class C AIR required if:
Standards
— first issued with an individual CofA on or after — turbine-engined, and
1 January 1989, or — application for TC submitted on or after
— turbine-engined. 1 January 2016.
ICAO Annex 6 Part I (No Recommended Practice on carriage of FDR required if:
Recommended Practices recording equipment)
— multi-engined turbine-powered, and
— first issued with an individual CofA on or after
1 January 1990.
FDR or ADRS or Class C AIR required if:
— turbine-engined, and
— first issued with an individual CofA on or after
1 January 2016.
Audio Regulation (EU) CVR required CVR required if:
No 965/2012
— multi-engined turbine-powered, and
Part-CAT
— MOPSC of more than 9, and
— first issued with an individual CofA on or after
1 January 1990.
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7. Appendices
Aeroplanes operated for CAT
Function Reference text MCTOM over 5 700 kg MCTOM up to 5 700 kg
ICAO Annex 6 Part I CVR required if: CVR or CARS required if:
Standards
— turbine-engined and MCTOM of over 27 000 kg — turbine-engined, and
and prototype was certified after — MCTOM of over 2 250 kg, and
30 September 1969, or
— required to be operated by more than one pilot,
— first issued with an individual CofA on or after and
1 January 1987.
— application for TC submitted on or after
1 January 2016.
ICAO Annex 6 Part I CVR required if turbine-engined and prototype was CVR or CARS required if:
Recommended Practices certified after 30 September 1969.
— turbine-engined, and
— MCTOM of over 2 250 kg, and
— required to be operated by more than one pilot,
and
— first issued with an individual CofA on or after
1 January 2016.
Data-link messages Regulation (EU) Recording required if: Recording required if:
No 965/2012
— CVR is required, and — CVR is required, and
Part-CAT
— capable to operate data-link messages, and — capable to operate data-link messages, and
— first issued with an individual CofA on or after — first issued with an individual CofA on or after
8 April 2014. 8 April 2014.
ICAO Annex 6 Part I Recording required if: Recording required if:
Standards
— CVR is required, and — CVR is required, and
— aircraft utilise any of the data-link — aircraft utilise any of the data-link communication
communication applications listed, and applications listed, and
— first issued with an individual CofA on or after — first issued with an individual CofA on or after
1 January 2016. 1 January 2016.
+ Recording required if: + Recording required if:
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Aeroplanes operated for CAT
Function Reference text MCTOM over 5 700 kg MCTOM up to 5 700 kg
— CVR is required, and — CVR is required, and
— aircraft modified on or after 1 January 2016 for — aircraft modified on or after 1 January 2016 for the
the installation and utilisation of any of the installation and utilisation of any of the data-link
data-link communication applications listed. communication applications listed.
ICAO Annex 6 Part I (No Recommended Practice on carriage of (No Recommended Practice on carriage of recording
Recommended Practices recording equipment) equipment)
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Table A.2: CAT helicopters
Helicopters operated for CAT
Function Reference text MCTOM over 3 175 kg MCTOM up to 3 175 kg
Flight parameters Regulation (EU) FDR required if: No carriage requirement.
No 965/2012
— MCTOM of over 3 175 kg and first issued with
Part-CAT
an individual CofA on or after 1 August 1999, or
— MCTOM of over 7 000 kg or MOPSC of more
than 9, and first issued with an individual CofA
on or after 1 January 1989.
ICAO Annex 6 Part III FDR required if: FDR or ADRS or Class C AIR required if:
Standards
— first issued with an individual CofA on or after — turbine-engined, and
1 January 2016, or — MCTOM of over 2 250 kg, and
— MCTOM of over 7 000 kg or passenger seating — application for TC submitted on or after
configuration of more than 19 and first issued 1 January 2018.
with an individual CofA on or after
1 January 1989.
ICAO Annex 6 Part III FDR required if first issued with an individual CofA FDR or ADRS or Class C AIR required if first issued with
Recommended on or after 1 January 1989. an individual CofA on or after 1 January 2018.
Practices
Audio Regulation (EU) CVR required if: No carriage requirement.
No 965/2012
— MCTOM of over 7 000 kg, or
Part-CAT
— MCTOM of over 3 175 kg and first issued with
an individual CofA on or after 1 January 1987.
ICAO Annex 6 Part III CVR required if MCTOM over 7 000 kg. (No Standard on carriage)
Standards
ICAO Annex 6 Part III CVR required if first issued with an individual CofA (No Recommended Practice on carriage)
Recommended on or after 1 January 1987.
Practices
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Helicopters operated for CAT
Function Reference text MCTOM over 3 175 kg MCTOM up to 3 175 kg
Data-link messages Regulation (EU) Recording required if: Recording required if:
No 965/2012
— CVR is required, and — CVR is required, and
Part-CAT
— capable to operate data-link messages, and — capable to operate data-link messages, and
— first issued with an individual CofA on or after — first issued with an individual CofA on or after
8 April 2014. 8 April 2014.
ICAO Annex 6 Part III Recording required if: Recording required if:
Standards
— CVR is required, and — CVR is required, and
— aircraft utilise any of the data-link — aircraft utilise any of the data-link communication
communication applications listed, and applications listed, and
— first issued with an individual CofA on or after — first issued with an individual CofA on or after
1 January 2016. 1 January 2016.
+ Recording required if: + Recording if:
— CVR is required, and — CVR is required, and
— aircraft modified on or after 1 January 2016 for — aircraft modified on or after 1 January 2016 for the
the installation and utilisation of any of the installation and utilisation of any of the data-link
data-link communication applications listed. communication applications listed.
ICAO Annex 6 Part III (No Recommended Practice on carriage) (No Recommended Practice on carriage)
Recommended
Practices
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7. Appendices
Table A.3: Aeroplanes operated for non-commercial or SPO operations
Aeroplanes operated for non-commercial or SPO operations
Function Reference text MCTOM over 5 700 kg MCTOM up to 5 700 kg
Flight parameters Regulation (EU) FDR required if first issued with an individual CofA (No carriage requirement)
No 965/2012 on or after 1 January 2016.
Part-NCC, Part-NCO and
Part-SPO
ICAO Annex 6 Part II FDR required if first issued with an individual CofA (No Standard on carriage)
Standards on or after 1 January 2005.
ICAO Annex 6 Part II (No Recommended Practice on carriage) FDR or ADRS or Class C AIR required if:
Recommended Practices
— turbine-engined, and
— first issued with an individual CofA on or after
1 January 2016, and
— (proposed by ICAO State Letter AN 11/6.3.27-
14/10) more than 5 passenger seats.
Audio Regulation (EU) CVR required if MCTOM is over 27 000 kg and first CVR required if:
No 965/2012 issued with an individual CofA on or after
— MCTOM of over 2 250 kg, and
Part-NCC, Part-NCO and 1 January 2016.
Part-SPO — certified for operation with at least two pilots, and
— one turbojet engine or more than one turboprop
engine, and
— TC first issued on or after 1 January 2016.
ICAO Annex 6 Part II CVR required if: (No Standard on carriage)
Standards
— MCTOM over 27 000 kg and first issued with an
individual CofA on or after 1 January 1987, or
— turbine-engined aeroplane required to be
operated by more than one pilot and
application for TC submitted on or after
1 January 2016.
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Aeroplanes operated for non-commercial or SPO operations
Function Reference text MCTOM over 5 700 kg MCTOM up to 5 700 kg
ICAO Annex 6 Part II CVR required if aeroplanes are required to be CVR or CARS required if:
Recommended Practices operated by more than one pilot and first issued
— turbine-engined, and
with an individual CofA on or after 1 January 1987.
— required to be operated by more than one pilot,
and
— first issued with an individual CofA on or after
1 January 2016, and
— (proposed by ICAO State Letter AN 11/6.3.27-
14/10) more than 5 passenger seats.
Data-link messages Regulation (EU) Recording required if: Recording required if:
No 965/2012
— CVR is required, and — CVR is required, and
Part-NCC, Part-NCO and
Part-SPO — capable to operate data-link messages, and — capable to operate data-link messages, and
— first issued with an individual CofA on or after — first issued with individual CofA on or after
1 January 2016. 1 January 2016.
ICAO Annex 6 Part II Recording required if: Recording required if:
Standards
— CVR is required, and — CVR is required, and
— aircraft utilise any of the data-link — aircraft utilise any of the data-link communication
communication applications listed, and applications listed, and
— first issued with an individual CofA on or after — first issued with an individual CofA on or after
1 January 2016. 1 January 2016.
+ Recording required if: + Recording required if:
— CVR is required, and — CVR is required, and
— aircraft modified on or after 1 January 2016 for — aircraft modified on or after 1 January 2016 for the
the installation and utilisation of any of the installation and utilisation of any of the data-link
data-link communication applications listed. communication applications listed.
ICAO Annex 6 Part II (No Recommended Practice on carriage) (No Recommended Practice on carriage)
Recommended Practices
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7. Appendices
Table A.4: Helicopters operated for non-commercial or SPO operations
Helicopters operated for non-commercial or SPO operations
Function Reference text MCTOM over 3 175 kg MCTOM up to 3 175 kg
Flight parameters Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 FDR required if MCTOM of over 3 175 kg No carriage requirement.
Part-NCC, Part-NCO and and first issued with an individual CofA on or
Part-SPO after 1 January 2016.
ICAO Annex 6 Part III FDR required if: (No Standard on carriage)
Standards
— first issued with an individual CofA on or
after 1 January 2016, or
— MCTOM of over 7 000 kg or passenger
seating configuration of more than 19
and first issued with an individual CofA
on or after 1 January 1989.
ICAO Annex 6 Part III FDR required if first issued with an (No Recommended Practice on carriage)
Recommended Practices individual CofA on or after 1 January 1989.
Audio Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 CVR required if MCTOM of over 7 000 kg No carriage requirement.
Part-NCC, Part-NCO and and first issued with an individual CofA on or
Part-SPO after 1 January 2016.
ICAO Annex 6 Part III CVR required if MCTOM over 7 000 kg. (No Standard on carriage)
Standards
ICAO Annex 6 Part III CVR required if first issued with an (No Recommended Practice on carriage)
Recommended Practices individual CofA on or after 1 January 1987.
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Helicopters operated for non-commercial or SPO operations
Function Reference text MCTOM over 3 175 kg MCTOM up to 3 175 kg
Data-link messages Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 Recording required if: Recording required if:
Part-NCC, Part-NCO and
— CVR is required, and — CVR is required, and
Part-SPO
— capable to operate data-link messages, — capable to operate data-link messages, and
and — first issued with an individual CofA on or after
— first issued with an individual CofA on or 8 April 2014.
after 8 April 2014.
ICAO Annex 6 Part III Recording required if: Recording required if:
Standards
— CVR is required, and — CVR is required, and
— aircraft utilise any of the data-link — aircraft utilise any of the data-link communication
communication applications listed, and applications listed, and
— first issued with an individual CofA on or — first issued with an individual CofA on or after
after 1 January 2016. 1 January 2016.
+ Recording required if: + Recording if:
— CVR is required, and — CVR is required, and
— aircraft modified on or after — aircraft modified on or after 1 January 2016 for the
1 January 2016 for the installation and installation and utilisation of any of the data-link
utilisation of any of the data-link communication applications listed.
communication applications listed.
ICAO Annex 6 Part III (No Recommended Practice on carriage) (No Recommended Practice on carriage)
Recommended Practices
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7. Appendices
7.2. Appendix B: Statistics of accidents and serious incidents
Table B.1 presents statistics of accidents and serious incidents with aircraft registered in any of the
EASA MSs for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014. These statistics were prepared using the EASA database
of accidents and serious incidents.
Note 1: The figures do not always add up in Table B.1. This is because some fields in the extracted
records are empty (e.g. type of operation missing for a given record, or MCTOM missing).
Note 2: In all tables of this Appendix, the following acronyms are used:
CAT = commercial air transport
AW = aerial work (SPO activities as per Regulation (EU) No 965/2012)
GA = general aviation
Table B.1: Accidents and serious incidents with aircraft registered in an EASA MS
(Source: EASA database — figures based on a query performed on 12.2.2016)
Category Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of
accidents fatal accidents fatal accidents fatal
and serious accidents and serious accidents and serious accidents
incidents in in 2012 incidents in in 2013 incidents in in 2014
2012 2013 2014
All aircraft 1 333 153 1 196 139 1 186 131
Aeroplanes, helicopters, 1 005 105 884 83 919 92
balloons and sailplanes
All aeroplanes 652 58 543 44 617 62
Aeroplanes operated for CAT 126 1 106 0 103 2
with MCTOM > 5 700 kg
Aeroplanes operated for GA 9 1 4 0 7 0
with MCTOM > 5 700 kg
Aeroplanes operated for AW 1 0 0 0 2 1
with MCTOM > 5 700 kg
Aeroplanes operated for CAT 9 3 9 0 11 2
with MCTOM < 5 700 kg
Aeroplanes operated for GA 443 42 381 35 433 46
with MCTOM < 5 700 kg
Aeroplanes operated for AW 34 7 37 6 34 7
with MCTOM < 5 700 kg
All helicopters 108 12 96 13 79 10
Helicopters operated for CAT 6 0 3 1 3 0
with MCTOM > 3 175 kg
Helicopters operated for GA 4 0 3 0 2 1
with MCTOM > 3 175 kg
Helicopters operated for AW 3 1 0 0 0 0
with MCTOM > 3 175 kg
Helicopters operated for CAT 2 0 1 0 1 1
with
2 250 kg ≤ MCTOM ≤ 3 175 kg
Helicopters operated for GA 6 0 9 0 5 0
with
2 250 kg ≤ MCTOM ≤ 3 175 kg
Helicopters operated for AW 4 0 4 1 2 0
with
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Category Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of Number of
accidents fatal accidents fatal accidents fatal
and serious accidents and serious accidents and serious accidents
incidents in in 2012 incidents in in 2013 incidents in in 2014
2012 2013 2014
2 250 kg ≤ MCTOM ≤ 3 175 kg
Helicopters operated for CAT 6 0 6 0 2 0
with MCTOM < 2 250 kg
Helicopters operated for GA 34 5 41 7 40 5
with MCTOM < 2 250 kg
Helicopters operated for AW 14 4 9 0 7 0
with MCTOM < 2 250 kg
All balloons 26 3 30 2 17 1
Balloons operated for CAT 14 2 8 1 8 1
Balloons operated for GA 9 1 17 1 7 0
Balloons operated for AW 1 0 1 0 2 0
All sailplanes 233 28 217 18 206 19
Sailplanes operated for CAT 13 0 2 0 1 0
Sailplanes operated for GA 217 28 209 18 178 16
Sailplanes operated for AW 1 0 0 0 23 3
Table B.2: Accidents and serious incidents with light aeroplanes registered in an EASA MS
(Source: EASA database — figures based on a query performed on 12.2.2016)
Category Number of Number of Number of
accidents and accidents and accidents and
serious incidents in serious incidents in serious incidents in
2012 2013 2014
Aeroplanes operated for GA with 443 381 433
MCTOM < 5 700 kg
Aeroplanes operated for AW with 34 37 34
MCTOM < 5 700 kg
Aeroplanes operated for CAT with 9 9 11
MCTOM < 5 700 kg
Aeroplanes operated for CAT with 0 1 4
MCTOM < 5 700 kg and multi-engined
turbine-powered and with an MOPSC of
more than 9
Aeroplanes operated for CAT with 3 3 4
MCTOM < 5 700 kg and engine turbine-
powered
Aeroplanes operated for CAT with 3 5 4
MCTOM < 5700 kg and which are:
— engine turbine-powered and with an
MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more, or
— with an MOPSC of more than 9.
Aeroplanes operated for AW with 5 6 4
MCTOM < 5 700 kg and which are:
— engine turbine-powered and with an
MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more, or
— with an MOPSC of more than 9.
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Table B.3: Accidents and serious incidents with light helicopters registered in an EASA MS
(Source: EASA database – figures based on a query performed on 12.2.2016)
Category Number of accidents and Number of accidents and Number of accidents and
serious incidents in 2012 serious incidents in 2013 serious incidents in 2014
Helicopters operated for GA 40 50 45
with MCTOM < 3 175 kg
Helicopters operated for AW 18 13 9
with MCTOM < 3 175 kg
Helicopters operated for CAT 8 7 3
with MCTOM < 3 175 kg
Turbine-engined helicopters 3 1 1
operated for CAT with
2 250 kg ≤ MCTOM < 3 175 kg
Turbine-engined helicopters 3 4 2
operated for AW with
2 250 kg ≤ MCTOM < 3 175 kg
Table B.4: Accidents and serious incidents with balloons registered in an EASA MS
(Source: EASA database — figures based on a query performed on 12.2.2016)
Category Number of Number of Number of
accidents and accidents and accidents and
serious incidents serious incidents serious incidents
in 2012 in 2013 in 2014
All balloons 27 32 17
Balloons operated for CAT with MCTOM of 2 0 2
2 250 kg or more
Balloons used for non-commercial operations 0 0 0
with MCTOM of 2 250 kg or more
Balloons operated for aerial work with MCTOM 0 0 0
of 2 250 kg or more
Balloons operated for CAT with MCTOM of less 13 9 6
than 3 000 kg
Balloons used for non-commercial operations 10 21 9
or aerial work with MCTOM of less than
3 000 kg
Balloons for which either the MCTOM or the 2 2 0
type of operation is unknown
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7. Appendices
7.3. Appendix C: Safety recommendations related to in-flight recording for light aircraft
Tables C.1 and C.2 present an inventory of safety recommendations related to in-flight recording for
light aircraft, and issued by safety investigation authorities of EASA MSs since 2000.
Table C.1 presents the reference information and the full text of the safety recommendations27.
Table C.2 presents the application domain of these safety recommendations, as well as the
characteristics of the aircraft actually involved in the investigated accidents and serious incidents that
triggered safety recommendations.
27
For convenience, some safety recommendations were translated into English. As accurate as the translation may be, the original
text of the safety recommendation should be consulted when in doubt.
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Table C.1: Reference and text of safety recommendations related to in-flight recording, and issued by safety investigation authorities of the EASA
MSs since 2000
Safety recommendation Investigation
Included in State of the
EASA EASA Date of
Addressed the terms of Date of safety
recommendation status on issue or Safety recommendation text
to EASA? reference of occurrence investigation
number 2.12.2016 receipt
RMT.0271? authority
UNKG-2001-001 No N/A No 08/01/2001 It is recommended that the CAA should: 26/07/1998 UK
a. Encourage the development of a suitable lightweight and low-cost Voice,
Data and Combined recorder and the installation of such equipment by
operators.
b. Consider whether such flight recorders should be introduced for operations
such as dedicated police and HEMS operations involving as they do, the
exposure of third parties to risk not present in normal Public Transport
operations.
UNKG-2001-038 No N/A No 31/07/2001 The CAA should take forward to the JAA a proposal to re-examine the criteria 03/09/1999 UK
for the carriage of flight recorders by mult-piston engine aircraft, which have in
force a certificate of airworthiness in the Transport Category (Passenger) and
are certified to carry more than 9 passengers with a view to requiring all
aircraft, whether piston or turbine powered, to carry at least a Cockpit Voice
Recorder.
FRAN-2001-038 No N/A No 01/07/2001 Consequently, the BEA recommends that: 24/03/2001 France
• the DGAC and the JAA make mandatory the installation of at least one flight
recorder on board public transport aircraft authorized to carry more than nine
passengers and whose maximum certified take-off weight is less than or equal
to 5,700 kg, whatever the date of certification may be.
GREC-2002-027 No N/A No 12/04/2005 At national level, the HCAA should take care of equip the helicopters in subject 14/01/2001 Greece
with CVR, regardless to the provisions in ANNEX 6, part III, referring to
helicopters operating in special conditions as the HELITALIA’s helicopters do.
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Safety recommendation Investigation
Included in State of the
EASA EASA Date of
Addressed the terms of Date of safety
recommendation status on issue or Safety recommendation text
to EASA? reference of occurrence investigation
number 2.12.2016 receipt
RMT.0271? authority
FRAN-2003-012 No N/A No 21/08/2003 Consequently, the BEA recommends that: 24/03/2001 France
• the DGAC and the J.A.A. urgently take into account, for safety reasons, the
need for flight recorders for the rapid determination of the causes and
circumstances of accidents which occur in public air transport and that, to this
end, these organizations:
- impose as soon as possible, without any possible exemptions, the carriage of
at least one flight recorder on aircraft operating for public transport with a
maximum certificated takeoff weight lesser than 5,700 kg and whose maximum
approved passenger seating configuration is ten seats or more, whatever the
date of certification may be;
- extend these provisions to airplanes of the same type transporting cargo;
- study the extension of these provisions to helicopters operated for public
transport.
GREC-2003-029 No N/A No 12/04/2005 CVR 16/06/2002 Greece
Despite ICAO restrictions as mentioned in ANNEX 6, Part III, referring to CVR
installation, all Public Transport helicopters on a national level should be
equipped with said equipment. The AAIASB after the helicopter accident on
January 14, 2001, issued ist ASA 2002/2, dated 3-7-2002 and insists in the
implementation of the aforementioned ASA once again.
GREC-2004-020 No N/A No 12/04/2005 All h/c for public transportation should be equipped with CVR, FDR, ELT and 11/02/2003 Greece
ULT devices.
UNKG-2004-084 No N/A No 19/11/2004 The Department for Transport should urge the International Civil Aviation 19/07/2003 UK
Organisation (ICAO) to promote the safety benefits of fitting, as a minimum,
cockpit voice recording equipment to all aircraft operating with a Certificate of
Airworthiness in the Commercial Air Transport category, regardless of weight
or age.
UNKG-2004-085 No N/A No 19/11/2004 The Department for Transport should urge the International Civil Aviation 20/07/2003 UK
Organisation (ICAO) to promote research into the design and development of
inexpensive, lightweight, airborne flight data and voice recording equipment.
N/A No N/A No 27/05/2005 It is recommended to assess the opportunity to make mandatory the 13/08/2003 Italy
installation of a CVR and an FDR on all helicopters operating for HEMS and SAR.
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Safety recommendation Investigation
Included in State of the
EASA EASA Date of
Addressed the terms of Date of safety
recommendation status on issue or Safety recommendation text
to EASA? reference of occurrence investigation
number 2.12.2016 receipt
RMT.0271? authority
UNKG-2005-062 Yes Closed No, it was 24/06/2005 It is recommended that the European Aviation Safety Agency develop 27/06/2004 UK
addressed by standards for appropriate recording equipment that can be practically
creation of implemented on small aircraft.
TSO 2C-197
on
information
collection
and
monitoring
systems
UNKG-2005-100 Yes Closed No, it was 04/05/2006 The EASA should promote research into the design and development of 22/01/2005 UK
addressed by inexpensive, lightweight, airborne flight data and voice recording equipment.
EASA
Research
Project
EASA.2007.O
P.18
UNKG-2005-101 Yes Closed Yes 04/05/2006 The EASA should promote the safety benefits of fitting, as a minimum, CVR 22/01/2005 UK
equipment to all aircraft operated for the purpose of commercial air transport,
regardless of weight or age.
DENM-2006-002 No N/A No 01/01/2006 The Danish Civil Aviation Administration should consider whether a Flight 06/08/2004 Denmark
Recorder should be required for all commercial aviation in order to improve
the operator’s opportunities for supervision. The data recorded for small
aircraft should at least include time, position and flying altitude.
IRLD-2008-014 Yes Closed No, it was 01/07/2008 EASA should initiate a study of the necessity for aerial work aircraft in the 25/05/2006 Ireland
addressed by General Aviation category to have installed a simple on-board device to record
EASA basic flight parameters.
Research
Project
EASA.2007.O
P.18
HUNG-2008-002 Yes Closed Yes 03/11/2009 The IC recommends the EASA to promote the safety benefits of fitting, as a 31/07/2008 Hungary
minimum, of an aircraft data recording system (ADRS) and a cockpit audio
recording system (CARS) to all twin-engine helicopters flying Category A
missions.
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7. Appendices
Safety recommendation Investigation
Included in State of the
EASA EASA Date of
Addressed the terms of Date of safety
recommendation status on issue or Safety recommendation text
to EASA? reference of occurrence investigation
number 2.12.2016 receipt
RMT.0271? authority
FRAN-2009-008 Yes Closed Yes 27/05/2009 [Unofficial English Translation: The BEA recommends that EASA expands the 18/10/2006 France
conditions of carriage obligation of flight recorders for public transport.]
N/A No N/A No N/A It is recommended that the International Civil Aviation Organisation establish 30/05/2008 Spain
as an essential requirement for skydiving operations that the aircraft utilized
for this activity have onboard a flight data recorder capable of logging at least
the basic parameters of the operation.
FRAN-2009-010 No N/A No 13/11/2009 En conséquence, le BEA recommande que l’ OACI étende les conditions 28/06/2008 France
d’obligation d’emport d’enregistreurs de vol à tous les avions effectuant du
transport public.
As a consequence, the BEA recommends that ICO extend the conditions for
mandating the carriage of flight recorders to all aeroplanes thet perform public
transport.
UNKG-2010-016 No N/A No 16/04/2010 It is recommended that the International Civil Aviation Organisation adopt the 30/03/2008 UK
proposals of its Flight Recorder Panel for the requirement to install flight
recorders on turbine-engine-powered aeroplanes of a maximum certified
takeoff mass of 5,700 kg or less.
SPAN-2012-011 Yes Closed Yes 06/07/2012 It is recommended that the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) study the 18/02/1998 Spain
viability of introducing a requirement into the operational regulations that
cockpit voice and flight data recorders of given specifications be installed on
turboprop aircraft authorized for IFR flights and used for the public transport
or passengers or cargo, regardless of their weight or maximum number of
seats.
NORW-2012-010 Yes Closed Yes 01/11/2012 The Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) recommends that EASA 04/07/2011 Norway
considers introducing requirements regarding flight recorders on more aircraft
than are covered by the current regulations.
NETH-2012-001 Yes Closed Yes 21/12/2011 It is recommended to EASA to make flight recorder equipment mandatory for 16/10/2009 Netherlands
High Performance Aircraft, designed for carrying persons and/or cargo for the
purpose of accident investigation.
FRAN-2013-012 Yes Closed Yes 23/05/2013 The BEA recommends that EASA extend the obligation to carry at least one 05/09/2010 France
flight recorder on board any aircraft operated for public transport.
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Safety recommendation Investigation
Included in State of the
EASA EASA Date of
Addressed the terms of Date of safety
recommendation status on issue or Safety recommendation text
to EASA? reference of occurrence investigation
number 2.12.2016 receipt
RMT.0271? authority
FINL-2014-001 Yes Closed Yes 23/01/2014 SIAF recommends that the EASA study the possibility of drawing up a proposal 08/11/2012 Finland
for a standard which would suggest that all GPS devices intended for use in
aviation have a function that records the parameters of the route flown.
Moreover, the memory of such devices should not require a power source to
retain the stored data. A similar safety recommendation was already issued in
2009, in conjunction with Investigation Report B3/2008L.
BELG-2015-001 Yes Open Yes 09/07/2015 It is recommended that EASA mandates the installation of a lightweight 19/10/2013 Belgium
recording system in aircraft used for parachuting activities
UNKG-2015-032 No N/A No 16/10/2015 It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority requires all helicopters 29/11/2013 UK
operating under a Police Air Operators Certificate, and first issued with an
individual Certificate of Airworthiness before 1 January 2018, to be equipped
with a recording capability that captures data, audio and images in
crash-survivable memory. They should, as far as reasonably practicable, record
at least the parameters specified in The Air Navigation Order, Schedule 4, Scale
SS(1) or SS(3) as appropriate. They should be capable of recording at least the
last two hours of (a) communications by the crew, including Police Observers
carried in support of the helicopter’s operation, and (b) images of the cockpit
environment. The image recordings should have sufficient coverage, quality
and frame rate characteristics to include actions by the crew, control selections
and instrument displays that are not captured by the data recorder. The audio
and image recorders should be capable of operating for at least 10 minutes
after the loss of the normal electrical supply.
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Safety recommendation Investigation
Included in State of the
EASA EASA Date of
Addressed the terms of Date of safety
recommendation status on issue or Safety recommendation text
to EASA? reference of occurrence investigation
number 2.12.2016 receipt
RMT.0271? authority
UNKG-2015-033 No N/A No 16/10/2015 It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority requires all helicopters 29/11/2013 UK
operating under a Police Air Operators Certificate, and first issued with an
individual Certificate of Airworthiness on or after 1 January 2018, to be fitted
with flight recorders that record data, audio and images in crash-survivable
memory. These should record at least the parameters specified in The Air
Navigation Order, Schedule 4, Scale SS(1) or SS(3), as appropriate. They should
be capable of recording at least the last two hours of (a) communications by
the crew, including Police Observers carried in support of the helicopter’s
operation, and (b) cockpit image recordings. The image recordings should have
sufficient coverage, quality and frame rate characteristics to include control
selections and instrument displays that are not captured by the other data
recorders. The audio and image recorders should be capable of operating
for at least 10 minutes after the loss of the normal electrical supply.
UNKG-2015-035 Yes Open Yes 16/10/2015 It is recommended that the European Aviation Safety Agency mandate the 29/11/2013 UK
ICAO Annex 6 flight recorder requirements for all helicopter emergency
medical service operations, regardless of aircraft weight. The last two hours of
flight crew communications and cockpit area audio should be recorded. The
cockpit area audio recording should continue for 10 minutes after the loss of
normal electrical power.
FRAN-2016-045 Yes Open Yes 02/12/2016 Consequently the BEA recommends that: 06/08/2014 France
EASA add this accident to the TBM700 registered N129AG on 6 August 2014 at
Saint-Jean-les-Deux-Jumeaux in the terms of reference for regulatory task
RMT.0271.
FRAN-2016-046 Yes Open Yes 02/12/2016 Consequently the BEA recommends that: 06/08/2014 France
EASA require or promote the installation of on-board recorders on aeroplanes
categorised as high performance aircraft (HPA), depending on the type of
operation of the aircraft.
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Table C.2: Scope of safety recommendations related to in-flight recording, and issued by safety investigation authorities of the EASA MSs since
2000
EASA Accident aircraft Application domain of the safety recommendation
recommendatio Aircraft Aircraft Type of operation Fixed Turbine or MCTOM Passenger Type of Fixed Turbine or piston Forward-fit or MCTOM Passenger capacity Recording
n number registration make and wing or piston (kg) capacity or operation wing or (and number of retrofit (kg) function
model rotary (number) payload rotary engines)
wing wing
UNKG-2001-001 G-MASK Aerospatial CAT (Emergency RW Turbine 2400 6 PAX CAT RW Not specified Not specified Not Not specified Not
e AS355 F1 medical services) (2) (Emergency specified specified
Ecureuil II medical
services)
UNKG-2001-038 G-ILGW Cessna 404 CAT (Passengers) FW Turbine 3810 10 PAX CAT Not Multi-engined Not specified All More than 9 pax CVR
Titan (2) (Passengers) specified
FRAN-2001-038 F-OGES De Havilland CAT (Passengers) FW Turbine 5670 20 PAX CAT Both All Retro fit < 5 700 More than 9 pax FDR or
DHC6-300 (2) kg CVR
GREC-2002-027 SX-HDT Agusta AW CAT (Emergency RW Turbine 3000 7 PAX Not specified Not Not specified Not specified Not Not specified CVR
109 medical services) (2) specified specified
FRAN-2003-012 F-OGES De Havilland CAT (Passengers) FW Turbine 5670 20 PAX CAT Both All Retro fit < 5 700 More than 9 pax FDR or
DHC6-300 (2) kg CVR
GREC-2003-029 SX-HDR Agusta AW CAT (EMS) RW Turbine 3000 7 PAX CAT RW All All All All CVR
109 (2)
GREC-2004-020 SX-HDV Agusta AW CAT (EMS) RW Turbine 3000 7 PAX CAT RW All Retro fit All All FDR + CVR
109 (2)
UNKG-2004-084 G-CSPJ Hughes GA (Private) RW Turbine 1157 4 PAX CAT Both All Retro fit All Not specified CVR
369HS (1)
UNKG-2004-085 G-CSPJ Hughes GA (Private) RW Turbine 1157 4 PAX Not specified Not Not specified Not specified Not Not specified Not
369HS (1) specified specified specified
N/A I-SEIQ Agusta Bell SAR RW Turbine 5400 13 PAX CAT + AW RW All Not specified All All FDR + CVR
412 SP (2)
UNKG-2005-062 G-BGED Cessna AW FW Piston (1) 1630 6 PAX Not specified Not Not specified Not specified Not Not specified Not
U206F specified specified specified
Stationair
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7. Appendices
EASA Accident aircraft Application domain of the safety recommendation
recommendatio Aircraft Aircraft Type of operation Fixed Turbine or MCTOM Passenger Type of Fixed Turbine or piston Forward-fit or MCTOM Passenger capacity Recording
n number registration make and wing or piston (kg) capacity or operation wing or (and number of retrofit (kg) function
model rotary (number) payload rotary engines)
wing wing
UNKG-2005-100 G-BXLI Bell 206B GA (Private) RW Turbine 1450 4 PAX Not specified Not Not specified Not specified Not Not specified FDR + CVR
(1) specified specified
UNKG-2005-101 G-BXLI Bell 206B GA (Private) RW Turbine 1 450 4 PAX CAT Both All Retro fit All All CVR
(1)
DENM-2006-002 OY-CAK SOCATA TB- CAT FW Piston (1) 1 150 5 PAX CAT Both All Not specified All All FDR
10
IRLD-2008-014 EI-CHM Cessna AW (Training FW Piston (1) 730 1 PAX (+2 AW Not Not specified Not specified Not Not specified FDR
150M flight) Children) specified specified
HUNG-2008-002 HA-ECE Eurocopter CAT (Emergency RW Turbine 2 835 2 pilots + 2 CAT RW Multi-engined Not specified All All FDR+CVR
EC135 T2 medical services) (2) patients
FRAN-2009-008 F-GVPD Beech 90 CAT FW Turbine 4 851 7 PAX CAT Not Not specified Not specified Not Not specified FDR+CVR
KING AIR (2) specified specified
N/A EC-JXH Pilatus PC6- AW (parachute FW Turbine 2 800 10 PAX Skydiving Not Not specified Not specified Not Not specified FDR
B2H4 dropping) (1) specified specified
FRAN-2009-010 V2-LFL De Havilland CAT FW Turbine 5 670 20 PAX CAT FW All Not specified All All Not
DHC6 (2) specified
UNKG-2010-016 VP-BGE Cessna CAT (Passengers) FW Turbine 5 375 6 PAX Not specified FW Turbine Not specified All All Not
Citation I (2) specified
(500)
SPAN-2012-011 EC-GDG Fairchild SA- CAT (Cargo) FW Turbine 5 665 19 PAX CAT FW Turbine Not specified All All FDR+CVR
226-TC (2)
NORW-2012-010 LN-OXC Eurocopter CAT (Passengers) RW Turbine 2 250 5 PAX Not specified Not Not specified Not specified Not Not specified Not
AS 350 B3 (1) specified specified specified
NETH-2012-001 PH-RUL Pilatus PC- GA (Business FW Turbine 4 740 6 PAX Not specified Both All Not specified All All Not
12/47E flight) (1) (business specified
config.)
FRAN-2013-012 F-OIXZ Cessna CAT FW Turbine 3 630 9 PAX CAT Both All Not specified All All FDR or
208B (1) CVR
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7. Appendices
EASA Accident aircraft Application domain of the safety recommendation
recommendatio Aircraft Aircraft Type of operation Fixed Turbine or MCTOM Passenger Type of Fixed Turbine or piston Forward-fit or MCTOM Passenger capacity Recording
n number registration make and wing or piston (kg) capacity or operation wing or (and number of retrofit (kg) function
model rotary (number) payload rotary engines)
wing wing
FINL-2014-001 OH-AAA Cessna 206 GA (Private) FW Piston (1) 1 720 5 PAX Not specified Both All Not specified All All GPS
BELG-2015-001 OO-NAC Pilatus PC6 AW (parachute FW Turbine 2 800 10 PAX Parachute Both All Retrofit All All Not
dropping) (1) dropping specified
UNKG-2015-032 G-SPAO Eurocopter State flight (police) RW Turbine 2 835 2 pilots + Police RW All Retrofit All All FDR + CVR
EC135 T2+ (2) 2 patients + Image
UNKG-2015-033 G-SPAO Eurocopter State flight (police) RW Turbine 2 835 2 pilots + Police RW All Forward-fit All All FDR + CVR
EC135 T2+ (2) 2 patients + Image
UNKG-2015-035 G-SPAO Eurocopter State flight (police) RW Turbine 2 835 2 pilots + CAT RW All Not specified All All FDR + CVR
EC135 T2+ (2) 2 patients (Emergency
medical
services)
FRAN-2016-045 N129AG Socata GA (Private) FW Turbine 2 984 5 PAX Not specified FW Turbine Not specified Not Not specified Not
TBM700 (1) specified specified
FRAN-2016-046 N129AG Socata GA (Private) FW Turbine 2 984 5 PAX Not specified FW All Not specified Not Not specified Not
TBM700 (1) specified specified
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7. Appendices
7.4. Appendix D: Promoting the benefits of in-flight recording for light aircraft
7.4.1. Potential benefits of in-flight recording for stakeholders
Tables D.1, D.2 and D.3 present the benefits (for safety, cost, liability, etc.) of installing in-flight
recording equipment that may be promoted to aviation stakeholders. Table D.1 addresses the flight
parameters recording function of such in-flight recording equipment, Table D.2 addresses the audio
recording function, and Table D.3 addresses the image recording function.
Table D.4 presents the potential incentives for each category of stakeholder using light aircraft.
Table D.1: Potential benefits of recording the aircraft flight parameters
Type of benefit Applicable Nature of the benefits Limitations
categories of
light aircraft
Safety/economic Light aeroplanes Flight parameters can be used for operational Making this safety benefit real would
and light safety monitoring (such as performed as part not only require airborne equipment,
helicopters of flight data monitoring (FDM)), analysis of but also ground infrastructure,
incidents, educating on hazards (training). human resources and procedures to
These processes can support with operational process and analyse the data at
data the safety management system (SMS) of regular time intervals.
28
an aircraft operator . Therefore, this is not relevant for
In addition, an evidence-based operational private owners.
safety monitoring might justify reduced
insurance premiums. This has been the case Many other factors than the
for FDM when implemented by aircraft availability of recorded data are
operators. taken into account by an insurer for
determining an insurance premium.
There is no automatic reduction of
insurance premium granted for
installing an in-flight recording
system.
Safety Light aeroplanes, Getting more reliable data on the Applicable mainly to aircraft
light helicopters, circumstances of incidents and accidents in manufacturers, aircraft operators,
sailplanes order to better understand safety issues and to and aircraft owner associations.
avoid that an aviation authority enacts Not relevant when considering an
conservative operational restrictions. individual aircraft owner.
Safety/economic Light aeroplanes, Getting clear answers to questions related to Applicable to aircraft and engine
/corporate light helicopters, the airworthiness of a product and being able manufacturers.
image sailplanes to determine quick corrective actions. Not relevant when considering an
individual aircraft owner.
Safety/economic Light aeroplanes Engine and systems health monitoring in order Assumes that more advanced flight
/aircraft and light to get a better insight into the circumstances parameters are recorded, not just
availability helicopters of engines failure and systems failure, detect basic trajectory parameters (hence
or confirm exceedance of limitations, and implying that these advanced flight
29
assess reliability or monitor trends . parameters are produced in the
aircraft).
Safety/liability Light aeroplanes, Monitor the compliance with airspace
light helicopters, restrictions, airfield procedures and noise-
sailplanes, abatement procedures by pilots. Aircraft users
balloons will take more care of the rules and procedures
because the aircraft owner can check their
flight afterwards.
28
Example for helicopters: Helicopter flight data monitoring toolkit produced by the IHST (http://www.ihst.org/portals/54/hfdm.pdf).
29
Note: Usage monitoring systems are already required for helicopters without an assured safe forced landing capability during the
take-off and landing phases, in accordance with CAT.POL.H.305.
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7. Appendices
Type of benefit Applicable Nature of the benefits Limitations
categories of
light aircraft
In addition, in case of complaints of airfield
neighbours or dispute with the local ATC,
recorded data provide evidence of the actual
trajectories flown by the aircraft. For this, only
trajectory flight parameters are needed.
Economic Light aeroplanes Accurate fuel and usage cost billing, based on For this purpose, a Hobbs meter is
and light actual flight time. sufficient.
helicopters
Warranty and Light aeroplanes Flight parameters can be used to set a datum This is assuming that a more
liability claims and light for measurement of performance guaranteed extensive set of flight parameters
helicopters by the aircraft manufacturer or an aircraft than just trajectory parameters is
equipment manufacturer. If it can be shown recorded.
with data that the actual performance is not at In addition, this could work for an
the specified levels then the aircraft aircraft operator or a pilot
owner/operator is in a position to claim association, but a single private
compensation under the terms of the aircraft owner would probably not
warranty. have sufficient resources nor enough
weight to make a successful claim. In
addition, for demonstrating
performance issues, accurate
knowledge of the conditions are
needed (atmospheric conditions,
loading, etc.). This is difficult to
achieve for an individual owner or
pilot.
Validation of Light aeroplanes, Trajectory flight parameters of a trustable
skills light helicopters, source (which cannot be altered) can be used
sailplanes, for validating success in a test or a
balloons competition. Example: the standard developed
by IGC for ‘IGC-approved flight recorders’ used
for badges.
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Table D.2: Potential benefits of recording audio
Type of benefit Applicable categories Nature of the benefits Limitations
of light aircraft
Safety Light aeroplanes, Getting more reliable data on the Applicable mainly to aircraft
light helicopters, circumstances of incidents and accidents manufacturers and aircraft
sailplanes, in order to detect and address earlier a operators, not relevant when
balloons safety issue and to avoid that an aviation considering aircraft owners.
authority enacts operational restrictions.
Safety Light aeroplanes and Engine/gearbox health monitoring. The Mainly of interest for helicopters.
light helicopters audio recording may capture information
on the speed, vibrations and transition Data privacy may limit the
modes of rotating parts, which are possible access to the recordings
difficult to record with flight parameters by maintenance staff, especially
(no sensor installed or too low sampling when considering image and
rate). audio recording.
Table D.3: Potential benefits of recording images
Type of Applicable categories Nature of the benefits Limitations
benefit of light aircraft
Safety Light aeroplanes, Getting more reliable and complete data Applicable mainly to aircraft
light helicopters, on the circumstances of incidents and manufacturers and aircraft
sailplanes, accidents in order to detect and address operators, not relevant when
balloons earlier a safety issue and to avoid that an considering aircraft owners.
aviation authority enacts operational
restrictions. Capturing usable pictures of
instruments and displays require
Information not recorded by audio or good picture resolution, capability
flight parameters includes: to cope with various lighting
— crew actions on flight controls, conditions and vibration-proofed
engine control, selectors and installation.
switches; This could significantly drive the
— non-verbal communication (for cost up.
aircraft certified for operation with a
minimum flight crew of at least two
pilots);
— flight parameters indicated by
aircraft instruments (when it is too
difficult to collect them from the
aircraft sensors);
— displayed pictures (e.g. by a moving
map, a TAWS, etc.) for glass cockpits;
— display settings;
— weather conditions.
Safety Light aeroplanes, Operational safety monitoring, analysis Making this safety benefit real
light helicopters, of incidents, educating on hazards would not only require airborne
sailplanes, (training). These processes can support equipment, but also ground
balloons with operational data the safety infrastructure, human resources
management system (SMS) of an aircraft and procedures to process and
operator. analyse the data at regular time
intervals.
Therefore, this is not relevant for
private owners.
Because of the privacy content,
there are limitations to the use of
image recording by the aircraft
operator; however, they are less
problematic if the view is limited
to the instruments panel.
Safety Light aeroplanes, Pilot knows that they are recorded and Experience has shown that some
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Type of Applicable categories Nature of the benefits Limitations
benefit of light aircraft
light helicopters, this is dissuading them from taking pilots bring a camera in the flight
sailplanes, unnecessary risk (flying low, risky crew compartment in order to
balloons manoeuvres). share a recording of their feats
afterwards, and this tends to
favour risk-taking. However, when
the camera is installed by the
aircraft owner or operator, then it
is assumed that it can help in
preventing reckless behaviour.
Because of the privacy content,
there are limitations to the use of
image recording by the aircraft
owner.
Safety Light aeroplanes, Video can be a good media for sharing Video can also be wrongly used to
light helicopters, lessons learnt among private pilots encourage excessive risk-taking by
sailplanes, (social media). displaying unsafe manoeuvres.
balloons For video to be used in a positive
way, there probably is a need for
control of the information. For
example, this could work if an
association of private pilots is
administering the social medium.
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7. Appendices
Table D.4: Potential incentives for in-flight recording per category of stakeholder
Category of stakeholder Potential incentives
Commercial aircraft operators — Better data-driven operational safety monitoring, including better understanding of
incidents.
— Smarter maintenance through engine and systems health monitoring and
quantitative data on limitation exceedance.
— Reduced operation cost through better monitoring of the management of fuel and
of the aircraft.
— Encourage better adherence to SOPs because pilots know they are monitored.
— Trustable source of data if an issue is raised by ATC/airport operator/airport
neighbours.
— Might justify lower insurance premiums.
Flying/piloting schools — Validation of test.
— Capturing events that can affect aircraft airworthiness (e.g. hard landings, abrupt
manoeuvres) yet get sometimes unnoticed/unreported.
— Replay of actual flights for training purposes.
— More data-driven training programmes.
Aero clubs — Monitoring of compliance with airspace restrictions, airfield procedures and noise-
abatement procedures by their members.
— Monitor the use of their aircraft if they are leased to people outside the club (safe
operation and, for example, usage of engines).
— Dissuade members from taking excessive risk.
— Capturing events that can affect aircraft airworthiness (e.g. hard landings, abrupt
manoeuvres) yet get sometimes unnoticed/unreported.
— Trustable source of data if an issue is raised by airfield operator/airfield neighbours.
Associations of aircraft owners — A larger proportion of light aircraft accidents being fully explained, allowing:
and pilots more focused safety communication towards their members;
self-explanatory examples of what-to-do and what-not-to-do in the case where
video recordings can be collected and shared;
more commensurate and focused corrective actions by aviation authorities.
— Provided recorded data can be collected from association members and analysed,
evidence of an issue with a given aircraft model, a given airfield, a requirement, etc.
Private pilots — Monitor the usage of their aircraft when they are leased;
— Might justify lower insurance premiums.
7.4.2. The privacy issue
7.4.2.1. Flight parameters
Using recorded flight parameters for sanctioning a professional pilot or publishing identified flight data
can have significant consequences on their career and it has been considered detrimental to the safety
of commercial operations in the long term.
This is why, when considering the flight data recorder (FDR) mandated on board large aeroplanes and
large helicopters, subparagraph (f)(2) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 requires the following:
‘FDR recordings or data-link recordings shall only be used for purposes other than for the investigation
of an accident or an incident which is subject to mandatory reporting, if such records are:
(i) used by the operator for airworthiness or maintenance purposes only; or
(ii) de-identified; or
(iii) disclosed under secure procedures.’
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A similar provision can be found in Part-NCC and Part-SPO.
However, care should be taken to not apply the same level of protection when considering light
aircraft used for non-professional activities because this could significantly reduce the possible use of
this equipment and therefore work against promotion of recording.
Note: The FDR may be used for a flight data monitoring (FDM) programme. However, accessing the
FDR to download the data is on most installations not convenient (because it is not easily
accessible and because the FDR is an MEL item). Furthermore, the FDR has usually a limited
recording duration (because its memory must be crash-protected and fulfil a number of
constraining specifications), so most operators use quick-access recorders (QARs) with easily
removable memory media instead, or even wireless transmission of the FDM data file when
the aircraft arrives at its gate. However, an FDM programme is also required to be ‘non-
punitive’ and to have ‘appropriate safeguards’ in place to protect the data.
7.4.2.2. Audio and images
Audio recordings and image recordings have an intrinsic privacy content (information that is private
and unrelated to the accident might be recorded, and the human voice itself or images of body parts
can be considered a privacy element). Therefore, the recording of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR)
mandated for large aircraft is considered sensitive, and its use is more restricted than it is for the FDR
recording.
Paragraph (f) of CAT.GEN.MPA.195 requires the following:
‘(f) Without prejudice to Regulation (EU) No 996/2010 of the European Parliament and of the
Council:
(1) Except for ensuring the CVR serviceability, CVR recordings shall not be disclosed or used
unless:
(i) a procedure related to the handling of CVR recordings and of their transcript is in
place;
(ii) all crew members and maintenance personnel concerned have given their prior
consent; and
(iii) they are used only for maintaining or improving safety.
(1a) When a CVR recording is inspected for ensuring the CVR serviceability, the operator shall
ensure the privacy of the CVR recording and the CVR recording shall not be disclosed or
used for other purposes than ensuring the CVR serviceability.’
Some level of protection would probably be justified for in-flight equipment recording audio or images
on board a light aircraft. This could restrict the possible use of this equipment, making its promotion
challenging.
One technical solution to partially mitigate this issue is to require that the pilot is made aware of the
recording of audio in the aircraft, and that a means is installed to erase the audio or image recording
after completion of the flight (recommended in France by Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et
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7. Appendices
des Libertés30). In addition, the aircraft owner should not be allowed to disclose the recordings without
the consent of the pilot(s).
Some dedicated in-flight recording systems only record a certain level of ambient noise.
IGC specifications for the equipment designated by the IGC as ‘IGC-approved flight recorders’31 also
specify that just a certain level of ambient noise needs to be recorded. This solution resolves the
privacy issue; however, the information content of ambient noise is much less, and it is not sufficient
for engine/gearbox health monitoring.
30
See http://www.cnil.fr/english/.
31
GNSS receivers which fulfil specifications set by the IGC.
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7. Appendices
7.5. Appendix E: Systematic studies of investigation reports
Four systematic studies of investigation reports were conducted in order to better assess the potential
safety benefits of in-flight recording for light aircraft. Their scope and results are presented below.
7.5.1. General principles applied for conducting the studies
For all four studies, the following principles were applied:
— For each study, the study set was defined based on homogeneous and transparent criteria (no
cherry-pick selection of study cases). The reports were analysed factually, without any
interpretation.
— The scope of the study was determined in order to account for a large enough sample for each
aircraft category, mass group and type of aircraft which are within the scope of RMT.0271 &
RMT.0272. ‘Sufficient’ in this context means enough to get a rough picture of the investigation
needs, and not necessarily to establish accurate statistics.
— Many investigation reports pertaining to light aircraft accidents are not translated into English,
partially due to the fact that they do not contain a safety recommendation addressed to an
international organisation. This means that only investigation reports in the language(s)
mastered by the analysts could be reviewed.
— Due to the limited range of light aircraft, most accidents and serious incidents that occurred in
the territory of an EASA MS involved aircraft which was (were) also registered in an EASA MS,
and conversely most accidents and serious incidents with aircraft registered in an EASA MS
occurred in the territory of an EASA MS. This means that the study focused on aircraft registered
in an EASA MS.
— Only investigation reports pertaining to accidents were analysed because a more severe
outcome usually justifies a more extensive safety investigation. Also, when considering that
accidents with light aeroplanes, light helicopters and sailplanes are numerous, the study set was
further reduced to fatal accidents which are often subject to even more investigation efforts.
However, when considering large aircraft and balloons, since the number of fatal accidents is
small, it is advisable to include all accidents.
— Only final investigation reports (containing the most complete information gathered and the
final conclusions of the investigation) were retained for the study. The life cycle of a safety
investigation is usually of a at least several months and up to several years. Therefore, the
studies focused on occurrences that were 1 year old or more the date on which the study was
conducted.
— In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 996/2010, which entered into force in December 2010, all
accidents of aircraft within the scope of RMT.0271 & RMT.0272 and occurring in Europe shall be
investigated, except for accidents involving Annex II aircraft. Before this time, national rules
applied and the scope of activity of some safety investigation authorities was limited. Therefore,
the studies focused on accidents which occurred after December 2010. In addition, because
accidents with Annex II aircraft are not required to be investigated and the regulation of
operation of Annex II aircraft is outside the remit of EASA, related investigation reports were not
retained for the studies.
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7.5.2. Study 1
7.5.2.1. Scope and study set
Study 1 aimed to assess to what extent facts can be established, causes determined, and safety issues
identified during light-aircraft accident investigations. Study 1 consisted in assessing whether the
investigations were hindered or significantly delayed due to the lack of factual data that could have
been recorded on board. It is based on three variant approaches which focus on:
— the difficulties in establishing the sequence of occurrences and events, and the factors;
— test and research activities performed in the absence of a recording; and
— the need to establish the final trajectory.
In order to assess to what extend the investigations could determine facts and safety issues after an
accident, a sample of safety investigations was analysed. Each safety investigation report was reviewed
and a set of questions defined for the study was answered given the information in the report. The
scope of the study and the questions are presented in Table E.1.
Table E.1: Scope of Study 1
Study 1 Criteria applied to determine the study set and study questions
Aircraft groups 1. Aeroplanes with MCTOM less than 5 700 kg
considered 2. Helicopters with MCTOM less than 3 175 kg
3. Sailplanes
4. Balloons and hot-air airships
Study period Between XX/XX/XXXX and 31/12/2012
Occurrence class Accidents
Aircraft Aircraft registered in one of the EASA MSs
registration
Severity — Fatal accidents (at least one fatality) for aircraft groups 1 to 3.
— Fatal and non-fatal accidents for aircraft group 4 (balloons and hot-air airships).
Investigation Only final reports
reports
Number of At least 20 for each aircraft category.
investigation The final reports corresponding to the 20 most recent accidents in the study period were selected
reports reviewed for the study.
for each aircraft The selection of investigation reports starts with those final reports corresponding to the most
group recent accidents in the study period and then it goes backwards into time until a sufficient
number of reports is obtained for the study.
Questions to — What is the category of aircraft (aeroplane, helicopter, balloon, sailplane)?
answer for each — What is the aircraft maximum occupancy provided in the type certificate datasheet? (Or, if not
report reviewed available for balloons, the difference between maximum take-off mass and minimum landing
mass provided in the type certificate datasheet.)
— For aeroplanes, helicopters and sailplanes: what is the aircraft MTOM provided in the type
certificate datasheet?
— What is the number of engines?
— What is the type of the engine (reciprocating, turboprop, turbojet)?
— For aeroplanes and helicopters: was the aircraft certified for operation with a minimum crew
of at least two pilots?
— State of the investigation authority.
— Provide the sequence of aviation occurrences identified in the report, or the category of the
last occurrence (RE, CFIT, LOC-I, etc.).
— What would be the applicable Part of the Air OPS rules (CAT, SPO, NCC, NCO)?
— Did the investigation report establish the final trajectory of the aircraft (from 5 minutes before
the accident until the accident): (yes; no; partially; not necessary; or not addressed):
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Study 1 Criteria applied to determine the study set and study questions
Final trajectory: which were the source(s) of data (FDR or ADRS; GNSS receiver or
navigation equipment; other airborne system; radar track; video from ground; eyewitness;
other; unknown)?
— Test and research activities: were there any test and research activities conducted during the
investigation?
— What was the essential information looked at?
— What kind of examinations were performed? If applicable:
Which flight parameters could have provided this essential information?
Would these flight parameters be recorded by an FDR? An ADRS? A GNSS receiver?
Which one of these flight parameters are among the parameters required to be measured
and displayed for this aircraft category and this type of operation, or which one of these
flight parameters can be calculated from the parameters required to be measured and
displayed for this aircraft category of and this type of operation?
— Was there a portable or installed equipment using a GNSS function?
— Were useful trajectory GNSS data retrieved?
— If not, why? (no track; damaged GNSS; loss of data due to volatile memory; data impossible to
decode; no data of the event flight recorded (recording not activated, full memory, rewriting);
sampling too low; 2D recording)
— Does the report explicitly mention that some causes and/or contributory factors could not be
established with certainty or were unknown? (yes; no, the causes/factors are clearly
established; not addressed)
If ‘yes’ and ‘no’, please provide paragraph references.
— Does the investigation report explicitly point at the need for and/or the benefit of in-flight
recording? (yes; no; not addressed)
If ‘yes’, please provide paragraph references.
A sample of 81 final safety investigation reports of light-aircraft accidents that occurred from 2009 to
2012 was analysed for Study 1. The reference information on these accidents is presented in Table E.2.
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Table E.2: Accidents whose investigation reports were analysed for Study 1
Date of the accident State of registry Aircraft registration Aircraft category
13/11/2012 Latvia YL-SVN aeroplane
11/11/2012 Ireland EI-AST aeroplane
10/10/2012 France F-GBXQ aeroplane
16/08/2012 Austria OE-DII aeroplane
16/08/2012 UK G-BODP aeroplane
10/08/2012 Germany D-EIYL aeroplane
19/05/2012 France F-KGDE aeroplane
05/05/2012 France F-GXES aeroplane
28/04/2012 Switzerland HB-PGA aeroplane
18/01/2012 UK G-BWHF aeroplane
08/01/2012 France F-GLPO aeroplane
12/11/2011 UK G-BXRG aeroplane
16/10/2011 Belgium OO-KKK aeroplane
14/10/2011 UK G-BBEF aeroplane
14/10/2011 Spain EC-KDS aeroplane
02/09/2011 France F-BRTE aeroplane
02/09/2011 Germany D-EGFU aeroplane
29/07/2011 UK G-RVRF aeroplane
17/07/2011 France F-GNJU aeroplane
04/07/2011 France F-GBCZ aeroplane
05/12/2012 Norway LN-OMY helicopter
18/09/2012 Switzerland HB-ZJO helicopter
11/01/2012 Sweden SE-JPZ helicopter
12/11/2012 UK G-WOOW helicopter
18/10/2011 Belgium OO-HCI helicopter
14/09/2011 France F-HFBI helicopter
24/07/2011 UK G-ROTG helicopter
09/07/2011 Belgium OO-HNE helicopter
04/07/2011 Norway LN-OXC helicopter
19/03/2011 Spain EC-KTA helicopter
08/03/2011 Hungary HA-LFB helicopter
09/12/2010 UK G-CBVL helicopter
04/08/2010 France F-OIEL helicopter
31/07/2010 France F-GKBF helicopter
25/07/2010 France F-GJGQ helicopter
27/06/2010 Netherlands PH-ECJ helicopter
31/05/2010 France F-ORGB helicopter
15/11/2009 UK G-RIDL helicopter
09/10/2009 France F-GKRL helicopter
22/09/2009 UK G-LINX helicopter
23/08/2012 Slovenia S5-OLO balloon
19/08/2012 France F-HDJH balloon
31/07/2012 UK G-VBFH balloon
26/07/2012 France F-GOXA balloon
25/05/2012 Netherlands PH-ZOZ balloon
23/05/2012 UK G-VBFA balloon
14/05/2012 France F-GXFX balloon
13/05/2012 France F-HTML balloon
25/03/2012 UK G-BEEI balloon
30/09/2011 UK G-VBFV balloon
22/09/2011 UK G-LRGE balloon
24/08/2011 UK G-CBZZ balloon
02/07/2011 Portugal CS-BAS balloon
12/06/2011 UK G-TLEL balloon
21/05/2011 France F-GSUI balloon
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22/04/2011 Belgium OO-BHA balloon
05/03/2011 UK G-VBFG balloon
07/01/2011 France F-GXEB balloon
01/01/2011 UK G-BVXF balloon
12/09/2010 Germany D-OBBU balloon
13/10/2012 Germany D-7565 sailplane
08/09/2012 Germany D-KPIW sailplane
04/09/2012 UK G-EENN sailplane
04/08/2012 France F-CEVU sailplane
04/08/2012 UK G-DDFN sailplane
30/07/2012 Switzerland HB-1585 sailplane
18/09/2012 Germany D-KBEM sailplane
14/06/2012 France F-CHFM sailplane
03/05/2012 France F-CGVV sailplane
05/10/2011 France F-CGZM sailplane
13/09/2011 Czech Republic OK-A630 sailplane
30/06/2011 Germany D-KKYB sailplane
12/06/2011 Finland OH-920 sailplane
18/05/2011 France F-CHIT sailplane
13/04/2011 Germany D-2428 sailplane
27/09/2010 France F-CGZL sailplane
13/08/2010 Belgium OO-ZGJ sailplane
08/08/2010 UK G-DBZZ sailplane
01/08/2010 France F-CBLB sailplane
07/07/2010 Germany D-KANR sailplane
12/06/2010 Belgium OO-YEB sailplane
7.5.2.2. Conclusions
In general, the investigations determined causes and factors. The proportion of reports which mention
that some causes and/or contributory factors could not be established is smaller for balloons and
higher for aeroplanes and sailplanes.
For at least a quarter of the study set, the investigations did not establish the complete sequence of
occurrences, which is an indication that even a high-level scenario of the accident is missing. This is
seldom the case when investigating an accident of a large aircraft that carries crash-protected flight
recorders. However, since this analysis did not go to a deeper level of analysis and assess to what
extent the sequence of events and descriptive factors identified by the investigation are complete, it is
not possible to draw any additional conclusions with regard to the capability of the investigation to
identify all causes and contributory factors in this study.
Also, a third of the investigations established the complete final trajectory, while trajectory
reconstruction was attempted in most cases. The proportion of investigations establishing a partial or
complete final trajectory is higher for aeroplanes and helicopters than it is for balloons and sailplanes.
This can be explained by the fact that a radar track is seldom available in the case of balloons and
sailplanes (because few are equipped with an SSR transponder) whereas it is one of the main sources
for helicopters and aeroplanes. However, the proportion of investigations establishing the complete
final trajectory is higher for sailplanes than it is for the other aircraft categories. A high proportion of
sailplanes have equipment using a GNSS function in comparison to other aircraft categories.
Eyewitness was one of the primary sources of trajectory data for all aircraft categories.
The investigation is more likely to reconstruct the complete final trajectory of the aircraft if the
recording of a GNSS receiver or of a radar track is available. However, the study does not show that the
investigation is more likely to establish causes and contributory factors when a GNSS receiver
recording or a radar track can be retrieved or when tests and research activities are conducted.
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A third of the investigations included tests and research activities. In most cases, one or several flight
parameters were identified that could have provided (alone or in combination) the desired
information. This means that a third of the investigations could be facilitated if flight parameters were
recorded. However, trajectory flight parameters would not be sufficient in most cases, and ADRS flight
parameters would be helpful only in half of the cases. Only a complete set of flight parameters such as
those required to be recorded by an FDR would cover the need for information in most cases.
In general, there are more tests and research activities conducted for aeroplane and helicopter
investigations than for balloon or sailplane investigations.
Only 3 reports out of 81 in the study set explicitly point at the need for and/or the benefit of in-flight
recording. Since the primary purpose of an accident report is not to express investigation needs, no
factual conclusion as regards the need for in-flight recording for the investigation can be drawn from
this figure alone.
7.5.3. Study 2
7.5.3.1. Scope and study set
The objective of Study 2 was to assess what factual data could be obtained from in-flight recording and
the benefit of that information for identifying and resolving safety issues. It was based on positive
evidence as it focused on the contribution of data coincidentally recorded on board.
In this study, recordings from equipment installed on aircraft and from devices brought by persons on
board as well as recordings made outside the aircraft were considered. For example, a recording from
a camera, a smartphone, a GNSS receiver, an avionics system, an engine control system, etc.
A sample of safety investigation reports was analysed. The scope of the study and the questions are
presented in Table E.3.
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Table E.3: Scope of Study 2
Study 2 Criteria applied to determine the study set and study questions
Aircraft groups considered 1. Aeroplanes with MCTOM less than 5 700 kg
2. Helicopters with MCTOM less than 3 175 kg
3. Sailplanes
4. Balloons and hot-air airships
Study period Between XX/XX/XXXX and 31/12/2012
Occurrence class Accidents
Aircraft registration Aircraft registered in one of the EASA MSs
Severity — Fatal accidents (at least one fatality) for aircraft groups 1 to 3.
— Fatal and non-fatal accidents for aircraft group 4 (balloons and hot-air airships).
Investigation reports Only final reports
Recording Only reports of accidents with light aircraft where a useful in-flight recording was retrieved
and analysed.
Number of investigation At least 20 for each aircraft category
reports reviewed for each The final reports corresponding to the 20 most recent accidents in the study period were
aircraft group selected for the study.
Questions to answer for — What is the category of aircraft (aeroplane, helicopter, balloon, sailplane)?
each report reviewed — What was the aircraft maximum occupancy provided in the type certificate datasheet?
(Or, if not available for balloons, the difference between maximum take-off mass and
minimum landing mass provided in the type certificate datasheet.)
— For aeroplanes, helicopter and sailplanes: what is the aircraft MTOM provided in the
type certificate datasheet?
— What is the number of engines?
— What is the type of the engine (reciprocating, turboprop, turbojet)?
— For aeroplanes and helicopters: was the aircraft certified for operation with a minimum
crew of at least two pilots?
— State of the investigation authority.
— Provide the sequence of aviation occurrences identified in the report, or the category
of the last occurrence (RE, CFIT, LOC-I, etc.).
— What would be the applicable Part of the AirOPS rules (CAT, SPO, NCC, NCO)?
— Was there any corrective action following the accident?
— For each recording retrieved, did the recording help in determining significant events
and/or significant causal/contributory factors? If yes:
What was the nature of the recording(s) retrieved (data from an instrument or
navigation equipment, from engine controls, from pictures or video, etc.)?
List the main events and contributory/causal factors that were established thanks to
the recording and provide paragraph references.
Indicate which in-flight recording function(s) (flight parameters, audio, image, data
link) could have provided equivalent information.
• Was the information extracted from the recording useful to identify and recommend
corrective actions? (yes/no; what were the recommended corrective actions; why
was the recording useful; paragraph reference).
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A sample of 48 final safety investigation reports of light-aircraft accidents occurred over from 2009 to
2012 was analysed for Study 2. The reference information on these accidents is presented in Table E.4.
Table E.4: Accidents whose investigation reports were analysed for Study 2
Date of the accident State of registry Aircraft registration Aircraft category
13/11/2012 Latvia YL-SVN aeroplane
16/08/2012 Austria OE-DII aeroplane
16/08/2012 UK G-BODP aeroplane
10/08/2012 Germany D-EIYL aeroplane
28/04/2012 Switzerland HB-PGA aeroplane
18/01/2012 UK G-BWHF aeroplane
08/01/2012 France F-GLPO aeroplane
12/11/2011 UK G-BXRG aeroplane
14/10/2011 UK G-BBEF aeroplane
02/09/2011 Germany D-EGFU aeroplane
29/07/2011 UK G-RVRF aeroplane
05/12/2012 Norway LN-OMY helicopter
11/01/2012 Sweden SE-JPZ helicopter
12/11/2012 UK G-WOOW helicopter
18/10/2011 Belgium OO-HCI helicopter
14/09/2011 France F-HFBI helicopter
24/07/2011 UK G-ROTG helicopter
04/07/2011 Norway LN-OXC helicopter
19/03/2011 Spain EC-KTA helicopter
08/03/2011 Hungary HA-LFB helicopter
09/12/2010 UK G-CBVL helicopter
04/08/2010 France F-OIEL helicopter
27/06/2010 Netherlands PH-ECJ helicopter
23/08/2012 Slovenia S5-OLO balloon
19/08/2012 France F-HDJH balloon
13/05/2012 France F-HTML balloon
12/06/2011 UK G-TLEL balloon
22/04/2011 Belgium OO-BHA balloon
05/03/2011 UK G-VBFG balloon
01/01/2011 UK G-BVXF balloon
12/09/2010 Germany D-OBBU balloon
28/08/2010 UK G-CBZU balloon
11/01/2010 France F-GOBI balloon
04/09/2012 UK G-EENN sailplane
04/08/2012 France F-CEVU sailplane
04/08/2012 UK G-DDFN sailplane
30/07/2012 Switzerland HB-1585 sailplane
18/06/2012 Germany D-KBEM sailplane
14/06/2012 France F-CHFM sailplane
03/05/2012 France F-CGVV sailplane
05/10/2011 France F-CGZM sailplane
13/09/2011 Czech Republic OK-A630 sailplane
30/06/2011 Germany D-KKYB sailplane
18/05/2011 France F-CHIT sailplane
13/04/2011 Germany D-2428 sailplane
27/09/2010 France F-CGZL sailplane
01/08/2010 France F-CBLB sailplane
07/07/2010 Germany D-KANR sailplane
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7.5.3.2. Conclusions
From the results it can be concluded that at least for a quarter of the investigations the complete
sequence of occurrences could not be established. This is a result similar to that of Study 1, therefore it
cannot be concluded that data from a recording can facilitate the determination of the sequence of
occurrences.
Note:
Establishing the correct sequence of occurrences depends on many factors: from the
availability of factual data (of which recorded data are just a category) to support the
investigation efforts to the capability to encode an accident or serious incident. For example, it
is sometimes difficult to code balloon accidents with the CICTT occurrence taxonomy because
this code was primarily designed for aeroplanes or helicopters.
For the majority of safety investigations, the recordings retrieved helped in determining significant
events and/or significant contributory factors. Also, all categories of recordings helped in determining
significant events and factors. In the case of aeroplanes, helicopters and sailplanes, the most useful
recording function that could have provided equivalent information is flight parameters, followed by
image recordings. When considering balloons, image recordings would have been the most useful:
indeed, no flight parameter can provide sufficient information on the position of passengers during
landing or on the wind and weather conditions, which appear to be essential information for a balloon
accident investigation.
The proportion of radar track data retrieved is higher for aeroplanes than it is for the other aircraft
categories, and the proportion of sailplanes fitted with equipment using a GNSS function is higher
when considering other aircraft categories. Pictures and videos considered together represent a third
of the recordings retrieved for aeroplanes and helicopters, but they represent half of the recordings for
balloons, and they represent only a small proportion of the recordings for sailplanes.
Only 18 out of 48 safety investigation reports identified a corrective action of any kind (safety
recommendation or mention of any other kind of corrective action taken by the parties involved). This
proportion is even smaller in the particular case of sailplanes, where only one quarter of the
investigation reports identified a corrective action.
Considering the investigation reports identifying corrective actions, in only 6 cases out of 18 was an
explicit link made between the information obtained from the recording and the corrective actions.
In particular for helicopters, no investigation report established a link between the findings from a
recording and the corrective actions.
Note: There is no obligation (or even guidance) to specify, when writing an investigation report,
whether the information obtained from a recording was useful to establish a given corrective
action. In addition, corrective actions generally relate to several significant events and factors
that are established based on the analysis of several sources of data. It is then difficult to
assess a posteriori the contribution of a given recording to the identification of corrective
actions.
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7.5.4. Study 3
7.5.4.1. Scope and study set
The aim of Study 3 was to assess the potential contribution of the CVR to the investigation of an
accident. Indeed, all models of aeroplanes with an MCTOM of over 27 000 kg and all models of
helicopters with an MCTOM of over 7 000 kg are subject to carry a CVR. However, for lighter models of
aeroplanes and helicopters, the eligibility criteria are different when considering CAT and when
considering other types of operations. This is why the initial scope of Study 3 was limited to:
— aeroplanes with an MCTOM of less than 27 000 kg required to carry a CVR in accordance with
Part-CAT, but not in accordance with Part-NCC/-SPO; and
— helicopters with an MCTOM between 3 175 and 7 000 kg (required to carry a CVR in accordance
with Part-CAT, but not in accordance with Part-NCC/-SPO).
Table E.5: CVR carriage requirements for aeroplanes, depending on the type of operation
Applicable Part of the CVR carriage required if:
Air Operations rules
Part-CAT — MCTOM > 5 700 kg, or
— multi-engined turbine-powered aeroplanes with MOPSC > 9 and first issued with
an individual CofA on or after 1 January 1990.
Part-NCC and Part-SPO — MCTOM > 27 000 kg and first issued with an individual CofA on or after
1 January 2016, or
— MCTOM > 2 250 kg and certified for operation with a minimum crew of at least
two pilots and equipped with turbojet engine(s) or more than one turboprop
engine and type certificate is first issued on or after 1 January 2016.
Table E.6: CVR carriage requirements for helicopters, depending on the type of operation
Applicable Part of the CVR carriage required if:
Air Operations rules
Part-CAT — MCTOM > 7 000 kg, or
— MCTOM > 3 175 kg and first issued with an individual CofA on or after
1 January 1987.
Part-NCC and Part-SPO — MCTOM > 7 000 kg and first issued with an individual CofA on or after
1 January 2016.
However, the EASA accident and incident database was queried in order to evaluate the number of
aeroplane and helicopter accidents that would fall within the scope of Study 3. It was found that:
— 451 non-Annex II aeroplanes registered in an EU MS were involved in accidents or incidents in
2012, and whose MCTOM < 27 000 kg. For 9 out of 451 of them, the aeroplane was of a model
subject to the CVR carriage requirement if operated for CAT, while it was operated for general
aviation or aerial work. This represents less than 2 % of the EU non-Annex II aeroplanes involved
in accidents or incidents in 2012.
— 178 non-Annex II helicopters registered in an EU MS were involved in accidents or incidents
between 2007 and 2012, and whose MCTOM < 7 000 kg. For 37 out of 178 of them, the
helicopter was of a model subject to the CVR carriage requirement if operated for CAT, while it
was operated for general aviation or aerial work. This represents 22 % of the EU non-Annex II
helicopters involved in accidents or incidents in 2012.
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Hence, the potential safety benefits of extending CVR carriage requirements currently applicable to
CAT to NCC/SPO appear to be very limited when considering aeroplanes. On the contrary, a significant
proportion of safety investigations involving helicopters operated under Part-NCC or Part-SPO may
potentially benefit from the carriage of a CVR. For this reason, it was decided to keep only helicopters
in the scope of Study 3.
A sample of safety investigation reports was analysed. The scope of the study and the questions are
presented in Table E.7.
Table E.7: Scope of Study 3
Study 3 Criteria applied to determine the study set and study questions
Aircraft groups considered CAT helicopters with an MCTOM between 3 175 and 7 000 kg and required to carry a CVR
in accordance with the OPS/CAT rules.
Study period Between XX/XX/XXXX and 31/12/2012
Occurrence class Accidents
Aircraft registration Aircraft registered in one of the EASA MSs
Severity Fatal and non-fatal accidents
Investigation reports Only final reports
Recording At least 5 (if possible, 10 or more) for helicopters.
The final reports corresponding to the most recent accidents (minimum 5, if possible 10 or
more) in the study period were selected for the study.
Number of investigation CAT helicopters with an MCTOM between 3 175 and 7 000 kg and required to carry a CVR
reports reviewed for each in accordance with the OPS/CAT rules.
aircraft group
Questions to answer for — What is the maximum occupancy of the helicopter provided in the type certificate
each report reviewed datasheet?
— What is the MTOM of the aircraft provided in the type certificate datasheet?
— What is the number of engines?
— What is the type of the engine (reciprocating, turboprop, turbojet)?
— State of the investigation authority.
— Provide the sequence of aviation occurrences identified in the report, or the category
of the last occurrence (RE, CFIT, LOC-I, etc.).
— Were there significant events or significant causal/contributory factors that could not
have been established with certainty without the CVR? If yes:
List these events and causal/contributory factors (quote with paragraph references).
Indicate which were the useful audio channels.
Would the significant causal/contributory factors have been captured by ATC
recording?
— Did the data in the CVR recording provide additional information that was useful to
identify and recommend corrective actions? (yes/no; what was (were) the corrective
action(s); why was the recording useful; paragraph reference)
A sample of 5 safety investigation reports of helicopter accidents occurred from 2007 to 2011 was
analysed. This sample is small because there have been only 2 or 3 accidents in average per year with
helicopters operated for CAT32 and registered in the EASA MSs in the last decade. The reference
information on these accidents is presented in Table E.8.
Table E.8: Accidents whose investigation reports were analysed for Study 3
32
In accordance with the European Air Operations requirements, helicopters not operated for commercial air transport may be
required to carry a CVR only if they are manufactured on or after 1 January 2016.
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Date of the accident State of registry Aircraft registration
11/07/2011 France F-HJCS
01/04/2009 UK G-REDL
09/03/2008 UK G-BKXD
13/06/2007 Spain EC-FBM
18/04/2007 Denmark OY-HGZ
7.5.4.2. Conclusions
Study 3 could only provide partial data on the safety benefits brought by the CVR for accidents with
large helicopters.
On the one hand, for all 5 cases analysed, the CVR helped in determining significant events or
significant contributory factors that could not have been established with certainty without the CVR.
These were: information on chronology and timeline; information on communication and CRM;
information on the application of procedures and checklists; and information on alarms and technical
failures.
On the other hand though, no investigation report clearly stated that the information obtained from
the CVR was used to identify a corrective action. This can be explained by the fact that only 5 cases
were analysed, only 2 investigation reports out of 5 mentioned corrective actions, and in these 2
investigation reports the link between the source of data, the information established and the
potential corrective actions was not clearly made.
It was also not possible to conclude on the most useful audio channel(s) as the analysed investigation
reports did not provide this information.
7.5.5. Study 4
7.5.5.1. Scope and study set
The objective of Study 4 was to assess what factual data could be specifically obtained from an
airborne image recording and the benefit of that information for identifying and resolving safety
issues. It was based on positive evidence. Only investigation reports mentioning the retrieval of image
recordings from the interior of the aircraft were selected for Study 4.
Study 4 was meant to complement Study 2, as the latter had identified few cases of image recordings
taken from the inside of the aircraft, hence making it difficult to draw meaningful conclusions with
regard to image recordings.
A sample of safety investigation reports was analysed. The scope of the study and the questions are
presented in Table E.9.
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Table E.9: Scope of Study 4
Study 4 Criteria applied to determine the study set and study questions
Aircraft groups for Study 4 1. Aeroplanes with an MCTOM less than 5 700 kg
2. Helicopters with an MCTOM less than 3 175 kg
3. Sailplanes
4. Balloons and hot-air airships
Study period Between 01/07/2011 and 01/07/2014
Occurrence class Accidents
Aircraft registration Aircraft registered in one of the EASA MSs
Severity Fatal and non-fatal accidents
Investigation reports Only final reports
Number of investigation reports At least 5 for each aircraft category.
reviewed for each aircraft group The final reports corresponding to at least the 5 most recent accidents in the study
period were selected for the study.
Questions to answer for each — What is the category of aircraft (aeroplane, helicopter, balloon, sailplane)?
report reviewed — What is the aircraft maximum occupancy provided in the type certificate
datasheet? (Or, if not available for balloons, the difference between maximum
take-off mass and minimum landing mass provided in the type certificate
datasheet.)
— For aeroplanes, helicopters and sailplanes: what is the aircraft MTOM provided
in the type certificate datasheet?
— What is the number of engines?
— What is the type of the engine (reciprocating, turboprop, turbojet)?
— For aeroplanes and helicopters: was the aircraft certified for operation with a
minimum crew of at least two pilots?
— State of the investigation authority.
— Provide the sequence of aviation occurrences identified in the report, or the
category of the last occurrence (RE, CFIT, LOC-I, etc.).
— What would be the applicable Part of the Air OPS rules (CAT, SPO, NCC, NCO)?
— Was there any corrective action following the accident?
— For each recording retrieved, did the image recording help in determining
significant events and/or significant causal/contributory factors? If yes:
What was the source of the recording(s) (dedicated image recorder, action
camera, smartphone, etc.)?
List the main events and contributory/causal factors that were established
thanks to the recording and provide paragraph references.
Indicate the type of information used for determining the significant events
and/or contributory/causal factors (physical condition and attention of the
pilot, non-verbal communication, meteorological conditions, indications of
instruments, etc.).
Was the information useful to identify and recommend corrective actions?
(yes/no; what were the recommended corrective actions; why was the
recording useful; paragraph reference.)
A sample of 20 final safety investigation reports of light-aircraft accidents occurred from 2011 to 2014
was analysed for Study 4. The reference information on these accidents is presented in Table E.10.
Note: One accident was an in-flight collision, hence involving two aircraft.
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Table E.10: Accidents reviewed for Study 4
Date of the accident State of registry Aircraft registration Aircraft category
07/11/2011 Switzerland HB-ZGI helicopter
20/09/2012 Switzerland HB-UVT aeroplane
28/04/2012 Switzerland HB-PGA aeroplane
24/06/2014 Norway LN-OSY helicopter
Germany D-EZKP aeroplane
15/03/2013
Germany D-EOTW aeroplane
09/06/2012 Austria OE-XKS helicopter
21/06/2013 Germany D-ECBZ aeroplane
27/02/2014 France F-BJQT aeroplane
14/09/2011 France F-HFBI helicopter
07/08/2012 Switzerland HB-KCF aeroplane
23/09/2012 France F-GBBY aeroplane
04/07/2012 France F-OHOR helicopter
16/06/2013 France F-BXRZ aeroplane
16/02/2014 France F-BUHP aeroplane
24/10/2013 France F-OIAB aeroplane
20/04/2014 Finland OH-XDZ aeroplane
02/11/2012 Poland SP-8050 sailplane
01/08/2013 France F-CEAT sailplane
18/12/2011 UK G-BVXS aeroplane
04/08/2012 UK G-DDFN sailplane
7.5.5.2. Conclusions
The general results of Study 4 can be summarised as follows:
— For the majority of the investigations, the recordings retrieved helped in determining significant
events and/or significant contributory factors.
— All categories of recording equipment (not only dedicated image recording systems) helped to
determine significant events and factors. In the majority of the cases even the recreational use
of video recorders or portable devices were an essential source of data to establish the events.
— In particular, image recordings appeared relevant for two types of information used in
investigation:
information presented by analogic instruments in the flight crew compartment;
information on the location of the aircraft when no radar data nor other recording of the
flight path is available.
— Only 4 out of the 20 safety investigation reports identify a corrective action (safety
recommendation or mention of any other kind of corrective action taken by the parties
involved). Only in 1 of these 4 cases was the corrective action univocally linked to data recorded
by an image recorder.
Note: There is no obligation (or even guidance) to specify, when writing an investigation report,
whether the information obtained from a recording was useful to establish a given corrective
action. In addition, corrective actions generally relate to several significant events and factors
that are established based on the analysis of several sources of data. It is then difficult to assess
a posteriori the contribution of a given recording to the identification of corrective actions.
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7. Appendices
7.6. Appendix F: Alternatives to dedicated in-flight recording equipment
In this Appendix, alternatives to dedicated in-flight recording equipment are reviewed.
The alternative solutions should deliver information on the aircraft trajectory or status of the engines
and essential systems, or of the situation on board, since such information is useful and facilitates the
investigation of accidents.
7.6.1. Identified alternative solutions
The following categories of alternative solutions were identified:
— Portable GNSS receivers: this category includes all portable devices (installation not certified)
that have a GNSS localisation function. This category also includes these GNSS receivers
designated as ‘IGC-approved flight recorders’ by the International Gliding Commission (IGC), for
which specifications exist.
— Panel-mounted GNSS receiver and navigation equipment: this category covers all aircraft
systems using a GNSS localisation function and which are permanently installed on the
instrument panel. Usually, the installation of such aircraft systems is performed by default or
offered as an option by the aircraft manufacturer and it must be certified.
— Integrated cockpit: this category designates installations where all flight parameters and flight
information needed for the piloting and flight management are concentrated and are usually
made available in an integrated manner33 (e.g. PFD, MFD).
— Anti-collision systems: this category designates products whose primary function is anti-collision
and which are designed for light aircraft (e.g. TCAS I or FLARM).
— Terrain avoidance warning systems: this category designates products whose primary function is
CFIT prevention and which are designed for light aircraft (such as Class C TAWS).
— SSR transponder and Mode S transponder: this category corresponds to the transponders used
in civil aviation and capable of Mode A/C or of Mode S/ADS-B transmission. A Mode A/C
transponder must be installed on all aeroplanes and helicopters operated under Part-CAT or
Part-NCC (it must also be installed on aeroplanes and helicopters operated under Part-NCO and
on sailplanes and balloons ‘where required by the airspace being flown’).
— ADS-B out capable transponder: this category designates SSR transponders capable of
transmitting ADS-B surveillance data.
— Engine control system and related recording equipment (ECU, DECU, EDR, FADEC, etc.): this
category designates aircraft systems whose primary purpose is to control and monitor the
aircraft engines or to record engine parameters.
— Engine information system (VEMD, JP instruments): these are displays rendering parameters
related to engine status and regime and fitted with internal memory.
— iPad/Tablets/PC/smartphones: this category includes all portable electronic devices on which
aviation software or apps can be installed.
— Video: this category includes cameras and GoPro (installation not certified).
33
Generally, an integrated cockpit/flight deck combines a number of flight guidance, airplane systems, and situational awareness
control and display functions onto a minimum number of interdependent electronic displays. It typically includes electronic display
and control of primary aeroplane airspeed, altitude and attitude instruments, and essential navigation and communication
functions. Integration may also include display and control of airborne surveillance, aeroplane systems and engine systems.
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— Flight-tracking solutions: these are real-time aircraft tracking solutions which do not rely on ATM
surveillance systems and are designed for light aircraft. Example: Spidertracks.
7.6.2. Assessment of the alternative solutions
The identified alternative solutions were assessed against several aspects, such as the equipment on
which they rely, the aircraft categories on which they are commonly installed, what data they record,
their cost, and overall relevance for safety investigation purposes.
The results are presented in Table F.1 and Table F.2.
The conclusions of this assessment for each category of aircraft that are within the scope of RMT.0271
& RMT.0272 are presented below.
7.6.2.1. Aeroplanes and helicopters
While portable GNSS receivers offer a good source of trajectory data, they are increasingly replaced by
non-specialised electronic devices on which aviation applications are run (iPad, tablets, smartphones,
etc.) The proprietary data format used by these devices make it very challenging to retrieve any useful
data when the device is damaged (often the case after an accident) and their manufacturers usually
provide little assistance to investigation authorities. The same applies to image and video recorders.
Terrain avoidance warning systems and airborne collision avoidance system are only installed on large
aeroplanes and they are expensive. Engine control systems and engine information systems may
record useful engine data; however, they do not usually provide trajectory information. Integrated
cockpits may contain a wealth information; however, given their cost it is likely that they will stay in
the short term reserved for the more expensive models among light aeroplanes and helicopters. Flight
tracking solutions provides a position at intervals of typically 1 minutes because of the satellite
communication cost; however, the rapid decrease of these cost may allow more frequent tracking in
the future.
The SSR transponder is installed on-board most light aeroplanes and helicopters operated over the
territory of EU Member states (because necessary to fly through airspace where it is required34), and
provided the SSR transponder is on, it will most likely be detected by at least one civilian or military
sensor (unless it is flying very low above the terrain or in a valley). Commission Implementing
Regulation (EU) 2016/1185 introduced a requirement in Regulation (EU) No 923/2012 according to
which an aircraft carrying a serviceable transponder must have it on at all times during the flight35:
‘SERA.13001 Operation of an SSR transponder
(a) When an aircraft carries a serviceable SSR transponder, the pilot shall operate the transponder at
all times during flight, regardless of whether the aircraft is within or outside airspace where SSR is used
for ATS purposes.
(b) [...]
(c) Except for flight in airspace designated by the competent authority for mandatory operation of
transponder, aircraft without sufficient electrical power supply are exempted from the requirement to
operate the transponder at all times.’
34
Refer to Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, Annex VII (Part-NCO), points NCO.IDE.A.200 and NCC.IDE.H.200.
35
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 923/2012 of 26 September 2012 laying down the common rules of the air and
operational provisions regarding services and procedures in air navigation and amending Implementing Regulation (EU)
No 1035/2011 and Regulations (EC) No 1265/2007, (EC) No 1794/2006, (EC) No 730/2006, (EC) No 1033/2006 and (EU)
No 255/2010 (OJ L 281, 13.10.2012, p. 1). This Regulation is applicable, among other things, to all aircraft engaged in general air
traffic and ‘operating into, within or out of the Union’ (Article 1).
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Hence, it can be reasonably expected that most light and non-complex aeroplanes and helicopters
operated over the territory of MSs will be tracked by radars all along the flight, even if they are not
operated commercially.
7.6.2.2. Sailplanes
Two types of systems recording data are commonly carried on sailplanes: anti-collision systems such as
FLARM (required to be affiliated by some national glider associations), and ‘IGC-approved flight
recorders’, i.e. GNSS receivers which fulfil the IGC specifications (when the sailplane is used for
competitions or badges).
Both types of systems essentially provide trajectory data, and studies of investigation reports tend to
indicate that trajectory data is most of the time useful for explaining sailplane accidents (refer to
Appendix E).
For both types of equipment, proprietary data formats are an issue for chip level data recovery (when
the equipment is damaged).
The installation of FLARM under a standard change is allowed by CS-STAN (CS-SC051a, installation of
‘FLARM’ equipment). It is planned (under RMT.0690) to enable the installation of GNSS receivers under
CS-STAN. The related NPA 2016-17, published in December 2016, can be consulted on the EASA
website.
7.6.2.3. Balloons
When engaged in competition, balloons usually carry a GNSS receiver. This enables scorers to
download each balloon’s course and to calculate the results. As for other aircraft, proprietary data
formats are an issue for chip level data recovery. NPA 2016-17 (RMT.0690) proposes to enable the
installation of GNSS receivers under a standard change.
In addition, studies of investigation reports tend to indicate that trajectory data alone are not very
useful for explaining balloon accidents; instead, airborne image recordings were much more helpful
(refer to Appendix E). NPA 2016-17 (RMT.0690) proposes to enable the installation of light cameras on
balloons under a standard change.
7.6.3. Recommendations for alternative solutions
For newly manufactured light aircraft, generic conditions could be defined for a solution to be an
acceptable alternative to dedicated in-flight recording. These conditions, while not prescribing a given
solution, would provide for a high probability that useful information could be retrieved by safety
investigators in case of an accident, hence enhancing accident prevention in the long term.
Based on the review of best current alternative solutions, conditions have been identified that could be
easily fulfilled by future airborne equipment designed for other primary purposes (i.e. anti-collision,
engine monitoring, etc.) without significantly increasing the cost of this equipment.
Recording techniques
— The recording may be performed on board, or data may be transmitted to the ground, or
elaborated on the ground based on a transponding system (such as an SSR), or any combination
thereof.
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— The recording function should use a digital method of storing the data in the memory medium. If
the recording is performed on board, the memory medium should be non-volatile, but does not
need to be crash-protected36.
— When the recording of data does not rely on ATM surveillance systems (SSR, ADS-B, etc.), the
memory used for recording should be managed in a way that there is always sufficient memory
to completely record the current flight. For example, the recording could be circular, i.e. the
most recent data overwriting the oldest data.
— Data compression and data encryption should not be used if the recording is performed on
board (because the crash conditions might corrupt the recording file, making it impossible to
decompress and/or decrypt with normal download software).
Recording format
When the recording of data does not rely on ATM surveillance systems, data should be recorded in a
format that is easily identified and can be decoded with appropriate documentation.
Means of access to recorded information
When the recording of data does not rely on ATM surveillance systems, the user’s means for
downloading the recorded information from the recording medium should not erase, rewrite or alter
the recording files.
Recording start-and-stop and recording delay
— The recording/transmitting/transponding function of the airborne equipment should
automatically start when the airborne equipment is powered on and remain active as long as the
airborne equipment is on.
— The user’s interface with the airborne equipment should not offer any means to disable the
recording/transmitting function when the equipment is on and used; however, this may be
possible when the airborne equipment is connected to dedicated test or download equipment.
— In case where data is recorded on board, the delay between the computation of the data and
the recording in the recording medium should not exceed a few seconds.
— In case where data is transmitted to the ground and not recorded on board, it should (to the
extent possible) be transmitted throughout the flight. The transmission of data upon completion
of the flight is not acceptable.
Erasure of recorded data
In case where data is recorded on board and it contains no privacy content (does not contain voices or
images of the aircraft occupants), except for the overwriting of the oldest data by new data, no means
for the erasure of data should be provided by the user’s interface when the equipment is used;
however, this may be possible on the ground, for example, if the recording is made on the ground or
when the alternative solution is connected to dedicated test or read-out equipment. In addition, if the
recording is likely to contain privacy content (e.g. sound in the flight crew compartment or a view of
the basket area in case of a balloon are recorded), there should be a means to erase the recording.
36
Adding any level of crashworthiness or hardening is nevertheless welcome.
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Content to be recorded in case of image recording
Essential information to be captured
As a minimum, the alternative solution should capture:
— a view of the control panel sufficient to read information corresponding to:
indicated airspeed, pressure altitude, magnetic heading and, when available, vertical
speed, stabilised heading, OAT, aircraft attitude turn and slip, for aeroplanes;
indicated airspeed, pressure altitude, magnetic heading, slip and, when available, vertical
speed, aircraft attitude, OAT, and stabilised heading for helicopters;
indicated airspeed, pressure altitude and, when available, magnetic heading, vertical
speed, turn and slip, and attitude for sailplanes;
— a view of the outside sufficient to identify weather conditions.
An actual in-flight recording should be checked after installation to verify that the view is unobstructed
by seats or pilot bodies and that the image quality is sufficient to read instrument conditions in normal
daylight flight conditions.
Recording rate
The maximum recording/transmission time interval should not exceed a few seconds.
Data to be recorded in case of flight parameters recording
This section describes the minimum flight parameters to be recorded on board or on the ground.
Essential parameters to be recorded
The alternative solution should record the following information or provide sufficient information to
reconstruct at least the following parameters:
— UTC time base;
— [aircraft 2D trajectory parameters] or [aircraft speed and aircraft track/heading] (both preferred,
when available);
— vertical speed or altitude (both preferred, when available).
Recording rate
Except when the recording relies on ATM surveillance systems, the maximum recording/transmission
time interval should not exceed a few seconds.
Essential parameters’ performance
Documentation should indicate for each essential parameter recorded:
— its source, e.g. GNSS receiver, barometric sensors, accelerometers, IRS, etc.;
— its operational range, i.e. the range of values on which it is accurate; and
— its accuracy.
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Additional data
Additional data related to the operation of the aircraft and that is available to the airborne equipment
performing the recording or transmission of the essential parameters should, when practicable, be also
recorded.
Examples of additional data are provided below. Additional data usually depend on the primary
function of the airborne equipment.
Examples:
— Anti-collision advisories and corresponding resolutions produced by an anti-collision system
(FLARM, TCAS).
— Terrain proximity warnings for a TAWS.
— Engine-related flight parameters used by an engine control and monitoring system.
— Active route, associated waypoints and last ‘go-to’ displayed by a navigation system.
— Data about the GNSS position accuracy (number of satellites in view, health and status of
satellites, VDOP, PDOP) computed by the GNSS receiver.
— Attitude parameters.
Installation of the airborne equipment
The airborne equipment that is required to record the data or transmit it to the ground does not need
to be certified for installation on the aircraft.
However, the airborne equipment or its mounting should not be removable from the aircraft without a
dedicated tool or a dedicated key. For example, the use of Velcro or of a clipping system allowing quick
removal should not be acceptable.
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Table F.1: Summary of the assessment of the alternative solutions — A to F
Airborne equipment A. Portable GNSS B. Panel-mounted GNSS C. Integrated cockpit D. Anti-collision E. Terrain avoidance F. SSR transponder
providing the receiver receiver and navigation systems warning systems (capable of Mode A/C
alternative solution equipment or capable of Mode S)
1. Airborne equipment All portable devices All aircraft systems using Installations were all Products whose primary Products whose primary Transponders used in
providing the alternative (installation not a GNSS localisation flight parameters and function is anti-collision function whose primary the civilian domain and
solution: short certified) that have a function and which are flight information and which are designed function is CFIT capable of Mode A/C or
description and GNSS localisation permanently installed needed for the piloting for light aircraft prevention and which Mode S / ADS-B
examples of models function. Includes GNSS on the instrument panel and managing the flight Examples: TCAS I, are designed for light transmission.
receivers designated as are concentrated and FLARM, low-power ADS- aircraft (such as Class C
‘IGC-approved flight are usually made B transceiver (LPAT). TAWS).
recorders’ by the available in an
International Gliding integrated manner (e.g.
Commission (IGC) PFD, MFD).
Examples: Garmin,
Zander
2. Start-and-stop logic of When powered on. On No recording of track When powered on. When powered on. Record data around a When transponder is on
data recording or data most models, recording data; Sometimes requires an warning. and in SSR range.
transmission to the is performed by default; only frequencies, and SD card.
ground however it can be flight plans
deactivated.
3. Ground-based Recording files can be None Recording files can be Recording files can be Manufacturer bench. Control centre
equipment needed to recovered and displayed recovered and displayed recovered and displayed
recover data that is using common using common using common
recorded or transmitted cartography software or cartography software or cartography software or
to the aircraft operator Google Earth. Google Earth. Google Earth.
during the flight No dedicated hardware No dedicated hardware No dedicated hardware
usually needed for usually needed for usually needed for
readout, except for readout, data is usually readout, except for
specific cables for older recorded onto a specific cables for older
models and for IGC removable medium. models and for IGC
recorders. recorders. New ones
have removable
medium.
4. Other infrastructure GNSS GNSS GNSS GNSS for FLARM Radio alti / GNSS / ADIR ATS surveillance systems
which is needed for the (SSR, ADS-B stations)
transmission and/or Transmitted Mode C/S
recording of data, and data is stored on
which is not controlled ground.
by the aircraft
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Airborne equipment A. Portable GNSS B. Panel-mounted GNSS C. Integrated cockpit D. Anti-collision E. Terrain avoidance F. SSR transponder
providing the receiver receiver and navigation systems warning systems (capable of Mode A/C
alternative solution equipment or capable of Mode S)
owner/operator
(satellites, ATS
surveillance systems,
etc.)
5. Primary purpose of Navigation Navigation Flight parameters and Anti-collision Protection against CFIT Air traffic control
the alternative solution: navigation data display
navigation, anti-
collision, engine
monitoring, badges and
diploma, etc.
6. Aircraft categories None None None ACAS: turbine-powered Aeroplanes having an Mode A/C: all flying in
and types of operation aeroplanes with an MCTOM of more than controlled area +
for which the airborne MCTOM of more than 5 5 700 kg or an MOPSC of mandated for all
equipment is required 700 kg or an MOPSC of more than 9 aeroplanes and
to be installed (if any) more than 19 (Part CAT (Part-CAT and Part- helicopters operated
and Part NCC) NCC). under Part CAT or Part
FLARM: Gliders NCC, whatever the
(required to be affiliated airspace being flown.
to French FFVV). Mode S elementary
surveillance: all IFR
flights + VFR flights,
depending on the State
Mode S enhanced
surveillance: All fixed
wing aircraft, having a
maximum take-off mass
greater that 5,700 kg or
a maximum cruising true
airspeed in excess of
250 kt, intending to fly
IFR.
7. Aircraft categories All light aircraft. All light aircraft. All motor-powered Gliders (required to be Mode A/C: All
and types of operation aircraft. affiliated to French aeroplanes and
for which the airborne FFVV). helicopters.
equipment is commonly
installed or used on a
voluntary basis
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Airborne equipment A. Portable GNSS B. Panel-mounted GNSS C. Integrated cockpit D. Anti-collision E. Terrain avoidance F. SSR transponder
providing the receiver receiver and navigation systems warning systems (capable of Mode A/C
alternative solution equipment or capable of Mode S)
8. Description of GNSS track , typically 1 Current and standby GNSS track, air data, GNSS track , 1 point Sometimes track data, Mode A/C: radar
recorded information: point every 4 seconds frequencies, and engine and attitude every 4 seconds A/C parameters (Vz, position (range and
flight parameters (which (for new generation recorded flight plans parameters, typically, 1 HDG, etc.) failure codes bearing) and FL
ones), image (of what), GNSS receivers, every point every second when triggered. Elementary Mode S:
audio? second, but could vary Mode C data + 0,25FL
depending on the Mode S enhanced
aircraft position, with surveillance= any
proprietary algorithm) programmed parameter
(for some models used (track attitude, AP, etc.)
for glider competition: and 0,25FL.
ambient noise level,
total and static
pressure)
9. Quality of the Accuracy dependent on n/a Accuracy dependent on Accuracy dependent on Radar position accuracy
recorded data: typical the GNSS service and the GNSS service and the GNSS service and depend on the radar
sampling rate, typical receiver (usually better receiver (usually better receiver (usually better head proximity and
accuracy and resolution, than 10 meter lateral than 10 meter lateral than 10 meter lateral performance.
reliability issue, other and 20 vertical). and 20 vertical). and 20 vertical). Sampling rate depends
limitations Last points of a Last points of a on the radar rotation
trajectory may be trajectory may be period (typically 4 or 6 s
predictive positions. predictive positions. for a SSR).
Accuracy dependent of
the installed sensors by
the A/C manufacturer.
10. Limitations to High attitude angles n/a None Up to 2 minutes of flight Not in range of an SSR
recording data during a (dependent on the can be lost due to the transponder not
normal flight: airborne location of the GNSS buffer memory. switched on
equipment not switched receiver antenna). Older attitude of the A/C.
on, airborne equipment model have limited
not recording memory capacity. In some States, listening
continuously, Normally memory is to SSR frequencies may
transmission of data not circular by default but not be authorised.
successful, etc. this setting can be
changed.
Could not be in a
recorder mode.
11. Possible reasons for Volatile memories on Volatile memory Proprietary data formats Proprietary data formats Proprietary data formats Data not stored by the
not retrieving recorded older models. are an issue for chip are an issue for chip are an issue for chip control centre long
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Airborne equipment A. Portable GNSS B. Panel-mounted GNSS C. Integrated cockpit D. Anti-collision E. Terrain avoidance F. SSR transponder
providing the receiver receiver and navigation systems warning systems (capable of Mode A/C
alternative solution equipment or capable of Mode S)
data after an accident: Proprietary data formats level recovery. level recovery. level recovery. enough (ex: mode S
volatile memory, are an issue for chip Increased complexity of Increased complexity of Manufacturers are data is only stored for 3
proprietary data format, level recovery. memory media is memory media is providing assistance. out of 25 of the radar in
encryption, etc. Increased complexity of requiring more and requiring more and France, in the UK
memory media is more advanced means more advanced means everything is already
requiring more and for chip level recovery. for chip level recovery. recorded).
more advanced means In addition, there are
for chip level recovery. non-ATC networks such
as FlightRadar24
In according with
Commission
Implementing
Regulation (EU)
No 1207/2011, ‘Air
navigation service
providers shall ensure
that, by 2 January 2020
at the latest, the
cooperative surveillance
chain has the necessary
capability to allow them
to establish individual
aircraft identification
using downlinked
aircraft identification
made available by
aircraft equipped in
accordance with
Annex II’, where
Annex II Parts A and C
correspond to Mode S
capability.
12. Overall relevance of Provides accurate time- Know the active flight Provides accurate time- Provides accurate time- Provides partial Provides accurate
the alternative solution stamped trajectory and plan especially for CFIT stamped trajectory, stamped trajectory and trajectory and aircraft trajectory and additional
to support investigation flight plan. For IGC accident. flight plan and engine flight plan. data. aircraft data (if
purposes recorders, a few Progressively replaced data. enhanced surveillance).
additional parameters by integrated cockpit.
are recorded.
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Airborne equipment A. Portable GNSS B. Panel-mounted GNSS C. Integrated cockpit D. Anti-collision E. Terrain avoidance F. SSR transponder
providing the receiver receiver and navigation systems warning systems (capable of Mode A/C
alternative solution equipment or capable of Mode S)
Progressively replaced
by iPad, tablets and
smartphones.
13. Range of purchase Usually a few hundreds Usually a few ten Up to EUR 50 000 EUR 500 EUR 2 000 to 3 000
cost of the airborne of euros, up to a few thousands of euros.
equipment thousands.
14. Range of purchase Cable and software Data are only viewable data is recorded in TXT Cable and software Manufacturer bench n/a
cost of the ground- usually included. on the screen. or XLS file. usually included.
based equipment If proprietary format,
(excluding ATM manufacturers have
surveillance systems) tools to convert data.
15. Cost of operating Database updates Database updates Database updates Database updates n/a
the solution (hourly, per
flight or per unit of
recorded/transmitted
data)
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Table F.1: Summary of the assessment of the alternative solutions — G to L
Airborne equipment G. SSR transponder H. Engine control I. Engine information J. Navigation applications on K. Video L. Flight-tracking
providing the capable of ADS-B system and related system iPad/tablets/PC/smartphones solutions
alternative solution recording equipment
1. Airborne equipment Aircraft systems
providing the whose primary
alternative solution: purpose is to control Displays rendering Cameras installed in the
short description and and monitor the parameters related to aircraft in order to film Equipment capable of
examples of models aircraft engine, or to engine status and the flight crew transmitting (typically
ADS-B broadcasting record engine regime and fitted with compartment and/or via satellites) the real-
unit (need to get an parameters internal memory (e.g. All portable electronic devices on the outside time position of the
outlook of ADS-B Examples: ECU, DECU, VEMD, EDM from JP which aviation software or apps Example: GoPro, aircraft.
deployment in Europe) EDR. Instruments). can be installed. Contour. Example: Spidertracks.
2. Start-and-stop logic When powered on. On most
of data recording or When transponder is When powered models, recording is performed by
data transmission to the on and in range of an on/above a certain default; however it can be
ground ADS-B station. When powered on power. deactivated. When switched on When switched on
3. Ground-based Recording files can be recovered
equipment needed to and displayed using common
recover data that is cartography software or Google
recorded or transmitted Earth.
to the aircraft operator ADS-B station (or non Manufacturer bench No dedicated hardware usually
during the flight ATC receivers such as for VEMD needed for readout, except for
FlightRadar24 no dedicated specific cables for older models No dedicated hardware
receivers). Manufacturer bench hardware for JPI and for IGC recorders. necessary Tracking platform
4. Other infrastructure
which is needed for the
transmission and/or
recording of data, and
which is not controlled ATS surveillance
by the aircraft systems (SSR, ADS-B
owner/operator stations)
(satellites, ATS Transmitted Mode C/S
surveillance systems, data is stored on Example Spidertracks:
etc.) ground None None GNSS/Bluetooth None GNSS+Iridium.
5. Primary purpose of
the alternative solution: Real-time fleet
navigation, anti- tracking
collision, engine Air traffic control and Engine control, engine General public use (not designed Private (pictures of own Alerting (backup to
monitoring, badges and traffic alert. condition monitoring. Engine control for aviation-specific use). flight), training. ELT).
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Airborne equipment G. SSR transponder H. Engine control I. Engine information J. Navigation applications on K. Video L. Flight-tracking
providing the capable of ADS-B system and related system iPad/tablets/PC/smartphones solutions
alternative solution recording equipment
diploma, etc.
6. Aircraft categories ADS-B out capability
and types of operation only required for
for which the airborne newly manufactured
equipment is required aircraft with a
to be installed (if any) maximum certified
take-off mass
exceeding 5 700 kg or
having a maximum
cruising true airspeed
capability greater than Engine with electronic
250 kt, and operated fuel regulation
under IFR. Diesel engines None None None None
7. Aircraft categories
and types of operation
for which the airborne
equipment is commonly
installed or used on a Large aeroplanes and All motor-powered All motor-powered
voluntary basis large helicopters. aircraft. aircraft. All All All
8. Description of Extended squitter
recorded information: includes:
flight parameters Aircraft address and
(which ones), image (of identification
what), audio? Lat/Long
Pressure altitude and
Geometric altitude
Groundspeed
Vertical speed
Selected altitude,
Baro setting External environment,
roll angle GNSS track , typically 1 point every pilot behaviour, flight
Mag heading Failure codes Failure codes second controls, flight panel Track data, sometimes
True track angle. engine parameters engine parameters Flight preparation sound 1 point every minute.
9. Quality of the Dependent on the Accuracy dependent on the GNSS
recorded data: typical aircraft systems service and receiver (usually
sampling rate, typical producing the flight better than 10 meter lateral and
accuracy and parameters 20 vertical). Depends on the camera
resolution, reliability transmitted in the Last points of a trajectory may be sensor.
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Airborne equipment G. SSR transponder H. Engine control I. Engine information J. Navigation applications on K. Video L. Flight-tracking
providing the capable of ADS-B system and related system iPad/tablets/PC/smartphones solutions
alternative solution recording equipment
issue, other limitations ADS-B messages. predictive positions.
10. Limitations to High attitude angles
recording data during a (dependent on the
normal flight: airborne location of the
equipment not GNSS/iridium receiver
switched on, airborne antenna). Older model
equipment not have limited memory
recording continuously, capacity. Normally
transmission of data not memory is circular by
successful, etc. Not in range of an default but this setting
ADS-B station Light issue, can be changed.
transponder not Device not switched on. movement/vibration Could not be in a
switched on Application not active. issue recorder mode.
11. Possible reasons for Data not stored by ATS
not retrieving recorded long enough.
data after an accident: In accordance with
volatile memory, Commission
proprietary data Implementing
format, encryption, etc. Regulation (EU)
No 1207/2011, ‘Air
navigation service
providers shall ensure
that, by 2 January
2020 at the latest, the
cooperative
surveillance chain has
the necessary
capability to allow
them to establish
individual aircraft
identification using Corrupted files at
downlinked aircraft accident switched off
identification made Proprietary data formats are an (to be clarified)
available by aircraft Proprietary data Proprietary data issue for chip level recovery. Increased complexity of
equipped in formats are an issue formats are an issue Increased complexity of memory memory media is
accordance with for chip level recovery. for chip level recovery. media is requiring more and more requiring more and
Annex II’, where Manufacturers are Manufacturers are advanced means for chip level more advanced means Access to the tracking
Annex II Part B providing assistance providing assistance recovery. for chip level recovery. platform
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Airborne equipment G. SSR transponder H. Engine control I. Engine information J. Navigation applications on K. Video L. Flight-tracking
providing the capable of ADS-B system and related system iPad/tablets/PC/smartphones solutions
alternative solution recording equipment
corresponds to ADS-B
out capability.
12. Overall relevance of Provides accurate
the alternative solution time-stamped
to support investigation trajectory and flight
purposes plan.
Provides accurate Provides a good Provides the last
trajectory and data on overview of the position of the aircraft,
aircraft speed and May provide accurate time- situation in the flight which facilitates
attitude angles. Provides engine data. Provides engine data. stamped trajectory and flight plan. crew compartment. wreckage localisation.
13. Range of purchase A few thousands of
cost of the airborne euros.
equipment Several ten thousands Several ten thousands
EUR 2 000 to 3 000 of euros of euros for VEMD. EUR 500 EUR 500 EUR 1 000
14. Range of purchase
cost of the ground-
based equipment Cable and software
(excluding ATM usually included/
surveillance systems) n/a Manufacturer bench manufacturer bench None None Included
15. Cost of operating
the solution (hourly, per
flight or per unit of
recorded/transmitted
data) n/a None None None
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7. Appendices
7.7. Appendix G: Results of the survey on cost and benefits of dedicated in-flight recording
EASA conducted a survey between 7 May and 9 June 2015, which focused on aircraft systems that are
permanently installed on light aeroplanes and light helicopters, and whose primary function is to
record data, audio or image, for later analysis or investigation. The survey consisted in a questionnaire
which was distributed to the Safety Standards Consultative Committee (SSCC) and to equipment
manufacturers. 12 organisations responded (8 aircraft manufacturers, 6 equipment manufacturers and
1 aircraft owner). In addition, informal feedback was received from ECOGAS, the new European
Helicopter Association (‘common position’), a representative of sailplane manufacturers at the SSCC,
and a flight school. The results of the survey are presented in Table G.1.
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Table G.1: Summary of replies to the industry survey on cost, operational impact and benefits of dedicated in-flight recording systems
Number Question Comment Reply
0 Please provide contact — Following the receipt of a filled form, (confidential information, the identity of responders and the organisations they
information phone contact may be requested in represent is not provided here).
order to obtain more background
information or clarify some replies;
— The objective of this questionnaire is
to support Rulemaking task
RMT.0271. Individual replies to this
questionnaire will be kept strictly
confidential and only fully de-
identified information will be shared.
1 You are: Replies from
— An aircraft manufacturer — 8 aircraft manufacturers (light aeroplanes and light helicopters).
— An equipment — 6 equipment manufacturers
manufacturer — 2 flight schools
— An aircraft operator or — 3 industry associations
owner
— Other (please specify)
2 Applicable aircraft make(s) Only provide the aircraft models on Many models were mentioned in the replies, including aeroplane models with less
and model(s) which the equipment was successfully than 2 250 kg MCTOM and reciprocating engines (example Piper PA-28, Diamond
installed. DA-40, Cessna 172, Socata TB20, etc.), and helicopters with MCTOM close to or
less than 2 250 kg (Bell 206, AS350, EC130). Heavier and more complex aircraft
models were also mentioned.
3 Case considered: forward fit For aircraft manufacturers: mainly forward-fit, standard installation on new light
or retrofit models. limited retrofit.
Equipment manufacturers: STCs mainly for light helicopter models
Flight school: retrofit.
4 Recording equipment For aircraft manufacturers: mainly ED-155 like recording equipment. Some install
model(s) ED-112 crash protected CVFDR on the heavier models. One has aircraft
manufacturer SD card on panel-mounted navigation equipment, another
mentioned a lightweight Quick Access Recorder (QAR)
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Number Question Comment Reply
Equipment manufacturers: ED-155 like recording equipment
Flight school: ED-155 like recording equipment.
EHA: referred to airborne equipment installed for usage monitoring system
(required by CAT.POL.H.305 i.e. for helicopters without an assured safe force
landing possibility at take-off or landing).
5 Functions offered by the Specify if some functions are not always Aircraft manufacturers: always flight parameters recording function. Some install
recording equipment model included in the recording equipment equipment combining flight parameters + cockpit audio + image.
(flight parameters, audio, (e.g. in the case of a modular system
image, data-link messages, that can perform several recording Equipment manufacturers: flight parameters and audio, or flight parameters, audio
etc.) functions). and image
6a Recording equipment: is it Aircraft manufacturers: some equipment models are compliant with ED-155 or ED-
compliant with EUROCAE 112 (or ED-55/56A), others are not fully compliant with these industry standards.
MOPS for crash-protected
flight recorders or lightweight Equipment manufacturers: some equipment models are compliant with ED-155 or
flight recorders? (ED55, ED-112, others are not fully compliant.
ED56A, ED112, ED112A,
ED155)?
6b Recording equipment: does it Provide the TSO or ETSO number Aircraft manufacturers: one of the recording equipment models has TSO-C197.
have a TSO/ETSO according to which the recording Others are deemed compliant with ED-155 yet they do not have TSO-C197. Others
authorisation? equipment was authorised are not fully compliant with ED-155
Equipment manufacturers: no.
7a Cost of installation design and — Normally once per aircraft model Aircraft manufacturers: very diverse assessment of cost depending on the
documentation (not including (non-recurring); company and the type of recording equipment assumed. As a minimum, around
installation test) — Cost should include the installation 10 000 € for 7a, 7b and 7c when considering recording equipment that is not fully
drawings, Installation Instructions, ED-155 compliant. When considering a fully ED-155 compliant recording
Maintenance Instructions, AFM and equipment, one manufacturer assessed the total cost for 7a, 7b and 7c at 300 000
the decoding documentation in the Euros, another to more than 100 000 Euros, another to more than 150 000 Euros.
case of an FDR or, ADRS.
Equipment manufacturers: between 10 000 and 60 000 € for an STC
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Number Question Comment Reply
7b Cost of installation test — Normally once per aircraft model Aircraft manufacturers: See 7a.
(non-recurring)
— Cost should include flight-test and Equipment manufacturers: between 2 000 and 5 000 € per individual aircraft.
evaluation of recording quality.
— If applicable, indicate the cost of test
for the flight parameter function
only, the audio recording function
only, and with all functions included
7c Cost of certifying the — Normally once per aircraft model Aircraft manufacturers: installation was part of the aircraft TC and handled as a
installation (non-recurring); minor change.
— Indicate if this was a Major Change
(STC) or a Minor Change and indicate Equipment manufacturers: in the range 10 000 to 60 000 € for an STC.
the certification fees.
8 Unit price, including the — Normally once per individual aircraft Aircraft manufacturers: for ED-155 like recording equipment, the unit price is in
recording equipment and its (recurring); the range from 4 000 to 8 000 Euros. For an ED-112 compliant crash-protected
dedicated wires, connectors, — Indicate unit price range if the recorder, price in the range 30 000 to 50 000 Euros.
sensors + the price of the number of units induce a significant
installation kit and of difference in price; Equipment manufacturers: four gave price indications. one product is ‘less than
voltage/current transformers — If applicable, indicate unit price for 10 000 €’ including software for readout and internal memory retrieval, the three
(if applicable) the flight parameter function only, others are in the range 5 000 to 15 000 €, also depending on customer choices.
the audio recording function only,
and with all functions included. Flight school: total cost of 20 000 € per individual aircraft, including recording
equipment, installation on the aircraft, testing and documentation.
EHA: cost associated with a usage monitoring system for a non-complex aircraft
are around 10 000 €.
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Number Question Comment Reply
9 Main cost drivers Indicate what specifications are, in your Aircraft manufacturers: for ED-155 like recording equipment: main drivers are
opinion, driving the total cost of certification (if item required to have a TSO/ETSO authorisation), testing (ground
recording equipment: and flight test), and flight parameters (if dedicated sensors need to be installed).
— flight parameters to record, For ED-112 crash-protected flight recorder, in addition to the above, development
— crashworthiness specifications, of a data frame layout for the FDR recording.
— start and termination logic,
— testing, Equipment manufacturers: STC cost, installation of dedicated sensors (in particular
— certification, for analogue cockpits), crashworthiness, economies of scale are too small.
— necessary airframe modifications
Flight school: STC cost, airframe modification (wirings), crashworthiness.
prior to this installation,
— aircraft down-time,
— etc.
10 Total weight of equipage, If applicable, indicate: Aircraft manufacturers: weight above 5 kg and up to 10 kg for ED-112 compliant
including the recording — the weight of an installation that is crash-protected flight recorders (without dedicated connectors, sensors,
equipment and its dedicated recording flight parameters only; acquisition unit etc.). Between 1 kg and 4 kg total weight for ED-155 like recording
wires, connectors, sensors + — the weight of an installation that is equipment.
the weight of the installation recording audio only;
kit and of voltage/current — and the weight when all functions Equipment manufacturers: less than 5 kg total weight for ED-155 like recording
transformers (if applicable) are included. equipment.
Flight school: 4 kg total weight for ED-155 like recording equipment.
11 Total power consumption of If applicable, indicate power Aircraft manufacturers: between 4 and 10 W for ED-155 like recording equipment.
the recording equipment, consumption: From 6 to 40 W for ED-112 compliant crash-protected recorder.
including dedicated sensors — for the flight parameter recording
function only; Flight school: 10W max.
— for the audio recording function
only; and Equipment manufacturers: 10 to 30W for the total power consumption
— with all functions included.
12a Retrofit: aircraft down time If the aircraft down time varies Aircraft manufacturers: 1 to 2 days for ED-155 like recording equipment (several
significantly from one aircraft model to aircraft manufacturers indicate they do not perform retrofit).
the next (or from one individual aircraft
to the next), please explain and provide Flight school: around 3 days.
a range of aircraft down times.
Equipment manufacturers: 1 day in the best case, more often 2 to 6 days.
12b Retrofit: number of man- — number of man hours for mechanical Equipment manufacturers: between 1 and 3 days for 2 mechanics (16 to 48 man
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Number Question Comment Reply
hours needed and electrical part of installation; hours).
— including functional test after
installation; Flight school: about 50 man-hours.
— If the number of man-hours varies
significantly from one aircraft model
to the next (or from one individual
aircraft to the next), please explain
and provide a range of man-hours;
— Note: labour cost may vary
depending on the country where the
installation is performed.
12c Retrofit: main drivers for Please indicate which are the main Aircraft manufacturers: for ED-155-like recording equipment, the main drivers are
down-time and man-hours drivers of the down-time and man-hours installation of sensors (flight parameter sensors and camera in the cockpit) and
needed for installing recording wirings, and ground testing.
equipment:
— sensors installation, Equipment manufacturer: installation of wiring, accessibility to sensors and cables.
— ground testing,
— flight testing, Flight school: mechanical and wiring installation.
— etc.
13 Download and replay — Specify if downloading the data Aircraft manufacturers: dedicated hardware is not always necessary; however,
equipment requires dedicated hardware / dedicated readout software is needed in any case for ED-155 like recording
software (connecting cables, special equipment as for crash-protected ED-112 compliant crash-protected flight
junction boxes, operating system, recorders. The data can be analysed without assistance of an external service
etc.); provider.
— Specify if converting the data files
into ready-to-analyse data requires Equipment manufacturers: dedicated software needed for configuring the unit and
dedicated software (i.e. flight reading it out; however, using standard connexion or standard memory media. The
parameters expressed in engineering data can be analysed without assistance of an external service provider.
units, audio files in a common audio
format), or if the data files cannot be Flight school: proprietary readout software provided with the recording
converted from a proprietary format. equipment.
In this case, please give the unit price
of the download and replay
equipment;
— Indicate if data can only be analysed
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Number Question Comment Reply
by an external service provider.
14 Maintenance scheduled tasks: — List all scheduled tasks, with their Aircraft manufacturers: scheduled maintenance tasks not always defined. For ED-
time intervals and cost periodicity and LLP´s (Life limited 155 like recording equipment, typically one recording inspection per year and
st
parts) operational check (control of LED status) before the 1 flight of the day..
— This should; include the recording
equipment and its dedicated Equipment manufacturers: no limited life part, except for one (change of battery
sensors; every 10 years). One manufacturer indicated having defined a functional test to be
— Take into account the usage made of run during scheduled maintenance of the aircraft.
the recorder (e.g. used for FDM)
which may have an impact on the Flight school: no limited life part. No preventive maintenance prescribed.
maintenance cost (wear and tear).
15 Any other issue not captured Any issue related to cost, weight, Aircraft manufacturers: authorities should not impose retrospective requirements
by the questions above volume, effect on aircraft performance, on voluntary installations of recording equipment. Acceptance of aircraft operators
restrictions to installation, impact on and pilots. If for some aircraft models crash-protected ED-112 recorder was
aircraft operation, aircraft maintenance, considered necessary, do not impose more than Type II FDR and allow one single
etc. flight data and cockpit voice combination recorder, to limit cost, weight,
consumption (the use of Type IA FDR (78 parameters, according to ICAO Annex 6)
in this kind of aeroplanes increases more than 8 kg in weight (sensors, wiring, etc.)
and cost is around 50 000 Euros). Big internal effort to have the ED-155 like
recording equipment certified on the A/C.
Equipment manufacturers: making the recording equipment a MEL item may
create operational restrictions. Lack of a regulatory framework that is
commensurate to the case of light aircraft.
Flight school: problem of design and/or installation with dedicated sensors,
unreliable software on the recording unit, data transfer is too long.
EHA: recording equipment should not be included in the MMEL of the helicopter
with a rectification interval of level A or B or C, as it does not need to be
serviceable at the start of every flight.
16 Savings generated by the — Savings could be lower insurance Aircraft manufacturers: there could be a possibility in the future to influence the
equipment once installed premiums, better aircraft condition insurance rate for the product liability as the data may help to decrease the cost in
or usage monitoring, better company a legal case. Avoidance of unnecessary maintenance. (e.g. MGB expertise in case of
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7. Appendices
Number Question Comment Reply
image, more accurate billing over limit). Good safety image of the company. Possibility to adapt the billing
information, etc.; according to the usage of the helicopter
— Please provide concrete examples
and an assessment of the saved Equipment manufacturers: avoid costly and invasive engine inspections. Reduced
amount. fuel consumptions by eliminating impractical procedures. Annual insurance
premium increases can be curtailed by providing proof of operating a FOQA
program. Companies operating under an Air Taxi AOC can qualify for more sales
due to compliance with customer FDM requirements and have more trust from
their customers thanks to the capability to better analyse their incidents. Those
who are reimbursed by Distance Flown can show and justify course deviations in
their billing data. Disprove claims of flight over forbidden areas, thus saving the
associated penalty.
Flight school: Increase of operating cost, due to the unexpected cost to correct
installation problems. Installed system remains mechanically fragile.
17a Safety benefits other than for Please provide concrete examples of Aircraft manufacturers: ensuring SOPs are followed across the fleet. For instance,
ICAO Annex 13 investigations safety benefits, specifying the some helicopter offshore operators limit the aircraft speed below certain altitude
organisation and evidence that the when flying close to the shore to minimize risk of bird strike. Proactively identify
recorded information was used to and reduce the risk. 3D replay for training or for other analysis. However one
improve or to better monitor the safety aircraft manufacturer thinks that the protection of recorded data could limit the
level (e.g. support for training courses). potential use of data. The recorded data are not typically used for maintenance or
a full-fledge FDM programme.
Equipment manufacturers: enhanced training using real-word examples, standard
of practice analysis to improve safety procedures. The pilots know that they are
monitored and therefore take less risk. Better understand accidents and take
effective corrective actions. Detect unsafe situations before an accident occurs
(e.g. at one operator, it was detected that torque was exceeded almost daily at
take-off. The take-off procedure was amended)
Flight school: better understand incidents (one case where it was helpful).
However restrictive policy to download the data could be a hindrance for using
them for maintenance purposes.
17b Benefits other than safety- Please provide concrete examples Two aircraft manufacturers believe that these data may support legal cases
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7. Appendices
Number Question Comment Reply
related (e.g. legal cases: was (provide better evidence against plaintiff’s theories). One aircraft manufacturers
the recording already used in thinks they could be used to collect data related to warranty claims against the
court cases and approved as a aircraft.
piece of evidence by judicial
authorities?) Equipment manufacturers:
- Insurance benefits; some companies offer reduced rates for FDM installation
- Liability; operators, owners alike can use the data to mitigate or support findings.
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7. Appendices
7.8. Appendix H: General principles of the safety risk assessment
7.8.1. Common methodology used for the safety risk assessment
Safety risk assessment is the assessment of the consequences of a hazard assuming the worst
foreseeable situation expressed in terms of predicted probability and severity.
What is risk?
Risk is the assessment of the consequences of a hazard assuming the worst foreseeable situation
expressed in terms of predicted probability and severity.
Key elements of risk assessment:
— probability of the event,
— severity,
— risk matrix.
This information is based on the available information at the Pre-RIA stage.
In order to define the elements ‘probability’ and ‘severity’, the following tables were developed based
on the ICAO framework.
Table H.1: Probability of occurrence37
Definition Description
Frequent Likely to occur many times (has occurred frequently)
Occasional Likely to occur sometimes (has occurred infrequently)
Remote Unlikely, but possible to occur (has occurred rarely)
Improbable Very unlikely to occur
Extremely improbable Almost inconceivable that the event will occur
37
These categories need to be applicable to a wide range of safety issues and are taken from the ICAO Safety Management Manual.
The description is harmonised with CS-25. Note that these descriptions are indicative only and may have to be adjusted to different
rulemaking tasks depending on subsector of aviation.
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Table H.2: Severity of occurrence
Definition Description
Catastrophic Multiple deaths and equipment destroyed (hull loss)
Hazardous A large reduction of safety margins
Maximum two fatalities
Serious injury
Major equipment damage
Major A significant reduction of safety margins
Serious incident
Injury of persons
Minor Nuisance
Operating limitations
Use of emergency procedures
Minor incident
Negligible Little consequences
A scale for the ‘severity’ and ‘probability’ parameters is used to measure the risk (severity ×
probability).
This results in a safety risk level: High/Medium/Low.
The outcome is presented in the following matrix.
Table H.3: Risk index matrix
Probability of Severity of occurrence
occurrence
Negligible Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic
Extremely
improbable
Improbable
Remote
Occasional
Frequent
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7. Appendices
Table H.4: Description of the different risk levels
Risk Description 38
level
High Unacceptable under the existing regulatory circumstances. Rulemaking action
significance required.
Based on feedback from stakeholders, this combination of probability and severity
Medium/high
may be considered to be of a high or a medium risk depending on the issue.
significance
Reasoning to be provided in Section 2.2 of the Pre-RIA.
Medium Tolerable based on risk mitigation by the stakeholders and/or rulemaking action.
significance
Low Acceptable, but monitoring or non-rulemaking action required. Under certain
significance circumstances, rulemaking may be required. Reasoning to be provided in
Section 2.2. of the Pre-RIA
7.8.2. Special considerations related to general aviation
The following extract from Section 2 of the document ‘European General Aviation Safety Strategy –
discussion paper’, dated 30 August 201239, gives the rationale for a different safety assessment
between general aviation and commercial operations:
‘It is important to recognise the differences between commercial and non-commercial environments
from a safety management perspective.
1.Control of Risk
End-use stakeholders in non-CAT aviation generally have much more ability to assess and control the
risk of the operation. In many cases, with the exception of very limited risk to third parties, the
operators are the only stakeholders exposed to risk. Even when passengers (or more often and
precisely ‘participants’) are carried, they are usually much closer to the process by which risk is
assessed and managed, and their participation is discretionary, not an intrinsic part of their day-to-day
business. Operational control is particularly important in determining appropriate target levels of
safety. This is, and has been traditionally, a good justification for offering a high level of autonomy to
the pilot.
[…]
2.Level Playing Field
In the competitive CAT market, a level playing field between actors is necessary to ensure that safety
does not enter a vicious spiral. If the level of safety expenditure, or the value of safety compared to
operational success, is left to the discretion of individual operators, a competitive advantage often
38
The descriptions are based on the ICAO Safety Management Systems Handbook. However, as the SMS system is geared towards
operators and not regulators, the descriptions were adjusted to better reflect EASA’s needs and in line with comments received
from stakeholders.
39
https://easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/European%20GA%20Safety%20Strategy%20Discussion%20Paper.pdf
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7. Appendices
arises for the operator who takes more risk. In essence, provided nothing catastrophic occurs, the
braver airline succeeds at the expense of the more cautious. Thus without explicit standards set by the
regulator, safety would be eroded. There is no corresponding effect for non-CAT aviation. Risk
management in a non-commercial operation will typically be carried out by the pilot who is able to
take account of his own aversion to risk in making operational decisions. If the pilot chooses a more
cautious approach, the operator does not suffer business failure.’
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7. Appendices
7.9. Appendix I: Requirements related to indications of instruments on board aeroplanes and
helicopters
This Appendix summarises the flight parameters required to be displayed on board aeroplanes and
helicopters operated under Part-CAT or Part-SPO. It was prepared in order to get a picture of what
flight parameters are likely to be already available in the aircraft, which then could be recorded either
as flight data or by means of recording images of the flight instruments.
7.9.1. Aeroplanes
The requirements related to flight and navigational instruments can be found in CAT.IDE.A.125 and
CAT.IDE.A.130 of Part-CAT, and in SPO.IDE.A.120 and SPO.IDE.A.125 of Part-SPO.
Table I.1 presents the indications required to be presented on the flight instruments of aeroplanes
operated under Part-CAT. Table I.2 presents the indications required to be presented on the flight
instruments of aeroplanes operated under Part-SPO.
Table I.1: Indications to be presented on the flight instruments of an aeroplane (Part-CAT)
Presented information Description Eligible aeroplane types Eligible operating conditions
Magnetic heading All VFR by day; VFR at night; IFR
Time Time in hours, minutes All VFR by day; VFR at night; IFR
and seconds.
Pressure altitude All VFR by day; VFR at night; IFR
Indicated airspeed All VFR by day; VFR at night; IFR
Vertical speed All VFR by day; VFR at night; IFR
Turn and slip Sensing the rate of turn, All except single-engined VFR by day; VFR at night; IFR
but not the rate of aeroplanes first issued with an
bank. individual CofA before 22 May 1995
if the compliance would require
retrofitting under VFR by day.
Attitude All except single-engined VFR by day; VFR at night; IFR
aeroplanes first issued with an
individual CofA before 22 May 1995
if the compliance would require
retrofitting under VFR by day.
Heading All except single-engined VFR by day
aeroplanes first issued with an
individual CofA before 22 May 1995
if the compliance would require
retrofitting under VFR by day.
Outside air temperature All except single-engined VFR by day; VFR at night; IFR
aeroplanes first issued with an
individual CofA before 22 May 1995
if the compliance would require
retrofitting under VFR by day.
Mach number Aeroplanes for which speed VFR by day; VFR by night; IFR
limitations are expressed in terms
of Mach number.
Stabilised heading All VFR at night; IFR
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Table I.2: Indications to be presented on the flight instruments of an aeroplane (Part-SPO)
Presented information Description Eligible aeroplane types Eligible operating
conditions
Magnetic heading All VFR by day; IFR
Time Time in hours, minutes and All VFR by day; IFR
seconds.
Pressure altitude All VFR by day; IFR
Indicated airspeed All VFR by day; IFR
Vertical speed All VMC at night; IFR
Turn and slip Sensing the rate of turn, All VMC at night; IFR
but not the rate of bank.
Attitude All VMC at night; IFR
Outside air All IFR
temperature
Mach number Aeroplanes for which VFR by day; IFR
speed limitations are
expressed in terms of
Mach number.
Stabilised heading All VFR at night; IFR
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7. Appendices
7.9.2. Helicopters
The requirements related to flight and navigational instruments can be found in CAT.IDE.H.125 and
CAT.IDE.H.130 of Part-CAT, and in SPO.IDE.H.120 and SPO.IDE.H.125 of Part-SPO.
Table I.3 presents the indications required to be presented on the flight instruments of helicopters
operated under Part-CAT.
Table I.4 presents the indications required to be presented on the flight instruments of helicopters
operated under Part-SPO.
Table I.3: Indications to be presented on the flight instruments of a helicopter (Part-CAT)
Presented Description Eligible helicopter types Eligible operating conditions
information
Magnetic heading All VFR by day; VFR by day for helicopters
with an MCTOM of more than 3 175 kg,
or any helicopter operating over water
when out of sight of land, or when the
visibility is less than 1 500 m; VFR at
night; IFR
Time Time in hours, minutes All VFR by day; VFR at night; IFR
and seconds.
Pressure altitude All VFR by day
Indicated airspeed All VFR by day; VFR at night; IFR
Vertical speed All VFR by day; VFR at night; IFR
Slip All VFR by day; VFR at night; IFR
Attitude All VFR by day for helicopters with an
MCTOM of more than 3 175 kg, or any
helicopter operating over water when
out of sight of land, or when the visibility
is less than 1 500 m; VFR at night; IFR
Outside air All VFR by day; VFR at night; IFR
temperature
Stabilised heading All VFR at night; IFR
Table I.4: Indications to be presented on the flight instruments of a helicopter (Part-SPO)
Presented Description Eligible helicopter types Eligible operating conditions
information
Magnetic heading All VFR by day; VMC over water and out of
sight of the land, or under VMC at night;
IFR
Time Time in hours, minutes All VFR by day; VMC over water and out of
and seconds. sight of land, or under VMC at night; IFR
Pressure altitude All VFR by day; VMC over water and out of
sight of land, or under VMC at night; IFR
Indicated airspeed All VFR by day; VMC over water and out of
sight of land or under VMC at night; IFR
Vertical speed All VMC over water and out of sight of land,
or under VMC at night; IFR
Slip All VFR by day; VMC over water and out of
sight of land, or under VMC at night; IFR
Attitude All VMC over water and out of sight of land,
or under VMC at night; IFR
Outside air All IFR
temperature
Stabilised heading All VMC over water and out of sight of land,
or under VMC at night; IFR
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7. Appendices
7.10. Appendix J: Examples of in-flight recording systems
Table J.1 contains examples of models of in-flight recording systems which can be installed on light
aircraft and are known to EASA.
This table is purely illustrative, non-exhaustive, and it should not be understood in any manner as EASA
recommendations. This table is only intended to provide concrete examples of in-flight recording
systems for the purpose of better understanding the analysis made in the impact assessment.
The systems are presented by equipment manufacturer name in alphabetical order.
Table J.1: Examples of in-flight recording systems
Name of equipment manufacturer Equipment brand name
Appareo GAU 3000
Appareo Vision 1000
ETEP Sentinel
Flight Data Vision MDU 379
Free Flight Systems Memory Management System
Iaero Apibox
ISEI Safetyplane
KAPI Electronics Kapi Air
L3Com Lightweight Data Recorder
North Flight Data System CV2R
North Flight Data System OVVR
NSE Brite Saver
Outerlink IRIS
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