European Aviation Safety Agency Date: 9 March 2016
Runway Excursions (RE) analysis 2011 - 2015
SM1. Safety Intelligence and Performance SM1.1 Safety Analysis Section
Annex A: Safety data collection for RMT.0296 - Review of
aeroplane performance requirements for CAT operations
Table of Contents
ANNEX A: SAFETY DATA COLLECTION FOR RMT.0296 - REVIEW OF AEROPLANE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
FOR CAT OPERATIONS ........................................................................................................................................... 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................................................................................................................. 1
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................................... 1
OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................................................ 2
SCOPE .................................................................................................................................................................... 2
OCCURRENCES DESCRIPTION TABLES..................................................................................................................... 6
PERFORMANCE CALCULATION ...........................................................................................................................................6
RUNWAY CONDITION AS A CASUAL FACTOR OF AN OCCURRENCE ..............................................................................................8
REPORTING OF RUNWAY CONDITION ................................................................................................................................15
Introduction
The general objective of the RMT.0296 is to provide a uniform, cost-efficient rules and safety standards
on aeroplane performance requirements for Commercial Air Transport operations. The specific objective
is to reduce the number of accidents and serious incidents where aeroplane performance is a causal
factor. Secondly, the resulting amendments should provide improved clarity, technical accuracy, flexibility
or a combination of these benefits for the EU operational requirements on aeroplane performance for
CAT operations. Thirdly, one of the aims of RMT.0296 is to contribute to the harmonisation of FAA and EU
operational requirements on aeroplane performance for CAT operations.
During the development of the draft rules and the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), the Rule Making
Group reviews the Take-off and Landing Performance Assessment Advisory and Rulemaking Committee
(TALPA ARC) recommendations and their endorsement in the European Action Plan for the Prevention of
Runway Excursions (EAPPRE). The latter document, while recognising runway excursions as a recurring
cause of accidents and serious incidents and identifying the main casual factors, contain
recommendations to EASA, which are going to be addressed by the RMT.0296.
Objectives
Taking into account the principles mentioned above, as a part of the Analysis of Runway Excursions (RE)
2011-2015 and basing on the same set of occurrences, a sub-study has been performed in order to
indicate all accidents and serious incidents in which at least one of the following conditions was fulfilled:
— Aeroplane performance calculation was inadequate to the reported runway condition,
— Measurement and/or reporting of the runway condition was inaccurate,
— Runway condition was a casual factor of an occurrence.
The results of this study will contribute to the safety data collection for the RIA.
Scope
The set of study is composed of 13 occurrences, each of them involving one aircraft. All accidents and
serious incidents occurred in the period of 5 years between 01/01/2011 and 31/12/2015. Figure 1
summarises the distribution of occurrences along this period and its split between accident and serious
incident (ICAO Annex 13 definitions). Due to the ongoing investigation of accidents and serious incidents,
the true figure is possible to be slightly higher as complete investigations are not yet available for all events
happened in 2015.
4
Number of RE occurrences
3
2
1
0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Accident Serious incident
Figure 1. Distribution by year and class of the occurrence
There are 11 different States of Registry represented in the study set: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Germany, Greece, Morocco, Norway, Romania, Sweden and United Kingdom (see Figure 2).
States of the operator are the same as the states of registry for all aircraft except one, which was
registered in Norway and operated by a Swedish operator.
3
Number of aircraft
2
1
0
State of Operator State of Registry
Figure 2. Distribution by state of operator and state of registry
As shown in Figure 3, the vast majority of occurrences happened during landing, with 5 of them classified
as accidents and 9 as serious incidents.
9
8
Nmber of RE occurrences
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Accident Serious incident Serious incident
Landing Take-off
Figure 3. Distribution by phase of flight and occurrence class
From the Figure 4 it is clear that runway overruns were less frequent, however they caused higher level
of damages and/or injuries than runway side excursions.
9
8
Number of RE occurrences
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Accident Serious incident Accident Serious incident
runway overrun side excursion
Figure 4. Distribution by type of runway excursion and occurrence class
Figure 5 depicts the number of occurrences with a distinction between types of runway excursion, as well
as between those that happened on landing and those that happened during take-off. The number of
runway overruns and side excursions occurred during landing is balanced. In the study set there was no
instance of a runway overrun during take-off.
6
5
Number of RE occurrences
4
3
2
1
0
Landing Landing Take-off
runway overrun side excursion
Figure 5. Distribution by type of runway excursion and phase of flight
Figure 6 presents the distribution by propulsion type depending on the aircraft mass group. Among the
aircraft lighter than 5 700 kg all were equipped with reciprocating engines, while the heavier aircraft have
turbofan or turboprop engines.
6
5
Number of aircraft
4
3
2
1
0
2 251 to 5 700 Kg 27 001 to 272 000 Kg 5 701 to 27 000 Kg
Reciprocating Turbofan Turboprop
Figure 6. Distribution by aircraft mass and propulsion type
There are 9 manufactures and 11 different models of aircraft represented in the study set (see Figure 7).
3
Number of RE occurrences
2
1
0
A320
A321
BN2A
A319
737
DHC8
EMB505 - Phenom
340
ATR72
JETSTREAM3100
F27
AIRBUS ATR BAE BOEING BRITTEN DE EMBRAER FOKKER SAAB
NORMAN HAVILLAND
Figure 7. Distribution by manufacturer and model of the aircraft
Due to specific criteria of selection (described in section ‘Objectives’above) and a small size of sample of
occurrences, none of the graphs presented above should be considered statistically representative for all
runway excursion accidents and serious incidents occurred in the EASA MS or involving EASA MS
operators.
Occurrences description tables
Performance calculation
Occurrence 1 of 5 Performance calculation
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
BAE - JETSTREAM3100 -
31/01/2014 Sweden Aeroplane
3200
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
side
5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Landing
excursion
The take-off was delayed due to prevailing weather with heavy snowfall. On board were 15 passengers and two crew
members. The weather forecasts for the current flight sector contained warnings of severe icing. The aircraft's propeller
de-icing system for the right engine was out of order, which was known by the commander. The malfunction was not
noted in the aircraft logbook. At the airport snow clearing was in progress due to the weather with 2 000 meters
visibility in snowfall. In the final phase of the clearing the friction coefficients were measured (see Section 1.6.9) on the
runway and reported to the arriving aircraft. The measured coefficients - which corresponded to medium braking
action - did not cause any action by the pilots as corrections for this was not included in the operator's performance
data.
The aircraft initiated a manual approach to runway 16 with the co-pilot at the controls. The landing took place well into
the runway with about 800 meters remaining runway length. After touchdown the commander took over control of
the airplane and started braking. The aircraft was unable to stop before the runway end and the commander then
decided to try to steer off to the right onto the taxiway. This was not successful, and the aircraft ran out into the snow
in the angle between the runway and the taxiway. No one was injured during the incident.
main factor snowfall, unstabilised approach, landing fast, lack of coherent
operator’s concept for stabilised approach
information related no use of friction coefficients, landing performed without access to any
to performance calculation relevant performance data for landing on contaminated RWYs
Occurrence 2 of 5 Performance calculation
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
25/08/2013 Czech Republic Aeroplane BOEING - 737 - 800
Propulsion
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase Type of RE
type
runway
27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Serious incident Landing
overrun
On 25. 8. 2013 during the landing, the aircraft ran outside the paved surface of the runway. The plane stopped 156 m
in the foreground of the runway 27. The passengers and crew disembarked the plane with no injury. The aircraft did
not suffer significant damages.
RWY wet, wrong setting of flaps, wrong selection of braking mode,
main factor opposite direction of the runway was more favourable, incompliance
with SOPs
information related
wrong calculation, required distance exceeded the LDA
to performance calculation
Occurrence 3 of 5 Performance calculation
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
24/05/2013 Bulgaria Aeroplane AIRBUS - A320 - 200
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
runway
27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Accident Landing
overrun
Aircraft landed on runway 09 at 10:19L (07:19Z) but overran the end of the runway, broke through the localizer antenna
and came to a stop about 270 meters past the runway end after colliding with the airport perimeter fence. The aircraft
was evacuated.
The aircraft was approaching in poor meteorological conditions that quickly deteriorated further with rain and variable
winds with significant gusts. The landing was long, the touchdown occurred a considerable distance past the touch
down zone of runway 09, the aircraft ran past the end of runway 09, collided with the airport perimeter fence and came
to a stop 270 meters past the end of the runway and 30 meters north of the extended runway center line. Two
passengers received broken legs during the evacuation.
adverse weather conditions (wind, rain), unstabilised approach, landing
main factor
long
information related
inadequate in depth analysis of meteorological conditions
to performance calculation
Occurrence 4 of 5 Performance calculation
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
29/03/2013 France Aeroplane AIRBUS - A321 - 100
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
runway
27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Accident Landing
overrun
The crew made a Category 1 (CAT I) ILS approach to runway 36R. The meteorological conditions were such that low
visibility procedures (LVP) were in place. On passing the stabilisation height at 1,000 ft, the speed of the aeroplane was
57 kt above the approach speed. At 140 ft, an inappropriate increase in thrust by the autothrust maintained the
aeroplane at high speed. The flare was long and the aeroplane touched the runway at 1,600 metres past the 36R
threshold. The aeroplane overran the runway and came to rest approximately 300 metres after the opposite threshold.
unstabilised approach (incomplete preparation for the approach – crew
not aware of tailwind and wet runway), tailwind, ATC procedures not
followed, partial application of SOPs, impaired task sharing and
main factor
degraded CRM, progressive deterioration in situational awareness,
landing fast and deep, A/THR anomaly (maintaining the aircraft at a
high energy level during landing)
information related wet runway, aircraft maximum landing weight and tailwind on ground
to performance calculation not included in the calculation
Occurrence 5 of 5 Performance calculation
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
EMBRAER (EMB505 -
06/08/2012 Switzerland Aeroplane
Phenom 300)
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
runway
5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turbofan Accident Landing
overrun
After the initial call to the aerodrome control centre tower, the crew quickly decided, after an enquiry from the air
traffic controller, on a direct approach on the runway 10 instrument landing system (ILS). Shortly thereafter, the landing
gear and flaps were extended. The flaps jammed at approximately 10 degrees and the FLAP FAIL warning message was
displayed. The crew carried out a go-around shortly before landing. The landing gear subsequently remained extended.
The flaps remained jammed for the remainder of the flight.
The crew decided immediately on a second ILS approach with jammed flaps, which according to the manufacturer's
information required an increased approach speed. During the approach, the crew had difficulty in reducing the
airspeed to this increased approach speed. At 13:40 UTC, the aircraft subsequently touched down on the wet runway
at an indicated air speed of 136 kt, approximately 290 m after the runway threshold, and could not be brought to a
standstill on the remaining length of runway. The aircraft then rolled over the end of runway 10, broke through the
aerodrome perimeter fence and overrun the road running perpendicular to the runway centreline, on which a public
transport bus was travelling. The aircraft rolled very close behind the bus and came to a standstill in a maize field,
approximately 30 m from the end of the runway.
The passenger and the two pilots were not injured in the accident. The aircraft was badly damaged.
There was crop damage and damage to the aerodrome perimeter fence.
landing long and fast, unstabilised approach, flaps jammed, late
main factor
initiation of braking, lack of cooperation between pilots
information related aircraft configuration, approach speed, runway condition and runway
to performance calculation length were not addressed
Runway condition as a casual factor of an occurrence
Occurrence 1 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
25/05/2015 Oslo Aeroplane BOEING - 737 - 800
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
runway
27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Serious incident Landing
overrun
Runway renovation had been in progress the last months with displaced threshold and a LDA of 1928 meters. XXRASH
over the field. Another B737 who landed in front reported extremely slippery concrete on the rwy. B737 landed with
flaps 30, autobrake 3 and touchdown 3-400 meters down the rwy. Reverse power selected early but with less
retardation than expected. Maximum manual braking and maximum reverse applied. Runway excursion 50-100 meters
into the 300 meters safety area. Minor damage to left cowling. A couple of rwy end lights damaged. Crew were mentally
prepared for landing in headwind, but actually it was approximately 7 kt tailwind. Landing calculations after the incident
shows that with autobrake 3 until complete stop, landing distance should be 1 960 meters and with manual braking 1
524 meters.
main factor tailwind
information related possible aggravating factor, extremely slippery RWY (reported by the
to runway condition crew of previous A/C)
Occurrence 2 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
DE HAVILLAND - DHC8 -
29/12/2014 Denmark Aeroplane
200
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
side
5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Landing
excursion
Upon landing on runway 23 and shortly after having selected reverse on both engines, the flight crew experienced that
the aircraft unexpectedly started to veer to the left. The pilot flying attempted to correct this by deactivating reverse
on both engines and by use of the wheel brakes and the nose wheel steering, but the aircraft continued veering towards
the left side of the runway. The aircraft ran off the left side of the runway and came to a complete stop in the safety
zone. A momentary failure of the right hand power lever micro switch causing a momentary activation of the right
hand propeller beta backup protection in combination with a divergence between reported and effective braking
action coefficients on runway 23 had a negative effect on the flight crew’s ability to maintain directional control, which
resulted in the aircraft running off the side of the runway. Neither passengers nor crew members suffered any injuries.
continuous snowfall, momentary activation of right propeller beta
main factor
protection, actual braking action coefficients different than reported
information related
possible aggravating factor
to runway condition
Occurrence 3 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
31/01/2014 Sweden Aeroplane BAE - JETSTREAM3100 - 3200
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
side
5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Landing
excursion
The take-off was delayed due to prevailing weather with heavy snowfall. On board were 15 passengers and two crew
members. The weather forecasts for the current flight sector contained warnings of severe icing. The aircraft's propeller
de-icing system for the right engine was out of order, which was known by the commander. The malfunction was not
noted in the aircraft logbook. At the airport snow clearing was in progress due to the weather with 2 000 meters
visibility in snowfall. In the final phase of the clearing the friction coefficients were measured (see Section 1.6.9) on the
runway and reported to the arriving aircraft. The measured coefficients - which corresponded to medium braking
action - did not cause any action by the pilots as corrections for this was not included in the operator's performance
data.
The aircraft initiated a manual approach to runway 16 with the co-pilot at the controls. The landing took place well into
the runway with about 800 meters remaining runway length. After touchdown the commander took over control of
the airplane and started braking. The aircraft was unable to stop before the runway end and the commander then
decided to try to steer off to the right onto the taxiway. This was not successful, and the aircraft ran out into the snow
in the angle between the runway and the taxiway. No one was injured during the incident.
main factor snowfall, unstabilised approach, landing fast, lack of coherent
operator’s concept for stabilised approach
information related
RWY contaminated with snow
to runway condition
Occurrence 4 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
BRITTEN NORMAN -
12/01/2014 United Kingdom Aeroplane
BN2A - III2
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
side
2 251 to 5 700 Kg Reciprocating Serious incident Landing
excursion
Runway excursion in crosswind caused damage to runway edge lights.
During a landing in heavy rain and with a strong crosswind the aircraft was blown from the asphalt runway surface
onto the grass edge of the runway, damaging three runway lights. The aircraft was undamaged.
The aircraft was making an approach into destination Airport. The pilot stated that, during the latter stages of the
approach, there was a strong, gusting southerly crosswind and that the rain suddenly intensified. The pilot also stated
that, during the landing roll, a very strong gust of wind was felt from the left such that the right main landing gear lost
grip in a large area of standing water. The aircraft veered to the right, off the asphalt surface and onto the grass area
at the side of the runway. The pilot was able to steer it back onto the asphalt section of the runway. The aircraft was
undamaged but ATC subsequently discovered that the right main wheels had run over and damaged three runway
edge lights.
The aircraft encountered heavy rain shortly before touchdown and a strong crosswind gust shortly after touchdown.
The strong gust and loss of the main landing gear grip in standing water caused the aircraft to veer to the right, off the
asphalt surface and onto the grass area to the side of the runway.
As a result of this incident, the operator reviewed its operation into the destination airport and reduced the crosswind
limit for its Trislander aircraft to 20 kt while the runway declared width is reduced.
main factor emergency descent, crosswind, human factor (crew fatigue)
information related
loss of MLG grip in standing water on RWY
to runway condition
Occurrence 5 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
10/01/2014 Sweden Aeroplane FOKKER - F27 - 50
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
side
5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Landing
excursion
The weather forecast for destination Airport that had been issued at 18.30 hrs stated the wind direction to be 280
degrees and the wind strength 25 knots with wind gusts of 45 knots as well as temporary rain showers. The
corresponding forecast that was issued at 00.30 hrs, i.e. about 45 minutes after take-off, stated the wind direction to
be 280 degrees and the wind strength 30 knots with wind gusts of 42 knots as well as temporary rain showers. The
forecasted wind direction meant that the wind was largely across the runway, i.e. direct crosswind.
The operator's flight manual stated a limitation, regarding the crosswind component on landing, of 30 knots for a dry
runway and 25 knots for a wet runway. According to the manufacturer's flight manual, the corresponding limitation is
33 knots for good braking action.
According to the crew, the approach and touchdown were performed without problems. Shortly after touchdown, the
engines were reversed. When the speed reduced, the aircraft began to yaw to the left. The commander explained that
he used the nose wheel steering to compensate the yawing tendency but that the nose wheel “probably went across”.
Furthermore, he was unsure whether the brakes had been used.
The yaw continued towards the left, and the aircraft left the runway and stopped with the nose wheel and left main
gear in the grass, with the right main gear on the asphalted runway shoulder. In connection with the excursion, the
nose gear and left main gear each ploughed a furrow in the ground on the grass area with a depth corresponding to
just under half the diameter of the wheels.
operator’s crosswind limitations of the aircraft exceeded, wet runway,
main factor
one alternate only
information related
wet RWY, but braking action good
to runway condition
Occurrence 6 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
18/12/2013 United Kingdom Aeroplane AIRBUS - A319 - 100
Propulsion Type of
Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
side
27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Serious incident Landing
excursion
Lateral runway excursion. The Aircraft slewed sideways on landing at approximately 70 knots. The LH gear exited the
runway. Mud covered the LH landing gear and the Engine 1 cowlings and L/H fuselage. Initial inspections show no
damage.
strong crosswind (close to or possibly above maximum aircraft
main factor limitation), insufficient de-crab at landing, no use of differential
braking on a wet/flooded RWY
information related
possible aggravating factor, RWY between wet and flooded condition
to runway condition
Occurrence 7 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
25/08/2013 Czech Republic Aeroplane BOEING - 737 - 800
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Serious incident Landing overrun
On 25. 8. 2013 during the landing, the aircraft ran outside the paved surface of the runway. The plane stopped 156 m
in the foreground of the runway 27. The passengers and crew disembarked the plane with no injury. The aircraft did
not suffer significant damages.
RWY wet, wrong setting of flaps, wrong selection of braking mode,
main factor opposite direction of the runway was more favourable, incompliance
with SOPs
information related
wet RWY as a possible aggravating factor
to runway condition
Occurrence 8 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
24/05/2013 Bulgaria Aeroplane AIRBUS - A320 - 200
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
runway
27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Accident Landing
overrun
Aircraft landed on runway 09 at 10:19L (07:19Z) but overran the end of the runway, broke through the localizer antenna
and came to a stop about 270 meters past the runway end after colliding with the airport perimeter fence. The aircraft
was evacuated.
The aircraft was approaching to the destination airport in poor meteorological conditions that quickly deteriorated
further with rain and variable winds with significant gusts. The landing was long, the touchdown occurred a
considerable distance past the touch down zone of runway 09, the aircraft ran past the end of runway 09, collided with
the airport perimeter fence and came to a stop 270 meters past the end of the runway and 30 meters north of the
extended runway center line. Two passengers received broken legs during the evacuation.
adverse weather conditions (wind, rain), unstabilised approach, landing
main factor
long
information related
wet, but braking action good
to runway condition
Occurrence 9 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
29/03/2013 France Aeroplane AIRBUS - A321 - 100
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
runway
27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Accident Landing
overrun
The crew made a Category 1 (CAT I) ILS approach to runway 36R. The meteorological conditions were such that low
visibility procedures (LVP) were in place. On passing the stabilisation height at 1,000 ft, the speed of the aeroplane was
57 kt above the approach speed. At 140 ft, an inappropriate increase in thrust by the autothrust maintained the
aeroplane at high speed. The flare was long and the aeroplane touched the runway at 1,600 metres past the 36R
threshold. The aeroplane overran the runway and came to rest approximately 300 metres after the opposite threshold.
unstabilised approach (incomplete preparation for the approach – crew
not aware of tailwind and wet runway), tailwind, ATC procedures not
followed, partial application of SOPs, impaired task sharing and
main factor
degraded CRM, progressive deterioration in situational awareness,
landing fast and deep, A/THR anomaly (maintaining the aircraft at a
high energy level during landing)
information related
wet RWY
to runway condition
Occurrence 10 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
11/08/2012 Romania Aeroplane ATR - ATR72 - 200
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
side
5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Accident Landing
excursion
During landing roll, at about 100m from touch down, the A/C exit the runway to the left and continue to run for about
300m on unpaved surface (grass and earth), with all three landing gears, and after that returned to the runway.
main factor aquaplaning
information related
possible aggravating factor, wet runway with puddles
to runway condition
Occurrence 11 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
EMBRAER (EMB505 -
06/08/2012 Switzerland Aeroplane
Phenom 300)
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
runway
5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turbofan Accident Landing
overrun
After the initial call to the aerodrome control centre tower, the crew quickly decided, after an enquiry from the air
traffic controller, on a direct approach on the runway 10 instrument landing system (ILS). Shortly thereafter, the landing
gear and flaps were extended. The flaps jammed at approximately 10 degrees and the FLAP FAIL warning message was
displayed. The crew carried out a go-around shortly before landing. The landing gear subsequently remained extended.
The flaps remained jammed for the remainder of the flight.
The crew decided immediately on a second ILS approach with jammed flaps, which according to the manufacturer's
information required an increased approach speed. During the approach, the crew had difficulty in reducing the
airspeed to this increased approach speed. At 13:40 UTC, the aircraft subsequently touched down on the wet runway
at an indicated air speed of 136 kt, approximately 290 m after the runway threshold, and could not be brought to a
standstill on the remaining length of runway. The aircraft then rolled over the end of runway 10, broke through the
aerodrome perimeter fence and overrun the road running perpendicular to the runway centreline, on which a public
transport bus was travelling. The aircraft rolled very close behind the bus and came to a standstill in a maize field,
approximately 30 m from the end of the runway.
The passenger and the two pilots were not injured in the accident. The aircraft was badly damaged.
There was crop damage and damage to the aerodrome perimeter fence.
landing long and fast, unstabilised approach, flaps jammed, late
main factor
initiation of braking, lack of cooperation between pilots
information related
wet RWY, friction coefficient not measured
to runway condition
Occurrence 12 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
24/11/2011 Sweden Aeroplane SAAB 340
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
side
5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Take-off
excursion
Runway veer off during takeoff, flat snow covered grass, minor damage nose wheel, taxi light, propeller tip.
The take-off was performed in darkness and winter conditions. In connection with the take off a snow shower came in
over the field which meant that visibility deteriorated and the wind speed increased. During take-off the aircraft
gradually approached the left edge of the runway. After about 800 m the aircraft ran out of the left edge of the runway
with the left main wheel and the nose wheel, continued parallel to the runway for about 350 meters and then came
back up onto the runway again. Shortly thereafter, the aircraft veered once more to the left, left the runway completely
and stopped a few metres from the runway edge parallel to the direction of take-off.
All persons on board were uninjured and left the aircraft through the main entrance and its staircase.
The incident was probably caused by a perceptual illusion for the pilots on account of large flakes of blowing snow,
which led to the aircraft’s drift not being noticed in time. The illuminated landing lights have served to reinforce the
illusion.
main factor perceptual illusion (snowfall with large flakes)
information related
possible, RWY contaminated with snow
to runway condition
Occurrence 13 of 13 Runway condition as a casual factor
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
BRITTEN NORMAN -
08/06/2011 Germany Aeroplane
BN2A
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
runway
2 251 to 5 700 Kg Reciprocating Accident Landing
overrun
Overshoot during landing - Main gear collapsed.
A/C substantially damaged
After landing on the wet runway 33 the aircraft departed the end of the runway, crossed a walk-way and came to a
stop in a dune.
main factor aquaplaning
information related to the
possible aggravating factor, contaminated runway (standing water)
runway condition
Reporting of runway condition
Occurrence 1 of 5 Reporting of runway condition
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
DE HAVILLAND - DHC8 -
29/12/2014 Denmark Aeroplane
200
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
side
5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Landing
excursion
Upon landing on runway 23 and shortly after having selected reverse on both engines, the flight crew experienced that
the aircraft unexpectedly started to veer to the left. The pilot flying attempted to correct this by deactivating reverse
on both engines and by use of the wheel brakes and the nose wheel steering, but the aircraft continued veering towards
the left side of the runway. The aircraft ran off the left side of the runway and came to a complete stop in the safety
zone. A momentary failure of the right hand power lever micro switch causing a momentary activation of the right
hand propeller beta backup protection in combination with a divergence between reported and effective braking
action coefficients on runway 23 had a negative effect on the flight crew’s ability to maintain directional control, which
resulted in the aircraft running off the side of the runway. Neither passengers nor crew members suffered any injuries.
continuous snowfall, momentary activation of right propeller beta
main factor
protection, actual braking action coefficients different than reported
information related to the incorrect aerodrome measurement procedures and reporting of RWY
reporting of runway condition condition
Occurrence 2 of 5 Reporting of runway condition
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
BAE - JETSTREAM3100 -
31/01/2014 Sweden Aeroplane
3200
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
side
5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Landing
excursion
The take-off was delayed due to prevailing weather with heavy snowfall. On board were 15 passengers and two crew
members. The weather forecasts for the current flight sector contained warnings of severe icing. The aircraft's propeller
de-icing system for the right engine was out of order, which was known by the commander. The malfunction was not
noted in the aircraft logbook. At the airport snow clearing was in progress due to the weather with 2 000 meters
visibility in snowfall. In the final phase of the clearing the friction coefficients were measured (see Section 1.6.9) on the
runway and reported to the arriving aircraft. The measured coefficients - which corresponded to medium braking
action - did not cause any action by the pilots as corrections for this was not included in the operator's performance
data.
The aircraft initiated a manual approach to runway 16 with the co-pilot at the controls. The landing took place well into
the runway with about 800 meters remaining runway length. After touchdown the commander took over control of
the airplane and started braking. The aircraft was unable to stop before the runway end and the commander then
decided to try to steer off to the right onto the taxiway. This was not successful, and the aircraft ran out into the snow
in the angle between the runway and the taxiway. No one was injured during the incident.
main factor snowfall, unstabilised approach, landing fast, lack of coherent
operator’s concept for stabilised approach
information related to the
reported, but not understood by the crew
reporting of runway condition
Occurrence 3 of 5 Reporting of runway condition
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
10/01/2014 Sweden Aeroplane FOKKER - F27 - 50
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
side
5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Landing
excursion
The weather forecast for destination Airport that had been issued at 18.30 hrs stated the wind direction to be 280
degrees and the wind strength 25 knots with wind gusts of 45 knots as well as temporary rain showers. The
corresponding forecast that was issued at 00.30 hrs, i.e. about 45 minutes after take-off, stated the wind direction to
be 280 degrees and the wind strength 30 knots with wind gusts of 42 knots as well as temporary rain showers. The
forecasted wind direction meant that the wind was largely across the runway, i.e. direct crosswind.
The operator's flight manual stated a limitation, regarding the crosswind component on landing, of 30 knots for a dry
runway and 25 knots for a wet runway. According to the manufacturer's flight manual, the corresponding limitation is
33 knots for good braking action.
According to the crew, the approach and touchdown were performed without problems. Shortly after touchdown, the
engines were reversed. When the speed reduced, the aircraft began to yaw to the left. The commander explained that
he used the nose wheel steering to compensate the yawing tendency but that the nose wheel “probably went across”.
Furthermore, he was unsure whether the brakes had been used.
The yaw continued towards the left, and the aircraft left the runway and stopped with the nose wheel and left main
gear in the grass, with the right main gear on the asphalted runway shoulder. In connection with the excursion, the
nose gear and left main gear each ploughed a furrow in the ground on the grass area with a depth corresponding to
just under half the diameter of the wheels.
operator’s crosswind limitations of the aircraft exceeded, wet runway,
main factor
one alternate only
information related to the ATIS not understood by the crew (disruption by other communication),
reporting of runway condition the crew had no awareness of the prevailing condition that the runway
was wet
Occurrence 4 of 5 Reporting of runway condition
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
24/05/2013 Bulgaria Aeroplane AIRBUS - A320 - 200
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
runway
27 001 to 272 000 Kg Turbofan Accident Landing
overrun
Aircraft landed on runway 09 at 10:19L (07:19Z) but overran the end of the runway, broke through the localizer antenna
and came to a stop about 270 meters past the runway end after colliding with the airport perimeter fence. The aircraft
was evacuated.
The aircraft was approaching destination airport in poor meteorological conditions that quickly deteriorated further
with rain and variable winds with significant gusts. The landing was long, the touchdown occurred a considerable
distance past the touch down zone of runway 09, the aircraft ran past the end of runway 09, collided with the airport
perimeter fence and came to a stop 270 meters past the end of the runway and 30 meters north of the extended
runway center line. Two passengers received broken legs during the evacuation.
adverse weather conditions (wind, rain), unstabilised approach, landing
main factor
long
information related to the misleading ATIS information 'NOSIG', TAF communicated but it didn't
reporting of runway condition reach the crew
Occurrence 5 of 5 Reporting of runway condition
State/area of Aircraft Aircraft State of
Local date Manufacturer/model
occurrence category registration registry
24/11/2011 Sweden Aeroplane SAAB 340
Propulsion Type of
Operator Mass group Occurrence class Flight phase
type RE
side
5 701 to 27 000 Kg Turboprop Serious incident Take-off
excursion
Runway veer off during takeoff, flat snow covered grass, minor damage nose wheel, taxi light, propeller tip.
The take-off was performed in darkness and winter conditions. In connection with the take off a snow shower came in
over the field which meant that visibility deteriorated and the wind speed increased. During take-off the aircraft
gradually approached the left edge of the runway. After about 800 m the aircraft ran out of the left edge of the runway
with the left main wheel and the nose wheel, continued parallel to the runway for about 350 meters and then came
back up onto the runway again. Shortly thereafter, the aircraft veered once more to the left, left the runway completely
and stopped a few metres from the runway edge parallel to the direction of take-off.
All persons on board were uninjured and left the aircraft through the main entrance and its staircase.
The incident was probably caused by a perceptual illusion for the pilots on account of large flakes of blowing snow,
which led to the aircraft’s drift not being noticed in time. The illuminated landing lights have served to reinforce the
illusion.
main factor perceptual illusion (snowfall with large flakes)
information related to the
reported runway condition were not reflecting the actual condition
reporting of runway condition
European Aviation Safety Agency
Notice of Proposed Amendment 2016-11
Review of aeroplane performance requirements
for commercial air transport operations
RMT.0296 (OPS.008(a)) — 30.9.2016
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) addresses a number of issues related to aeroplane performance
requirements for commercial air transport (CAT) operations.
In particular, the NPA addresses two safety recommendations (SRs), and it is linked with Actions 3.7.1, 3.7.2 and 3.7.3 of
the European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions (EAPPRE).
It also provides for alignment with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) State Letters 2016/12 and
2016/29.
The NPA proposes standards for runway surface condition reporting, airworthiness standards for landing performance
computation at time of arrival, an in-flight assessment of landing performance at time of arrival as well as a reduced
required landing distance for business aviation operations with performance class A aeroplanes and for performance
class B aeroplane operations.
The proposed changes are expected to increase the current level of safety in relation to aeroplane performance, to
improve harmonisation with the corresponding Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules, to ensure alignment with
(ICAO), and to allow for flexibility and proportionality for certain CAT operations.
Applicability Process map
Affected — Annex I (Definitions); Terms of Reference (ToR), Issue 1: 9.6.2015
regulations — Annex II (Part-ARO); Concept paper (CP): No
and decisions: — Annex IV (Part-CAT); Rulemaking group (RMG): Yes
to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012; Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) type: Full
— ED Decision 2003/002/RM (CS-25); Technical consultation during NPA drafting: No
— ED Decision 2012/015/R (Definitions); NPA consultation duration: 3 months
— ED Decision 2014/017/R (Part-ORO); Review group (RG): Yes
— ED Decision 2014/015/R (Part-CAT) Focused consultation: TBD
Affected CAT aeroplane operators; flight crew; Opinion expected publication date: 2017/Q3
stakeholders: national aviation authorities (NAAs); Decision expected publication date: 2018/Q3
aircraft manufacturers
Driver/origin: Safety/proportionality
Reference: — EAPPRE;
— SR UNKG-2008-076;
— SR NORW-2011-011;
— ICAO Annex 6, Part I
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 1 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
Table of contents
Table of contents
1. Procedural information .................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.1. The rule development procedure ........................................................................................................................... 3
1.2. The structure of this NPA and related documents .................................................................................................. 3
1.3. How to comment on this NPA ................................................................................................................................. 3
1.4. The next steps in the procedure ............................................................................................................................. 3
2. Explanatory Note .............................................................................................................................................................. 5
2.1. Overview of the issues to be addressed ................................................................................................................. 5
2.2. Objectives ................................................................................................................................................................ 5
2.3. Summary of the RIA ................................................................................................................................................ 5
2.4. Overview of the proposed amendments ................................................................................................................ 8
2.4.1. Annex I (Definitions) to the Air OPS Regulation ............................................................................................. 8
2.4.2. Annex II (Part-ARO) to the Air OPS Regulation ............................................................................................... 9
2.4.3. Annex III (Part-ORO) to the Air OPS Regulation ............................................................................................. 9
2.4.4. Annex IV (Part-CAT) to the Air OPS Regulation .............................................................................................. 9
2.4.5. CS-25 ............................................................................................................................................................. 17
3. Proposed amendments................................................................................................................................................... 19
3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion) .................................................................................................................. 19
3.1.1. Definitions .................................................................................................................................................... 19
3.1.2. Part-ARO ....................................................................................................................................................... 21
3.1.3. Part-CAT ........................................................................................................................................................ 21
3.2. Draft CSs (draft EASA Decision) ............................................................................................................................. 31
3.2.1. CS-25 Book 1 ................................................................................................................................................. 31
3.2.2. CS-25 Book 2 ................................................................................................................................................. 32
3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision) ................................................................................................................... 49
3.3.1. Definitions .................................................................................................................................................... 49
3.3.2. Part-ORO....................................................................................................................................................... 50
3.3.3. Part-CAT ........................................................................................................................................................ 51
4. RIA ................................................................................................................................................................................... 68
4.1. Issues to be addressed .......................................................................................................................................... 68
4.1.1. Safety risk assessment .................................................................................................................................. 72
4.1.2. Who is affected? ........................................................................................................................................... 76
4.1.3. How could the issue/problem evolve? ......................................................................................................... 77
4.2. Objectives .............................................................................................................................................................. 77
4.3. Policy options ........................................................................................................................................................ 77
4.4. Methodology and data (only for a full RIA) ........................................................................................................... 79
4.4.1. Applied methodology ................................................................................................................................... 79
4.4.2. Data collection .............................................................................................................................................. 79
4.5. Analysis of impacts ................................................................................................................................................ 81
4.5.1. Safety impact ................................................................................................................................................ 81
4.5.2. Environmental impact .................................................................................................................................. 88
4.5.3. Social impact ................................................................................................................................................. 89
4.5.4. Economic impact .......................................................................................................................................... 90
4.5.5. General aviation and proportionality issues................................................................................................. 91
4.5.6. Impact on ‘better regulation’ and harmonisation ........................................................................................ 92
4.6. Comparison and conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 93
4.6.1. Comparison of options ................................................................................................................................. 93
4.6.2. Monitoring and ex post evaluation .............................................................................................................. 93
5. References ...................................................................................................................................................................... 94
5.1. Affected regulations .............................................................................................................................................. 94
5.2. Affected CS, AMC and GM..................................................................................................................................... 94
5.3. Reference documents ........................................................................................................................................... 94
6. Appendices ..................................................................................................................................................................... 96
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 2 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
1. Procedural information
1. Procedural information
1.1. The rule development procedure
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) developed this NPA in line with Regulation (EC)
No 216/20081 (the EASA Basic Regulation) and the Rulemaking Procedure2.
This rulemaking activity is included in the EASA 5-year Rulemaking Programme under RMT.0296
(former task number: OPS.008(A)).
The text of this NPA has been developed by EASA based on the input of RMG RMT.0296 (OPS.008(A)).
It is hereby submitted to all interested parties3 for consultation.
The process map on the title page contains the major milestones of this rulemaking activity to date and
provides an outlook of the timescales of the next steps.
1.2. The structure of this NPA and related documents
Chapter 1 of this NPA contains the procedural information related to this task. Chapter 2 (Explanatory
Note) explains the core technical content. Chapter 3 contains the proposed text for the new
requirements, CS and AMC/GM. Chapter 4 contains the RIA showing which options were considered
and what impacts were identified, thereby providing the detailed justification for this NPA.
1.3. How to comment on this NPA
Please submit your comments using the automated Comment-Response Tool (CRT) available at
http://hub.easa.europa.eu/crt/4.
The deadline for the submission of comments is 9 January 2017.
1.4. The next steps in the procedure
Following the closing of the NPA public consultation period, EASA will review all the comments
received. For this purpose, an RG will be established and one or more group meetings will be held if
required. Depending on the number and nature of the comments received, a focused consultation in
the form of a workshop with selected stakeholders may be also organised.
The outcome of the NPA public consultation and eventual focused consultation will be reflected in the
respective comment-response document (CRD).
EASA will publish the CRD with the Opinion.
1
Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the field of
civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC)
No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC (OJ L 79, 19.3.2008, p. 1).
2
EASA is bound to follow a structured rulemaking process as required by Article 52(1) of the Basic Regulation. Such process has been
adopted by the EASA Management Board (MB) and is referred to as the ‘Rulemaking Procedure’. See MB Decision No 18-2015 of
15 December 2015 replacing Decision 01/2012 concerning the procedure to be applied by the Agency for the issuing of opinions,
certification specifications and guidance material.
3
In accordance with Article 52 of the Basic Regulation and Articles 6(3) and 7 of the Rulemaking Procedure.
4
In case of technical problems, please contact the CRT webmaster (
[email protected]).
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 3 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
1. Procedural information
The Opinion contains proposed changes to European Union (EU) regulations (implementing rules (IRs))
and is submitted to the European Commission to be used as a technical basis in order to prepare a
legislative proposal.
The Decision(s) containing certification specifications (CS), acceptable means of compliance (AMC) and
guidance material (GM) will be published by EASA when the related IRs are adopted by the European
Commission.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 4 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
2. Explanatory Note
2. Explanatory Note
2.1. Overview of the issues to be addressed
The main issues this NPA addresses are the following:
— standards for runway surface condition assessment and reporting;
— airworthiness standards for landing performance computation at time of arrival;
— in-flight assessment of landing performance at time of arrival;
— crosswind limitations;
— reduced required landing distance for business aviation operations with performance class A
aeroplanes and for performance class B aeroplane operations; and
— miscellaneous amendments to improve technical accuracy, clarity and consistency.
The reasons for addressing these issues are essentially the implementation of amendments to ICAO
Annex 6, Part I, and to ICAO Annex 8, certain SRs addressed to EASA, harmonisation with the FAA,
proportionality, technical improvements and clarifications of the rules on aeroplane performance.
For a more detailed analysis of the issues addressed by this proposal, please refer to the RIA
Section 4.1. — Issues to be addressed.
2.2. Objectives
The overall objectives of the EASA system are defined in Article 2 of the Basic Regulation. This proposal
will contribute to the achievement of the overall objectives by addressing the issues outlined in
Chapter 2 of this NPA.
The general objective of this proposal is to maintain a uniform and high level of safety with cost-
efficient rules.
The specific objectives of this proposal are to:
— reduce the number of accidents and serious incidents where aeroplane performance is a causal
factor;
— provide improved clarity, technical accuracy, flexibility or a combination of these benefits for the
EU operational requirements on aeroplane performance for CAT operations; and
— contribute to the harmonisation of FAA and EU operational requirements on aeroplane
performance for CAT operations.
2.3. Summary of the RIA
For two of the issues addressed by this NPA, namely:
— miscellaneous amendments to improve technical accuracy, clarity and consistency; and
— crosswind limitations,
a RIA is not considered necessary.
The other two issues, namely:
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 5 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
2. Explanatory Note
— implementation of ICAO amendments (which includes standards for runway surface condition
assessment and reporting, airworthiness standards for landing performance computation at
time of arrival, and in-flight assessment of landing performance at time of arrival); and
— reduced required landing distance for performance class A and B aeroplane operations,
which have different starting points and drivers, have been considered under two separate RIAs.
Implementation of ICAO amendments
Along with the baseline option (Option 0 — No changes), another option was considered:
— implement the ICAO amendments.
The impacts of the two options are analysed in detail in Chapter 4 below. Option 1 has been selected
as the most appropriate one for the following reasons:
— it is expected to provide the highest safety benefit;
— it allows full alignment of the EU rules with the adopted ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices (SARPs); and
— it achieves a higher degree of harmonisation between EU and US rules.
Reduced required landing distance for performance class A and B aeroplane operations
Along with the baseline option (Option 0 ‘No changes’), another option was considered:
— introduce the possibility of using a landing factor of 80 % of the landing distance available (LDA)
for performance class A and B aeroplanes under defined conditions and with the approval of the
competent authority (CA).
The impacts of the two options are analysed in detail in Chapter 4 below. Option 1 has been selected
as the most appropriate one because while it maintains the same level of safety as with the current
rules, it is expected to achieve the following additional benefits:
— to have a medium positive social impact;
— to have a medium positive economic impact;
— to render EU rules more proportionate; and
— to achieve a higher degree of harmonisation between EU and US rules.
SRs addressed by this NPA
EASA committed to consider the following SRs in this RMT:
EAPPRE, Ref. 3.7.1 Establish and implement one consistent method of contaminated runway
surface condition assessment and reporting by the aerodrome operator for
use by aircraft operators. Ensure the relation of this report to aircraft
performance as published by aircraft manufacturers.
EASA reply The SR has been agreed and addressed through the changes of:
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 6 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
2. Explanatory Note
— CAT.OP.MPA.311 on runway surface condition assessment; and
— CS 25.1591 and CS 25.1592 on performance data published by the
manufacturers.
It should be noted that the requirements applicable to aerodrome operators
to implement one consistent method for runway surface condition
assessment and reporting will be developed through a future rulemaking
task in the ‘Aerodromes (ADR)’ context.
EAPPRE Ref. 3.7.2 Establish and implement one consistent method of calculation of crosswind
limits for use by aircraft manufacturers and aircraft operators.
EASA reply The development of a standardised methodology for the calculation of
crosswind limits is at the level of flight testing and cannot be addressed in
the context of operational rules for aeroplane performance.
The SR is, therefore, considered to be beyond the scope of this NPA.
Furthermore, it was recognised that the issue is currently being addressed
by the Flight Test Harmonization Working Group (FTHWG), where EASA is
represented and which is considered to be the most appropriate body to
deliberate on the issue.
EAPPRE Ref. 3.7.3 It is recommended that aircraft operators always conduct an in-flight
assessment of the landing performance prior to landing. Note: Apply an
appropriate margin to the results.
EASA reply The SR has been agreed and addressed through the proposed new
requirement of CAT.OP.MPA.303 for in-flight check of the landing distance
at the time of arrival.
SR UNKG-2008-076 The European Aviation Safety Agency should require operators to ensure that
flight crews are provided with guidance material on aircraft performance
when operating on a runway that is notified as ‘may be slippery when wet’,
or has sections thereof notified as ‘may be slippery when wet’.
EASA reply The SR has been agreed and addressed through the proposed amendments
of:
— Annex I (Definitions) to Regulation (EU) No 965/20125 (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Air OPS Regulation’) on the runway surface
condition and contaminant descriptors;
5
Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and administrative procedures
related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296,
25.10.2012, p. 1).
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 7 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
2. Explanatory Note
— CAT.OP.MPA.311 on runway surface condition assessment;
— CAT.OP.MPA.303 on in-flight check of the landing distance at the time
of arrival; and
— CS 25.1591, CS 25.1592
SR NORW-2011-011 The Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) recommends that FAA,
EASA and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Norway evaluate the airlines’
crosswind limits in relation to friction values and consider whether they
should be subject to separate approval by the authorities.
EASA reply The SR has been accepted and the following assessment has been done:
— Operational crosswind limits are either based on manufacturer’s
approved data or on manufacturer’s advisory data provided in other
documents; thus, an additional approval by the CA is not considered
necessary.
— Guidance to operators is necessary on how to use the information
available from manufacturers to establish operational crosswind limits
in the operations manual (OM) and to relate such limits to the runway
surface conditions.
The SR has been then addressed by the proposed amendments of:
GM1 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — general
CROSSWIND LIMITATIONS IN THE OPERATIONS MANUAL.
2.4. Overview of the proposed amendments
2.4.1. Annex I (Definitions) to the Air OPS Regulation
The definitions of dry, wet and contaminated runway are amended in accordance with the definitions
introduced in ICAO Annex 6 and Annex 14.
Procedural information that was previously contained in the definitions of dry and contaminated
runway is moved to the related GM. For ‘contaminated runways’, it is further specified that being the
runway condition reported by runway thirds, a ‘significant portion of the runway’ in this context refers
to one third of the runway and not to the entire length.
The definition of ‘damp runway’ is deleted as this condition is now included in the definition of ‘wet
runway’.
The following new definitions are added to support the proposed runway surface condition assessment
and reporting system:
— ‘runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM)’;
— ‘runway condition report (RCR)’;
— ‘runway condition code (RWYCC)’; and
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 8 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
2. Explanatory Note
— ‘runway surface condition(s)’.
The definitions of the runway surface descriptors are added as well.
Furthermore, a definition of ‘slippery wet runway’ is added in accordance with ICAO Annex 14.
2.4.2. Annex II (Part-ARO) to the Air OPS Regulation
Appendix II
Note 20 to the OPERATIONS SPECIFICATIONS form (EASA FORM 139, Issue 1) is amended to include
under the listed items the approval for reduced required landing distance operations to be consistent
with the proposed new rules CAT.POL.A.255 and CAT.POL.A.355 regulating such operations.
2.4.3. Annex III (Part-ORO) to the Air OPS Regulation
GM2 ORO.GEN.130(b) Changes related to an AOC holder
The list of changes requiring prior approval is amended to include reduced required landing distance
operations to be consistent with the proposed new rules CAT.POL.A.255 and CAT.POL.A.355 regulating
such operations.
GM1 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — general
Guidance is proposed to operators on how to establish crosswind limits in the OM to clarify that the
primary source should be the manufacturer’s information and that then, further restrictions may be
applied based on the consideration of operational experience and operating-environment factors,
including runway surface condition.
2.4.4. Annex IV (Part-CAT) to the Air OPS Regulation
CAT.OP.MPA.300 Approach and landing conditions
A requirement for a specific in-flight assessment of the landing distance at the time of arrival is
proposed in accordance with ICAO Annex 6.
For clarity reasons, the following amendments are also proposed:
— The rule previously applicable to both aeroplanes and helicopters is split in two different
requirements. The new requirement CAT.OP.MPA.301 for helicopters has no content changes
compared to the current rule.
— The details of the in-flight assessment of the landing distance at the time of arrival are contained
in a new dedicated rule because the current CAT.OP.MPA.300 serves also other purposes than
checking the landing distances, such as checking the weather minima. In this regard, it should be
noted that said rule is being revised under the ongoing RMT.0379 — All-weather operations
(AWO) (check of the operating minima and other consistency changes). However, the proposal
of RMT.0379 is not presented in this NPA, since the related NPA has not been published yet.
Further coordination in this respect will be ensured in the future.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 9 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
2. Explanatory Note
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 Approach and landing conditions
— The helicopter-related AMC is separated from the aeroplane-related AMC for clarity reasons
without any content changes.
— The aeroplane-related AMC is amended to specify that the commander should make during the
approach preparation a decision on the worst runway condition that may be accepted for safe
landing, should the meteorological conditions lead to a degradation of the runway condition.
CAT.OP.MPA.303 In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes
A new requirement is proposed for an in-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival in
accordance with ICAO Annex 6 and the Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment Aviation
Rulemaking Committee (TALPA ARC) recommendations.
A different approach is taken for various categories of aeroplanes as follows:
— performance class A aeroplanes:
the TALPA ARC recommendations require the application of a 15% factor to the landing distance
determined in accordance with performance data for the landing distance at the time of arrival.
— performance class B aeroplanes:
in consideration of the fact that in many cases, data from the manufacturer may not be available
for this category of aeroplanes as no relevant airworthiness standards may exist, the proposed
new rule allows, as a minimum, to ensure that the landing distance calculated at the time of
landing, based on the actual conditions, is at least in accordance with the criteria applicable at
dispatch; and
— performance class C aeroplanes:
in consideration of the fact that in many cases, data from the manufacturer may not be available
for this category of aeroplanes as no relevant airworthiness standards may exist, the proposed
new rule allows, as a minimum, to ensure that the landing distance calculated at the time of
landing, based on the actual conditions, is at least in accordance with the criteria applicable at
dispatch.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(a);(b)(1);(c)(1) In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival
— aeroplanes
A new AMC is proposed, based on the FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 25-32, for the use of corrective
factors for the in-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival when no manufacturer’s
data are provided in the AFM for performance class A aeroplanes.
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes
Guidance is proposed mainly to explain the following:
— when during the approach, the in-flight check of the landing distance should be performed;
— what information should be considered;
— the autobrake usage; and
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 10 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
2. Explanatory Note
— when the assessment may be limited only to confirmation of the dispatch calculation.
CAT.OP.MPA.311 Runway braking action reporting
A new requirement is proposed in accordance with ICAO Annex 6 for the commander to report the
braking action experienced during landing if it is not as good as expected from previous reports.
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 Runway braking action reporting
A new AMC is proposed to implement the requirement on runway braking action reporting based on
amendments of ICAO documents. The background is the following:
The core of the ICAO amendments is the RCAM. Its structure adheres to the previous ICAO runway
codes used in the SNOWTAM format and includes seven runway condition levels associated with codes
from 0 (for less than poor braking action) to 6 (for dry), where each runway condition code (except 0) is
matched with a corresponding aeroplane deceleration performance level. A version of the RCAM
derived from the TALPA ARC proposals is available in ICAO Doc 9981 ‘PANS — Aerodromes’.
Different criteria of runway condition reporting can be used as entry points for the determination of
the applicable aeroplane performance level. These reporting criteria are:
— primary observations of contaminant type and depth, as well as of temperature;
— pilot advisory report of braking action; and
— runway friction measurements (Mu (μ)).
The last two types of report should be used only for downgrading a braking action category of a
runway, which is basically identified via contaminant type and depth. Runway condition codes are to
be reported for each third of the runway when more than 25 % of one third of the runway surface is
contaminated. If a friction measurement or reports from pilots of preceding aeroplanes (air reports
(AIREPs)) indicate that the friction levels have dropped below those expected for the type of
contaminant on the runway, the aerodrome should consider this information in reporting the relevant
condition code in line with the observed friction or braking action.
The TALPA ARC recommended that friction values should no longer be transmitted to pilots, but
restricted to use by the aerodrome in consolidating the runway condition assessment, mainly to
downgrade a runway condition assessment from descriptive characteristics. Furthermore, an ICAO
SARP recommends not to consider friction readings in winter conditions, except on hard contaminants
(i.e. compacted snow and ice).
It should be noted that the RCAM provides a recommendation for the performance classification of
runways that are reported as ‘slippery wet’ due to rubber contamination or otherwise degraded
runway friction. The concept of reporting runways as ‘slippery wet’, when the measured friction drops
below the maintenance threshold, was previously recommended for enforcement by the States in
ICAO Annex 14, but no associated aeroplane performance was so far available to allow flight crew to
take this information into account in their performance assessment at the time of arrival.
CAT.POL.A.105 General
Paragraph (d) on damp runways is deleted for consistency with the changes introduced in the
definitions, and the following (e) is renumbered as (d) accordingly.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 11 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
2. Explanatory Note
CAT.POL.A.200 General
A new paragraph is proposed for performance data necessary for the landing distance assessment at
the time of arrival.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.200 General
An amendment to the AMC on wet and contaminated runway data is proposed to reflect the new ICAO
methodology of reporting runway surface condition based on the RWYCC and RCAM.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.200 General
A new GM is proposed to specify the applicable standards for the assessment of the landing distance at
the time of arrival.
CAT.POL.A.215 En-route — one-engine-inoperative (OEI)
Further to taking into account proposal 6 of the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) NPA-OPS 47, rule
references are corrected and some text clarifications introduced.
Moreover, a new paragraph is added as the current rule was assuming the availability of en route OEI
net flight path data for performance class A aeroplanes. However, this is not always the case. Most
notably, airworthiness standards applicable to commuter category aeroplanes (CS-23 or equivalent) do
not require this information to be provided in the AFM. To address this disparity, it is necessary to
specify the appropriate margin that should be applied to the OEI gross en-route flight path data for
performance class A aeroplanes. Accordingly, the OEI net flight path margins specified in CS-25 for two-,
three- and four-engined aeroplanes are added.
CAT.POL.A.220 En-route — aeroplanes with three or more engines, two engines inoperative
Further to the proposal of the JAA NPA-OPS 47, the following changes are introduced:
— the use of ‘long range cruising speed’ is replaced with ‘cruising power’, thus harmonising with
the corresponding Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 121 requirement. This change would allow
more flexibility to operators who would be able to substantiate the use of a speed other than
the long-range cruising speed to comply with the rule; and
— text clarifications are introduced and rule references added; it should be noted that the
reference to CAT.POL.A.235 is restricted to wet runways only compared to the JAA proposal.
CAT.POL.A.230 Landing — dry runways
The rule is amended to include the existence of reduced required landing distance operations as per
proposed new CAT.POL.A.255.
Furthermore, paragraph (f) on alternates is proposed to be deleted for the following reasons:
— the original intent of this requirement was to cater for a rare and unique set of circumstances,
which is better addressed by an exemption or a derogation than a general rule; and
— this paragraph is partly superseded regarding the in-flight check part by the proposed new
CAT.OP.MPA.303.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 12 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
2. Explanatory Note
It is, however, considered that alleviation for alternates is necessary for operations on contaminated
runways; in this regard, a proposal is made.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.230 Landing — dry runways
Rule references are corrected.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.230 Landing — dry runways
The possibility of a landing factor of 80 % is mentioned in consistence with the change proposed in
CAT.POL.A.255.
CAT.POL.A.235 Landing — wet and contaminated runways
A new paragraph is added to allow flexibility on the use of alternates when dispatching on
contaminated runways.
CAT.POL.A.250 Approval of short landing operations
Further to the new type of operations introduced into CAT.POL.A.255, in CAT.POL.A.250, it is specified
that short landing operations cannot be conducted in combination with reduced required landing
distance operations.
CAT.POL.A.255 Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
A new requirement is proposed for reduced required landing distance operations of performance
class A aeroplanes. These operations are only allowed for non-scheduled on-demand CAT operations of
aeroplanes having a maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) of 45 360 kg or less and a maximum
operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of 19, and require a prior approval by the CA.
The rule allows the use of a landing factor of 80 % of the LDA, which in turn reduces the required
landing distance.
The intent of this proposed new requirement is to achieve proportionality of the rules for business
aviation operations and harmonisation with the corresponding US requirement, under a set of
conditions that, as explained in Chapter 4 (RIA) of this NPA, attain a level of safety equivalent to that
intended by CAT.POL.A.230.
The proposed mitigating measures are developed in the following four main areas:
— operational conditions;
— flight crew;
— aerodrome conditions, and
— aeroplane characteristics and performance.
Particularly as regards the assessment of aerodrome conditions, it should be noted that when the
runway is forecast to be wet, a further check of the landing distance is required for the following
reason: the landing distance calculated in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230 for dry runways at dispatch
needs to be increased by 1.15 for the case of a wet runway (as per CAT.POL.A.235). This distance is
obtained as follows:
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 13 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
2. Explanatory Note
Wet LD = 1.15 × 1.25 × ALD
where:
— ‘Wet LD’ is the required landing distance for wet runways;
— ‘1.15’ is the factor of the wet check required by CAT.POL.A.235;
— ‘1.25’ is the factor resulting from the use of 80 % of the LDA; and
— ‘ALD’ is the actual landing distance for the type resulting from AFM data in accordance with
CS 25.125 or equivalent (FAR 25.125).
However, a comparison with the landing distance required by CAT.OP.MPA.303 was performed for a
number of performance class A aeroplane types showing that the distance based on CAT.OP.MPA.303
may be higher or lower than Wet LD figures depending on the aeroplane type, number of operative
reversers and other assumptions made during the certification of the aeroplane.
Figure 1 — Wet margin for large jet aeroplanes
Current regulatory Wet margin (%) for Good/Wet time of
arrival distance
40 Data based on Sea Level,
30 std. day, no slope, no wind
20
10 1.15*1.25*FAR 25.125 dry
Margin
compared to Unfactored
%
0
TOA Good/Wet
-10
-20
-30 Part-25-certified aeroplanes — mixture of commercial and business jets
-40
These differences for certain aeroplane types may lead to the situation where the Wet LD for reduced
required landing distance operations is systematically shorter of the one calculated in-flight due to the
use of the 80 % landing factor.
To avoid this situation, a requirement is proposed to compare at the time of dispatch the Wet LD with
the distance calculated in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.303, and use the longer of the two.
Notwithstanding the above reasoning, the requirement of CAT.OP.MPA.303 to check again the landing
distance in-flight against the latest information available at the time of arrival remains valid.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
Guidance is provided to clarify that charter operations are not eligible for reduced required landing
distance operations.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 14 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
2. Explanatory Note
GM2 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
Guidance is proposed on how to determine for these operations a level of safety equivalent to that
attained by the current rules. It is highlighted that all the conditions established have to be adhered to
as it is the combination that achieves the intended level of safety. Criteria for the risk assessment are
also listed.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
An AMC is proposed on qualification, training, and checking of the flight crew. Details of the various
phases as well as equivalence criteria to account for previous experience are also provided.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
Flight data monitoring is recommended as a possible method to monitor these operations.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
Guidance is provided to explain the intent of an aerodrome landing analysis programme (ALAP).
GM2 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
Guidance is provided on adverse weather conditions that have to be considered for these operations,
especially in relation to wind.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(v) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
Guidance on equipment and minimum equipment list (MEL) usage is provided.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(viii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
An AMC on how to account additional aerodrome conditions is proposed.
CAT.POL.A.330 Landing — dry runways
The rule is amended to include the existence of reduced required landing distance operations as
proposed in CAT.POL.A.355.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.330 Landing — dry runways
Rule references are corrected.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.330 Landing — dry runways
The possibility of a landing factor of 80 % is mentioned in consistence with the change proposed in
CAT.POL.A.355.
CAT.POL.A.350 Approval of short landing operations
Further to the new type of operations introduced into CAT.POL.A.355, in CAT.POL.A.350, it is specified
that short landing operations cannot be conducted in combination with reduced required landing
distance operations.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 15 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
2. Explanatory Note
CAT.POL.A.355 Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
A new requirement is proposed for reduced required landing distance operations of performance
class B aeroplanes. These operations are allowed for specific runways at aerodromes where a public
interest and operational necessity have been determined by the state of the aerodrome, and require a
prior approval by the CA.
The rule allows the use of a landing factor of 80 % of the LDA which in turn reduces the required
landing distance.
The intent of the rule is to achieve proportionality of the rules for small CAT operators under a set of
conditions that, as explained in Chapter 4 (RIA) of this NPA, are considered to attain a level of safety
equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.230.
The proposed mitigating measures are developed in the following four main areas:
— operational conditions,
— flight crew,
— aerodrome conditions, and
— aeroplane characteristics and performance.
Compared to the corresponding rule for performance class A aeroplanes, requirements on training are
simplified; however, further limitations are proposed on the control of the touchdown area, and
operations are restricted to visual meteorological conditions (VMC) only.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
Guidance is proposed on how to determine for these operations a level of safety equivalent to that
attained by the current rules. It is highlighted that all the conditions established have to be adhered to
as it is the combination that achieves the intended level of safety. Criteria for the risk assessment are
also listed.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(3) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
An AMC on how to control the touchdown area is proposed.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(4) and (b)(5) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
An AMC is proposed on experience, training, and recency of the flight crew.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(6) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
Guidance is proposed:
— to explain the intent of an aerodrome landing analysis program (ALAP); and
— on adverse weather conditions that have to be considered for these operations, especially in
relation to wind.
GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7)(i) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
Guidance on equipment and MEL usage is proposed.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 16 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
2. Explanatory Note
GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7)(ii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
Guidance on the use of deceleration devices is proposed.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(8) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
An AMC on maintenance instructions and operational procedures to enhance the efficiency of
deceleration devices is proposed.
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(10) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
An AMC on how to account additional aerodrome conditions is proposed.
CAT.POL.A.415 En-route — OEI
The changes introduced into CAT.POL.A.215 and CAT.POL.A.220 in accordance with JAA NPA-OPS 47
are also introduced here for consistency, as applicable to performance class C aeroplanes.
CAT.POL.A.420 En-route — aeroplanes with three or more engines, two engines inoperative
The changes introduced in CAT.POL.A.215 and CAT.POL.A.220 in accordance with JAA NPA-OPS 47 are
also introduced here for consistency, as applicable to performance class C aeroplanes.
2.4.5. CS-25
CS 25.1591
The applicability of this provision is restricted to take-off performance information only as a new
standard is introduced for landing performance information.
AMC 25.1591
Information and explanatory material is amended in accordance with the TALPA ARC
recommendations and FAA AC 25-31, taking into account ICAO standards for runway condition codes
and contaminant descriptors. Definitions and terminology used throughout the entire text are
amended accordingly.
Information related to landing is deleted and moved, appropriately amended, to new AMC 25.1592.
In addition to the main changes, further improvements or clarifications are the following:
— Paragraph 7.1 ‘Contaminant Drag — Standing Water, Slush, Wet Snow’ is updated to provide for
the option of using 100 % of drag accountability during acceleration, as an alternative to
demonstration of conservatism considering 50 % for the entire accelerate and stop distance
(ASD);
— Paragraph 7.3.4 is added to provide limitations on upgrades for specially prepared winter
runway surfaces in accordance with ICAO; and
— In paragraph 8.3, references to other CS-25 provisions are added, as well as a clarification on
crosswind.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 17 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
2. Explanatory Note
CS 25.1592
A new standard is introduced for landing performance information, including performance data for the
time of arrival, in accordance with ICAO Annex 8.
AMC 25.1592
Information and explanatory material is amended in accordance with the TALPA ARC
recommendations and FAA AC 25-32, taking into account ICAO standards for runway condition codes
and contaminant descriptors. ICAO definitions and terminology are introduced accordingly throughout
the entire text.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 18 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
3. Proposed amendments
The text of the amendment is arranged to show deleted text, new or amended text as shown below:
(a) deleted text is marked with strike through;
(b) new or amended text is highlighted in grey;
(c) an ellipsis (…) indicates that the rest of the text is unchanged.
3.1. Draft Regulation (draft EASA Opinion)
3.1.1. Definitions
1. Definitions is amended as follows:
Definitions for terms used in Annexes II to VIII
For the purpose of this Regulation, the following definitions shall apply:
(…)
(25) ‘contaminated runway’ means a runway of which a significant portion of the runway surface
area (whether in isolated areas or not) within the length and width being used is covered by one
or more of the substances listed under the runway surface condition descriptors.more than 25 %
of the runway surface area within the required length and width being used is covered by the
following:
(a) surface water more than 3 mm (0,125 in) deep, or by slush, or loose snow, equivalent to
more than 3 mm (0,125 in) of water;
(b) snow which has been compressed into a solid mass which resists further compression and
will hold together or break into lumps if picked up (compacted snow); or
(c) ice, including wet ice;
(…)
(32) ‘damp runway’ means a runway where the surface is not dry, but when the moisture on it does
not give it a shiny appearance;
(…)
(42) ‘dry runway’ means a runway which is neither wet nor contaminated, and includes those paved
runways which have been specially prepared with grooves or porous pavement and maintained
to retain ‘effectively dry’ braking action even when moisture is present;whose surface is free of
visible moisture and not contaminated within the area intended to be used.
(…)
(103a) ‘Runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM)’ means a matrix allowing the assessment of the
runway condition code, using associated procedures, from a set of observed runway surface
condition(s) and pilot report of braking action.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 19 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
(103b) ‘Runway condition code (RWYCC)’ means a number describing the runway surface condition to
be used in the runway condition report.
Note: the purpose of the runway condition code is to permit an operational aeroplane
performance calculation by the flight crew.
(103c)‘Runway condition report (RCR)’ means a comprehensive standardised report relating to runway
surface conditions and their effect on the aeroplane landing and take-off performance.
(103d) ‘Runway surface condition(s)’ means a description of the condition(s) of the runway surface
used in the runway condition report which establishes the basis for the determination of the
runway condition code for aeroplane performance purposes.
Note 1: the runway surface conditions used in the runway condition report establish the
performance requirements among the aerodrome operator, aeroplane manufacturer and
aeroplane operator.
Note 2: aircraft de-icing chemicals and other contaminants are also reported but are not
included in the list of runway surface condition descriptors because their effect on runway
surface friction characteristics and the runway condition code cannot be evaluated in a
standardised manner.
(103e) ‘Runway surface condition descriptors’ means one of the following elements on the surface of
the runway (note: the descriptions under (a) to (h) below are used solely in the context of the
runway condition report and are not intended to supersede or replace any existing World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) definitions):
(a) ‘Compacted snow’: snow that has been compacted into a solid mass such that aeroplane
tires, at operating pressures and loadings, will run on the surface without significant
further compaction or rutting of the surface.
(b) ‘Dry snow’: snow from which a snowball cannot readily be made.
(c) ‘Frost’: ice crystals formed from airborne moisture on a surface whose temperature is
below freezing; frost differs from ice in that the frost crystals grow independently and,
therefore, have a more granular texture.
Note 1: below freezing refers to air temperature equal to or lower than the freezing point
of water (0 °C).
Note 2: under certain conditions, frost can cause the surface to become very slippery, and
it is then reported appropriately as ‘reduced braking action’.
(d) ‘Ice’: water that has frozen or compacted snow that has transitioned into ice, in cold and
dry conditions.
(e) ‘Slush’: snow that is so water-saturated that water will drain from it when a handful is
picked up or will splatter if stepped on forcefully.
(f) ‘Standing water’: water of depth greater than 3 mm.
Note: running water of depth greater than 3 mm is reported as ‘standing water’ by
convention.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 20 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
(g) ‘Wet ice’: ice with water on top of it or ice that is melting.
Note: freezing precipitation can lead to runway conditions associated with wet ice from an
aeroplane performance point of view. Wet ice can cause the surface to become very
slippery. It is then reported appropriately as ‘reduced braking action’.
(h) ‘Wet snow’: snow that contains enough water to be able to make a well-compacted, solid
snowball, but water will not squeeze out.
(…)
(107a) ‘Slippery wet runway’ means a wet runway where the surface friction characteristics of a
significant portion of the runway have been determined to be degraded
(…)
(128) ‘Wet runway’ means a runway of which the surface is covered with water, or equivalent, less
than specified by the ‘contaminated runway’ definition or when there is sufficient moisture on
the runway surface to cause it to appear reflective, but without significant areas of standing
waterwhose surface is covered by any visible dampness or water up to and including 3 mm deep
within the intended area of use.
3.1.2. Part-ARO
1. Appendix II is amended as follows:
APPENDIX II
(…)
20. Other approvals or data can be entered here, using one line (or one multi-line block) per
authorisation (e.g. short landing operations, steep approach operations, reduced required
landing distance operations, helicopter operations to/from a public interest site, helicopter
operations over a hostile environment located outside a congested area, helicopter operations
without a safe forced landing capability, operations with increased bank angles, maximum
distance from an adequate aerodrome for two-engined aeroplanes without an ETOPS approval,
aircraft used for non-commercial operations).
EASA FORM 139 Issue 2(…)
3.1.3. Part-CAT
1. CAT.OP.MPA.300 is amended as follows:
CAT.OP.MPA.300 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes
Before commencing anDuring the approach to land, the commander shall be satisfied that, according
to the information available to him/her, the weather at the aerodrome and the condition of the
runway or FATO intended to be used should not prevent a safe approach, landing or missed approach,
having regard to the performance information contained in the operations manual. A landing distance
assessment shall be done in accordance with CAT.OP.MPA.303.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 21 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
2. New CAT.OP.MPA.301 is added:
CAT.OP.MPA.301 Approach and landing conditions — helicopters
Before commencing an approach to land, the commander shall be satisfied that according to the
information available to him or her, the weather at the aerodrome and the condition of the runway or
final approach and take-off area (FATO) intended to be used should not prevent a safe approach,
landing or missed approach, having regard to the performance information contained in the operations
manual (OM).
3. New CAT.OP.MPA.303 is added:
CAT.OP.MPA.303 In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes
(a) For performance class A aeroplanes, no approach to land shall be continued unless the landing
distance available (LDA) is at least 115 % of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing
on the intended runway, determined in accordance with the approved landing distance data at
the time of arrival for landing distance assessment.
(b) For performance class B aeroplanes, no approach to land shall be continued unless:
(1) the LDA is at least 115 % of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing on the
intended runway, determined in accordance with the approved landing distance data at
the time of arrival for landing distance assessment; or
(2) if approved landing distance data at the time of arrival for landing distance assessment are
not available, the LDA at the estimated time of landing on the intended runway is checked
to be at least the required landing distance determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.330
or CAT.POL.A.335, as applicable.
(c) For performance class C aeroplanes, no approach to land shall be continued unless:
(1) the LDA is at least 115 % of the landing distance at the estimated time of landing on the
intended runway, determined in accordance with the approved landing distance data at
the time of arrival for landing distance assessment; or
(2) if approved landing distance data at the time of arrival for landing distance assessment are
not available, the LDA at the estimated time of landing on the intended runway is checked
to be at least the required landing distance determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.430
or CAT.POL.A.435, as applicable.
4. New CAT.OP.MPA.311 is added:
CAT.OP.MPA.311 Runway braking action reporting
Whenever the runway braking action encountered during the landing roll is not as good as reported,
the knowledge of which the commander considers to be safety relevant, he or she shall notify the air
traffic services (ATS) as soon as practicable.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 22 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
5. CAT.POL.A.105 is amended as follows:
CAT.POL.A.105 General
(…)
(d) For performance purposes, a damp runway, other than a grass runway, may be considered to be
dry.
(e) The operator shall take account of charting accuracy when assessing the take-off requirements
of the applicable chapters.
6. CAT.POL.A.200 is amended as follows:
CAT.POL.A.200 General
(a) The approved performance data in the AFM shall be supplemented as necessary with other data
if the approved performance data in the AFM is insufficient in respect of items such as:
(1) accounting for reasonably expected adverse operating conditions such as take-off and
landing on contaminated runways; and
(2) consideration of engine failure in all flight phases.
(b) For wet and contaminated runways, performance data determined in accordance with
applicable standards on certification of large aeroplanes or equivalent shall be used.
(c) For the landing distance assessment at the time of arrival, data determined in accordance with
applicable standards on certification of large aeroplanes, or equivalent, shall be used.
(d) The use of other data referred to in (a) and equivalent requirements referred to in (b) and (c)
above shall be specified in the operations manual.
7. CAT.POL.A.215 is amended as follows:
CAT.POL.A.215 En-route — one-engine-inoperative (OEI)
(…)
(c) The net flight path shall permit the aeroplane to continue flight from the cruising altitude to an
aerodrome where a landing can be made in accordance with CAT.POL.A.22530 or
CAT.POL.A.2305, as appropriate. The net flight path shall clear vertically, by at least 2 000 ft, all
terrain and obstructions along the route within 9.3 km (5 NM) on either side of the intended
track in accordance with the following:
(1) the engine is assumed to fail at the most critical point along the route;
(2) account is taken of the effects of winds on the flight path;
(3) fuel jettisoning is permitted to an extent consistent with reaching the aerodrome where
the aeroplane is assumed to land after engine failure with the required fuel reservesas per
CAT.OP.MPA.150, appropriate for an alternate aerodrome, if a safe procedure is used; and
(4) the aerodrome where the aeroplane is assumed to land after engine failure shall meet the
following criteria:
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 23 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
(i) the performance requirements at the expected landing mass are met; and
(ii) weather reports and/or forecasts and fieldrunway condition reports indicate that a
safe landing can be accomplished at the estimated time of landing.; and
(5) if the AFM does not contain en-route net flight path data, the gross OEI en-route flight
path shall be diminished by a climb gradient of 1.1 % for two-engined aeroplanes, 1.4 %
for three-engined aeroplanes, and 1.6 % for four-engined aeroplanes.
(d) The operator shall increase the width margins of (b) and (c) to 18.5 km (10 NM) if the
navigational accuracy does not meet at least required navigation performance 5 (RNP 5).
8. CAT.POL.A.220 is amended as follows:
CAT.POL.A.220 En-route — aeroplanes with three or more engines, two engines inoperative
(a) At no point along the intended track shall an aeroplane having three or more engines be more
than 90 minutes, with all engines operating at cruising power or thrust, as appropriate,at the all-
engines long range cruising speed at standard temperature in still air, away from an aerodrome
at which the performance requirements of CAT.POL.A.230 or CAT.POL.A.235(a) as applicable at
the expected landing mass are met, unless it complies with (b) to (f).
(b) The two-engines-inoperative en-route net flight path data shall allow the aeroplane to continue
the flight, in the expected meteorological conditions, from the point where two engines are
assumed to fail simultaneously to an aerodrome at which it is possible to land and come to a
complete stop when using the prescribed procedure for a landing with two engines inoperative.
The net flight path shall clear vertically, by at least 2 000 ft, all terrain and obstructions along the
route within 9.3 km (5 NM) on either side of the intended track. At altitudes and in
meteorological conditions requiring ice protection systems to be operable, the effect of their use
on the net flight path data shall be taken into account. If the navigational accuracy does not
meet at least RNP5, the operator shall increase the width margin given above to 18.5 km (10
NM).
(c) The two engines shall be assumed to fail at the most critical point of that portion of the route
where the aeroplane is more than 90 minutes, with all engines operating at cruising power or
thrust, as appropriate,at the all-engines long range cruising speed at standard temperature in
still air, away from anthe aerodrome specified in (a) aboveat which the performance
requirements applicable at the expected landing mass are met.
(d) The net flight path shall have a positive gradient at 1 500 ft above the aerodrome where the
landing is assumed to be made after the failure of two engines.
(e) Fuel jettisoning shall be permitted to an extent consistent with reaching the aerodrome with the
required fuel reserves of (f) below, if a safe procedure is used.
(f) The expected mass of the aeroplane at the point where the two engines are assumed to fail shall
not be less than that which would include sufficient fuel to proceed to an aerodrome where the
landing is assumed to be made, and to arrive there at least 1 500 ft directly over the landing area
and thereafter to fly level for 15 minutes at cruising power or thrust, as appropriate.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 24 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
9. CAT.POL.A.230 is amended as follows:
CAT.POL.A.230 Landing — dry runways
(a) The landing mass of the aeroplane determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.105(a) for the
estimated time of landing at the destination aerodrome and at any alternate aerodrome shall
allow a full stop landing from 50 ft above the threshold:
(1) for turbojet-powered aeroplanes, within 60 % of the landing distance available (LDA); and
(2) for turbopropeller-powered aeroplanes, within 70 % of the LDA. and;
(3) notwithstanding (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, for aeroplanes having a maximum certified take-
off mass (MCTOM) of 45 360 kg or less and a maximum operational passenger seating
configuration (MOPSC) of 19 or less, used in non-scheduled on-demand commercial air
transport (CAT) operations, within 80 % of the LDA when CAT.POL.A.255 is complied with.
(b) For steep approach operations, the operator shall use the landing distance data factored in
accordance with (a), based on a screen height of less than 60 ft, but not less than 35 ft, and shall
comply with CAT.POL.A.245.
(c) For short landing operations, the operator shall use the landing distance data factored in
accordance with (a) and shall comply with CAT.POL.A.250.
(d) When determining the landing mass, the operator shall take the following into account:
(1) the altitude at the aerodrome;
(2) not more than 50 % of the headwind component or not less than 150 % of the tailwind
component; and
(3) the runway slope in the direction of landing if greater than ± 2 %.
(e) For dispatching the aeroplane it shall be assumed that:
(1) the aeroplane will land on the most favourable runway, in still air; and
(2) the aeroplane will land on the runway most likely to be assigned, considering the probable
wind speed and direction, the ground handling characteristics of the aeroplane and other
conditions such as landing aids and terrain.
(f) If the operator is unable to comply with (e)(1) for a destination aerodrome having a single
runway where a landing depends upon a specified wind component, the aeroplane may be
dispatched if two alternate aerodromes are designated that permit full compliance with (a) to
(e). Before commencing an approach to land at the destination aerodrome, the commander shall
check that a landing can be made in full compliance with (a) to (d) and CAT.POL.A.225.
(gf) If the operator is unable to comply with (e)(2) for the destination aerodrome, the aeroplane shall
be only dispatched if an alternate aerodrome is designated that allows full compliance with (a)
to (ed).
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 25 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
10. CAT.POL.A.235 is amended as follows:
CAT.POL.A.235 Landing — wet and contaminated runways
(a) When the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the
estimated time of arrival may be wet, the LDA shall be at least 115 % of the required landing
distance, determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230.
(b) When the appropriate weather reports and/or forecasts indicate that the runway at the
estimated time of arrival may be contaminated, the LDA shall be at least the landing distance
determined in accordance with (a), or at least 115 % of the landing distance determined in
accordance with approved contaminated landing distance data or equivalent, whichever is
greater. The operator shall specify in the operations manual if equivalent landing distance data
are to be applied.
(c) A landing distance on a wet runway shorter than that required by (a), but not less than that
required by CAT.POL.A.230(a), may be used if the AFM includes specific additional information
about landing distances on wet runways.
(d) A landing distance on a specially prepared contaminatedwinter runway shorter than that
required by (b), but not less than that required by CAT.POL.A.230(a), may be used if the AFM
includes specific additional information about landing distances on contaminated runways.
(e) For (b), (c) and (d), the criteria of CAT.POL.A.230 shall be applied accordingly, except that
CAT.POL.A.230(a) shall not be applied to (b) above.
(f) For (b) and (d) above, if the operator is unable to comply with CAT.POL.A.230(e)(1) for a
destination aerodrome where a landing depends upon a specified wind component, the
aeroplane may be dispatched if two alternate aerodromes are designated that permit full
compliance with CAT.POL.A.230(a) to (e).
11. CAT.POL.A.250 is amended as follows:
CAT.POL.A.250 Approval of short landing operations
(…)
(b) To obtain the approval, the operator shall provide evidence that the following conditions are
met:
(1) the distance used for the calculation of the permitted landing mass may consist of the
usable length of the declared safe area plus the declared LDA;
(…)
(11) the slope of the declared safe area does not exceed 5 % upward nor 2 % downward in the
direction of landing; and
(12) reduced required landing distance operations in accordance with CAT.POL.A.255 are
prohibited; and
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 26 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
(123) additional conditions, if specified by the competent authority, taking into account
aeroplane type characteristics, orographic characteristics in the approach area, available
approach aids and missed approach/balked landing considerations.
12. New CAT.POL.A.255 is added:
CAT.POL.A.255 Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
(a) For aeroplanes having a maximum certified take-off mass (MCTOM) of 45 360 kg or less and a
maximum operational passenger seating configuration (MOPSC) of 19 or less, used in non-
scheduled on-demand commercial air transport (CAT) operations, landing operations with a
landing mass of the aeroplane allowing a full stop landing within 80 % of the landing distance
available (LDA) require prior approval by the competent authority.
(b) To obtain the approval, the operator shall provide evidence that:
(1) a risk assessment has been conducted by the operator to demonstrate that a level of
safety equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.230(a)(1) or CAT.POL.A.230(a)(2), as
applicable, is achieved; or
(2) the following conditions are met:
(i) special-approach procedures, such as steep approaches, planned screen heights
higher than 60 ft or lower than 35 ft, low-visibility operations, planned operations
outside stabilised approach criteria, are prohibited;
(ii) short landing operations in accordance with CAT.POL.A.250 are prohibited;
(iii) an adequate training, checking and monitoring process for the flight crew is
established;
(iv) an aerodrome landing analysis programme (ALAP) is established by the operator to
ensure that the following conditions are met:
(A) no tailwind is forecasted at the expected time of arrival;
(B) if the runway is forecasted to be wet at the expected time of arrival, the
landing distance at dispatch shall either be determined in accordance with
CAT.OP.MPA.303(a) or be at least 115 % of the landing distance required by
CAT.POL.A.230(a)(3), whichever is longer;
(C) no expected contaminated runway conditions exist at the expected time of
arrival; and
(D) no forecasted adverse weather conditions exist at the expected time of
arrival;
(v) all the equipment affecting landing performance is operative before commencing
the flight;
(vi) the flight crew is composed of at least two qualified and trained pilots having
recency in reduced required landing distance operations;
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 27 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
(vii) the commander shall make the final decision to conduct reduced required landing
distance operations and may decide not to do so when they consider this to be in
the interest of safety; and
(viii) additional aerodrome conditions, if specified by the competent authority, taking
into account aeroplane type characteristics, orographic characteristics in the
approach area, available approach aids, missed-approach and balked-landing
considerations.
13. CAT.POL.A.330 is amended as follows:
CAT.POL.A.330 Landing — dry runways
(a) The landing mass of the aeroplane determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.105(a) for the
estimated time of landing at the destination aerodrome and at any alternate aerodrome shall
allow a full stop landing from 50 ft above the threshold within 70 % of the landing distance
available (LDA). taking into account:
(b) Notwithstanding (a) above, the landing mass of the aeroplane determined in accordance with
CAT.POL.A.105(a) for the estimated time of landing at the destination aerodrome may allow a
full stop landing from 50 ft above the threshold within 80 % of the LDA when CAT.POL.A.355 is
complied with.
(c) When determining the landing mass, the operator shall take the following into account:
(1) the altitude at the aerodrome;
(2) not more than 50 % of the headwind component or not less than 150 % of the tailwind
component;
(3) the runway surface condition and the type of runway surface; and
(4) the runway slope in the direction of landing.
(db) For steep approach operations, the operator shall use landing distance data factored in
accordance with (a) based on a screen height of less than 60 ft, but not less than 35 ft, and
comply with CAT.POL.A.345.
(ec) For short landing operations, the operator shall use landing distance data factored in accordance
with (a) and comply with CAT.POL.A.350.
(fd) For dispatching the aeroplane in accordance with (a) to (c), it shall be assumed that:
(1) the aeroplane will land on the most favourable runway, in still air; and
(2) the aeroplane will land on the runway most likely to be assigned considering the probable
wind speed and direction, the ground handling characteristics of the aeroplane and other
conditions such as landing aids and terrain.
(ge) If the operator is unable to comply with (d)(2) for the destination aerodrome, the aeroplane shall
only be dispatched if an alternate aerodrome is designated that permits full compliance with (a)
to (d).
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 28 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
14. CAT.POL.A.350 is amended as follows:
CAT.POL.A.350 Approval of short landing operations
(…)
(b) To obtain the approval, the operator shall provide evidence that the following conditions are
met:
(…)
(10) reduced required landing distance operations in accordance with CAT.POL.A.355 are
prohibited; and
(101) additional conditions, if specified by the competent authority, taking into account
aeroplane type characteristics, orographic characteristics in the approach area, available
approach aids and missed approach/balked landing considerations.
15. New CAT.POL.A.355 is added:
CAT.POL.A.355 Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
(a) Operations with a landing mass of the aeroplane allowing a full stop landing within 80 % of the
landing distance available (LDA) on the intended runway require prior approval by the
competent authority. Such approval shall be obtained for each runway on which operations with
reduced required landing distance are conducted.
(b) To obtain the approval, a risk assessment shall be conducted by the operator to demonstrate
that a level of safety equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.330(a) is achieved, and at least
the following conditions shall be met:
(1) the state of the aerodrome has determined a public interest and operational necessity for
the operation, either due to the remoteness of the aerodrome or to physical limitations
relating to the extension of the runway;
(2) short landing operations in accordance with CAT.POL.A.250 and particular approaches
approved under CAT.OP.MPA.115(a) are prohibited;
(3) a specific control procedure of the touchdown area is defined in the operations manual
(OM) and implemented; this procedure shall include adequate go-around and balked-
landing instructions when touchdown in the defined area cannot be achieved;
(4) an adequate aerodrome training and checking programme for the flight crew is
established;
(5) the flight crew is qualified and have recency in the concerned aerodrome in accordance
with the standards defined in the OM;
(6) an aerodrome landing analysis program (ALAP) is established by the operator to ensure
that the following conditions are met:
(i) no tailwind is forecasted at the expected time of arrival;
(ii) no expected contaminated runway conditions exist at the expected time of arrival;
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 29 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
(iii) if the runway is forecasted to be wet at the expected time of arrival, the landing
distance at dispatch shall either be determined in accordance with
CAT.OP.MPA.303(b) or be at least 115 % of the landing distance required by
CAT.POL.A.330(b), whichever is longer; and
(iv) no forecasted adverse weather conditions exist at the expected time of arrival;
(7) operational procedures and instructions are established to ensure that:
(i) all the equipment affecting landing performance and landing distance is operative
before commencing the flight;
(ii) the deceleration devices are correctly used by the flight crew; and
(iii) landing on contaminated runways is prohibited;
(8) specific maintenance instructions and operational procedures are established for the
aeroplane’s deceleration devices to enhance the reliability of these systems;
(9) the final approach and landing are conducted under visual meteorological conditions
(VMC) only; and
(10) additional aerodrome conditions, if specified by the competent authority.
16. CAT.POL.A.415 is amended as follows:
CAT.POL.A.415 En-route — OEI
(…)
(e) Fuel jettisoning is permitted to an extent consistent with reaching the aerodrome where the
aeroplane is assumed to land after engine failure with the required fuel reserves as per
CAT.OP.MPA.150, appropriate for an alternate aerodrome, if a safe procedure is used.
17. CAT.POL.A.420 is amended as follows:
CAT.POL.A.420 En-route — aeroplanes with three or more engines, two engines inoperative
(a) At no point along the intended track shall an aeroplane having three or more engines be more
than 90 minutes, with all engines operating at cruising power or thrust, as appropriateat the all-
engines long range cruising speed at standard temperature in still air, away from an aerodrome
at which the performance requirements of CAT.POL.A.430, applicable at the expected landing
mass are met, unless it complies with (b) to (e).
(b) The two-engines-inoperative flight path shall permit the aeroplane to continue the flight, in the
expected meteorological conditions, clearing all obstacles within 9,3 km (5 NM) either side of the
intended track by a vertical interval of at least 2 000 ft, to an aerodrome at which the
performance requirements applicable at the expected landing mass are met.
(c) The two engines are assumed to fail at the most critical point of that portion of the route where
the aeroplane is more than 90 minutes, with all engines operating at cruising power or thrust, as
appropriateat the all-engines long range cruising speed at standard temperature in still air, away
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 30 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
from anthe aerodrome specified in (a) aboveat which the performance requirements applicable
at the expected landing mass are met.
(d) The expected mass of the aeroplane at the point where the two engines are assumed to fail shall
not be less than that which would include sufficient fuel to proceed to an aerodrome where the
landing is assumed to be made, and to arrive there at an altitude of a least 450 m (1 500 ft)
directly over the landing area and thereafter to fly level for 15 minutes at cruising power or
thrust, as appropriate.
(e) The available rate of climb of the aeroplane shall be taken to be 150 ft per minute less than that
specified.
(f) The width margins of (b) shall be increased to 18,5 km (10 NM) if the navigational accuracy does
not meet at least RNP5.
(g) Fuel jettisoning is permitted to an extent consistent with reaching the aerodrome with the
required fuel reserves as per (d) above, if a safe procedure is used.
3.2. Draft CSs (draft EASA Decision)
3.2.1. CS-25 Book 1
Certification Specifications
Large Aeroplanes
SUBPART G — OPERATING LIMITATIONS AND INFORMATION
(…)
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
1. CS 25.1591 is amended as follows:
CS 25.1591
Take-off Performance Information for Operations with Contaminated Runway Surface Conditions
(See AMC 25.1591)
(a) Supplementary take-off performance information applicable to aeroplanes operated on runways
contaminated with standing water, slush, snow or ice may be furnishedprovided at the
discretion of the applicant. If supplied, this information must include the expected performance
of the aeroplane during take-off and landing on hard-surfaced runways covered by these
contaminants. If information on any one or more of the above contaminated surfaces is not
supplied, the AFM must contain a statement prohibiting take-offoperation(s) on the
contaminated surface(s) for which information is not supplied. Additional information covering
operation on contaminated surfaces other than the above may be provided at the discretion of
the applicant.
(b) Performance information furnishedprovided by the applicant must be contained in the AFM. The
information may be used to assist operators in producing operational data and instructions for
use by their flight crews when operating with contaminated runway surface conditions. The
information may be established by calculation or by testing.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 31 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
(c) The AFM must clearly indicate the conditions and the extent of applicability for each
contaminant used in establishing the contaminated runway performance information. It must
also state that actual conditions that are different from those used for establishing the
contaminated runway performance information may lead to different performance.
2. New CS 25.1592 is added:
CS-25.1592
Performance Information for Landing Distance Assessment
(See AMC 25.1592)
(a) Landing performance information applicable to aeroplanes operated on dry and wet runways
and supplementary landing performance information applicable to aeroplanes operated on
runways contaminated with standing water, slush, snow or ice must be provided by the
applicant.
(b) Performance information provided by the applicant must be contained in the aircraft flight
manual (AFM). The information may be used to assist operators in producing operational data
and instructions for use by their flight crews for performance assessment. The information may
be established by calculation or by testing.
(c) The landing distance to be used for landing performance assessment consists of the horizontal
distance from the point at which the main gear of the aeroplane is 50 ft above the landing
surface to the point where the aeroplane comes to a complete stop. It considers runway surface
conditions/braking action, winds, temperatures, average runway slope, pressure altitude, icing
condition, planned final-approach speed, aeroplane mass and configuration, and deceleration
devices used.
3.2.2. CS-25 Book 2
Acceptable Means of Compliance
Large Aeroplanes
AMC — SUBPART G
1. AMC 25.1591 is amended as follows:
AMC 25.1591
The derivation and methodology of performance information for use when taking-off and landing
with contaminated runway surface conditions.
1.0 Purpose
This AMC provides information, guidelines, recommendations and acceptable means of
compliance for use by applicants in the production of performance information for aeroplanes
when operated ontaking off from runways that are contaminated by standing water, slush,
snow, ice or other contaminants.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 32 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
2.0 Technical Limitations of Data
(…)
It has been recently determined that the assumption to use wet runway surface field length
performance data for operations on runway surfaces contaminated with dry snow (depths below
10 mm) and wet snow (depths below 5 mm) may be inappropriate. Flight test evidence together
with estimations have indicated some measure of relatively low gear displacement drag and a
measurable reduction in surface friction in comparison to the assumptions associated with wet
runway field performance data. As a consequence it has been agreed that additional work is
required to further develop the associated methodology. As an interim measure it has been
concluded that it is reasonable to consider these surfaces by recommending that they be
addressed by using the data for the lowest depth of the contaminant provided.It is recognised
that the observation and reporting of the type and depth of contaminants (water, slush, dry
snow and wet snow) is limited in terms of the accuracy and timeliness with which it can be made
and relayed to the flight crew. Furthermore, shallow depths of contaminants do not generally
reduce wheel braking friction below that of a wet runway, except in unfavourable circumstances
for which lower than expected runway condition codes (RWYCCs) are reported (see
AMC 25.1592). In line with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Federal Aviation
Authority (FAA) standards, a depth of more than 3 mm for contaminant accountability in take-off
performance assessments is considered as a reasonable lower threshold. Below this depth, the
runway is considered to be wet, for which AMC 25.1591 does not apply.
(…)
(…)
4.0 Definitions
These definitions may be different to those used by other sources but are considered
appropriate for producing acceptable performance data, suitable for use in aeroplane
operations.The following definitions are a subset of the runway surface condition descriptors for
which a representative take-off performance model may be derived using the methods
contained in this AMC.
4.1 Standing Water
Water of a depth greater than 3mm. A surface condition where there is a layer of water of 3mm
or less is considered wet for which AMC 25.1591 is not applicable.
Note: a surface condition where there is a layer of water of 3 mm or less is considered wet, for
which AMC 25.1591 is not applicable.
4.2 Slush
Partly melted snow or ice with a high water content, from which water can readily flow, with an
assumed specific gravity of 0.85. Slush is normally a transient condition found only at
temperatures close to 0°C.Snow that is so water-saturated that water will drain from it when a
handful is picked up or will splatter if stepped on forcefully.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 33 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
4.3 Wet Snow
Snow that will stick together when compressed, but will not readily allow water to flow from it
when squeezed, with an assumed specific gravity of 0.5.Snow that contains enough water to be
able to make a well-compacted, solid snowball, without squeezing out water.
4.4 Dry Snow
Fresh snow that can be blown, or, if compacted by hand, will fall apart upon release (also
commonly referred to as loose snow), with an assumed specific gravity of 0.2. The assumption
with respect to specific gravity is not applicable to snow which has been subjected to the natural
ageing process. Snow from which a snowball cannot readily be made.
4.5 Compacted Snow
Snow which has been compressed into a solid mass such that the aeroplane wheels, at
representative operating pressures and loadings, will run on the surface without causing
significant rutting.Snow that has been compacted into a solid mass such that aeroplane tires, at
operating pressures and loadings, will run on the surface without significant further compaction
or rutting of the surface.
4.6 Ice
Water whichthat has frozen or compacted snow that has transitioned into iceon the runway
surface, including the condition where compacted snow transitions to a polished ice surface, in
cold and dry conditions.
Note: this definition excludes wet ice that has a film of water on top of it or contains melting ice,
which provides minimal braking friction and uncertain lateral control.
4.7 Slippery Wet
A wet runway where the surface friction characteristics of a significant portion of the runway
have been determined to be degraded.
4.78 Specially Prepared Winter Runway
A runway, with a dry frozen surface of compacted snow and/or ice which has been treated with
sand or grit or has been mechanically or chemically treated to improve runway friction. The
runway friction is measuredmonitored and reported on a regular basis in accordance with
national procedures.
4.89 Specific Gravity
The density of the contaminant divided by the density of water.
5.0 Contaminant Properties to be Considered
5.1 Range of Contaminants
(…)
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 34 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
Contaminant Range of Specific Is Drag Is Braking Analysis
Type Depths to be Gravity Increased? Friction Paragraphs
Considered - Assumed for Reduced Relevant
mm Calculation below Dry
Runway
Value?
Standing More than 3- 1.0 Yes Yes 7.1, 7.3, 7.4
Water, up to 15
Flooded (see Note 1)
runway
Slush More than 3- 0.85 Yes Yes 7.1, 7.3, 7.4
up to 15
(see Note 1)
Wet Snow BelowMore No Yes 7.3, 7.4
(see Note 2) than 3 up to
5
(see Note 1)
Wet Snow More than 5- 0.5 Yes Yes 7.1, 7.3, 7.4
(see Note 3) up to 30
Dry Snow BelowMore No Yes 7.3, 7.4
(see Note 2) than 3 up to
10
(see Note 1)
Dry Snow More than 0.2 Yes Yes 7.2, 7.3, 7.4
10-
up to 130
Compacted 0 No Yes 7.3, 7.4
Snow (see Note 4)
Ice 0 No Yes 7.3, 7.4
(see Note 4)
Slippery Wet 0 No Yes 7.3, 7.4
Specially 0 No Yes 7.3.4, 7.4
Prepared (see Note 4)
Winter
Runway
(see Note 5)
Table 1
Note 1: Runways with water depths or slush or snow depths ofless than 3 mm or less are
considered wet, for which AMC 25.1591 is not applicable.
Note 2: Contaminant drag may be ignored.
Note 3: For conservatism the same landing gear displacement and impingement drag
methodology is used for wet snow as for slush.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 35 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
Note 4: Where depths are given as zero it is assumed that the aeroplane is rolling on the surface
of the contaminant.
Note 5: No default model is proposed for specially prepared winter runways in this AMC. Such
surfaces are specific and treatment may be of variable effectiveness. The procedures and
methods should be approved by the competent authority of the state of operator.
(…)
6.0 Derivation of Performance Information
6.1 General Conditions
Take-off and landing performance information for contaminated runways should be
determined in accordance with the assumptions given in paragraph 7.0.
(…)
(…)
6.3 Landing on a Contaminated Runway
6.3.1 Airborne distance
Assumptions regarding the airborne distance for landing on a contaminated runway are
addressed in paragraph 7.4.2.
6.3.2 Ground Distance
Except as modified by the effects of contaminant as derived below, performance
assumptions for ground distance determination remain unchanged from those used for a
dry runway. These assumptions include:
- Touchdown time delays.
- Stopping means other than wheel brakes (but see paragraph 7.4.3).
7.0 Effects of Contaminant
7.1 Contaminant Drag -— Standing Water, Slush, Wet Snow
General advice and acceptable calculation methods are given for estimating the drag force
due to fluid contaminants on runways:
Total drag Drag due to Drag due to airframe
due to fluid = fluid displacement + impingement of fluid
contaminant by tyres spray from tyres
The essence of these simple calculation methods is the provision of appropriate values of
drag coefficients below, at, and above tyre aquaplaning speed, VP (see paragraph 7.1.1):
— Paragraphs 7.1.2.a and 7.1.2.b give tyre displacement drag coefficient values for
speeds below VP.
— Paragraph 7.1.3.b.2 gives tyre equivalent displacement drag coefficient values to
represent the skin friction component of impingement drag for speeds below VP.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 36 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
— Paragraph 7.1.4 gives the variation with speed, at and above VP, of drag coefficients
representing both fluid displacement and impingement.
The applicant may account for contaminant drag for computation of the deceleration
segment of the accelerate-stop distance. However, if the actual contaminant depth is less
than the reported value, then, using the reported value to determine contaminant drag
will result in a higher drag level than the one that actually exists, leading to a conservative
take-off distance and take-off run, but a potentially optimistic accelerate-stop distance. It
is assumed that these effects will offset each other; however, the applicant may consider:
— either using 100 % of the reported contaminant depth when determining the
acceleration portion, and 50 % when considering the deceleration portion; or
— using 50 % of the reported contaminant depth when determining both the
acceleration and the stop portion of the accelerate-stop distance. This will result in
a conservative computation of the resultant take-off distance without being unduly
penalising. The applicant should check to ensure that using drag for half of the
contaminant depth for the accelerate-stop computation is conservative for the
applicant’s aeroplane configuration.
7.1.1 Aquaplaning Speed
An aeroplane will aquaplane at high speed on a surface contaminated by standing water,
slush or wet snow. For the purposes of estimating the effect of aquaplaning on
contaminant drag, the aquaplaning speed, VP, is given by -
𝑉𝑃 = 9√𝑃
where VP is the ground speed in knots and P is the tyre pressure in lb/in2.
For the purpose of estimating the effect of aquaplaning on wheel-to-ground friction, the
aquaplaning speed VP given above should be factored with a coefficient of 0.85.
Predictions (Reference 5) indicate that the effect of running a wheel over a low density
liquid contaminant containing air, such as slush, is to compress it such that it essentially
acts as high density contaminant. This means that there is essentially no increase in
aquaplaning speed to be expected with such a lower density contaminant.
For this reason, the aquaplaning speed given here is not a function of the density of the
contaminant.
(See References 1, 5 and 10)
(…)
7.3 Braking Friction (All Contaminants)
On most contaminant surfaces the braking action of the aeroplane will be impaired.
Performance data showing these effects can be based on either the minimum
conservative ‘default’ values, given in Table 2 or test evidence and assumed values (see
paragraph 7.3.2). In addition the applicant may optionally provide performance data as a
function of aeroplane braking coefficient or wheel braking coefficient.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 37 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
7.3.1 Default Values
To enable aeroplane performance to be calculated conservatively in the absence of any
direct test evidence, default friction values as defined in Table 2 may be used. These
friction values represent the maximum effective braking coefficient of an fully modulating
anti-skid controlled braked wheel/tyre. For quasi-modulating systems, multiply the listed
braking coefficient by 0.625. For on-off systems, multiply the listed braking coefficient by
0.375. For the classification of anti-skid systems, please refer to AMC 25.109(c)(2).
Aeroplanes without anti-skid systems will need to be addressed separately on a case-by-
case basis.
Contaminant Default Wheel Braking Coefficient
µ
Standing Water
and Slush
where V is ground speed in knots
Note: For V greater than 85 % of the aquaplaning speed, use µ = 0.05
constant
Wet Snow below 0.167
5mmabove 3 mm
depth
Wet Snow 0.17
Dry Snow below 0.167
10mmabove
3 mm depth
Dry Snow 0.17
Compacted Snow 0.20
below outside air
temperature
(OAT) -15 °C
Ice (Cold & Dry) 0.075
Slippery Wet 0.16
Note: Braking Force = load on braked wheel x Default Friction Value µ
Table 2
Note: For a specially prepared winter runway surface no default friction value can be given
due to the diversity of conditions that will apply.
(See reference 10)
(…)
7.3.3 Use of Ground Friction Measurement Devices
Ideally it would be preferable to relate aeroplane braking performance to a friction index
measured by a ground friction device that would be reported as part of a Surface
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 38 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
Condition Report. However, tThere is not, at present, a correlation between aircraft
stopping capability andmmon friction index for all ground friction measuring devices.
Hence it is not practicable at the present time to determine aeroplane performance on
the basis of an internationally accepted friction index measured by ground friction
devices. Notwithstanding this lack of correlationa common index, the applicant may
optionally choose to present take-off and landing performance data as a function of an
aeroplane braking coefficient or wheel braking coefficient constant with ground speed for
runways contaminated with wet snow, dry snow, compacted snow or ice. The
responsibility for relating this data to a friction index measured by a ground friction device
will fall on the operator and the operatingcompetent authority of the state of operator.
7.3.4 Specially Prepared Winter Runway Surface
At the option of the applicant, take-off performance data may be provided for specially
prepared winter runway surfaces. This may include icy surfaces that have been treated
with sand or gravel in such a way that a significant improvement of friction may be
demonstrated. It is suggested that a reasonable margin should be applied to the observed
braking action in performance computations for such surfaces, and that effective friction
not greater than 0.16 (for fully modulating anti-skid systems) should be assumed. The
continued effectiveness of such a treatment must be frequently monitored. Appropriate
procedures and methods should be approved by the competent authority of the state of
aerodrome.
(…)
7.4.2 Landing Air Distance
For contaminated surfaces, the airborne distance should be calculated by assuming that 7
seconds elapse between passing through the 50 ft screen height and touching down on
the runway. In the absence of flight test data to substantiate a lower value, the
touchdown speed should be assumed to be 93% of the threshold speed.
7.4.23 Reverse Thrust
Performance information may include credit for reverse thrust where available and
controllable, as described in AMC 25.109.
8.0 Presentation of Supplementary Performance Information
(…)
8.3 Take-off and Landing Data
This should be presented either as separate data appropriate to a defined runway
contaminant or as incremental data based on the AFM normal dry or wet runway
information. Information relating to the use of speeds higher than VREF on landing, that is
speeds up to the maximum recommended approach speed additive to VREF, and the
associated distances should also be included.The take-off distance (TOD) should be
determined in accordance with CS 25.113(b) and the take-off run (TOR) in accordance with
CS 25.113(c)(2).
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 39 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
The landing distance must be presented either directly or with the factors required by the
operating manuals, with clear explanation where appropriate.
The applicant should provide crosswind guidance for operations on contaminated
runways.
Where data is provided for a range of contaminant depths, for example greater than 3, 6,
9, 12, 15mm, then the AFM should clearly indicate how to define data for contaminant
depths within the range of contaminant depths provided.
The AFM should provide:
— the performance data for operations on contaminated runways;
— definitions of runway surface conditions; and
— the procedures and assumptions used to develop the performance data.
The AFM should state that operations are prohibited on runways with contaminant depths
greater than those for which data is provided. Instructions for use of the data should be
provided in the appropriate documentation.
Where the AFM presents data using VSTOP and VGO, it must be stated in the AFM that
use of this concept is acceptable only where operation under this standard is permitted.
9 References
Reference sources containing worked methods for the processes outlined in 7.1 to 7.3.3 are
identified below:
1. ESDU Data Item 83042, December 1983, with Amendment A, May 1998. ‘Estimation of
Spray Patterns Generated from the Side of Aircraft Tyres Running in Water or Slush’.
2. ESDU Data Item 98001, May 1998. ‘Estimation of Airframe Skin -Friction Drag due to
Impingement of Tyre Spray’.
3. ESDU Data Item 90035, November 1990, with Amendment A, October 1992. ‘Frictional
and Retarding Forces on Aircraft Tyres. Part V: Estimation of Fluid Drag Forces’.
4. ESDU Memorandum No.97, July 1998. ‘The Order of Magnitude of Drag due to Forward
Spray from Aircraft Tyres’.
5. ESDU Memorandum No. 96, February 1998. ‘Operations on Surfaces Covered with Slush’.
6. ESDU Memorandum No. 95, March 1997, ‘Impact Forces Resulting From Wheel Generated
Spray: Re-Assessment Of Existing Data’.
7. NASA Report TP-2718 ‘Measurement of Flow Rate and Trajectory of Aircraft Tire -
Generated Water Spray’.
8. Van Es, G.W.H., ‘Method for Predicting the Rolling Resistance of Aircraft Tires in Dry
Snow’. AIAA Journal of Aircraft, Volume 36, No.5, September -October 1999.
9. Van Es, G.W.H., ‘Rolling Resistance of Aircraft Tires in Dry Snow’, National Aerospace
Laboratory NLR, Technical Report TR-98165, Amsterdam, 1998.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 40 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
10. ESDU Data Item 72008, May 1972. ‘Frictional and retarding forces on aircraft tyres’. Part
III: planning.
11. FAA AC 25-31, ‘Takeoff Performance Data for Operations on Contaminated Runways’,
22 December 2016.
12. ICAO Doc 10064, ‘Aeroplane Performance Manual’ (to be published).
2. New AMC 25.1592 is added as follows:
AMC 25.1592
The Derivation and Methodology of Performance Information for Landing Distance Assessment at
Dispatch and at Time of Arrival
1.0 Purpose
This AMC provides information, guidelines, recommendations and acceptable means of
compliance for use by applicants in the production of landing performance information. This
information is for use by operators:
— before flight when planning to land on runways that are contaminated by standing water,
slush, snow, ice or other contaminants; and
— at the time of arrival, whatever the runway surface condition is.
2.0 Applicability of Data
Appropriate landing performance data assists operators in performing dispatch or time-of-arrival
landing performance assessments. Because of differences in the variables to be taken into
account and of the various ways that those data are to be used, the landing performance data
for time-of-arrival landing performance assessments may be different than the landing
performance data developed in accordance with CS 25.125 and provided in the aeroplane flight
manual (AFM) in accordance with CS 25.1587(b). The methods contained in this AMC 25.1592
include those for derivation of landing distance on dry and wet runways intended to be used at
the time of arrival only. The preflight landing performance assessment, when planning to land on
a dry or wet runway surface, uses the landing distance developed in compliance with CS 25.125.
The data derived in accordance with the method(s) contained in this AMC is appropriate for the
preflight landing performance assessment when planning to land on a contaminated runway
surface only.
3.0 Standard Assumptions
The data for time-of-arrival landing performance assessments should represent expected landing
performance of a trained flight crew of average skill following normal flight procedures and
training. It should take into account runway surface conditions/runway condition codes, winds,
temperatures, average runway slope, pressure altitude, icing condition, final-approach speed,
aeroplane weight and configuration, and deceleration devices used.
Like the landing distances defined in CS 25.125, the landing distances to be used for time-of-
arrival landing performance assessments should consist of the horizontal distance from the point
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 41 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
at which the main gear of the aeroplane is 50 ft above the landing surface to the position where
the aeroplane is brought to a stop. See Figure 1 below.
4.0 Definitions
In addition to those defined in AMC 25.1591 above, the following runway conditions should be
considered:
4.1 Frost
Ice crystals formed from airborne moisture on a surface whose temperature is below
freezing. Frost differs from ice in that frost crystals grow independently and, therefore,
have a more granular texture.
Note 1: below freezing refers to air temperature equal to or lower than the freezing point
of water (0 °C).
Note 2:— under certain conditions, frost can cause the surface to become very slippery,
which is then reported appropriately as ‘reduced braking action’.
4.2 Runway Condition Code (RWYCC)
A number describing the runway surface condition to be used in the runway condition
report. See Section 6.2 of this AMC for the classification of runway conditions.
Note: the purpose of RWYCC is to permit an operational aeroplane performance
calculation by the flight crew. Procedures for the determination of the runway condition
code are described in ICAO Doc 9981 ‘PANS — Aerodromes’.
5.0 Assumptions for Landing Distances
Landing performance data should be provided in terms of RWYCCs within the approved
operational envelope for landing. Data should be provided for codes 6 through 1. At the option
of the applicant, additional data for fluid contaminants (dry snow, wet snow, slush and standing
water) may be provided for the range of depths given in Table 2 of Section 7.0 of this AMC.
Landing performance data is not presented for code 0 (zero) because this is not a performance
category but rather a condition in which flight operations should cease on the runway until the
aerodrome has taken an action to improve the braking action.
Landing distance data should cover all normal operations with all engines operating within the
normal landing operating envelope. The effect of each of the parameters affecting landing
distance should be provided, by taking into account the following:
— approved landing configurations, including Category III landing guidance, where approved;
— approved deceleration devices (e.g. wheel brakes, speed brakes/spoilers, and thrust
reversers);
— pressure altitudes within the approved landing operating envelope;
— weights up to the maximum take-off weight (MTOW);
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 42 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
— expected airspeeds at the runway threshold, including speeds up to the maximum
recommended final-approach speed, considering possible speed additives for winds and
icing conditions;
— temperatures within the approved landing operating envelope;
— winds within the approved landing operating envelope:
not more than 50 % of the nominal wind components along the landing path
opposite to the direction of landing; and
not less than 150 % of the nominal wind components along the landing path in the
direction of landing;
— runway slopes within the approved landing operating envelope; and
— icing conditions, if required to provide the landing distances required under CS 25.125 in
icing conditions.
6.0 Derivation of Landing Distance
The landing distance consists of three segments:
— an airborne segment,
— a transition segment, and
— a final stopping configuration (full braking) segment,
as shown in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1 — Landing distance segments
The landing distance for a time-of-arrival landing performance assessment may be determined
analytically from the landing performance model developed to show compliance with CS 25.125.
For the purposes of determining the landing distance for time-of-arrival assessments, the model
should be modified as described in the following sections.
Changes in the aeroplane’s configuration, speed, power, and thrust used to determine the
landing distance for time-of-arrival landing performance assessments should be made using
procedures established for operation in service. These procedures should:
— be able to be consistently executed in service by crews of average skill;
— use methods or devices that are safe and reliable; and
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 43 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
— include allowance for any time delays that may reasonably be expected in service (see
Section 6.2. below).
The procedures and assumptions used to develop the operational landing distances should be
documented in the AFM.
6.1 Air Distance
As shown in Figure 1 above, the air distance is the distance from a height of 50 ft above the
landing surface to the point of main gear touchdown. This definition of the air distance is
unchanged compared to that used for compliance with CS 25.125. However, the air distance
determined under CS 25.125 may not be appropriate for use when making time-of-arrival
landing performance assessments. The air distances determined under CS 25.125 may be shorter
than the distance that the average pilot is likely to achieve in normal operations.
The air distance used for any individual landing at any specific runway is a function of the
following parameters:
— runway approach guidance;
— runway slope;
— use of any aeroplane features or equipment (e.g. heads-up guidance, autoflight systems,
etc.);
— pilot technique; and
— the inherent flare characteristics of the specific aeroplane.
Unless the air distance used for compliance with CS 25.125 is representative of an average pilot
flying in normal operations (see flight test demonstration below), the air distance used for time-
of-arrival landing performance assessments should be determined analytically as the distance
traversed over a time period of 7 sec at a speed of 98 % of the recommended speed over the
landing threshold, also referred to as the final-approach speed (VAPP). This represents a flare
time of 7 sec and a touchdown speed (VTD) of 96 % of the VAPP. The VAPP should be consistent
with the procedures recommended by the applicant, including any speed additives, such as
those that may be used for winds or icing. The effect of higher speeds, to account for variations
that occur in operations or are caused by the operating procedures of individual operators,
should also be provided.
If the air distance is determined directly from flight test data instead of using the analytical
method provided above, the flight test data should meet the following criteria:
— procedures should be used that are consistent with the applicant’s recommended
procedures for operations in service; these procedures should address the recommended
final-approach airspeed, flare initiation height, thrust/power reduction height and
technique, and target pitch attitudes;
— at a height of 50 ft above the runway surface, the aeroplane should be at an airspeed not
slower than the recommended final-approach airspeed; and
— the touchdown rate of descent should be in the range of 1–4 ft per sec.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 44 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
If the air distance is based on a time of 7 sec at a speed of 98 % of the recommended speed over
the runway threshold, this air distance is considered valid for downhill runway slopes up to 2 %
in magnitude (no credit should be taken for an uphill runway slope).
6.2 Transition Distance
As shown in Figure 1 above, the transition distance is the distance travelled from the point of
main gear touchdown to the point where all deceleration devices used for determining the
landing distance are operating. If the air distance is based on a time of 7 sec at a speed of 98 %
of the recommended speed over the runway threshold, the speed at the start of the transition
segment should be 96 % of the final approach speed.
The transition distance should be based on the recommended procedures for use of the
approved means of deceleration, both in terms of sequencing and of any cues for initiation.
Reasonably expected time delays should also be taken into account.
For procedures that call for initiation of deceleration devices beginning at nose gear touchdown,
the minimum time for each pilot action taken to deploy or activate a deceleration means should
be the demonstrated time, but not less than one second.
For procedures that call for initiation of deceleration devices beginning prior to nose gear
touchdown, the minimum time for each pilot action taken to deploy or activate a deceleration
means should be the demonstrated time plus one second.
For deceleration means that are automatically deployed or activated (e.g. auto speed brakes or
autobrakes), the demonstrated time may be used with no added delay time.
The distance of the transition segment, and the speed at the start of the final stopping
configuration segment should include the expected evolution of the braking force achieved over
the transition distance. The evolution of the braking force should take into account any
differences that may occur for different RWYCCs, such as the aeroplane transition to the full
braking configuration (see Table 1 below for the wheel braking coefficient of the full braking
configuration of each runway surface condition and pilot-reported braking action).
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 45 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
RWYCC Runway surface condition description Wheel braking coefficient
6 — Dry 90 % of certified value used to comply
with CS 25.1251
5 — Frost Per method defined in CS 25.109(c)
— Wet (includes damp and water
equal to or less than 3 mm deep)
Depth of 3 mm or less of:
— Slush
— Dry snow
— Wet snow
4 –15 °C and colder outside air 0.202
temperature (OAT)
— Compacted snow
3 — Wet (‘Slippery Wet’ runway) 0.162
— Dry snow or wet snow (any depth)
over compacted snow
More than 3 mm depth of:
— Dry snow
— Wet snow
Warmer than – 15 °C OAT
— Compacted snow
2 More than 3 mm depth of: (1) For speeds below 85 % of the
— Water hydroplaning speed3, 50 % of the
— Slush wheel braking coefficient
determined in accordance with
CS 25.109(c), but not greater than
0.162
(2) For speeds at 85 % of the
hydroplaning speed3 and above,
0.052
1 — Ice 0.082
0 — Wet ice Not applicable (no operations in
— Water on top of compacted snow RWYCC = 0 conditions)
— Dry snow or wet snow over ice
Table 1 — Correlation between wheel braking coefficient and RWYCC
1
100 % of the wheel braking coefficient used to comply with CS 25.125 may be used if the testing
from which that braking coefficient was derived was conducted on portions of runways containing
operationally representative amounts of rubber contamination and paint stripes.
2
These wheel braking coefficients assume a fully modulating anti-skid system. For quasi-modulating
systems, multiply the listed braking coefficient by 0.625. For on-off systems, multiply the listed
braking coefficient by 0.375. For the classification of anti-skid systems, please refer to
AMC 25.109(c)(2). Aeroplanes without anti-skid systems will need to be addressed separately on a
case-by-case basis.
3
The hydroplaning speed, VP, may be estimated by the equation VP = 9√𝑃, where VP is the ground
2
speed in kt and P is the tire pressure in lb/in .
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 46 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
6.3 Final Stopping Configuration Distance (Full Braking Distance)
As shown in Figure 1 above, the final stopping configuration (full braking) segment begins
at the end of the transition segment, which is the point where all deceleration devices
used in determining the landing distance are operating. It ends at the nose gear position
when the aeroplane comes to a stop.
The calculation of the final stopping configuration distance should be based on the braking
coefficient associated with the runway surface condition or pilot-reported braking action,
including the effect of hydroplaning, if applicable. Credit may be taken for the use of
thrust reversers, where available and controllable. See following Section 7 for information
about taking into account contaminant drag from loose contaminants.
7.0 Contaminant Drag — Standing Water, Slush, Wet Snow
Loose contaminants result in additional contaminant drag due to the combination of the
displacement of the contaminant by the aeroplane tires and impingement of the contaminant
spray on the airframe. This contaminant drag provides an additional force helping to decelerate
the aeroplane, which reduces the distance needed to stop the aeroplane. Because contaminant
drag increases with contaminant depth, the deeper the contaminant is, the shorter the stopping
distance will be. However, the actual contaminant depth is likely to be less than the reported
depth for the following reasons:
— contaminant depths are reported in runway surface condition reports using specific depth
increments;
— the procedure for reporting contaminant depths is to report the highest depth of the
contaminant along the reported portion of the runway surface; contaminant depths,
however, are unlikely to be uniform over the runway surface (or reported portion of the
runway surface), so it is likely that there will be areas of lesser contaminant depth; and
— in a stable weather environment (that is, no replenishment of the contaminant on the
runway), the contaminant depth is likely to decrease as successive aeroplanes traverse
through this environment and displace the contaminant.
If the actual contaminant depth is less than the reported value, using the reported value to
determine the contaminant drag will result in a higher drag level than the one that actually
exists, leading to an optimistic stopping distance prediction. Therefore, it is recommended not to
include the effect of contaminant drag in the calculation of landing distances for time-of-arrival
landing performance assessments. If the effect of contaminant drag is included, it should be
limited to no more than the drag resulting from 50 % of the reported depth.
If the effect of contaminant depth is included in the landing distance data, then data should be
provided for the reportable contaminant depths up to the maximum contaminant depth for
each contaminant for which landing operations are permitted. In considering the maximum
depth of runway contaminants, it may be necessary to take account of the maximum depth for
which the engine air intakes have been shown to be free of ingesting hazardous quantities of
water in accordance with CS 25.1091(d)(2).
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 47 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
If the effect of contaminant depth is included in the landing distance data, then data should be
provided for the specific gravities shown in Table 2 below.
Loose contaminant Maximum depth Specific gravity
Standing Water 15 mm 1.0
Slush 15 mm 0.85
Dry Snow 130 mm 0.2
Wet Snow 30 mm 0.5
Table 2 — Maximum depth and specific gravity of loose contaminants
For the method of determining the contaminant drag, refer to AMC 25.1591.
8.0 Presentation of Supplementary Performance Information
8.1 General
Performance information for contaminated runways, derived in accordance with
Sections 5.0–7.0 of this AMC, should be accompanied by appropriate statements such as
the following:
— operation on runways contaminated with water, slush, snow, ice or other
contaminants implies uncertainties with regard to runway friction and contaminant
drag and, therefore, to the achievable performance and control of the aeroplane
during landing since the actual conditions may not completely match the
assumptions on which the performance information is based; where possible, every
effort should be made to ensure that the runway surface is cleared of any
significant contamination;
— the performance information assumes any runway contaminant to be of uniform
depth and density; and
— the provision of performance information for contaminated runways should not be
taken as implying that ground handling characteristics on these surfaces will be as
good as those that may be achieved on dry or wet runways, in particular following
engine failure, in crosswinds or when using reverse thrust.
8.2 Procedures
In addition to performance information appropriate to operating on a contaminated
runway, the AFM should also include recommended procedures associated with this
performance information. Differences in other procedures for operation of the aeroplane
on a contaminated surface should also be presented, e.g. reference to crosswinds.
8.3 Landing Data
This should be presented either as separate data appropriate to a defined runway
contaminant or as incremental data based on the normal dry or wet runway information
in the AFM. Information relating to the use of speeds higher than the VREF on landing,
that is, the VREF with an increment up to the maximum recommended approach speed, as
well as the associated distances, should also be included. The landing distance should be
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 48 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
presented either directly or with the factors required by the operating manuals (OMs),
with a clear explanation, where appropriate.
Where data is provided for a range of contaminant depths, e.g. greater than 3, 6, 9, 12,
15 mm, then the AFM should clearly indicate how to define data for contaminant depths
within the range of the contaminant depths provided.
The AFM should provide:
— the performance data for operations on contaminated runways;
— definitions of runway surface conditions; and
— the procedures and assumptions used to develop the performance data.
The AFM should state that operations are prohibited on runways with contaminant depths
greater than those for which data is provided. Instructions for use of the data should be
provided in the appropriate documentation.
9.0 References
1. FAA AC 25-32, ‘Landing Performance Data for Time-of-Arrival Landing Performance
Assessments’, 22 December 2015.
3.3. Draft AMC/GM (draft EASA Decision)
3.3.1. Definitions
1. New GM13 Annex I Definitions is added as follows:
GM13 Annex I Definitions
CONTAMINATED RUNWAY
As the runway condition is reported in runway thirds, a significant portion of the runway surface area is
more than 25 % of one third of the runway surface area within the required length and width being
used.
2. New GM14 Annex I Definitions is added as follows:
GM14 Annex I Definitions
DRY RUNWAY
The ‘area intended to be used’ means the area of the runway that is part of the take-off run available
(TORA) or landing distance available (LDA) declared in the aeronautical information publication (AIP) or
by notice to airmen (NOTAM).
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 49 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
3.3.2. Part-ORO
Subpart GEN — General requirements
SECTION I — GENERAL
1. GM3 ORO.GEN.130(b) is amended as follows:
GM3 ORO.GEN.130(b) Changes related to an AOC holder
CHANGES REQUIRING PRIOR APPROVAL
The following GM is a non-exhaustive checklist of items that require prior approval from the
competent authority as specified in the applicable Implementing Rules:
(…)
(n) performance:
(1) increased bank angles at take-off (for performance class A aeroplanes);
(2) short landing operations (for performance class A and B aeroplanes);
(3) steep approach operations (for performance class A and B aeroplanes); and
(4) reduced required landing distance operations (for performance class A and B aeroplanes);
(…)
SUBPART MLR — MANUALS, LOGS AND RECORDS
2. New GM1 ORO.MLR.100 is added as follows:
GM1 ORO.MLR.100 Operations manual — general
CROSSWIND LIMITATIONS IN THE OPERATIONS MANUAL (OM)
When publishing operational crosswind limitations in Part B of the OM in accordance with
AMC3 ORO.MLR.100, operators should consider:
(a) the following manufacturer’s information:
(1) values published in the ‘Limitations’ Section of the aircraft flight manual (AFM);
(2) maximum demonstrated crosswind values, when more limiting values are not published in
the ‘Limitations’ Section of the AFM;
(3) gust values; and
(4) additional guidance or recommendations;
(b) operational experience; and
(c) operating-environment factors such as:
(5) runway width;
(6) runway surface condition; and
(7) prevailing weather conditions.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 50 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
3.3.3. Part-CAT
Subpart B — Operating procedures
Section 1 — Motor-powered aircraft
1. AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 is amended as follows:
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.300 Approach and landing conditions — aeroplanes
IN-FLIGHT DETERMINATION OF THE LANDING DISTANCE
The in-flight determination of the landing distance should be based on the latest available
meteorological orand runway statecondition report, preferably not more than 30 minutes before the
expected landing time. When meteorological conditions may lead to a degradation of the runway
condition, the commander should determine during the approach preparation the most unfavourable
runway condition that may be accepted in order to conduct a safe landing.
2. New AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.301 is added as follows:
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.301 Approach and landing conditions — helicopters
IN-FLIGHT DETERMINATION OF THE LANDING DISTANCE
The in-flight determination of the final approach and take-off area (FATO) suitability landing distance
should be based on the latest available meteorological or runway condition report, preferably no more
than 30 minutes before the expected landing time.
3. New AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1) is added as follows:
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1) In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of
arrival — aeroplanes
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION FOR LANDING DISTANCE ASSESSMENT AT THE TIME OF ARRIVAL
(a) Performance information for landing distance assessment at the time of arrival should be
developed in accordance with AMC 25.1592, or equivalent, and included in the operations
manual (OM).
(b) When the aircraft manufacturer does not provide the relevant data for performance class A
aeroplanes, performance information for landing distance assessment at the time of arrival may
be determined by applying the following methods:
(1) Correction factors may be applied to the certified landing distances on dry runway
published in the AFM for turbojet-powered aeroplanes and turbopropeller-powered
aeroplanes.
(2) For this purpose, the landing distance factors (LDFs) from Table 1 below may be used:
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 51 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
Table 1 — LDFs
Runway
condition
6 5 4 3 2 1
code
(RWYCC)
Braking Good to Medium to
Dry Good Medium Poor
action medium poor
Runway
Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1 Note 1
description
Turbojet
without 1.67 2.6 2.8 3.2 4.0 5.1
reverse
Turbojet
with 1.67 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.9 3.4
reverse
Turboprop
(see 1.67 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.9
Note 2)
Note 1: runway descriptions may be found in the runway condition assessment matrix
(RCAM) for each RWYCC or braking action.
Note 2: these LDFs apply only to modern turboprops with efficient disking drag. For older
turboprops without adequate disking drag, use the Turbojet, No Reverse LDFs.
Note 3: the LDFs can apply to any type of anti-skid system, i.e. fully-modulating, quasi-
modulating or on-off system.
(3) To find the landing distance required (LDR) multiply the AFM (dry, unfactored) landing
distance by the applicable LDFs from Table 1 above for the runway conditions existing at
the time of arrival. If the AFM landing distances are presented as factored landing
distances, then that data needs to be adjusted to remove the applicable dispatch factors
applied to that data.
(4) The LDFs given in Table 1 above include a 15 % safety margin and an air distance
representative of normal operational practices. They account for variations of
temperature up to international standard atmosphere (ISA) + 20 °C, runway slopes
between –2 % and +2 %, and an average approach speed increment of 5 up to 20 kt. They
may not be conservative for all configurations in case of unfavourable combinations of
these parameters.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 52 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
4. New GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 is added as follows:
GM1 CAT.OP.MPA.303 In-flight check of the landing distance at the time of arrival — aeroplanes
TIMELINESS
The assessment is initially performed when landing weather and runway condition reports are
obtained, usually around top of descent. The assessment includes consideration of how much
deterioration in runway surface friction characteristics can be tolerated so that a quick decision is
made just prior to landing if the preceding aircraft provides a pilot advisory report of braking action
(AIREP) of worse than expected braking action.
RUNWAY CONDITION CONSIDERATIONS
When available for the portion of the runway that will be used for landing, the following elements are
considered:
(a) runway condition code (RWYCC);
(b) expected runway conditions (contaminant type and depth); and
(c) pilot advisory report of braking action (AIREP).
AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS
The following considerations may impact operational landing distance calculations:
(a) runway slope;
(b) aerodrome elevation;
(c) wind;
(d) temperature;
(e) aeroplane mass and configuration;
(f) approach speed at threshold;
(g) eventual adjustments to the landing distance, such as autoland; and
(h) planned use of aeroplane ground deceleration devices.
AUTOBRAKE USAGE
While autobrakes are a part of the aeroplane’s landing configuration, the landing distance assessment
at the time of arrival is not intended to force a selection of a higher than reasonable autobrake level.
For operations when the runway is dry or wet grooved or with a porous friction course (PFC), if the
manual braking distance provides a 15 % safety margin, then the braking technique may include a
combination of autobrakes and manual braking even if the selected autobrake landing data does not
provide a 15 % safety margin.
ASSESSMENT BASED ON DISPATCH CRITERIA
When the runway is dry or wet grooved or with a PFC, the assessment of the landing distance at the
time of arrival may be done by confirming that the runway meets the criteria used for dispatch.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 53 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
The required landing distance for dry runways determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230(a)
contains adequate margin to fulfil the intent of the time-of-arrival landing distance calculation on a dry
runway, which includes specific allowance for the additional parameters considered in that calculation.
When using wet runway dispatch applying the 15 % increase on the dry landing distance in accordance
with CAT.POL.A.235(a) to determine the required landing distance for a wet grooved surface or with a
PFC, there is adequate margin to cover eventualities considered in the time-of-arrival landing distance
calculation.
DOCUMENTATION AND TRAINING
The Operations Manual (OM) and training material should include the assumptions about and the
limitations on the use of the data provided for performing a landing distance assessment at the time-
of-arrival.
5. New AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 is added as follows:
AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.311 Runway braking action reporting
GENERAL
Pilot reports of runways surface conditions and braking action are considered by the aerodrome when
assessing the RWYCC reported in the runway condition report (RCR).
A single reference within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) documentation to the
runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM) and associated procedures is published in ICAO Doc 9981
— ‘PANS Aerodromes’.
Pilot reports of runway braking action should be done in the format of special air report (AIREP).
Instructions for in-flight reporting of runway braking action may be found in ICAO Doc 4444 — ‘PANS
ATM’.
RCAM
The presentation of the information in the RCAM is appropriate for use by aerodrome personnel
trained and competent in assessing the runway condition in a way relevant to aircraft performance.
While full implementation of the proposed standards would eventually no longer require the flight
crew to derive from various information available to them the appropriate runway condition to be
used for the landing performance assessment at the time of arrival, it is desirable that pilots maintain
an understanding of the performance effect of various components considered in the assessment.
It is the task of the aerodrome personnel to assess the appropriate RWYCC in order to allow the flight
crew to assess any potential change of the runway surface conditions. When no RWYCC is available in
winter conditions, the RCAM provides the flight crew with a combination of the relevant information
(runway surface conditions: state and/or contaminant or pilot report of braking action (AIREP)) in order
to assess the RWYCC.
Table 1 below is an excerpt of the RCAM and permits to perform the primary assessment based on the
reported contaminant type and depth, as well as outside air temperature (OAT).
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 54 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
Table 1 — Association between runway surface condition and RWYCC based on reported
contaminant type and depth and OAT
Runway surface Surface condition
Depth Notes RWYCC
condition descriptor
Including wet or contaminated
Dry N/a runways below 25 % coverage in 6
each runway third
Damp
(any visible 5
Wet
dampness)
Wet 3 mm or less 5
Slippery wet 3
At or below OAT – 15 °C 4
Compacted snow Any
Above OAT – 15 °C 3
3 mm or less 5
More than Including when any depth occurs
Dry snow 3 mm up to on top of compacted snow 3
100 mm
Any On top of ice 02
Frost1 Any 5
Ice Any In cold and dry conditions 1
3 mm or less 5
More than
Slush
3 mm up to 2
Contaminated
15 mm
3 mm or less 5
More than
Standing water 3 mm up to 2
15 mm
Any On top of ice 02
Wet ice Any 02
3 mm or less 5
More than Including when any depth occurs
Wet snow 3 mm up to on top of compacted snow 3
30 mm
Any On top of ice 02
Note 1: under certain conditions, frost may cause the surface to become very slippery.
Note 2: operations in conditions where less-than-poor braking action prevails are prohibited.
A primary assessment may have to be downgraded based on an AIREP of lower braking action than the
one typically associated with the type and depth of contaminant on the runway. The following table
shows the correlation between AIREP terminology and RWYCC.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 55 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
Table 2 — Association between AIREP and RWYCC
AIREP Description RWYCC
N/A 6
Braking deceleration is normal for the
GOOD wheel braking effort applied AND 5
directional control is normal.
Braking deceleration OR directional control
GOOD TO MEDIUM 4
is between good and medium.
Braking deceleration is noticeably reduced
MEDIUM for the wheel braking effort applied OR 3
directional control is noticeably reduced.
Braking deceleration OR directional control
MEDIUM TO POOR 2
is between medium and poor.
Braking deceleration is significantly
reduced for the wheel braking effort
POOR 1
applied OR directional control is
significantly reduced.
Braking deceleration is minimal to non-
LESS THAN POOR existent for the wheel braking effort 0
applied OR directional control is uncertain.
Note 1: the aerodrome personnel may downgrade or upgrade the reported RWYCC based on the
friction coefficient (Mu) measured by a friction measuring device meeting standards set or agreed by
the state of aerodrome. Such a decision should not be taken by a flight crew on the approach as it must
be supported by all other observations. Measured friction values poorly correlate with actual aircraft
braking capability/landing performance.
Subpart C — Aircraft performance and operating limitations
Section 1 — Aeroplanes
Chapter 2 — Performance class A
6. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.200 is amended as follows:
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.200 General
WET AND CONTAMINATED RUNWAY DATA
If the performance data have been determined on the basis of a measured runway friction coefficient,
the operator should use a procedure correlating the measured runway friction coefficient and the
effective braking coefficient of friction of the aeroplane type over the required speed range for the
existing runway conditions.Determination of take-off performance for wet and contaminated runways
should be based on the reported runway surface condition in terms of contaminant and depth.
Determination of landing performance should be based on information provided in the operations
manual (OM) on the reported runway condition code (RWYCC). The RWYCC is determined by the
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 56 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
aerodrome operator using the runway condition assessment matrix (RCAM) and associated procedures
defined in ICAO Doc 9981 — ‘PANS Aerodromes’.
7. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.200 is added as follows:
GM1 CAT.POL.A.200 General
APPLICABLE STANDARDS FOR LANDING DISTANCE ASSESSMENT AT THE TIME OF ARRIVAL
Applicable standards for the assessment of the landing distance at the time of arrival are provided
under AMC1 CAT.OP.MPA.303(a) and (b)(1) and (c)(1).
8. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.230 is amended as follows:
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.230 Landing — dry runways
FACTORING OF AUTOMATIC LANDING DISTANCE PERFORMANCE DATA
In those cases where the landing requires the use of an automatic landing system, and the distance
published in the AFM includes safety margins equivalent to those contained in CAT.POL.A.230 (a)(1),
CAT.POL.A.230(a)(2) and CAT.POL.A.235, the landing mass of the aeroplane should be the lesser of:
(a) the landing mass determined in accordance with CAT.POL.A.230 (a)(1), CAT.POL.A.230(a)(2) or
CAT.POL.A.235, as appropriate; or
(b) the landing mass determined for the automatic landing distance for the appropriate surface
condition, as given in the AFM or equivalent document. Increments due to system features such
as beam location or elevations, or procedures such as use of overspeed, should also be included.
9. GM1 CAT.POL.A.230 is amended as follows:
GM1 CAT.POL.A.230 Landing — dry runways
LANDING MASS
CAT.POL.A.230 establishes two considerations in determining the maximum permissible landing mass
at the destination and alternate aerodromes:
(a) Firstly, the aeroplane mass will be such that on arrival the aeroplane can be landed within 60 %,
70 %, or 780 % (as applicable) of the landing distance available (LDA) on the most favourable
(normally the longest) runway in still air. Regardless of the wind conditions, the maximum
landing mass for an aerodrome/aeroplane configuration at a particular aerodrome cannot be
exceeded.
(b) Secondly, consideration should be given to anticipated conditions and circumstances. The
expected wind, or ATC and noise abatement procedures, may indicate the use of a different
runway. These factors may result in a lower landing mass than that permitted under (a), in which
case dispatch should be based on this lesser mass.
(c) The expected wind referred to in (b) is the wind expected to exist at the time of arrival.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 57 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
10. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) is added as follows:
GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
NON-SCHEDULED ON-DEMAND COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORT (CAT) OPERATIONS
Non-scheduled on-demand CAT operations eligible for reduced required landing distance operations
do not include holiday charters, i.e. charter flights that are part of a holiday travel package.
11. New GM2 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) is added as follows:
GM2 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
EQUIVALENT LEVEL OF SAFETY
A level of safety equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.230(a)(1) or CAT.POL.A.230(a)(2), as
applicable, may be achieved when conducting reduced required landing distance operations if
mitigating measures are established and implemented. Such measures should address flight crew,
aircraft characteristics and performance, aerodromes and operations. It is, however, essential that all
conditions established are adhered to as it is the combination of said conditions that achieves the
intended level of safety. The operator should in fact also consider the interrelation of the various
mitigating measures.
The mitigating measures may be determined by the operator by using a risk assessment or by fulfilling
all the conditions established under CAT.POL.A.255(b). An operator willing to establish a set of
conditions different from those under CAT.POL.A.255(b) should demonstrate to the competent
authority the equivalent level of safety through a risk assessment.
The competent authority may require further mitigating measures in addition to those proposed by the
operator.
12. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) is added as follows:
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
RISK ASSESSMENT
The risk assessment required by CAT.POL.A.255(b)(1) should include at least the following elements:
(a) flight crew qualification in terms of training, checking and recency;
(b) flight crew composition;
(c) runway surface conditions;
(d) dispatch criteria;
(e) weather conditions and limitations;
(f) aerodrome characteristics;
(g) aeroplane characteristics and limitations;
(h) aeroplane equipment and systems affecting landing performance;
(i) aeroplane performance data; and
(j) operating procedures and operating minima.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 58 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
13. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii) is added as follows:
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
GENERAL
(a) The operator should ensure that flight crew training programmes for reduced required landing
distance operations include ground training, flight simulation training device (FSTD), and/or
flight training.
(b) Flight crew with no reduced required landing distance operations experience should have
completed the full training programme of (a) above.
(c) Flight crew with previous increased reduced required landing distance operations experience of
a similar type of operation with another EU operator, may undertake the following:
(1) an abbreviated ground training course if operating an aircraft of a type or class different
from that of the aircraft on which the previous reduced required landing distance
operations experience was gained;
(2) an abbreviated ground, FSTD and/or flight training course if operating the same type or
class and variant of the same aircraft type or class on which the previous reduced required
landing distance operations experience was gained; this course should include at least the
provisions of the conversion training contained in this AMC; the operator may reduce the
number of approaches/landings required by the conversion training if the type/class or
the variant of the aircraft type or class has the same or similar operating procedures,
handling characteristics and performance characteristics as the previously operated
aircraft type or class.
(d) Flight crew with reduced required landing distance operations experience with the operator may
undertake an abbreviated ground, FSTD and/or flight training course according to the following
conditions:
(1) when changing aircraft type or class, the abbreviated course should include at least the
content of the conversion training;
(2) when changing to a different variant of aircraft within the same type or class rating that
has the same or similar operating procedures, handling characteristics and performance
characteristics, as the previously operated aircraft type or class, a difference course or
familiarisation appropriate to the change of variant should fulfil the abbreviated course’s
purposes; and
(3) when changing to a different variant of aircraft within the same type or class rating that
has significantly different operating procedures, handling characteristics and performance
characteristics, the abbreviated course should include the content of the conversion
training.
GROUND TRAINING
(a) The initial ground training course for reduced required landing distance operations should
include at least the following:
(1) operational procedures and limitations, including flight preparation and planning;
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 59 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
(2) characteristics of the runway visual aids and runway markings;
(3) aircraft performance related to reduced required landing distance operations, including:
(i) aircraft-specific decelerating devices and equipment;
(ii) items that increase the aircraft landing distance, e.g. excess speed at touchdown,
threshold crossing height, delayed brake application, delayed spoiler/speed brake
or thrust reverser application; and
(iii) runway surface conditions;
(4) in-flight assessment of landing performance, including maximum landing masses and
runway conditions;
(5) stabilised approach criteria;
(6) correct vertical flight path after the DA/MDA;
(7) correct flare, touchdown and braking techniques;
(8) touchdown within the appropriate touchdown zone;
(9) recognition of failure of aircraft equipment affecting aircraft performance, and action to
be taken in that event;
(10) flight crew task allocation and pilot monitoring duties, including monitoring of the
activation of deceleration devices;
(11) go-around/balked-landing criteria and decision-making;
(12) selection of precision approaches versus non-precision approaches if both are available;
and
(13) qualification requirements for pilots to obtain and retain reduced required landing
distance operations, including aerodrome landing analysis programme (ALAP) procedures.
FSTD TRAINING AND/OR FLIGHT TRAINING
(a) FSTD and/or flight training should at least be required for the commander and any other pilot
flying for landing when performing reduced required landing distance operations.
(b) FSTD and/or flight training for reduced required landing distance operations should include
checks of equipment functionality, both on the ground and in-flight.
(c) Initial reduced required landing distance operations training should consist of a minimum of two
approaches and landings to include at least the following exercises which may be combined:
(1) an approach and landing at the maximum landing mass;
(2) an approach and landing without the use of visual approach;
(3) a landing on a wet runway;
(4) a malfunction of a stopping device on landing; and
(5) a go-around/balked landing.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 60 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
(d) Special emphasis should be given to the following items:
(1) in-flight assessment of landing performance;
(2) stabilised approach, recognition of an unstable approach and, consequentially, a go-
around;
(3) flight crew task allocation and pilot monitoring duties, including monitoring of the
activation of deceleration devices;
(4) timely and correct activation of deceleration devices;
(5) correct flare technique; and
(6) landing within the appropriate touchdown zone.
CONVERSION TRAINING
Flight crew members should complete the following reduced required landing distance operations
training if converting to a new type or class or variant of aircraft in which reduced required landing
distance operations will be conducted.
(a) Ground training, taking into account the flight crew member’s increased landing factor
operations experience.
(b) FSTD training and/or flight training.
RECURRENT TRAINING AND CHECKING
(a) The operator should ensure that in conjunction with the normal recurrent training and
operator’s proficiency checks, the pilot’s knowledge and ability to perform the tasks associated
with reduced required landing distance operations are adequate.
(b) The items of the ground training should cover a 3-year period.
(c) An annual reduced required landing distance operations training should consist of a minimum of
two approaches and landings so that it includes at least the following exercises which may be
combined:
(1) an approach and landing at the maximum landing mass;
(2) an approach and landing without the use of visual approach;
(3) a landing on a wet runway;
(4) a malfunction of a stopping device on landing; and
(5) a go-around/balked landing.
FLIGHT CREW QUALIFICATION AND EXPERIENCE
(a) Flight crew qualification and experience are specific to the operator and type of aircraft
operated.
(b) The operator should ensure that each flight crew member successfully completes the specified
FSTD and/or flight training before conducting reduced required landing distance operations.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 61 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
(c) The operator should ensure that no inexperienced flight crew members, as defined in
AMC1.ORO.FC.200(a), perform an approach and landing with reduced required landing distance
operations.
14. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii) is added as follows:
GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
MONITORING
(a) Reduced required landing distance operations should be continuously monitored by the
operator to detect any undesirable trends before they become hazardous.
(b) A flight data monitoring (FDM) programme, as required by ORO.AOC.130, is an acceptable
method to monitor operational risks related to reduced required landing distance operations.
(c) Although ORO.AOC.130 requires FDM only for aeroplanes with a maximum certified take-off
mass (MCTOM) of more than 27 000 kg, FDM is recommended for all operators conducting
reduced required landing distance operations.
15. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) is added as follows:
GM1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
AERODROME LANDING ANALYSIS PROGRAMME (ALAP)
The intent of an ALAP is to ensure that the aerodrome critical data related to landing performance in
reduced required landing distance operations are known and taken into account in order to avoid any
further increase of the landing distance.
Two important aerodrome-related variables largely contribute to increasing the landing distance:
(a) unfavourable or variable winds; and
(b) runway surface condition.
16. New GM2 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) is added as follows:
GM2 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
ADVERSE WEATHER
Adverse weather conditions include thunderstorms, showers, downbursts, squall lines, tornadoes,
moderate or severe turbulence on approach, heavy precipitation, wind shear, icing conditions. In
general, all weather phenomena having the potential to increase the landing distance should be
carefully assessed. Among these, tailwind is particularly relevant, therefore, reduced required landing
distance operations with tailwind are prohibited by CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(iv)(A).
Wind variations should be carefully monitored as they may lead to variations in the reported and/or
actual wind at the touchdown zone. Due consideration should be given also to the crosswind
perpendicular to the landing runway as a slight variation in the direction of the crosswind may result in
a considerable tailwind component.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 62 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
17. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(v) is added as follows:
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(v) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
EQUIPMENT AFFECTING LANDING PERFORMANCE
Equipment affecting landing performance typically includes flaps, slats, spoilers, brakes, anti-skid,
autobrakes, reversers, etc. The operator should establish procedures to identify, based on the aircraft
characteristics, those systems and the equipment that are performance relevant, and to ensure that
they are verified to be operative before commencing the flight. Dispatch with such equipment that is
inoperative under the minimum equipment list (MEL) is not allowed for reduced required landing
distance operations.
18. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(vi) is added as follows:
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(vi) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
RECENCY
Flight crew conducting reduced landing distance operations should have a recency in said operations of
at least two landings, either in actual operations or in an FSTD, performed within the validity period of
the operator proficiency check (OPC).
19. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(viii) is added as follows:
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.255(b)(2)(viii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
ADDITIONAL AERODROME CONDITIONS
(a) Operators should establish procedures to ensure that:
(1) the aerodrome information is obtained from an approved source;
(2) any change reducing landing distances that has been declared by the aerodrome operator
has been taken into account; and
(3) no steep approaches, screen heights lower than 35 ft or higher than 60 ft, operations
outside the stabilised approach criteria, or low-visibility operations are required at the
aerodrome where reduced required landing distance operations are conducted.
(b) Additional aerodrome conditions related to aeroplane type characteristics, orographic
characteristics in the approach area, available approach aids and missed approach/balked
landing considerations, as well as operating limitations, should also be taken into account.
(c) When assessing the aerodrome characteristics and the level of risk of the aeroplane
undershooting or overrunning the runway, the operator should consider the nature and location
of any hazard beyond the runway end, including the topography and obstruction environment
beyond the runway strip, and the effectiveness of any mitigation measures that may be in place
to reduce the likelihood and the consequences of a runway overrun.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 63 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
Chapter 3 — Performance class B
20. AMC1 CAT.POL.A.330 is amended as follows:
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.330 Landing — dry runways
LANDING DISTANCE CORRECTION FACTORS
(a) Unless otherwise specified in the AFM, or other performance or operating manuals from the
manufacturers, the variable affecting the landing performance and the associated factor that
should be applied to the AFM data are shown in the table below. It should be applied in addition
to the operational factors as prescribed in CAT.POL.A.330 (a) and CAT.POL.A.330(b).
Table 1: Landing distance correction factors
Surface type Factor
Grass (on firm soil up to 20 cm
1.15
long)
(b) The soil should be considered firm when there are wheel impressions but no rutting.
21. GM1 CAT.POL.A.330 is amended as follows:
GM1 CAT.POL.A.330 Landing — dry runways
LANDING MASS
CAT.POL.A.330 establishes two considerations in determining the maximum permissible landing mass
at the destination and alternate aerodromes.
(a) Firstly, the aeroplane mass will be such that on arrival the aeroplane can be landed within 70 %
or 80 %, as applicable, of the LDA on the most favourable (normally the longest) runway in still
air. Regardless of the wind conditions, the maximum landing mass for an aerodrome/aeroplane
configuration at a particular aerodrome cannot be exceeded.
(b) Secondly, consideration should be given to anticipated conditions and circumstances. The
expected wind, or ATC and noise abatement procedures, may indicate the use of a different
runway. These factors may result in a lower landing mass than that permitted under (a), in which
case dispatch should be based on this lesser mass.
(c) The expected wind referred to in (b) is the wind expected to exist at the time of arrival.
22. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b) is added as follows:
GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
EQUIVALENT LEVEL OF SAFETY
A level of safety equivalent to that intended by CAT.POL.A.330(a) may be achieved when conducting
reduced required landing distance operations if mitigating measures are established and implemented.
Such measures should address flight crew, aircraft characteristics and performance, aerodromes and
operations. It is, however, essential that all conditions established are adhered to as it is the
combination of said conditions that achieves the intended level of safety. The operator should in fact
also consider the interrelation of the various mitigating measures.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 64 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
The competent authority may require further mitigating measures in addition to those proposed by the
operator.
23. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(3) is added as follows:
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(3) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
CONTROL OF THE TOUCHDOWN AREA
The control of the touchdown area may be ensured by using external references visible from the flight
crew compartment. The end of the designated touchdown area should be clearly identified with a
ground reference point beyond which a go-around is required. Adequate go-around and balked landing
instructions should be established in the operations manual (OM). A written and/or pictorial
description of the procedure should be provided for crew use.
24. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(4) and (b)(5) is added as follows:
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(4) and (b)(5) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
TYPE EXPERIENCE
The operator should specify in the operations manual (OM) the minimum pilot’s experience on the
aircraft type or class required to conduct such operations.
TRAINING PROGRAMME
(a) Initial training
(1) The aerodrome training programme shall include ground and flight training with a suitably
qualified instructor.
(2) Flight training should be carried out on the runway of the intended operations, and should
include a suitable number of:
(i) approaches and landings; and
(ii) missed approach/balked landings.
(3) When performing approaches and landings, particular emphasis should be placed on:
(i) stabilised approach criteria;
(ii) accuracy of flare and touchdown;
(iii) positive identification of the ground reference point controlling the touchdown
area; and
(iv) correct use of deceleration devices.
(4) These exercises should be conducted in accordance with the specific control procedure of
the touchdown area established by the operator, and should enable the flight crew to
identify the external visual references and the designated touchdown area.
(b) Recurrent training
The operator should ensure that in conjunction with the recurrent training and checking
programme required by Subpart FC of Annex III (Part-ORO) to Regulation (EU) No 965/2012, the
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 65 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
pilot’s knowledge and ability to perform the tasks associated with this particular operation, for
which the pilot is authorised by the operator, are verified.
RECENCY
The operator should define in the OM appropriate recent-experience requirements to ensure that the
pilot’s ability to perform an approach to and landing on the intended runway is maintained.
25. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(6) is added as follows:
GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(6) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
AERODROME LANDING ANALYSIS PROGRAMME (ALAP)
The intent of an ALAP is to ensure that the aerodrome critical data related to landing performance in
reduced required landing distance operations are known and taken into account in order to avoid any
further increase of the landing distance.
Two important aerodrome-related variables largely contribute to increasing the landing distance:
(a) unfavourable or variable winds; and
(b) runway surface condition.
ADVERSE WEATHER
Adverse weather conditions include thunderstorms, showers, downbursts, squall lines, tornadoes,
moderate or severe turbulence on approach, heavy precipitation, wind shear, icing conditions. In
general, all weather phenomena having the potential to increase the landing distance should be
carefully assessed. Among these, tailwind is particularly relevant, therefore, reduced required landing
distance operations with tailwind are prohibited by CAT.POL.A.355(b)(6)(i).
Wind variations should be carefully monitored as they may lead to variations in the reported and/or
actual wind at the touchdown zone. Due consideration should be given also to the crosswind
perpendicular to the landing runway as a slight variation in the direction of the crosswind may result in
a considerable tailwind component.
26. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7)(i) is added as follows:
GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7)(i) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
EQUIPMENT AFFECTING LANDING PERFORMANCE
Equipment affecting landing performance typically includes flaps, slats, spoilers, brakes, anti-skid,
autobrakes, reversers, etc. The operator should establish procedures to identify, based on the aircraft
characteristics, those systems and the equipment that are performance relevant, and to ensure that
they are verified to be operative before commencing the flight. Dispatch with such equipment that is
inoperative under the minimum equipment list (MEL) is not allowed for reduced required landing
distance operations.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 66 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
3. Proposed amendments
27. New GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7)(ii) is added as follows:
GM1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(7)(ii) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
CORRECT USE OF DECELERATION DEVICES
Flight crew should use full reverse when landing irrespectively of any noise-related restriction on its
use unless this affects the controllability of the aircraft. The use of all stopping devices, including
reverse thrust, should commence immediately after touchdown without any delay.
28. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(8) is added as follows:
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(8) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
SPECIFIC MAINTENANCE INSTRUCTIONS
Additional maintenance instructions, such as more frequent checks, for the aircraft’s deceleration
devices, especially for the reverse system, should be established by the operator in accordance with
the manufacturer’s recommendations, and be included in the operator’s maintenance programme in
accordance with Annex I (Part-M) to Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014.
SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
The operator should establish procedures for the flight crew to check before take-off the correct
deployment of the deceleration devices, such as the reverse system.
29. New AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(10) is added as follows:
AMC1 CAT.POL.A.355(b)(10) Approval of reduced required landing distance operations
ADDITIONAL AERODROME CONDITIONS
(a) Operators should establish procedures to ensure that:
(1) the aerodrome information is obtained from an approved source; and
(2) any change reducing landing distances declared by the aerodrome operator has been
taken into account.
(b) Additional aerodrome conditions related to aeroplane type characteristics, orographic
characteristics in the approach area, available approach aids and missed approach/balked
landing considerations, as well as operating limitations, should also be taken into account.
(c) When assessing the aerodrome characteristics and the level of risk of the aeroplane
undershooting or overrunning the runway, the operator should consider the nature and location
of any hazard beyond the runway end, including the topography and obstruction environment
beyond the runway strip, and the effectiveness of any mitigation measures that may be in place
to reduce the likelihood and the consequences of a runway overrun.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 67 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
4. RIA
4.1. Issues to be addressed
General review of aeroplane performance requirements
A first attempt to review the operational requirements on aeroplane performance for CAT operations
with the purpose of harmonisation between US and EU rules was initiated by the Joint Aviation
Authorities (JAA)/Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC)
Performance Harmonisation Working Group (PERFHWG).
The recommendations of said working group were subsequently discussed by the JAA OPS
Performance Sub-Committee (PERFSC) and included in an NPA (NPA-OPS 47). Such NPA became the
input for EASA rulemaking task OPS.008 (former task number).
The main effects of the proposed changes were considered to be an improvement of clarity, technical
accuracy and flexibility for operators ,as well as harmonisation with the FAA rules.
A general consistency review of the aeroplane performance requirements in Subpart C ‘AIRCRAFT
PERFORMANCE AND OPERATING LIMITATIONS’ of Part-CAT is also performed in this NPA.
A further need for coordination and a consistency check has been identified in eventual changes
proposed for aeroplane-performance-related rules by the following RMTs:
— RMT.0379 ‘All-weather operations’ (AWO), and
— RMT.0570 ‘Reduction of runway excursions’.
ICAO amendments
However, it soon became evident that the number of issues and safety concerns to be addressed in the
field of aeroplane performance was larger.
Later on in fact, it was recognised that airworthiness standards and operating rules may not cover
adequately all conditions for take-off and landing performance, particularly in relation to runway
surface condition when the runway is wet or contaminated. This issue touches multiple domains of the
aviation regulatory framework such as Airworthiness (AW), Air Operations (Air OPS) and ADR.
For this reason, the FAA tasked the Takeoff and Landing Performance Assessment Advisory Rulemaking
Committee (TALPA ARC) to perform an exhaustive review of operations on contaminated runways.
TALPA ARC developed proposals along the three main directions of:
— standards for runway condition reporting by aerodromes;
— standards for aircraft manufacturers to produce data for operational landing performance
computation at the time of arrival; and
— operational rules for aircraft operators.
Most of the TALPA ARC recommendations were endorsed by the European Action Plan for the
Prevention of Runway Excursions (EAPPRE), which, in particular, contained the following SRs to EASA:
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 68 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
— 3.7.1 — Establish and implement one consistent method of contaminated runway surface
condition assessment and reporting by the aerodrome operator for use by aircraft operators.
Ensure the relation of this report to aircraft performance as published by aircraft manufacturers.
— 3.7.3 — It is recommended that aircraft operators always conduct an in-flight assessment of the
landing performance prior to landing. Note: Apply an appropriate margin to these results.
Under the Research Project EASA.2008/4, EASA also published in 2010 a study on runway friction
characteristics measurement and aircraft braking (RuFAB), which endorses some of the TALPA ARC
recommendations.
Part of the TALPA ARC recommendations on certification aspects related to performance were also
initially considered by EASA in RMT MDM.069 —‘Take-off and landing performance assessment’, which
was then deleted from the EASA Rulemaking Programme to be included in the present RMT.
The TALPA ARC recommendations were also the basis for the following two draft Advisory Circulars
(ACs) published by the FAA in December 2015:
— AC 25-32: Landing Performance Data for Time of Arrival Landing Performance Assessments. This
AC provides guidance and standardised methods that data providers, such as type certificate
(TC) holders, supplemental type certificate (STC) holders, applicants, and aeroplane operators,
can use when developing landing performance data for time-of-arrival landing performance
assessments for transport category aeroplanes. This AC also promotes the use of consistent
terminology for runway surface conditions used among data providers and FAA personnel.
— AC 25-31: Takeoff Performance Data for Operations on Contaminated Runways. This AC is
equivalent to the above one but intended for developing take-off performance data.
The TALPA ARC recommendations have been endorsed as well by ICAO through the work of the
Friction Task Force (FTF). The result of this work were presented in ICAO State Letter 4/1.1.55-15/30,
issued in 2015, including a number of standards and recommended practices amending the following
annexes:
— ICAO Annex 3 ‘Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation’;
— ICAO Annex 6 ‘Operation of Aircraft’, Part I and Part II;
— ICAO Annex 8 ‘Airworthiness of Aircraft’;
— ICAO Annex 14 ‘Aerodromes’; and
— ICAO Annex 15 ‘Aeronautical Information Services;
as well as the following documents:
— ICAO Doc 9981 ‘PANS — Aerodromes’; and
— ICAO Doc 4444 ‘PANS — ATM’.
Such proposals were then adopted by the Council of ICAO in 2016.
This NPA addresses the following ICAO amendments:
— assessment of performance at the time of landing (State Letter AN 11/1.3.29-16/12, ICAO
Annex 6, Part I — Amendment 40);
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 69 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
— reporting of degraded runway conditions by the flight crew (State Letter AN 11/1.3.29-16/12,
ICAO Annex 6, Part I — Amendment 40); and
— provision of distances at the time of landing in the OM (ICAO Annex 8, Part IIIB —
Amendment 105).
The other amendments to ICAO Annexes will be addressed by a dedicated RMT in the context of ADR.
However, the content of the amendment to ICAO Annex 14 (State Latter AN 4/1.2.26-16/19), as a well
as that of Amendment 1 to the Procedures for Air Navigation Services — Aerodromes in PANS-
Aerodromes, as well as Amendment 7 to PANS-ATM will be referenced in the present NPA.
In this context, the following SR to EASA:
— UNKG-2008-076: The European Aviation Safety Agency should require operators to ensure that
flight crews are provided with guidance material on aircraft performance when operating on a
runway that is notified as ‘may be slippery when wet’, or has sections thereof notified as ‘may be
slippery when wet’
is also addressed.
Crosswind limitations
Furthermore, EASA has received the following SR:
— NORW-2011-011: The Accident Investigation Board Norway (AIBN) recommends that FAA, EASA
and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) Norway evaluate the airlines' crosswind limits in relation to
friction values and consider whether they should be subject to separate approval by the
authorities;
and a similar SR in EAPPRE:
— 3.7.2 — Establish and implement one consistent method of calculation of crosswind limits for use
by aircraft manufacturers and aircraft operators.
Guidance on crosswind limitations has been already produced by EASA in the Safety Information
Bulletin (SIB) No 2014-20 but, based on the above SRs, further assessment and regulatory
developments are necessary.
Reduced required landing distances for certain CAT operations
In 2014, the European Business Aviation Association (EBAA) approached EASA to discuss the applicable
landing factors for CAT operations in relation to the specificities of certain aircraft types, belonging to
performance class A and used in business aviation, in order to determine whether more flexibility is
achievable under given conditions. Such flexibility exists in the US in the context of ‘eligible on-demand
operations’ regulated under Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR).135 and 91K. For this purpose, EBAA has
commissioned a study to an independent research body (National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR)) and
has submitted it to EASA for consideration in the present RMT (Report No NLR-CR-2014-206 — Safety
Assessment Of Landing Performance Factors Of Business Type Of Aircraft). The study identifies the
risks related to landing operations with an increased landing factor of 80 % of the LDA, i.e. with a
reduced required landing distance (RLD), as well as the mitigating measures to attain a level of safety
equivalent to that of the current rules.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 70 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
A similar proposal, but for performance class B aeroplanes, was submitted to EASA in 2015 by the
Direction Générale de l’Aviation Civile (DGAC) France. The drivers of this proposal are however
different as in this case, the possibility to use an increased landing factor of 80 % of the LDA is
restricted to specific aerodromes where a public interest exists. The safety justification of the proposal
is based on a risk assessment that defines a number of mitigating measures tailored to the
characteristics of the types in use in order to attain a level of safety equivalent to that of the current
rules.
Summary of the issues
Based on the above, the following issues are addressed in this NPA:
Issue Input sources
General review of — JAA NPA-OPS 47 — Aeroplane Performance;
aeroplane performance — technical improvements, clarifications and consistency check of
requirements the rules on aeroplane performance;
— coordination with RMT.0379 — AWO;
— coordination with RMT.0570 — Reduction of runway excursions
ICAO Amendment 1 — EAPPRE SR 3.7.1;
Standards for runway — SR UNKG-2008-076;
surface condition — ICAO SL 2015/30;
assessment and reporting — ICAO SL 2016/12;
— ICAO SL 2016/19;
— Runway Friction Characteristics Measurement and Aircraft
Braking (RuFAB) study
ICAO Amendment 2 — EAPPRE SR 3.7.1;
Airworthiness standards — ICAO SL 2015/30;
for landing performance — ICAO SL 2016/29;
computation at the time of — ICAO SL 2016/12;
arrival — FAA AC 25-32;
— FAA AC 25-31
ICAO Amendment 3 — EAPPRE SR 3.7.3;
In-flight assessment of — ICAO SL 2015/30;
landing performance at the — ICAO SL 2016/12
time of arrival
Crosswind limitations — EAPPRE SR 3.7.2;
— SR NORW-2011-011;
— EASA SIB No 2014-20
Reduced required landing — Report No NLR-CR-2014-206;
distance for performance — FAR 135.385(f);
class A and B aeroplanes — DGAC France proposal
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 71 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
4.1.1. Safety risk assessment
General review of aeroplane performance requirements
The JAA NPA-OPS 47 originally contained the following 10 proposals:
Proposal JAR-OPS reference Subject
Proposal 1 1.475 Deletion of the definition of ‘Damp Runway’.
Proposal 2 1.480 Introduction of the definition of ‘Grooved or Porous Friction
Course Wet Runway’ and changes to the definitions of runway
surface contaminants.
Proposal 3 1.485 Amendment of the reference to airworthiness standards for
wet runways
Proposal 4 1.490/1.495 Editorials. Guidance on ‘Grooved or Porous Friction Course Wet
Runway’. Guidance for non-linear runway slope accountability
Proposal 5 1.495 Clarifications on the maximum bank angles that can be used
with and without approval
Proposal 6 1.500 Text clarifications and new paragraph added to specify
net flight path margins for two-, three- and four-engined
aeroplanes
Proposal 7 1.505 Text clarifications and technical-accuracy improvements
Proposal 8 1.510 Clarifications on missed approach climb gradient requirements
Proposal 9 1.515 Several changes on landing performance
Proposal 10 1.570 Editorials
Proposals 1, 2, 3, 4 and 9 were recognised to be superseded by the ICAO amendments addressed in
this NPA and, therefore, were not considered further.
Proposals 5 and 8 are not harmonised with the corresponding FAA rules. Furthermore, some of the
issues touched by these proposals are under consideration in the FTWHG, which, having a wider
representation of manufacturers in its composition, is considered to be a more appropriate forum to
deliberate. Therefore, said proposals are not considered further in this NPA.
The remaining Proposals 6, 7 and 10 are transposed into the corresponding requirements of Part-CAT.
Further necessary consistency changes have been introduced, as a consequence of the changes
proposed to address the other issues of this NPA.
No further changes have been identified through RMT.0570 and RMT.0379, for each of which an NPA is
yet to be published.
Therefore, due to the nature of the above amendments, no safety impact has been identified for this
issue and consequently, it will not be subject to this RIA.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 72 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
Implementation of the ICAO amendments
Runway surface conditions have contributed to many safety events, and investigations have revealed
shortfalls in the accuracy and timeliness of assessment and reporting methods currently in use. An
issue has been identified particularly in the lack of standardisation in the way runway surface
conditions, and consequently braking action, are assessed and reported.
Similarly, operating rules and performance data defined in accordance with the current airworthiness
standards do not address adequately all conditions for take-off and landing performance in relation to
the runway surface condition when the runway is wet or contaminated.
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) Safety Report 2014 indicates that 87 % of runway
excursions occurred in the landing phase, and poor weather conditions were present in 43 % of those
cases. Said Report further recommends to operators to use a standardised runway surface condition
reporting system harmonised with performance information provided by manufacturers, and to apply
appropriate margins to the take-off and landing distances in relation to the runway surface condition.
These issues are captured by EAPPRE SRs 3.7.1 and 3.7.3 as well as UNKG-2008-076.
Furthermore, in a safety analysis conducted by EASA for this RMT over a period of 5 years
(2011–2015), the accidents and serious incidents were reviewed in which at least one of the following
conditions had been fulfilled:
— aeroplane performance calculation was inadequate to the reported runway condition;
— measurement and/or reporting of the runway condition was inaccurate; and
— runway condition was a causal factor in an occurrence.
In the analysis, 13 occurrences were identified, out of which 5 were classified as accidents and 9 as
serious incidents. The majority occurred during landing. There is a balance between the number of
runway overruns and that of side excursions that occurred during landing. The following figure shows
the distribution of the occurrences by mass and propulsion type.
6
5
Number of aircraft
4
3
2
1
0
2 251 to 5 700 Kg 27 001 to 272 000 Kg 5 701 to 27 000 Kg
Reciprocating Turbofan Turboprop
Figure 1 — Distribution of occurrences by aircraft mass and propulsion type
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 73 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
In order to address these issues, further to an accident occurred to a 737-700, the FAA tasked in 2007
the TALPA ARC with an exhaustive review of safety issues of operations on contaminated runways. This
working group was composed of a wide range of stakeholders such as aviation authorities, air
operators, aerodrome operators, aeroplane manufacturers and various associations.
In 2009, the TALPA ARC submitted to the FAA its proposals which were oriented along the following
three main axes:
— standards for runway condition reporting by aerodromes (in FAR 139);
— definition of the operational landing performance computation (in FAR 25); and
— operational rules for transport category aeroplanes (in FAR 121).
In the period 2010–2011, field trials were conducted with volunteering aerodromes and operators to
validate a crucial element of the proposals, the RCAM.
The FAA has then taken the approach of implementing the proposals of the TALPA ARC in a series of
ACs, as well as other guidance and policy documents that allow the various stakeholders to apply them
on a voluntary basis.
However, several aircraft manufacturers and States have already adopted significant elements of the
TALPA ARC work in their operational documentation and reporting systems.
The TALPA ARC proposals have been also endorsed by ICAO that, as mentioned above, through the
work of the FTF, addressed the following three issues of interest for this NPA:
(a) Standards for runway surface condition assessment and reporting
In ICAO Annex 6 (Section 4.4.2.1) pilots are required to issue the runway braking action special
air report (AIREP) when the runway braking action encountered is not as good as reported.
(b) Airworthiness standards for landing performance computation at the time of arrival
In ICAO Annex 8 (Section 2.2.7.1(f)), manufacturers are required to provide in the AFM landing
performance data for the time of landing.
(c) In-flight assessment of landing performance at the time of arrival
In ICAO Annex 6 (Section 4.4.11) pilots are required to assess landing performance at the time of
arrival against the latest runway surface condition information available.
These changes are considered in this NPA along with other relevant elements from other ICAO
annexes and documents.
Said assessment addresses SRs 3.7.1 and 3.7.3 of EAPPRE as well as UNKG-2008-076.
Crosswind limitations
The establishment, the understanding and the correct application of crosswind limitations, also in
relation to runway surface conditions, have a significant safety relevance as crosswind has a major
impact on directional stability.
Crosswind is recognised as an important causal factor in runway excursions.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 74 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
The AIBN, in its Report SL 2011/10, performed a systematic analysis of 30 reports of accidents and
incidents related to operations on contaminated and slippery runways over a 10-year period, and in 19
of those accidents/incidents, a correlation with the presence of crosswind was found.
The safety relevance of crosswind limitations was also recognised in EAPPRE (SR 3.7.2).
This assessment addresses EAPPRE SR 3.7.2 and SR NORW-2011-011.
A study on crosswind (Research Project EASA.2011/08 ‘NGW — Near-Ground Wind Gust Detection’)
was commissioned by EASA and carried out by the National Aerospace Laboratory of the Netherlands
(NLR). This study showed that a crosswind or tailwind component was a causal factor in a significant
number of occurrences investigated since 1990 and involving CS-25-certified aeroplanes operated in
CAT. These occurrences typically resulted in wingtip strikes, tail strikes, hard landings and runway
excursions. The wind in these occurrences was frequently accompanied by gusty conditions. The
analysis of existing practices revealed several issues:
— demonstrated values of crosswind limits of different aircraft types cannot be compared with
each other as different ways of wind determination during the flight tests may be used;
— for most commercial aircraft designed since 1950, no hard crosswind limits were established
during certification flight testing;
— for the vast majority of commercial aircraft designed since 1950, gust is not mentioned in the
demonstrated crosswind;
— there is currently no common industry standard on how to derive advisory crosswind values for
non-dry runway conditions;
— most but not all operators surveyed for this study used hard crosswind limits;
— not all operators consider gusts when evaluating crosswind limits; and
— there is no generally accepted way of decomposing reported wind gusts into crosswind and
tailwind components.
Based on the above conclusions, EASA issued SIB No 2014-20 to raise awareness on the risks associated
with operations in strong and/or gusty crosswind conditions and to provide guidance to
manufacturers, operators and training organisations.
The current EU rules on Air OPS, namely Part-CAT, are requiring operators to publish wind limitations
in their OM, but no specific guidance is provided on how this limitations should be developed for
crosswind, nor it is defined how to establish a correlation between crosswind and runway surface
conditions.
Having regard to EAPPRE SR 3.7.2, the RG considered the possibility to develop a standardised
methodology for the calculation of crosswind limits; however, it was recognised that a similar action is
already under consideration by the FTHWG.
Furthermore, one of the conclusions of Research Project EASA.2011/08 ‘NGW — Near-Ground Wind
Gust Detection’ indicated that the need for harmonisation among manufacturers of the methodology
for determining crosswind limits is at the level of flight testing.
The RG concluded that regulatory material for the development of such methodology is beyond the
scope of this RMT and that this issue is more appropriately addressed by the FTHWG.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 75 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
Similarly, having regard to SR NORW-2011-011, the RG considered the possibility to require an
approval of the operator’s crosswind limits by the CA.
This possibility was, however, also discarded as the definition of operational crosswind limits is either
based on manufacturer’s approved data in the AFM or manufacturer’s advisory data provided in other
documents. Thus, an additional approval by the CA is not considered necessary.
It was then decided to provide only guidance to operators on how to use the information available
from manufacturers to establish crosswind limits in the OM and to relate such limits to the runway
surface conditions.
Due to the nature of this proposed amendment, no negative safety impact or other adverse impacts
have been identified and, consequently, it is not part of the RIA.
Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes
The possibility to introduce flexibility into the methodology used to determine the landing distance is
advocated by certain stakeholders.
The current EU rules, namely CAT.POL.A.230, require to determine the landing mass of the aeroplane
in a way that allows the aeroplane to come to a full stop within 60 % of the LDA for turbojet-powered
aeroplanes and within 70 % of the LDA for turbopropeller-powered aeroplanes, respectively.
The application of this factor to the landing distance is intended to provide an adequate safety margin
against landing overruns.
The business aviation community requested EASA to allow the use of an 80 % landing factor for
business aviation operations conducted with performance class A aeroplanes. The application of this
factor to the LDA results in a reduction of the required landing distance. The proposal is based on a rule
in force in the US regulatory framework under FAR.135 and 91K (eligible on-demand operations) and is
substantiated by a study which defines a number of risk-mitigating conditions in order to attain a level
of safety equivalent to that of the current rule. The adoption of this regulatory proposal would allow
more flexibility for the above-mentioned business operators, facilitate the access to certain regional
aerodromes and, according to EBAA, eliminate a competitive disadvantage for European operators.
DGAC France has submitted to EASA a similar proposal to allow the use of the 80 % landing factor for
the operation of performance class B aeroplanes. In this case, however, the reasons are different as
these operations would be limited to specific aerodromes where the state of the aerodrome has
determined a public interest (e.g. remote or isolated areas with reduced or no availability of other
transport modes, aerodromes with short runways that cannot be extended, aeromedical services, etc.),
and an operational necessity exist. This proposal is also based on a set of mitigating measures.
The driver for the consideration of the issue in this NPA is, therefore, not safety but rather flexibility
and proportionality of the rules; however, it should be noted that a safety risk is introduced if an 80 %
landing factor is allowed without establishing appropriate mitigating measures to attain a level of
safety equivalent to that originally attained through CAT.POL.A.230 and CAT.POL.A.330.
4.1.2. Who is affected?
The issues identified in and addressed by this NPA affect CAT aeroplane operators and flight crews as
they have to directly comply with the aeroplane performance requirements.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 76 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
CAs are also affected as the authorities responsible for the oversight and approvals related to
aeroplane performance.
Aeroplane manufacturers are also affected as they have to provide the necessary performance data to
operators.
4.1.3. How could the issue/problem evolve?
In case the issues considered in this NPA are not addressed, and if the regulatory framework is not
changed, it is expected that the identified safety risks related to operations on wet and contaminated
runways and in crosswind conditions would remain the same or possibly develop further.
The harmonisation level between EU and US rules would remain the same or most likely develop
further in relation to the implementation of the TALPA ARC recommendations as well as of reduced
required landing distance on-demand operations.
Moreover, the EU rules would remain non-aligned with the corresponding ICAO SARPs.
Finally, the lack of flexibility for business aviation operators when operating with a reduced required
landing distance could create a competitive disadvantage for European operators.
4.2. Objectives
The overall objectives of the EASA system are defined in Article 2 of the Basic Regulation. This proposal
will contribute to the achievement of the overall objectives by addressing the issues outlined in
Chapter 2 of this NPA.
The general objective of this proposal is to maintain a uniform and high level of safety with cost-
efficient rules.
The specific objectives of this proposal are to:
— reduce the number of accidents and serious incidents where aeroplane performance is a causal
factor;
— provide improved clarity, technical accuracy, flexibility or a combination of these benefits for the
EU operational requirements on aeroplane performance for CAT operations; and
— contribute to the harmonisation of FAA and EU operational requirements on aeroplane
performance for CAT operations.
4.3. Policy options
Two of the issues listed under Section 4.1.1 above, namely ‘General review of aeroplane performance
requirements’ and ‘Crosswind limitations’, do not require a RIA.
The other two issues, having different starting points and drivers, will be subject to separate RIAs.
Implementation of ICAO amendments
When considering the implementation of the ICAO amendments, the RG assessed the option to
introduce a new unified dispatch criterion for the landing distance by using already at dispatch the
performance data for the in-flight assessment. This was an attempt to avoid using two different sets of
performance data for landing performance, one at dispatch and one in-flight, the use of those two
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 77 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
different sets being in accordance with the new requirement of in-flight assessment of landing
performance.
However, this option was discarded for the following reasons:
— the review of dispatch criteria was outside the scope of the TALPA ARC and ICAO amendments;
— it would lead to disharmonisation with the FAA; and
— landing distances calculated using the criteria at dispatch are used in the certification process of
aeroplanes, therefore, the impact of this Option could not be estimated for most of the existing
types.
Table 1 — Selected policy options for ICAO amendments
Option No Short title Description
0 No change Baseline option (no change in rules; risks remain as outlined in the
issue analysis).
1 Implement ICAO Introduce:
amendments
— a requirement for pilot reports on the runway braking action;
— a requirement for an in-flight check of landing performance
at the time of arrival;
— airworthiness standards for the production of landing
performance data at the time of arrival.
Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes
For this issue, the following options have been identified:
Table 2 — Selected policy options for the reduced required landing distance operations for
performance class A and B aeroplanes
Option No Short title Description
0 No change Baseline option (no change in rules; risks remain as outlined in the
issue analysis).
1 Reduced Introduce the possibility of using a landing factor of 80 % of the LDA
required landing for performance class A and B aeroplanes under defined conditions
distance and with the approval of the CA.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 78 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
4.4. Methodology and data (only for a full RIA)
4.4.1. Applied methodology
The methodology applied to this RIA is the multi-criteria analysis (MCA), which allows comparing all
options by scoring them against a set of criteria.
The MCA covers a wide range of techniques that aim at combining a variety of positive and negative
impacts into a single framework to allow an easier comparison of scenarios. Essentially, it applies cost-
benefit thinking to cases where there is a need to present impacts that are a mixture of qualitative,
quantitative, and monetary data, and where there are varying degrees of certainty. The MCA key steps
generally include:
— establishing the criteria to be used for comparing the options (these criteria must be
measurable, at least in qualitative terms);
— scoring how well each option meets the criteria; the scoring needs to be relative to the baseline
scenario;
— ranking the options by combining their respective weights and scores; and
— performing a sensitivity analysis of the scoring to test the robustness of the ranking.
The criteria used to compare the options were derived from the Basic Regulation, and the guidelines
for the RIA were developed by the European Commission. The principal objective of EASA is to
‘establish and maintain a high uniform level of safety’ in accordance with Article 2(1) of the Basic
Regulation. As additional objectives, the Basic Regulation identifies environmental, economic,
proportionality, and harmonisation aspects, which are reflected below.
For the scoring of the impacts, a scale of –5 to +5 is used to indicate the negative and positive impacts
of each option (i.e. from ‘very high’ to ‘very low’ negative/positive impacts). The intermediate levels of
benefits are termed ‘high’, ‘medium’ and ‘low’, providing a total of 5 levels in each direction (5 in the
positive and 5 in the negative one), with a ‘no impact’ score also being possible.
4.4.2. Data collection
In order to estimate the impact of the selected policy options for each issue considered in the RIA, the
following data are needed:
— fleet information;
— information on stakeholders’ awareness of the ICAO amendments and their voluntary alignment
therewith when manufacturers’ data is available; and
— aerodrome information in relation to the use of increased landing factors.
Fleet information is based on current fleet figures from the Ascend Flightglobal Consultancy. The data set
includes most turbine-powered aircraft except a few piston-to-turbine conversions and kit-built aircraft6.
6
Cessna 206 Soloy, Cessna 207 Soloy, Cessna 210 Centurion, Cessna 421 Turbo Conversion, Comp Air Aviation 10, Comp Air Aviation
12, Comp Air Aviation 9, Epic Aircraft LT/Dynasty, Gulfstream Aerospace Goose, Gulfstream Aerospace S-2T Turbo Tracker, Hawker
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 79 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
The following fleet figures were extracted on 1 February 2016. They include all aircraft in service or
temporarily stored in the fleet of EASA Member State (MS) operators used generally in CAT, or in
business/corporate/executive aviation.
Table 3 — MTOW and seat capacity of the CAT fleet of European operators
Categories ≤ 5 700 kg 5 700–45 360 kg > 45 360 kg Total
19 or less 1 326 1 853 26 3 205
More than 19 11 1 031 3 657 4 699
Freight / Cargo 15 203 233 451
Total 1 352 3 087 3 916 8 355
Table 4 — MTOW and seat capacity of the business aviation fleet of European operators
Seats ≤ 5 700 kg 5 700–45 360 kg > 45 360 kg Total
19 or less 1 167 1 683 25 2 875
More than 19 16 47 63
Total 1 167 1 699 72 2 938
A survey on the awareness and voluntary implementation of the ICAO amendments was conducted by
EASA among stakeholders between mid-December 2015 and mid-February 2016. 73 stakeholders from
22 countries responded, amongst which: national aviation authorities (NAAs), air navigation service
(ANS) providers, aerodrome operators, business aviation aircraft operators, General Aviation
Manufacturers Association (GAMA) manufacturers and European Cockpit Association (ECA) pilots. The
survey is provided as an Appendix to this NPA (see Chapter 6 below).
Aerodrome information has been derived from Report No NLR-CR-2014-206 — Safety Assessment Of
Landing Performance Factors Of Business Type Of Aircraft. The study is provided as an Appendix to this
NPA (see Chapter 6 below).
Traffic data for business aviation has been derived from Eurocontrol’s ‘Briefing: Business Aviation in
Europe in 2012’, STATFOR Briefing 167.
Furthermore, EASA conducted a safety analysis over a period of 5 years (2011–2015) to review the
accidents and serious incidents in which at least one of the following conditions was fulfilled:
— aeroplane performance calculation was inadequate to the reported runway condition;
— measurement and/or reporting of the runway condition was inaccurate; and
— runway condition was a causal factor in an occurrence.
The analysis is provided as an Appendix to this NPA (see Chapter 6 below).
Beechcraft 18, Hawker Beechcraft Bonanza (turbine), Lancair Evolution, Lancair Propjet, Maule Aircraft 7, Pacific Aerospace Cresco,
Pacific Aerospace FU-24, and Partenavia P68.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 80 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
Other specific data, as necessary for the purposes of this NPA, were provided to the RG by Airbus,
Embraer and IATA. Where necessary, the use of such data and their source are detailed in the
following Sections.
4.5. Analysis of impacts
4.5.1. Safety impact
Implementation of ICAO amendments
The safety issues identified in relation to:
— runway surface conditions assessment and reporting;
— manufacturers’ performance data not addressing adequately take-off and landing performance
on contaminated runways; and
— the need to reassess landing performance at the time of arrival when the conditions considered
at dispatch have changed,
may be addressed effectively only in combination.
In fact, a pilot report of braking action is effective only if based on a global and consistent methodology
for assessing and reporting runway surface conditions. Such information may be then used to reassess
the landing performance calculation at the time of arrival when the actual conditions at the time of
arrival differ from those at dispatch. However, the in-flight assessment has to be based on
performance data consistent with the information on the runway surface condition.
For this reason, the ICAO amendments imply the introduction of the following changes:
— a requirement for pilot reports on the runway braking action;
— a requirement for an in-flight check of landing performance at the time of arrival; and
— airworthiness standards for the production of landing performance data at the time of arrival.
The FAA, ICAO and the EAPPRE have concurred on the validity of these changes.
In addition to the occurrences and the consequent SRs already considered in this NPA, the safety
analysis conducted by EASA over the last 5 years identified the following events, where one or more of
the above issues was a causal or contributing factor:
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 81 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
In the period 2011–2015, there were 29.9 million flights in Europe, which gives the following rates:
— 1 accident per 10 million flights; and
— 2.3 serious incidents per 10 million flights.
In the base scenario of EUROCONTROL’s latest 7-year forecast (updated in February 2016), an average
traffic growth of 2.2 % per annum is predicted for Europe between 2015 and 2022. However, it should
be noted that this forecast is conservative, and that in the long term, the traffic growth is expected to
be higher.
The numbers of flights as well as the rates of accidents and serious incidents that may be expected if
no regulatory changes are introduced are the following:
The proposed changes are expected to prevent or mitigate the consequences of these potential
accidents or serious incidents.
Impact Rationale
The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore, no impact is
Option 0 0
expected through this Option.
This Option is expected to prevent or mitigate the consequences of the
Option 1 4 potential accidents or serious incidents indicated in the table above.
The safety impact is, therefore, considered high positive.
Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes
The driver for the proposed changes in the use of a reduced required landing distance for performance
class A and B aeroplanes under given conditions is flexibility and proportionality of the rules.
In order to avoid that a safety risk is introduced, appropriate mitigating measures are necessary to
attain a level of safety equivalent to that originally attained through CAT.POL.A.230 and
CAT.POL.A.330.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 82 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
Performance class A aeroplanes
Under FAR.135 and 91K, the use of a landing factor of 80 % is allowed under certain conditions. Such
factor in turn permits to reduce the required landing distance and to operate either on shorter
runways or with higher payloads. Operators using this higher landing factor must meet certain
requirements as per FAA 14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 135.4, including a two-pilot crew,
specific additional flight crew experience, crew pairing requirements, the use of a destination airport
analysis program (DAAP), and the prior approval of the CA.
EU rules require either a factor of 60 % for turbojets or of 70 % for turboprops.
In order to consider the use of an 80 % factor, a quantitative safety assessment is necessary.
Such assessment was made in the study contained in Report No NLR-CR-2014-206 — Safety
Assessment Of Landing Performance Factors Of Business Type Of Aircraft, which was conducted by the
National Aerospace Laboratory Air Transport Safety Institute (NLR-ATSI).
The level of safety in this context is defined as the probability of a landing overrun and it is calculated
by means of an engineering model based on a Montecarlo simulation, which considers aircraft
characteristics, landing performance data and operational factors (floating, crew reaction times,
threshold speed deviations, headwind/tailwind, runway surface condition, aircraft mass).
The safety assessment is conducted for performance class A business-operated aircraft with a
maximum take-off mass (MTOM) of 45 000 kg and a maximum seating capability of 19 passengers,
reflecting the largest business aircraft currently operated and grouped in 4 categories:
— 13–19-passenger jet aircraft;
— 9–12-passenger jet aircraft;
— 6–8-passenger jet aircraft; and
— 14-passenger turboprop aircraft.
For each group, an existing aircraft model was selected.
The model showed that until the threshold of the 80 % factor, mitigating measures allow achieving an
equivalent level of safety. Above that threshold, mitigating measures are not effective any longer.
The following mitigating measures were identified:
— avoidance of unstable approaches;
— avoidance of long landings (floating);
— use of reverse thrust or propeller reverse on each landing (if installed);
— no landings on a runway that is forecasted to be contaminated;
— no landings on a runway where tailwind is forecasted; and
— no MEL dispatch allowed with inoperative systems having an effect on landing performance.
The RG, based on these results, discussed extensively the issue and first limited the applicability of
these operations to CAT operations where:
— the aircraft has an MCTOM of 45 360 kg and an MOPSC of 19, and
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 83 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
— a prior approval is granted by the CA.
Then the conditions for obtaining the approval were defined by means of a risk assessment based on 4
main criteria related to:
— operational conditions:
special approach procedures, low-visibility operations or other operations requiring prior
approval by the CA are prohibited in order to avoid the cumulation of different risks;
— flight crew:
the crew is composed of two pilots having recency in those operations;
requirements for qualification, training, checking and monitoring of the flight crew are in
place; and
the commander has the final authority to decide whether or not such operations shall be
conducted:
— aerodrome:
an ALAP is established to ensure that no tailwind, runway contamination conditions or
other adverse weather conditions exist at the destination; and
a check of landing performance against wet runway landing criteria is made when the
runway is wet; and
— aircraft:
all equipment affecting landing performance is operative.
Alternatively the operator may conduct a risk assessment covering all aspects identified by the 4
criteria above.
Finally, the CA may impose additional conditions if specific concerns exist.
Overall, the RG considered that through the proposed conditions, the mitigating measures identified
by the study are implemented, and further safety barriers are created that permit to achieve a level of
safety equivalent to that originally intended by CAT.POL.A.230.
Performance class B aeroplanes
The proposal for performance class B aeroplanes requires an assessment similar to that of
performance class A aeroplanes; however, the following additional element was also considered:
— the applicability of the proposed change is strongly limited by the fact that the required approval
is for specific runways of specific aerodromes and is possible only in those aerodromes where a
public interest has been declared,
which significantly reduces the exposure of these operations to safety risks.
Subsequently, a risk assessment was conducted to identify the appropriate mitigating measures for
performance class B aeroplanes (see the following figure):
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 84 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
Threats Aircraft Accurate flare Prevention controls Top Escalation Consequences
maintained within and event factor
stable approach touchdown: Go around
criteria (SOPs): specific /balked
propeller control monitoring of landing
of the final the touchdown instructions VMC
Flight crew land approach speed area
significantly
outside the
touchdown
criteria (zone or
speed) No operations
No
tailwind
on
contaminated
! 10%
Flight crew land
within the forecasted runway Training
touchdown Crew
and
criteria but LDR qualifications:
checking:
calculations are Experience Runway Landing
Initial
incorrect or no Recency excursion: factor
Recurrent
longer valid Enhanced No MEL items inability to Runway
maintenance affecting Operational make a stop overrun:
programme for landing checks of within the injuries/
aircraft’s performance braking expected fatalities
Unanticipated stopping devices devices landing
technical failure distance
of the aircraft’s requirement
stopping devices
on landing
Operational
procedures
mandating Propeller
immediate and reverse
Incorrect or no maximal use of highly
deployment of braking devices effective
the aircraft’s
stopping devices
by the flight crew
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 85 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
which is summarised as follows:
Threat Preventive measures Risk
Flight crew A specific monitoring of the touchdown area aims to improve Runway
land the accuracy of the flare and touchdown performed by the excursion:
significantly flight crew. inability to make
outside the a stop within the
This monitoring may be based on the use of external
touchdown expected landing
references that already exist (e.g. taxiway) or that must be
criteria (zone distance
created (e.g. specific painting on the runway), beyond which a
or speed). requirement.
go-around is mandatory. If an efficient control of the
touchdown area is implemented, it may be considered that
there is no more inaccuracy in the air distance, and the safety
margin of 30 % may only be applied to the ground roll part.
Adequate go-around or balked landing instructions should be
established in the OM.
Benefits of performance class B aeroplanes: at the lowest flight
idle, propellers generate a significant drag that allows a better
control of the final approach speed than turbofans on jet
aircraft.
Visual meteorological conditions that help perform a
touchdown within the designated area.
Crew qualifications, specific training and checking as well as
aerodrome recency enhance the flight crew proficiency in
performing an accurate landing in compliance with the specific
operational procedures implemented by the operator.
The initial and recurrent training shall include flight training.
The specific aerodrome training and recency conditions help
the flight crew to familiarise themselves with the airfield and
acquire the necessary visual references to control the
touchdown area.
Flight crew No tailwind is forecasted around the estimated time of arrival.
land within This constraint reduces the severity of the consequences that
the may be induced by the variations between the forecasted and
touchdown the actual wind.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 86 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
criteria but
Landing on contaminated runway is prohibited.
LDR
calculations
are incorrect
or no longer
valid.
Unanticipated Additional maintenance instructions, such as more frequent
technical checks of the aircraft’s deceleration devices, especially of the
failure of the reverse system, should be established by the operator, in
aircraft’s liaison with the manufacturer, in order to enhance the
deceleration reliability of these systems.
devices on
landing
The operator shall establish operational procedures to ensure
that all equipment affecting landing performance is operative
before commencing the flight.
Incorrect or The operator shall establish operational procedures to ensure
no the immediate and maximal use of deceleration devices by the
deployment flight crew.
of the
aircraft’s
Benefits of class B performance aircraft: propeller reverse is
deceleration
highly effective and can be used at much lower speeds than
devices by
reverse thrust on jet aircraft.
the flight
crew
Crew qualifications, specific training and checking as well as
aerodrome recency ensure appropriate use of deceleration
devices by the flight crew in accordance with the operational
procedures established by the operator.
The initial and recurrent training shall include flight training.
Based on the above assessment, the RG recognised that most of the risks are adequately addressed
by the conditions defined for performance class A aeroplanes and, in addition to those, decided to
introduce requirements for:
— the control of the touchdown area; and
— operations in VMC only.
Overall, the RG considered that through the proposed conditions, the mitigating measures identified
for performance class B aeroplanes are implemented in order to achieve a level of safety equivalent
to that originally intended by CAT.POL.A.330.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 87 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
Summary
Impact Rationale
The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore; no impact
Option 0 0
is expected through this option.
Due to the limitations on the applicability of the changes proposed
by this Option in combination with the mitigating measures required
Option 1 0
for performance class A and B aeroplanes, respectively, no impact on
safety is expected through this Option.
4.5.2. Environmental impact
Implementation of ICAO amendments
Impact Rationale
The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore; no impact
Option 0 0
is expected through this Option.
This Option may have an environmental impact due to increased fuel
consumption and CO2 emissions in those cases where the in-flight
landing distance check gives a landing distance longer than that
calculated at dispatch and does not allow a landing. In such cases, in
fact, a diversion would be necessary.
Airbus, having already voluntarily implemented the TALPA ARC
recommendations, has conducted a large-scale check representative
of 8 aircraft types on 8 000 runways.
It was found that for wet runways, only 8 runways would be so
limited to have operational consequences. In no cases, all runways of
the same aerodrome were limited.
Option 1 –1
A more limited study on contaminated runways (namely on one
aircraft type and on runways contaminated with compacted snow
and standing water) has identified that 15 aerodromes were limited.
On average, the landing distances calculated in-flight were
systematically longer than the one at dispatch only on contaminated
runways.
Another survey conducted by Embraer among its operators found
that a limited number of diversions occur when TALPA ARC
recommendations are applied.
Overall, this Option is expected to have a very low negative
environmental impact.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 88 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes
Impact Rationale
The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore, no impact
Option 0 0
is expected through this Option.
The study contained in Report No NLR-CR-2014-206 indicates that
the adoption of the changes proposed by this Option would lead to
an increase of 15 % of the usable runways.
Data form Eurocontrol (‘Briefing: Business Aviation in Europe in
Option 1 –1 2012’) indicates a yearly traffic growth forecast between 3 % and 4 %
until 2018. However, business aviation contributes only by 1.1 % to
CO2 emission in aviation.
On this basis, this Option is expected to have a very low negative
environmental impact.
4.5.3. Social impact
Implementation of ICAO amendments
Impact Rationale
The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore, no impact
Option 0 0
is expected through this Option.
Option 1 0 No social impact is expected through this Option.
Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes
Impact Rationale
The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore, no impact
Option 0 0
is expected through this Option.
This Option will lead to an increase of traffic in regional aerodromes
Option 1 3 and will facilitate access to locations where a public interest exists.
The social impact is expected to be medium positive.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 89 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
4.5.4. Economic impact
Implementation of ICAO amendments
Impact Rationale
The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore, no impact
Option 0 0
is expected through this Option.
A cost is expected for aircraft manufacturers for the production of
performance data required by this Option.
Several large aeroplane manufacturers, among which Airbus, Boeing
and Embraer, have already produced performance data in
accordance with the TALPA ARC recommendations. Such data is
provided to operators either as a standard or as an option.
For the manufacturers of smaller aeroplanes, a cost is also expected;
however, for all performance class B and C aeroplanes, the changes
proposed by this Option do not mandate the use of dedicated
manufacturer data for the in-flight assessment of the landing
distance at the time of arrival when such data is not available.
A cost for operators for the implementation of this Option is also
expected. Data provided to the RG by Airbus, IATA and Embraer
shows, respectively, that:
— 97 % of Airbus European operators have implemented the
TALPA ARC methodology for the in-flight assessment of the
Option 1 –1 landing distance at the time of arrival;
— 11 Embraer operators out of 74 surveyed perform in-flight
assessment of the landing distance at the time of arrival based
on the TALPA ARC methodology; and
— out of 80 IATA operators contacted, 17 provided a reply, 14 of
which European; overall, 16 perform in-flight assessment of
the landing distance at the time of arrival.
Therefore, considering that voluntary implementation of the changes
proposed by this Option has started, the cost for operators is
considered small.
As regards the cost for aerodromes becoming unusable due to the
increased landing distance calculated at the time of arrival, which
may lead to a diversion, the analysis done for the environmental
impact shows that a very low economic impact is also expected.
Overall, this option is expected to have a very low negative economic
impact.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 90 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes
Impact Rationale
The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore, no impact
Option 0 0
is expected through this Option.
The study contained in Report No NLR-CR-2014-206 indicates that
the adoption of the changes proposed by this Option for
performance class A aeroplanes would lead to an increase of 15 % of
the usable runways.
Data from Eurocontrol (‘Briefing: Business Aviation in Europe in
2012’) indicates for business aviation a yearly traffic growth forecast
between 3 % and 4 % until 2018.
An economic benefit due to the increase of traffic is expected both
for operators and aerodromes.
Option 1 3 Conversely, some costs have been identified for operators, mainly for
the qualification and training of the flight crew. However, this
regulatory proposal offers the flexibility to conduct the training
either in an FSTD or in-flight during normal operations. Overall, such
costs are assumed to be largely outweighed by the enhanced
operational flexibility and the increase of traffic.
A small positive economic impact is expected also for performance
class B aeroplane operations.
On this basis, this option is expected to have a medium positive
economic impact.
4.5.5. General aviation and proportionality issues
Implementation of ICAO amendments
Impact Rationale
No impact on general aviation and proportionality is expected
Option 0 0 through this Option as the current situation would remain
unchanged.
The criteria for the in-flight assessment of the landing distance at the
time of arrival have been tailored to the different categories of
aeroplanes. In most cases, the assessment is reduced to confirming
Option 1 0
the criteria used at dispatch and, therefore, the implementation
effort will be limited. The negative impact of this Option is therefore
considered insignificant.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 91 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes
Impact Rationale
No impact on general aviation and proportionality is expected
Option 0 0 through this Option as the current situation would remain
unchanged.
A medium positive impact is expected through this Option as it would
Option 1 3
introduce more flexibility and proportionality for small operators.
4.5.6. Impact on ‘better regulation’ and harmonisation
Implementation of ICAO amendments
Impact Rationale
This Option will leave the current situation unchanged, thus making
Option 0 –5 EU rules non-aligned with ICAO SARPs once the changes adopted by
ICAO will enter into force. The impact is considered highly negative.
This Option fully aligns EU rules with the described ICAO
amendments and, therefore, is considered to have a very positive
high impact. The harmonisation with the FAA is also achieved on the
Option 1 5
content of the proposed changes; however, regarding the
implementation, the FAA has opted for a voluntary system rather
than mandating the ICAO standards.
Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes
Impact Rationale
The current situation would remain unchanged; therefore, no impact
Option 0 0
is expected through this Option.
This Option introduces into the EU regulatory framework a similar
concept to that of the ‘eligible on-demand operations’ existing in the
US under FAR 135 and 91K although it defines more precise and
Option 1 3
stringent conditions to obtain the approval for such operations. The
impact on harmonisation with the FAA is considered medium
positive.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 92 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
4. RIA
4.6. Comparison and conclusion
4.6.1. Comparison of options
The following table summarises the impacts of the options considered in this NPA.
Reduced required landing distance
Implementation of ICAO amendments operations for performance class A
and B aeroplanes
Option 0 Option 1 Option 0 Option 1
Safety impact 0 4 0 0
Environmental
0 –1 0 –1
impact
Social impact 0 0 0 3
Economic
0 –1 0 3
impact
GA and
proportionality 0 0 0 3
issues
Impact on
‘better
–5 5 0 3
regulation’ and
harmonisation
Total –5 7 0 11
Based on this assessment, it is considered that the following options provide the best global positive
impact:
Implementation of ICAO amendments:
Option 1.
Reduced required landing distance operations for performance class A and B aeroplanes:
Option 1.
4.6.2. Monitoring and ex post evaluation
The need for monitoring and ex post evaluation of the implementation of the new requirements will
be determined based on the results of the NPA public consultation.
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 93 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
5. References
5. References
5.1. Affected regulations
— Commission Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements
and administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC)
No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ L 296, 25.10.2012, p. 1)
5.2. Affected CS, AMC and GM
— Decision No. 2003/2/RM of the Executive Director of the Agency of 17 October 2003 on
certification specifications, including airworthiness codes and acceptable means of compliance,
for large aeroplanes (‘CS-25’)
— Decision N° 2012/015/Directorate R of the Executive Director of the Agency of
24th October 2012 on Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Commission
Regulation (EU) No 965/2012 of 5 October 2012 laying down technical requirements and
administrative procedures related to air operations pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of
the European Parliament and of the Council ‘Guidance Material to Annex I — Definitions’
— Decision 2014/017/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting
Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-ORO of Regulation (EU)
No 965/2012 and repealing Decision 2012/017/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of
24 October 2012 ‘AMC and GM to Part-ORO — Issue 2’
— Decision 2014/015/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of 24 April 2014 adopting
Acceptable Means of Compliance and Guidance Material to Part-CAT of Regulation (EU)
No 965/2012 and repealing Decision 2012/018/R of the Executive Director of the Agency of
24 October 2012 ‘AMC and GM to Part-CAT — Issue 2’
5.3. Reference documents
— JAA NPA-OPS 47 — Aeroplane Performance
— SR UNKG-2008-076 — Aircraft Accident Report 1/2009, Air Accidents Investigation Branch
(AAIB), UK Department for Transport, 9 January 2009
— SR NORW-2011-011 — Report SL 2011/10, Winter Operations, Friction Measurements and
Conditions for Friction Predictions, Vol II — Main Report, Accident Investigation Board Norway
(AIBN), May 2011
— European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Excursions (EAPPRE), Released Edition 1.0,
January 2013
— IATA Safety Report 2014, 51st Edition, April 2015
— Research Project EASA.2011/08 NGW — Near-Ground Wind Gust Detection (Report no. NLR-CR-
2012-143)
— Eurocontrol — ‘Briefing: Business Aviation in Europe in 2012’ — STATFOR Briefing 167
— Research Project EASA.2008/4 — Runway Friction Characteristics Measurement And Aircraft
Braking (RuFAB), final report, March 2010
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 94 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
5. References
— EASA Safety Information Bulletin (SIB) No 2014-20 — Aeroplane Operations in Crosswind
Conditions, 23 June 2014
— Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 121
— Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 135
— FAA AC No. 25-32 — Landing Performance Data for Time of Arrival Landing Performance
Assessments
— FAA AC No. 25-31— Takeoff Performance Data for Operations on Contaminated Runways
— ICAO Annex 6 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Operation of Aircraft,
Part I — International Commercial Air Transport — Aeroplanes, 9th Edition, July 2010
— ICAO Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Airworthiness of
Aircraft, 11th Edition, July 2010.
— ICAO Annex 14 to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Aerodromes, Volume I
— Aerodrome Design and Operations, 6th Edition, July 2013
— ICAO State Letter AN 4/1.1.55-15/30 of 29 May 2015
— ICAO State Letter AN 3/5.10-16/29 of 6 April 2015
— ICAO State Letter AN 11/1.3.29-16/12 of 8 April 2016
— ICAO State Letter AN 4/1.2.26-16/19 of 5 April 2016
— ICAO Doc 9981 — PROCEDURES FOR AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES (PANS) — Aerodromes
— ICAO Doc 4444 — PROCEDURES FOR AIR NAVIGATION SERVICES (PANS) — Air Traffic
Management (ATM)
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 95 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency NPA 2016-11
6. Appendices
6. Appendices
Below documents are available for information only at the following address:
https://www.easa.europa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendment/npa-2016-11
— Report No NLR-CR-2014-206 — Safety Assessment Of Landing Performance Factors Of Business
Type Of Aircraft, conducted by the National Aerospace Laboratory Air Transport Safety Institute
(NLR-ATSI)
— EASA EU Survey on RMT.0296 (February 2016)
— Runway Excursions (RE) analysis 2011–2015 — Annex A: Safety data collection for RMT.0296
‘Review of aeroplane performance requirements for commercial air transport operations’
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO 9001 certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/internet. Page 96 of 96
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency
RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance
requirements for CAT operations
Survey Summary Aeroplane performance
Version 0 - 29 February 2016
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) through the Rulemaking task 0296 “Review of aeroplane
performance requirements for CAT operations” is considering the implementation of the ICAO State Letter
30 proposing amendments to Annex 6 Part 1 and several other annexes. These proposed amendments
introduce new elements for the in-flight assessment of landing distance and for runway surface condition
reporting further to the work done by the Take-off and Landing Performance Assessment (TALPA) Aviation
Rulemaking Committee (ARC) and the ICAO Friction Task Force (FTF).
A stepping stone for the process is to gain an understanding of the current situation, especially in the EASA
Member States. For that reason an EU Survey was developed.
Disclaimer
The number of answers to this survey cannot ensure that the results are representative of the sector. Therefore the
interpretation of the results has to be cautious. The Agency strongly recommends that you contact us
(
[email protected]) for any questions on the usage of the survey.
The following summary of the survey has been done in order to give a short feedback to the respondents for each question
they have answered.
Further analysis are being performed by the Agency to assess how to use it in its rulemaking activities.
Survey map
Audience:
Addressees: RAG/FCL&OPS TAG/ADR TAG/ATM-ANS TAG
and SSCC Members
Survey period: 22 December 2015 to 18 February 2016
Tool: EUSurvey website
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/Internet. Page 1 of 16
An agency o the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency
RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance
requirements for CAT operations
Table of contents
1. Background ................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.
2. General information on the survey ............................................................................. 3
3. Overview of the answers ........................................................................................... 4
3.1. By country ....................................................................................................... 4
3.2. By type of organisation ...................................................................................... 4
4. Are you aware of the changes proposed by TALPA ARC or ICAO State Letter 30? ............. 5
4.2. Organisations other than authorities that are not aware of the proposed changes: .... 6
4.3. Aditional comments ........................................................................................... 6
4.4. Authorities that are aware of the proposed changes were also asked 4 additional
questions: ................................................................................................................. 7
4.5. Do you feel there are inconsistencies or missing elements in the current rules EU
(965/2012 Part-CAT) on the determination of landing performance at dispatch and in-flight?8
4.6. Additional comments ......................................................................................... 8
5. Air navigation service providers and aerodrome operators section .................................. 9
6. Business aviation aircraft operators section ............................................................... 11
7. ECA/pilots section .................................................................................................. 15
8. Appendices ........................................................................................................... 16
8.1. Appendix 2 – Template for survey sent in December 2015 ................................... 16
TE.RPRO.00034-004 © European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Confirm revision status through the EASA intranet/Internet. Page 2 of 16
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency
RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance
requirements for CAT operations
1. General information on the survey
A survey was conducted to assess the scale of the problem from airline operators’ point of view (see
Appendix 2 for survey template). EASA Advisory Bodies have been contacted to fill in or forward a
questionnaire for airline operators between mid-December 2015 and mid-February 2016.
73 stakeholders from 22 countries answered, amongst which: authoties, air navigation service
providers, aerodrome operators, business aviation aircraft operators, GAMA manufacturers and
ECA/pilots.
European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 3 of 16
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency
RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance
requirements for CAT operations
2. Overview of the answers
2.1. By country
73 relevant participating organisations from 22 countries:
Germany 7 11 13
Czech Republic 10
France 7
Sweden 1 3 1
Portugal 1111 Manufacturers
Belgium 11 2
Slovak Republic 3 Air navigation service
Switzerland 111 providers;
United Kingdom 11
Norway 2 Aerodrome operators;
Netherlands 11
Denmark 2 National aviation authorities;
Finland 1
Spain 1
N/A ECA/pilots.
Hong Kong 1
Albanian CAA 1 Business aviation aircraft
Hungary 1 operators;
MONTENEGRO 1
Croatia 1
Italy 1
Iceland 1
Source: EU Survey RMT.0296
2.2. By type of organisation
Number of respondents per organisational type:
Business aviation aircraft operators; 42
ECA/pilots. 13
National aviation authorities; 10
Aerodrome operators; 8
Air navigation service providers; 2
Manufacturers 1
Source: EU Survey RMT.0296
European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 4 of 16
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency
RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance
requirements for CAT operations
3. Are you aware of the changes proposed by TALPA ARC or ICAO State
Letter 30?
Note: this question was asked to all participants in the survey but it was divided in two
sets (1a for authorities and 1b for everyone else). Total number of respondents:74
1a & 1b: Are you aware of the changes proposed by
TALPA ARC or ICAO State Letter 30? 42
40
35
15
30
25
20
15 10 8 26
10 0
1 2
5 3
10
1 5
0 0
1 1
GAMA National aviation Air navigation Aerodrome Business aviation
manufacturers authorities; service operators; aircraft
providers; operators;
Yes No Grand Total
Source: question 1a and 1b
Note: the below graph is a representation of the above one but filtered only for business
aviation aircraft operators and shown by country. Total number of respondents:41
Operators (41): Are you aware of the changes
proposed by TALPA ARC/ICAO State Letter 30?
Germany 6 7
France 3 4
Denmark 2
Belgium 1
1
Czech Republic 1 9
Yes
Switzerland 1
3 No
Slovak Republic
Croatia 1
Portugal 1
Spain 1
Sweden 1
Source: question 1b
European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 5 of 16
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency
RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance
requirements for CAT operations
3.2. Organisations other than authorities that are not aware of the proposed changes:
Germany 7
3
France 3
Denmark 2 Business aviation aircraft
operators;
Aerodrome operators;
Belgium 1
Switzerland 1
Czech Republic 1
Source: question 1b
3.3. Aditional comments
Additional comments on Q1:
request for
regulatory
harmonisation
3%
(blank)
97%
European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 6 of 16
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency
RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance
requirements for CAT operations
3.4. Authorities that are aware of the proposed changes were also asked 4 additional
questions:
Note: Total number of participating in the survey authorities:10
Authorities which marked "Yes" on Q1a:
1.4 Changes to your current practices? 6 3 1
1.3 Are you aware of difficulties in the implementation
6 4 0
of TALPA ARC recommendations?
1.2 Are runway condition reporting and in-flight landing
distance assessment part of the Operations Manual 8 1 1
approval/assessment?
1.1 Do you already consider runway condition reporting
and in-flight landing distance assessment when issuing 7 2 1
AOCs and during the oversight of CAT operators?
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Yes No No answer
Source: question 1.1; 1.2; 1.3; 1.4
European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 7 of 16
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency
RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance
requirements for CAT operations
3.5. Do you feel there are inconsistencies or missing elements in the current rules EU
(965/2012 Part-CAT) on the determination of landing performance at dispatch and
in-flight?
Note: this questions was asked only to authorites. Total number: 10
2. Do you feel there are inconsistencies or missing elements in the
current rules EU (965/2012 Part-CAT) on the determination of
landing performance at dispatch and in-flight?
Yes, 6
No, 2
No answer, 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Source: question 2
3.6. Additional comments
Q2 Additional comments
request for
clarity and
consistency of
performance
requirements
8%
(blank)
92%
European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 8 of 16
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency
RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance
requirements for CAT operations
4. Air navigation service providers and aerodrome operators section
Note: the below graph represents answers from both stakeholder types
3. What is your estimated number of Pilot Reports on
braking action after 2011 as compared to before 2011?
Aerodrome operators; More;, 2 Equal;, 5 No asnwer, 1
Air navigation service
Equal;, 2
providers;
Source: question 3
Note: the below graph represents answers from a question asked only to aerodrome operators
Aerodromes (8): 4. Do you use Pilot Reports to manage airport
operations in adverse weather conditions? correlated with Q3
(Estimated number on braking actions after 2011 compared to
2011)
Yes More;, 2 Equal;, 3 No asnwer, 1
No Equal;, 2
Source: question 4
European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 9 of 16
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency
RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance
requirements for CAT operations
Note: the below graph represents answers from a questiona asked only to aerodrome operators
Aerodromes (8): 4.a. How do you use Pilot Reports to
manage airport operations in adverse weather
conditions?
Decision-making
tool, 2
Aditional
info, 4
European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 10 of 16
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency
RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance
requirements for CAT operations
5. Business aviation aircraft operators section
Operators(41): 5. Do you have a SMS that addresses
take-off and landing performance?
No, 7
Yes, 35
Source: question 5
Operators (41): 6. Do you have a FDM programme
related to approach?
No asnwer, 3
No, 17
Yes, 22
Source: question 6
Operators(41): Do you have SMS that addresses
take-off and landing correlated with FDM related to
approach?
No asnwer, 3
Yes, 20
Yes, 2 No, 12
No, 5
No Yes
Source: question 5 and 6
European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 11 of 16
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency
RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance
requirements for CAT operations
Operators (41):7. Do you have a FDM
programme related to landing performance?
No, 19
Yes, 23
Source: question 7
Operators (41): 8. To which extent are in-flight
landing distance assessments performed before
landing?
Always; 25
Only when needed; 10
Seldom. 5
No asnwer 1
Often; 1
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Source: question 8
Operators(41):9. If in-flight landing distance
assessments are performed before landing,
which criteria do you use?
Mixed criteria 9
Runway state 8
Pre-defined tables 8
Other (braking action/no… 6
Weather 4
FMS 3
No criteria 2
EFB 1
Source: question 9
European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 12 of 16
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency
RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance
requirements for CAT operations
Operators(41):10. Do your crews submit PIREPS
on contaminated or slippery runways?
No, 10
Yes, 32
Source: question 10
Operators(41):11. Is training provided to
establish what a slippery runway is?
No, 5 No asnwer, 2
Yes, 35
Source: question 11
European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 13 of 16
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency
RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance
requirements for CAT operations
Source: question 10 and 11
Operators (41):12. Do you operate in airports with
special landing or approach procedures or other
restrictions in your network?
Less than 25%; 33
None; 3
No asnwer 3
More than 50% 2
25%-50%; 1
Source: question 12
Operators (41):13. What is the estimated percentage of
aerodromes in your network which are performance limited
in take-off or landing by the available runway length?
Less than 25%; 29
25%-50%; 8
None; 5
Source: question 13
European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 14 of 16
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency
RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance
requirements for CAT operations
6. ECA/pilots section
ECA/pilots (13): 16. To which extent do you perform in-flight
landing distance assessments before landing?
United Kingdom 1
Finland 1
Switzerland 1
Hong Kong 1
Germany 1 Always;
Italy 1 Only when needed;
Portugal 1 Seldom.
Iceland 1
Netherlands 1
Sweden 3
Belgium 1
Source: question 16
Source: question 17 and 18
European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 15 of 16
An agency of the European Union
European Aviation Safety Agency
RMT.0296 Review of aeroplane performance
requirements for CAT operations
7. Appendices
7.1. Appendix 2 – Template for survey sent in December 2015
RMT0296AicraftPerf
ormance2016_21_12_2015_EN.pdf
European Aviation Safety Agency. All rights reserved. ISO9001 Certified.
Proprietary document. Copies are not controlled. Page 16 of 16
An agency of the European Union
NLR-CR-2014-030
Safety assessment of landing
performance factors of business type
of aircraft
G.W.H. van Es
J.N.M. van Eekeren
Anthony Fokkerweg 2, 1059 CM Amsterdam, P.O. Box 90502,1006 BM Amsterdam, The Netherlands
T: +31 88 511 35 00, F: +31 88 511 32 10, E:
[email protected], I: www.nlr-atsi.nl
NLR-CR-2014-030
Executive summary
SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF LANDING PERFORMANCE
FACTORS OF BUSINESS TYPE OF AIRCRAFT
Problem area safety assessment that Report no.
EASA Landing distance investigates what risk reducing NLR-CR-2014-030
limitations oblige operators to measures would be required to
calculate the landing mass at the achieve an equivalent level of Author(s)
destination airport in such a way safety with landing factors G.W.H. van Es
J.N.M. van Eekeren
a full stop is achieved at 60% of higher than those stated by
the Landing Distance Available EASA.
Report classification
for a turbo-jet aircraft and 70% UNCLASSIFIED
of the Landing Distance Results and conclusions
Available for a turbo-propeller A safety assessment is done for Date
aircraft. This regulation four different business aircraft May 2014
originally applied to commercial types that are representative to
air carriers only. However, it can the aircraft used by European Knowledge area(s)
now also apply to business business aircraft operators. Vliegveiligheid (safety &
security)
aircraft operators. This limits the Different mitigating measures
Vliegoperaties
destinations that can be selected are identified and their impact
during dispatch. on the landing performance is Descriptor(s)
determined. The impact of the Overrun safety
Description of work identified mitigating measures is Business aircraft
EBAA, in co-operation with quantified using a landing Landing performance
GAMA and ERAC, intends to distance simulation model. This Landing factors
present a Safety Case that shows that an equivalent level of
analysis the possibility of higher safety with landing dispatch
runway landing factors similar to factors higher than those stated
the US. As a key input to this by EASA is achievable.
safety case the EBAA requires a
UNCLASSIFIED
NLR-CR-2014-030
NLR Air Transport Safety Institute
Anthony Fokkerweg 2, 1059 CM Amsterdam,
UNCLASSIFIED
P.O. Box 90502, 1006 BM Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Telephone +31 88 511 35 00, Fax +31 88 511 32 10, Web site: http://www.nlr-atsi.nl
NLR-CR-2014-030
SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF LANDING
PERFORMANCE FACTORS OF BUSINESS TYPE
OF AIRCRAFT
G.W.H. van Es
1
J.N.M. van Eekeren
1
SAFE-RUNWAY GmbH
No part of this report may be reproduced and/or disclosed, in any form or by any means
without the prior written permission of the owner.
Customer EBAA - European Business Aviation Association
Contract number -----
Owner EBAA - European Business Aviation Association
Division Air Transport
Distribution Limited
Classification of title Unclassified
May 2014
Approved by:
Author Reviewer Managing department
G.W.H. van Es H. Post A. Rutten
Date: Date: Date:
SUMMARY
EASA Landing distance limitations as prescribed by CAT.POL.A.230 Landing —
dry runways – of Annex IV [Part-CAT] of the Cover Regulation on Air operations
[Reg. (EC) 965/2012] oblige operators to calculate the landing mass at the
destination airport in such a way a full stop is achieved at 60% of the Landing
Distance Available for a turbo-jet aircraft and 70% of the Landing Distance
Available for a turbo-propeller aircraft. This regulation originally applied to
commercial air carriers only. However, it can now also apply to business aircraft
operators. This limits the destinations that can be selected during dispatch.
In the US, the FAA approved a change of the landing factor form 60% into 80% for
business operators under certain conditions. Contrary to the FAA the EASA
regulations do not (yet) provide a possibility for a relaxation of the landing
factor. Since present EASA regulations are the most limiting, the EBAA claims that
a situation “fair market distortion and unfair competition” occurs to business
aircraft operators. Therefore EBAA, in co-operation with GAMA and ERAC, intends
to present a Safety Case that analysis the possibility of higher runway landing
factors similar to the US. As a key input to this safety case the EBAA requires a
safety assessment that investigates what risk reducing measures would be
required to achieve an equivalent level of safety with landing factors higher than
those stated in EASA CAT.POL.A.230. The present report presents the results of
this safety assessment. The assessment is done for four different business
aircraft types that are representative to the aircraft used by European business
aircraft operators. Different mitigating measures are identified and their impact
on the landing performance is determined. The impact of the identified
mitigating measures is quantified using a landing distance simulation model.
This shows that an equivalent level of safety with landing dispatch factors higher
than those stated in EASA CAT.POL.A.230 is achievable. The actual increase of
the landing dispatch factors varies between the different aircraft types analysed.
NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014 v
CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Background 1
1.2 Project objectives and scope 2
2 PROJECT APPROACH AND PROPOSED METHODOLOGY 4
2.1 Overall safety assessment approach 4
2.1.1 Landing overrun probability model 4
2.1.2 Application of the landing overrun model 7
2.1.3 Landing distance model 10
2.1.4 Important assumptions in landing distance simulations 13
3 RESULTS 16
3.1.1 Identification of mitigating measures 16
3.1.2 Background on mitigating measures 16
3.1.3 Implementation of the mitigating measures 18
3.1.4 Impact of mitigating measures on landing overrun probability 22
3.2 Impact of landing factor on runways/airports in Europe 26
4 CONCLUSIONS 28
5 REFERENCES 29
APPENDIX A EXAMPLES LANDING PERFORMANCE MODEL VERIFICATION 30
vi NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
Commercial air carriers cannot take off for a destination airport unless the
Airplane Flight Manual indicates that the jet aircraft is capable of a full stop
landing at that airport within 60% of the effective length of the runway. The
original 60% rule reflects the inability to accurately predict aircraft landing
performance for aircraft that existed during the 1940s and provided a safety
margin against landing overruns. During this period, performance variations
existed among aircraft of the same model produced by the same manufacturer,
and these differences were often significant. Also the ability to accurately
forecast weather conditions at the planned airport destination was not available.
Although the typical problems of the 1940s that justified the use of the 60% rule
were resolved in the years after, the rule is still in use today. This is mainly
because the certified landing distances do not always represent the landing
performance that can be achieved during day-to-day operations. The dispatch
factor now accounts for the deviate from the conditions during certification flight
test (e.g. longer flares, longer transition times from touchdown to braking, lower
deceleration values, and higher approach speeds). The landing dispatch factor
itself was never formally changed despite many changes in operations and
certification of commercial aircraft. Also other improvements like better weather
forecasts, better pilot training, and improvements in aircraft systems like brakes,
and anti-skid systems have also not been considered. Today the landing dispatch
factor developed in the 1940s is still applied for jet aircraft operations (for turbo
propeller aircraft a factor of 70% is used).
In 2000, the Fractional Ownership Aviation Rulemaking Committee proposed to
the US Federal Aviation Authorities FAA that for certain business jet operations
the 60% rule should be changed into 85%. The FAA finally agreed with a change
of the landing factor into 80% however only under certain conditions. Operators
using this higher landing factor must meet certain requirements identified in FAA
14 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 135.4 including two-pilot crew and
specific additional flight crew experience and crew pairing requirements. Also
the operator must have a Destination Airport Analysis Program (DAAP) to keep an
acceptable level of safety for landing. The landing factor of 80% was to the
knowledge of the present authors not determined by a formal quantitative safety
assessment.
NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014 1
EASA has also regulations on landing factors that an operator needs to apply
during dispatch which are similar to the FAA regulations. EASA Landing distance
limitations as prescribed by CAT.POL.A.230 Landing — dry runways – of Annex IV
[Part-CAT] of the Cover Regulation on Air operations [Reg. (EC) 965/2012] oblige
operators to calculate the landing mass at the destination airport in such a way a
full stop is achieved at 60% of the Landing Distance Available for a turbo-jet
aircraft and 70% of the Landing Distance Available for a turbo-propeller aircraft.
Contrary to the FAA the EASA regulations do not (yet) provide a possibility for a
relaxation of the landing factor. Since present EASA regulations are the most
limiting, the EBAA claims that a situation “fair market distortion and unfair
competition” occurs to business aircraft operators. Therefore EBAA, in co-
operation with GAMA and ERAC, intends to present a Safety Case that analysis
the possibility of higher runway landing factors similar to the US. This is done in
advance of the proposed rulemaking tasks RMT.0296 (OPS.008 a) & RMT.0297
(OPS.008 b) producing Opinion and Decision for Aeroplane CAT performance
taking into account the European Action Plan for Prevention of Runway Excursion
[EAPRE, (2013)]. As a key input to this safety case the EBAA requires a safety
assessment that investigates what risk reducing measures would be required to
achieve an equivalent level of safety with landing factors higher than those stated
in CAT.POL.A.230. The present report presents this safety assessment.
1.2 PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE
The objectives of the presented study are to:
• To determine if a level of safety equivalent to that implied by the runway
factors in CAT.POL.A.230 can be achieved using higher runway factors
and additional risk reducing measures;
• To conduct sensitivity tests to investigate how robust the conclusions of
the risk assessment are and to determine what range of runway factors
could be considered acceptably safe;
• To provide documented evidence that can support the arguments to be
developed within the EBAA Safety Case;
• To determine, for certain types of business aircraft, how many
runways/airports in Europe such a change in allowed landing distance
would correspond to.
2 NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014
The safety assessment is conducted for performance class A, business operated
aircraft with a takeoff mass of no more than 45,000 kg and a maximum seat
capability of 19 seats or less (reflecting the largest business aircraft currently
operated). Under EASA regulations performance Class A aircraft include multi-
engine turboprop aircraft with more than 9 seats or a maximum takeoff mass
exceeding 5700 kilograms, and all multi-engine turbojet powered aircraft.
NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014 3
2 PROJECT APPROACH AND PROPOSED
METHODOLOGY
The proposed methodology for the safety assessment of runway landing factors
of business type aircraft is discussed in this section.
2.1 OVERALL SAFETY ASSESSMENT APPROACH
The main objectives of the present study is to determine if a level of safety
equivalent to that implied by the runway factors in CAT.POL.A.230 can be
achieved using higher runway factors and additional risk reducing measures. In
aviation, the level of safety is often defined in terms of the probability of an
aircraft accident or incident occurring. In some cases the term risk is also used
which refers to the combination of probability of an occurrence and the
associated consequences. In this last case an equivalent level of safety can be
achieved by reducing the probability of an occurrence and/or by reducing the
consequences of the occurrence. In the present study the safety level is defined
as the probability of a landing overrun. The consequences of a landing overrun
are mainly influenced by the surface on which the aircraft runs on after leaving
the runway and/or obstacles surrounding the runway end. The landing factors
will primarily influence the landing overrun probability. In the present
assessment consequences of landing overruns are therefore not taken into
account.
The selected approach here is to calculate the landing overrun probability for a
given runway length, landing factor and aircraft type under a wide variety of
operational conditions (e.g. runway conditions, tailwind, etc.). The reference case
which determines the level of safety to be achieved is defined here as the landing
overrun probability with a 60% landing factor. Overrun probabilities for higher
landing factors are then determined and compared to the reference case.
Mitigating measures that could reduce the landing overrun probability are
defined and the impact on the landing overrun probability is quantified.
2.1.1 LANDING OVERRUN PROBABILITY MODEL
In order to determine the safety level associated with a certain value of the
landing dispatch factor, the landing overrun probability should be quantified.
4 NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014
Landings overruns are normally always caused by a combination of different
factors. Typical important causal factors are: excess speed, long landings, late
application of brakes, slippery runways, and strong tailwind [Van Es (2013), Van
Es (2010)]. These types of causal factors have a direct influence on the landing
stopping performance. Basically the energy during landing is too high (e.g. due
to an unstable approach or tailwind) and/or the energy not reduced quickly
enough during the landing resulting in an inability to stop the aircraft on the
runway (e.g. due to slippery runways, late application of stopping devices etc.).
There are several ways to quantify the landing overrun probability. First of all
statistical data on landing overruns obtained from worldwide or European
operations could be used. This approach can give a good indication of the
average probability. However a major drawback is that it is difficult to accurately
account for airport and aircraft specific factors like runway length and landing
performance characteristics with this pure statistical approach. Furthermore
there are several interdependencies between factors that can’t be easily
quantified using statistical data only. In normal landing operations there is
always randomness in the value of parameters such as pilot reaction times,
speed deviations, aircraft weight variations etc. These factors play an important
role that is difficult to assess using only statistical data. Therefore an alternative
approach using simulations to quantify the landing overrun probabilities is used
for the present study. NLR-ATSI has developed engineering aircraft performance
models according to industry standards which accurately describe the landing
performance of an aircraft. The landing performance models account for
variations in environmental factors such as wind and runway contamination.
Other factors like runway slope are also taken into account by the model. A
schematic overview of the landing distance model is shown in Figure 1. The
landing distance is calculated in distinct segments comprised of the air distance,
the transition distance and the braking distance.
A number of factors in landing performance are not constant and can vary. To
analyse the effects of these random and varying factors, a simulations are
conducted using the Monte Carlo method. This allows simulating millions of
landings under a wide variation of conditions in a reasonable amount of time 1.
For a given runway length it is then possible to calculate the probability that an
aircraft cannot be stopped on the runway during a landing. In the Monte Carlo
method, a landing distance model is used which includes (most of) the variables
1
The principal feature of a Monte Carlo simulation is that a large number of input random
variables represented by probability distributions are utilised. The parameter values of the
functions are randomly selected using a random number generator.
NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014 5
that could affect the landing distance. Independent random values of each
significant operational variable are selected from estimates of the statistical
distribution of the variable, and the resulting landing distance is determined. The
estimates of the statistical distribution of the variables (such as deviation from
target approach speed, significant floating during flare, time from touchdown to
braking etc.) are based as much as possible on available operational landing data
for business aircraft obtained from flight data monitoring programmes. A
number of such data for business jet operations are available to NLR-ATSI. These
data have been extended with additional data of EBAA members that have a
Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) programme.
The Monte Carlo approach used here has also been successfully used to analyse
landing dispatch factors in relation to EASA NPA 14/2004 [Transport Canada
(2005)]. The method used here has been used successfully to change proposed
regulation on landing performance in the past.
6 NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014
Figure 1: Schematic overview of the landing performance simulation model.
2.1.2 APPLICATION OF THE LANDING OVERRUN MODEL
The simulation model described in section 2.1.1 is applied to a limited number
of business type of aircraft considered to be representative for their category.
The assessment is done for EASA performance class A, business operated aircraft
as defined in the project scope. Performance Class A aircraft include multi-engine
turboprop aircraft with more than 9 seats or a maximum takeoff mass exceeding
5700 kilograms, and all multi-engine turbojet powered aircraft. The present
assessment is limited to 3 business jet aircraft and 1 business twin turboprop
aircraft. Based on ownership and usage data of business aircraft operators in
NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014 7
EASA countries (see e.g. Figure 2) the following four aircraft categories are used
for the safety assessment:
• 13-19 passenger jet aircraft (like the Gulfstream G550/G650, Dassault
Falcon 2000, Dassault Falcon 900, CL-600) ;
• 9-12 passenger jet aircraft: (like the Citation Excel, Hawker Horizon,
Learjet 45) ;
• 6-8 passenger jet aircraft: (like Cessna CJ3, Cessna mustang, BEECHJET,
BAE-125, Premier, MU-300);
• 14 passenger turbo prop: (like the Beech king Air series);
Figure 2: Activity data of business operated aircraft in Europe (source Eurocontrol
STATFOR, 2012).
For each category a model of a representative aircraft is selected and used for
the simulations.
For the selected aircraft types Monte Carlo simulations on landing distance are
performed. The main result of these simulations is a range of actual landing
distances that are compared to the available runway length (LDA). From that a
landing overrun probability can be calculated. As a first step an assessment is
8 NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014
done for a 60% landing factor for jets and 70% factor for turboprops assuming
the normal dispatch requirements. For those individual cases where the aircraft
cannot comply with the dispatch landing distance requirement the result is
disregarded from the simulation. The landing overrun probability associated with
the landing factor of 60 or 70% is assumed to be a value for the level safety that
needs to be achieved. In the next step the assessment is done for higher landing
factors. This increase of the landing factor will automatically be associated with
an increase in landing overrun probability compared to the lower values as the
runway margins become less (shorter runways become available to land on). To
account for the increase in landing overrun probability mitigating measures are
identified and the impact of the measure on the operation is determined. For
each mitigating measure and combinations of measures the assessment is done
for a range of landing factors. This is repeated until an overrun probability is
found that is equal to the reference value for a landing factor of 60/70%. Note
that the reference case does not include any of the mitigating measures
identified. Figure 3 illustrates the overall safety assessment process.
Figure 3: Illustration of steps taken in safety assessment.
The landing factors discussed so far are for dry runways. However changing
these dry runway factors could also affect the safety when landing on none-dry
runways. In the landing distance simulations wet and contaminated runways are
also considered through a reduction in deceleration during the ground roll.
Regulations require during dispatch an additional landing distance factor of 1.15
to be used on top of the dry runway factor when the runway is forecasted to be
NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014 9
2
wet or contaminated . Changes to this additional non-dry runway landing factor
are not considered in the present study. All dispatch calculations conducted in
the present assessment assume a factor of 1.15 for wet/contaminated runways
on top of a dry runway landing factor.
2.1.3 LANDING DISTANCE MODEL
Aircraft performance models are used here developed according to industry
standards and practices. These models accurately describe the landing stopping
performance of an aircraft. The landing performance models account for the
aircraft characteristics, variations in environmental factors such as wind, runway
contamination and other factors like runway slope are also taken into account by
the model. A schematic overview of the landing distance model is shown in
Figure 1. The landing distance is calculated in distinct segments comprised of
the air distance, the transition distance and the braking distance. For each
segment engineering models are used. The first segment is calculated using the
method developed by ESDU [Mitchel (1991)]. This gives a detailed engineering
model for estimating airborne distance for fixed-wing aircraft. The method is
based on energy considerations. It is based on analyses of measured
performance for a wide range of aircraft types including business jets and
business propeller-powered aircraft. It accounts for factors like different styles of
landing flares (e.g. floating), influence of speed losses, approach speed variation,
wind and runway slope. The second segment in the landing distance is calculated
using the touchdown speed (as determined in the first segment calculations),
wind speed, and transition time. Finally the third segment is calculated using the
e.g. the speed after transition ending, wind speed, time of use of thrust
reversers, runway slope, and runway condition [see e.g. Boeing (2009), ESDU
(2006)].
Models are developed for 4 classes of business aircraft as described in section
2.1.2. For each class data for an existing aircraft was used and a landing distance
model was developed using the characteristics of this aircraft (e.g. wing area,
maximum lift coefficients, wing aspect ratio, declarations capabilities, influence
of thrust reverser etc.). The results obtained with the landing distance
performance models are compared to the published landing performance data of
the actual aircraft. Appendix A shows some comparisons of the landing distance
2
If the computed landing distance on a contaminated runway (calculated according to EASA CS
25.1591 or other advisory data provided by the manufacturer) plus a 15% safety margin is less than
the factored wet runway landing distance, the factored wet runway landing distance prevails. This is
taken into account in the landing simulations.
10 NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014
as calculated by the NLR engineering model and published performance data.
Typically the average difference between the landing distance model and the
published manufacturer data is less than 1.5% which is more than acceptable for
the present study. Note that in the present assessment the 19 and 12 passenger
jets and the 14 passenger turbo prop aircraft are equipped with thrust/propeller
reversers, whereas the 8 passenger jet has no thrust reverser installed. This
reflects the typical standards of aircraft in these categories.
The distributions of the variable parameters affecting the landing distance used
in the Monte Carlo Statistical Analysis are obtained from operational flight data
of a number of business aircraft operators and other data sources available to
NLR [FDM (2013)]. Frequency distributions are determined for parameters like
head-tailwind during landing, flare characteristics, pilot reaction times, reverse
thrust usage, glide slope deviations, runway conditions, speed deviations,
runway slope, temperature etc. During each run in the landing simulation a
runway length (LDA) is randomly selected. The distribution of this runway length
is based on the frequency of airports used in Europe for the 4 different business
aircraft categories considered in this study. These data were obtained from the
Eurocontrol Statistics and Forecast Service, STATFOR 3.
A large number of runs is required to establish a reliable estimate of model
uncertainties. The total number of runs used here is based on a standard error of
less than 1% of the mean statistic defined as the ratio of the standard deviation
of the calculated landing distance and the square root of the number of trials in
the simulation. According to this measure the minimum required number of runs
is in the order of 350 million. Most of the simulations were conducted with more
than 350 million.
A number of metrics can be considered to validate the Monte Carlo simulation
model results. The ultimate metric is the landing overrun probability. However a
direct comparison of the model predicted and historical landing overrun
probabilities is not straightforward. Historical data on landing overruns need to
be assessed over some time to obtain statically accurate rates (say 10-20 years).
During such a period many changes could have occurred in the operational
characteristics and technical developments which cannot always correctly be
assessed within the model. Also the historical data are mainly recorded for
accidents and serious incidents whereas the model results are for all types of
overruns irrespectively of the consequences. The historical data therefore could
3
The Central Route Charges Office of EUROCONTROL is a key data source to STATFOR. It includes
all IFR flights and only those VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flights which are chargeable.
NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014 11
result in lower overrun rates than calculated. Furthermore the Monte Carlo
landing model is run for certain aircraft type whereas the historical data normally
covers a wide range of different aircraft types. Nevertheless the probabilities
calculated by the model have been compared to some historical data. It was
found that these are in the same order of magnitude as historical rates or
4
somewhat higher . A second way of validation of the Monte Carlo model is done
by looking how strongly model parameters influence the landing distance (and
hence the landing overrun probability) and compare these with causal factors in
landing overruns as an equivalent. Figure 4 shows how strongly different
parameters in the model correlate with the calculated landing distance by the
simulation model. The closer the correlation coefficient is to ±1 the stronger the
correlation between the parameter and the landing distance is. A positive value
of the coefficient relates to an increase in landing distance. For instance a non-
dry runway will significantly affect the landing distance (increase) whereas a
5
headwind (as opposite to a tailwind) significantly reduces the landing distance.
This is reflected by the model as shown in Figure 4.
Rank correlation coefficient
-0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Wet/contamainetd runway condition
Wind
Floating
Overspeed at screen
Glidepath at screen
Reverse thrust used
Runway slope
Height at screen
Time delay braking/reverse thrust
Figure 4: Correlation of model parameters with landing distance in Monte Carlo
simulation.
When compared to the major causal factors in landing overruns with business
aircraft (see Figure 5), the model parameters show a very similar pattern in terms
importance. This is also an indication that the model produces validate results.
4
It can be expected that the model would be slightly more conservative (identifying more landing
overruns).
5
As more landings are made wind a headwind rather than a tailwind, the correlation coefficient
shown is negative. The results show a strong influence of wind.
12 NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014
Wet/contaminted rwy
Floating
Fast approach/TD
Tailwind
Late/incorrect use of stopping
devices
High on approach
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45%
Figure 5: Causal factors in landing overruns with business aircraft as percent of overruns
with known causes ([Van Es (2013)].
2.1.4 IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS IN LANDING DISTANCE SIMULATIONS
It is assumed in all calculations that any installed equipment that would influence
the landing distance is serviceable. It is therefore assumed that no MEL dispatch
occurs with inoperative systems such as ground spoilers (if installed), anti-skid
6
systems, brakes, thrust reversers (if installed), and flaps . Malfunctions of these
systems can have a significantly greater impact on the actual landing distance
and hence on the landing overrun probability than changes in the landing
dispatch factors. Table 1 gives an overview of typical increases in landing
distance for a number of system malfunctions for executive type of aircraft as
found in flight manuals. Finally it should be noted that the failure rates of aircraft
systems are not affected by the landing dispatch factor itself.
6
This means that during dispatch with higher landing factors these systems should be available.
NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014 13
Table 1: Typical values for landing distance increase for different system malfunctions.
Malfunction Typical increase in
landing distance (dry
runway)
No ground spoilers 150-170%
No anti-skid 160-200%
No brakes 200-300%
No flaps 130-150%
There are different types of runway contaminates all with their specific impact on
stopping performance. For the present study the braking characteristics
associated with a flooded runway are used without any kind of contamination
drag to account for the effect of contaminated runways on landing stopping
performance. This gives a good average representation of impact of the different
types of contaminated runways.
7
All Monte Carlo simulations are conducted with a so-called fixed seed value .
This means that the results from simulation will not change each time it is run.
As the present study looks at the impact of different mitigating measures it is
important that the changes in the simulation results are not caused by the
different seed values used to generate random numbers.
It is assumed for all calculations that the conditions at the destination airport
8
have not changed while flying the mission . This means that the weather and
runway conditions known during dispatch are assumed to be same when landing
at the destination airport.
During each run in the simulation a runway length is randomly selected. The
distribution of the runway length is based on the frequency of airports used in
Europe for the 4 different business aircraft categories. These data are obtained
from Eurocontrol. Both a minimum and maximum runway length is used in the
7
Starting off with a seed value generates a particular sequence in the simulation. A different seed
value will result in another sequence and hence other results if insufficient simulations are
conducted.
8
In reality the conditions forecasted for the destination airport can change. The accuracy of a
forecast (e.g. wind and runway condition) depends on a number of factors such as the quality of
the local met office, regional influences, and the overall time for which the forecast is valid. By
assuming unchanged conditions at the destination airport some error is introduced. However, it is
believed that this error will be small as the actual conditions could be worse or better than
forecasted. Also it is imperative that crews will perform an inflight weather check to assess if a safe
landing can be performed.
14 NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014
simulation reflecting the actual limits in runway length at the European airports
used by the involved business aircraft category.
All simulations are done for airports with normal approach angles (2.5-3.5
degrees). Some airports require steep approaches. Some business aircraft have
been certified to conduct such steep approaches. Steep approach procedures at
airports could require lowering the threshold crossing height to e.g. 35 feet,
allowing for an early touchdown. It is accepted that these types of operation
allow less margin for error and that steep approaches require special training
and procedures. Special procedures, such as steep approaches are outside the
scope of this analysis. It is sometimes suggested that operations on very short
runways will increase pilot’s alert levels. Psychological effects on pilot reaction
times during operations on e.g. short runways; adverse weather operations;
mountainous terrain etc. are also outside the scope of this analysis. Finally all
special operating conditions such as MMEL; low visibility; special approach
procedures (e.g. leading to go outside the stabilized approach criteria), etc. are
not considered in the analysis.
NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014 15
3 RESULTS
3.1.1 IDENTIFICATION OF MITIGATING MEASURES
Mitigating measures are identified that could bring the level of safety for
operations with the higher landing factors to the same level as for 60% or 70%
landing factors. These mitigating measures were defined using available
information from the literature e.g. European Action Plan for the Prevention of
Runway Excursions, items covered in a Destination Airport Analysis Program
used by some US business aircraft operators, runway excursion safety studies,
and assessments done by operational experts. The actual influence of some of
9)
the mitigating measures on related landing parameters (e.g. tendency to
floating, deviation from target speed at threshold etc.) had to be estimated
through engineering judgement and/or known results from best practices from
commercial airlines.
After a careful analysis of the available information and expert knowledge the
following mitigating measures are considered in the present analysis:
• Avoidance of continuation of unstable approaches;
• Avoidance of long landings (floating);
• Use of reverse thrust or propeller reverse on each landing (if installed);
• No landings on a runway that is forecasted to be contaminated or with a
10
braking action of less than GOOD ;
• No landings on a runway forecasted to have a tailwind;
• No MEL dispatch is allowed with inoperative systems such as ground
spoilers, anti-skid systems, brakes, thrust reversers and flaps.
3.1.2 BACKGROUND ON MITIGATING MEASURES
This chapter identifies reasoning behind the various factors leading to an
increased overrun risk for business type aircraft operators which are used for
defining mitigating measures. The next section, 3.1.3 addresses the mitigation
measures that operators could implement.
9)
NLR-ATSI has access to a large collection of operational landing flight data from commercial
airlines from which this can be estimated.
10
Currently a new classification is being explored for runway friction classification (TALPA ARC
Runway Condition Assessment Matrix). This will have a different classification for runways using
numbers instead of braking action.
16 NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014
Stabilised approaches
Flight data from business operators show that compared to commercial
operators a larger percentage of unstabilised approaches are continued [FDM
11
(2013), Van Es (2013)] . Flight data from business operators show that there are
significantly more overspeed events at the threshold during unstable approaches
than during stable approaches and that the threshold crossing height
distribution is similar for both unstable and stable approaches. The flight data
also show that for business aircraft the speed deviations at the threshold are
much higher than with landings of commercial airlines. It should be possible for
business operators to obtain similar speed deviations at the threshold as the
commercial airlines with the appropriate measures. For this flight crews of
business operators should conduct a stabilised approach according to published
criteria by the operator so as to cross the threshold at 50 feet and calculated
speed in the intended landing configuration. Any approach which is not
stabilised should result in executing the published missed approach procedure
and no attempt should be made to continue the landing.
Long landings/floating
Flight data from business operators show that compared to commercial
operators long landings occur more often within the business aircraft operations
[FDM (2013), Van Es (2013)]. This is illustrated in Figure 6. It should be possible
for business operators to reduce the amount of landings with significant floating
to the same level as commercial operators. Flight crews should therefore aim to
touchdown within the first 1000-1200 feet, avoiding floating as a mitigating
measure.
Figure 6: Comparison long landing rate [Van Es, (2013)].
11
Commercial operations have an unstabilised approach rate in the order of 1-8% and business
operations have a rate in the order of 4-14%. Only 1-2 % of unstabilised approaches resulted in a
go-around.
NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014 17
Maximum reverse thrust
Late or incorrect use of reverse thrust is a contributing factor in landing
overruns. Reverse thrust is especially effective on slippery runways. EAPRE
recommendation 3.4.24 explicitly recommends the use of immediate full reverse
on wet contaminated runways irrespective of any noise related restrictions.
No tailwind landings
Data show (refer to figure 3 and 4 of paragraph 2.1.3) that the Landing overrun
risk is considerably increased in tailwind conditions. Variations of the forecasted
wind with the actual wind cannot be avoided. However the probability of large
deviations can be reduced by limiting the planned mean forecasted wind and by
a forecast with high accuracy. Weather reports should therefore always come
from a formally approved source and no forecasted tailwind should exist.
No landings on contaminated runways
Data show (refer to figure 3 and 4 of paragraph 2.1.3) landing overrun risk is
considerably increased on contaminated runway operations. Although at the
moment the interpretation of contaminated runway is changing; this analysis
refers to the EASA definition. Reducing the landing overrun risk could therefore
also be achieved by not considering operations on runways forecasted to be
contaminated during dispatch. It is also important that the weather forecasts and
possible runway reports are of high accuracy. Weather and runway reports
should therefore always come from a formally approved source.
Dispatch items
It is assumed for all calculations that any installed equipment that would
influence the landing distance is serviceable. This means that no MEL dispatch is
allowed with inoperative systems such as ground spoilers, anti-skid systems,
brakes, thrust reversers and flaps when using a higher landing factor than 60%
for jets or 70% for turbo props.
3.1.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MITIGATING MEASURES
In this section details are provided how operators can achieve a successful
implementation of the different mitigating measures.
Operational restrictions
The operational restrictions to destinations such a contaminated runways, no
tailwind, or no MEL dispatch with inoperative systems such as ground spoilers (if
18 NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014
installed), anti-skid systems, brakes, thrust reversers (if installed), and flaps, can
be covered in a dispatch checklist. The only extra provision here would be to
assure that the data for the wind and runway reports are from an approved and
reliable source. These limitations could reasonably simple be implemented at
dispatch.
It will prove more challenging to implement stabilized approaches, go-arounds,
correct 50’ height crossing speed, avoiding floating, fast or long landings, timely
use of brakes and reverse etc. as mitigating measures. All these items are
dependent on human, crew performance. Only stating in an operational manual
that e.g. “a correct approach and landing must be applied when using a higher
landing factor” would be correct but at the same time be insufficient. Thus
getting grip and improving crew performance is needed. A traditional method
trying to quantify crew’s performance is to refer to flight hours. Apparently it is
assumed that more flight hours will provide a certain guarantee that approaches
are flown stable and landings are conducted normal.
The FAA requires that when operators would like to plan with higher landing
factors (EOD) 12, their pilots are trained in accordance with an approved
Destination Airport Analysis Program (DAAP). The crew shall consist of minimal 2
qualified pilots; the PIC should have an ATPL, type rating and minimal1500
hours. The SEC should have a CPL IR with minimal 500 hours and either one
must have minimal 75 hours on type for operations under the DAAP. Basically
tries this traditional method based on flying hours to assure that operations with
a higher landing factor would be flown accurate enough. However it might be
expected that e.g. 1000 hours/ year on long haul flights only will be of far less
significance than 50 landings/year on short runways. Thus regular exposure to
short or critical runway operations could be regarded as a mitigating factor.
Especially during operations with higher landing factors the combination of
exposure, training and monitoring could prove to be of higher value than a flight
hours alone criteria in assuring that the crew as mitigating element is acceptable.
The EAPRE provides evolved recommendations on improving crew
13
performance. . Adopting these EAPRE recommendations would enable accepting
crew performance as mitigating measure with reference to stabilized approaches,
avoiding floating, long or fast landings, immediate use of braking devices.
Experience by the large commercial aircraft operators learned that a combination
12
The Eligible On Demand operator must meet certain requirements identified in FAA 14 Code of
Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 135.4
13
(EAPRE 3.4.3; 3.4.15; )
NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014 19
of regular exposure, continuous training (theoretical and practical), checking and
monitoring proved to be a successful method to achieve the desired crew
performance.
Stabilised approach
Especially during operations with an increased landing factor the crews mind set
should be that the approach would result in a go-around except when all
14
parameters of the stabilized approach are met . This mind set can only be
achieved if promoted by the operator and trained as such. Experience by large
commercial operators and business aircraft operators show that a non-punitive
FDM program not only enhances crew’s awareness, but also provide operators a
good method of improving specific training and or operations. Another element
of avoiding un-stabilised approaches is technology. Presently special on-board
warning equipment is available warning the pilot when an unstabilised approach
is flown. Such stabilised approach monitor systems offer a supplement to the
flight crew awareness of unstabilised approaches. Such systems automatically
issue advisories if the pre-defined stabilised approach criteria for e.g. flaps,
speed, and approach profile are not met.
Long landings / floating
For operations with the increased landing factor are correct landings at the
correct speed and touchdown point more important since the margin for error is
proportionally reduced with the increased landing factor. A stabilised approach
helps achieving this, but is no a guarantee. During these types of operation a
firm and correct touchdown is preferable over a smooth, soft, and long landing.
Operators should provide adequate training, passengers should be briefed and
the crew should be aware of the aiming point and ultimate touchdown point 15. A
non-punitive FDM program will help reducing the long landing / floating factor.
Currently special on-board warning equipment is available for some aircraft that
helps to warn the pilot when a long landing occurs. If the aircraft has not
touched down before a pre-defined threshold, the system will activate an aural
(caution) message upon the crew can react (e.g. balked landing).
Immediate use of all braking devices
Data show that too late using full reverse thrust (if installed) or too late wheel
braking are a causal factor in landing overruns (see e.g. Figure 5). Especially low
speed overruns occur often after late application of wheel brakes and finding out
14
EAPRE 3.4.16; 3.4.18; 3.4.19
15
EAPRE 3.4.21; 3.4.22;
20 NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014
too late that the deceleration is not what is expected to be. Immediate use of all
available stopping devices is not only necessary on wet runways but is also
16
required when operating under the increase Landing Factor. This element
should be adequately trained and monitored as well.
Flight Data monitoring
EAPRE 3.4.2 recommends that operators should include and monitor aircraft
parameters related to potential runway excursions in their FDM program. Flight
Data Monitoring is the pro-active use of digital flight data from routine
operations to improve aviation safety and is mandatory for aircraft with a
maximum certificated take-off mass (MCTOM) in excess of 27 000 kg. FDM is
now being used by aircraft operators throughout the world to inform and
facilitate corrective actions in a range of operational areas. It offers the ability to
track and evaluate operational safety trends, identify risk precursors, and take
the appropriate remedial action. These actions include, but are not limited to,
specific training, improved operations and addressing identified potential safety
risks.
Typical parameters would be related to the stabilized approach, touchdown
point, touchdown speed and the moment of using the various braking devices.
Data from various operators (airline and business) show that approach and
landing deviations have been reduced considerably after implementing a non-
17
punitive FDM program . The European Authorities coordination Group on Flight
Data Monitoring provides material on implementing FDM programs and
standardised FDM based indicators.
The main goals of a FDM program should be to recognise trends in unstabilised
approaches, long landings, fast landings and / or late application of braking
devices. It could also serve in a non-punitive environment as a specific crew
awareness method. It is recognised that FDM is in general not obliged for
business type operators and also not all business type operators would be in a
position to set-up an own FDM. Nevertheless is it expected that a voluntarily FDM
would enhance the possibility of regarding crews as a solid mitigating factor
during increased landing factor operations.
16
EAPRE 3.4.24; 3.4.25;
17
The European Aviation Safety Plan addresses specifically the role of FDM in the risk of runway
excursions.
NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014 21
Other factors
Visual clues
Especially during the final approach phase could visual clues influence the
18
perception of pilots. Factors that are mentioned to increase the possibility of
the overrun risk are wide, short runways, downslope, low intensity lighting and
haze. These items should be addressed in crew training but should not be a
regarded as limiting factors for planning with higher landing factors.
Threshold crossing height
It is generally accepted that each deviation of + 50 ft threshold crossing height,
typically increases the landing distance by 300 meter. Crossing the threshold too
low, increases the risk of an undershoot and decreases the margin for error.
Planned deviations from the threshold crossing height are not considered in this
analysis.
Conclusion on realism of mitigating measures.
It is reasonable to expect that the mentioned operational limits (contaminated
runways, no tailwind, or no MEL dispatch with inoperative systems such as
ground spoilers (if installed), anti-skid systems, brakes, thrust reversers (if
installed), and flaps) can be adhered to during dispatch.
Crew related items require a more comprehensive approach. First of all is
adequate training essential, second a reasonable amount of exposure and finally
an (voluntarily) implemented FDM program would be beneficial.
3.1.4 IMPACT OF MITIGATING MEASURES ON LANDING OVERRUN
PROBABILITY
In this section the influence of the identified mitigating measures on the overrun
probability for higher landing factors is presented and discussed. First Figure 7
shows the influence of different landing dispatch factors on the overrun
probability relative to the reference case of each of the four aircraft types
19
considered without any mitigating measures . As shown increasing the landing
factor without any mitigating measures will increase the landing overrun
probability. The influence of the landing factor on the overrun probability differs
for the different aircraft types. The lowest influence in noticeable for the 14
passenger turbo prop aircraft and the highest for the 12 passenger jet. During
each run in the landing simulation a runway length (LDA) is randomly selected.
18
Airbus getting to grips ALAR.
19
Shown is the ratio between the overrun probability for a given landing factor and the probability
for the reference case.
22 NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014
The distribution of this runway length is based on the frequency of airports used
in Europe for the 4 different business aircraft categories. The frequency
distributions of the LDA vary for the four aircraft which to some extend explains
the differences between the aircraft shown in Figure 7. The rather low change of
probability with increasing landing factor for the 14 passenger turbo prop can be
explained by the fact that this type of aircraft is not frequently used at airports
with short runways according to the Eurocontrol operational data. Therefore
increasing the landing factor (which provides the opportunity to land at shorter
runways) has not a strong influence.
20
18 19 passenger jet
12 passenger jet
Relative increase in overrun probability
16
8 passenger jet
14 14 passenger turbo prop
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
70% 80% 90%
Landing factor
Figure 7: Influence of landing factor on the relative overrun probability (relative to the 60%
or 70% factor for jets and turbo props respectively).
Next the influence of mitigating measures on the overrun probability (as
discussed in the previous section) on the landing overrun probability is
discussed. The analysis was conducted with those measures and combinations of
measures that were considered to be the most promising ones which also could
be introduced without great difficulties or effort. For all cases it is assumed that
systems such as ground spoilers, anti-skid systems, brakes, thrust reversers and
flaps are operative at the landing. For combinations of mitigating measures the
landing factor was determined which would provide an equivalent level of safety
to the reference case with a 60% or 70% landing factor (for jets and turbo props
respectively). The overall process is illustrated in Figure 8. The simulation is
NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014 23
rerun with small increments of the landing dispatch factor until an equivalent
level of safety is found.
Figure 8: Illustration of the process for determining an equivalent level of safety for a
given (set of) mitigating measure(s).
It should be noted again that the reference cases do not include any of the
mitigating measures. The results of the safety analysis are shown in Table 2. The
combination of mitigating measures shown in this table were chosen as such that
they provided the most effective influence in reducing the overrun probability
compared to the reference case. The analysis started with the restriction of
landings on contaminated runways as initial analysis indicated that this provided
the most significant reduction of landing overrun probability of all mitigating
measures identified. The results show that the restriction of landings on
20
contaminated runways provides an additional 8-12% landing factor for the
business jets. The turbo prop aircraft only gained 1% in landing factor with this
21
measure . Restricting tailwind landings together with no landings on
contaminated runways provides an additional 11-14% landing factor for the
business jets. The effect of these combined measures for the turbo prop aircraft
is small again as only 2% is gained in the landing factor. The addition of the
20
This is equivalent to a reported braking action less than GOOD.
21
As propeller reverse is highly effective and can be used down to much lower speeds than reverse
thrust on jet aircraft the influence of restricting contaminated runway landings does not have a
significant effect on the landing overrun probability of the 14 passenger turbo prop aircraft
analysed here.
24 NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014
100% use of reverse thrust or propeller reverse (if installed) on each landing to
the previous measures provides an absolute increase in the landing factor of 12-
22
18% for the business jets and 8% for the turbo prop aircraft . Reverser thrust is
most effective in reducing stopping distance on contaminated runways. As
contaminated runways are already excluded as a mitigating measure the impact
of a 100% use of reverser thrust is now mainly for wet runway landings which is
normally much less than for contaminated runways. Finally use of all mitigating
measures considered provides an absolute increase in the landing factor of 18-
22% for the business jets and 11% for the turbo prop aircraft on top of the
reference landing factor of 60% and 70% respectively.
Table 2: Landing factors with an equivalent safety level for different mitigating measures.
13-19 passenger 9-12 passenger 6-8 passenger 14 passenger
Mitigating measure(s)*
jet jet jet turbo prop
No landings on contaminated runways 69% 72% 68% 71%
No tailwind landings, no landings on
71% 74% 71% 72%
contaminated runways
No tailwind landings, no landings on
contaminated runways, 100% reverse 72% 78% N/A** 78%
thrust
No tailwind landings, no landings on
contaminated runways, 100% reverse
78% 82% 74% 81%
thrust, reduced unstable approaches,
limited floating
* It is assumed that systems such as ground spoilers, anti-skid systems, brakes, thrust
reversers and flaps are operative.
**Aircraft type does not have thrust reversers installed.
It can be concluded that when the identified mitigating measures (no tailwind
landings, no landings on contaminated runways, 100% reverse thrust, reduced
unstable approaches, limited floating) are all applied, an equivalent level of
safety compared to the landing factor of 60% /70% is achieved at a landing factor
of 78% (13-19 passenger jet); 82% (9-12 passenger jet); 74% (6-8 passenger jet)
and 81% (14 passenger turbo prop). With the exemption of the 8-passenger jet
the figures are close to the FAA 14 CFR part 135.4 of 80%.
22
Analysis of flight data of business aircraft operators indicated that reverse thrust is normally
used during 90-99% of all landings. An average of 95% utilisation is assumed in the reference case.
NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014 25
3.2 IMPACT OF LANDING FACTOR ON RUNWAYS/AIRPORTS IN
EUROPE
For a number of business aircraft it is determined how many additional runways
(in Europe) a change in the landing factor would provide at dispatch. For this the
NLR-ATSI airport database is used which contains detailed information on
Landing distance Available LDA of all runways in Europe. Only those European
airports are considered that according to Eurocontrol STATFOR data were used at
least once a day on average by business aircraft in 2013. Landing distances for
the different aircraft types considered are obtained from the official flight
manuals of these aircraft. The assessment is conducted for still air conditions
and a maximum landing mass. Only the most commonly used aircraft for
23
business operations in Europe are considered. The results are shown in Table 3.
The percentages in this table show the increase in the number of runways
available during dispatch relative to a landing factor of 60% for jets and 70% for
turbo props.
For jets a landing factor of 70% the number of available runways increases
between 5 and 20% with an average of 9%. For a landing factor of 80% this ranges
from 10-31% with an average of 15%. For the turbo props little is to gain with an
increasing landing factor as the airports used by these aircraft have runways that
are much longer than required during dispatch for these aircraft.
23
The most commonly used twin turboprop aircraft in an executive role are the Beech King Air 200
and the King Air 90 accounting for more than 75% of all aircraft activity in Europe (source: STATFOR
Eurocontrol).
26 NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014
Table 3: Impact of higher landing factors on the increase in available runways for
dispatch in Europe.
Aircraft type 70% landing distance factor 80% landing distance factor
F900EX 17.1% 25.3%
F2000EX 11.9% 20.6%
7X 8.6% 14.3%
G550 6.0% 10.3%
LR60 19.7% 30.6%
MU-300 6.3% 10.8%
Beechjet 400 8.1% 15.1%
HS-125-800 5.4% 10.7%
Mustang 6.0% 11.2%
CJ1 6.8% 11.2%
XLS 9.2% 14.5%
CJ2 7.1% 13.5%
CJ3 6.1% 10.6%
King Air 200 N/A 2.3%
King Air 90 N/A 0.0%
NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014 27
4 CONCLUSIONS
The present report presents the results of a safety assessment that investigates
what risk reducing measures would be required to achieve an equivalent level of
safety with landing dispatch factors higher than those stated in EASA
CAT.POL.A.230. The assessment is done for four different business aircraft types
that are representative to the aircraft used by European business aircraft
operators. Different mitigating measures are identified and their impact on the
landing performance is determined using e.g. operational flight data. The impact
of the identified mitigating measures is quantified using a landing distance
simulation model. This shows that an equivalent level of safety with landing
dispatch factors higher than those stated in EASA CAT.POL.A.230 can be
achieved. It is concluded that when the mitigating measures no tailwind landings,
no landings on contaminated runways, 100% reverse thrust, reduced unstable
approaches, and limited floating are all applied, an equivalent level of safety
compared to the landing factor of 60% /70% is achieved at a landing factor of
78% (13-19 passenger jet); 82% (9-12 passenger jet); 74% (6-8 passenger jet) and
81% (14 passenger turbo prop). With the exemption of the 8-passenger business
jet the figures are close to the FAA 14 CFR part 135.4 of 80%.
It is shown that higher landing factors will increase the number of runways (and
hence airports) available during dispatch. This applies to all business jet aircraft
analysed. However, turbo prop business aircraft show hardly any increase of
available runways with increasing dispatch factor.
28 NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014
5 REFERENCES
FDM (2013) Unpublished Flight Data from business and commercial
operators, NLR
Van Es , GWH Why do business aircraft go off the runway more often than
(2013) commercial aircraft? 58th annual Business Aviation Safety
Seminar, Montreal, Canada
Mitchel, D. Estimation of airborne performance in landing, ESDU 91032
(1991)
Boeing (2009) Jet Transport Performance Methods, Boeing D6-1420
ESDU (2006) Calculation of ground performance in take-off and landing,
ESDU 85029
Van Es, G.W.H A Study of Runway Excursions from a European Perspective,
(2010) NLR CR-2010-259
Transport EASA NPA 14/2004 landing distance on contaminated
Canada (2005) runways, discussion paper no. 35, Transport Canada aircraft
certification flight test division
EAPRE European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway
Excursions. Edition 1.0, 2013.
NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014 29
Appendix A EXAMPLES LANDING PERFORMANCE
MODEL VERIFICATION
3500
NLR-ATSI Engineering model
Published performance data
3000
Unfactored landing distance (ft.)
2500
2000
1500 -Vref
-Maximum flaps
-Threshold at 50 ft.
1000 -Sea Level
500
0
25000 35000 45000 55000 65000 75000 85000 95000
Landing mass (lbs.)
19 passenger jet business, dry runway no reverse thrust.
9000
NLR-ATSI Engineering model
8000 Published performance data
7000
Unfactored landing distance (ft.)
6000
5000
4000
-Vref
-Max flaps
3000 -Threshold at 50 ft.
-Sea Level
2000
1000
0
25000 35000 45000 55000 65000 75000 85000 95000
Landing mass (lbs.)
19 passenger business jet, dry runway, no braking, reverse thrust.
30 NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014
4000
NLR-ATSI Engineering model
Published performance data
3500
Unfactored landing distance (ft.)
3000
2500
2000
-Vref
1500 -Max flaps
-Threshold at 50 ft.
-Sea Level
1000
500
0
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
Landing mass (lbs.)
12 passenger business jet, dry runway, no reverse thrust.
3500
NLR-ATSI Engineering model
Published performance data
3000
Unfactored landing distance (ft.)
2500
2000
1500 -Vref
-Max flaps
-Threshold at 50 ft.
1000 -Sea Level
500
0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000
Landing mass (lbs.)
8 passenger business jet, dry runway, no reverse thrust.
NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014 31
1600
NLR-ATSI Engineering model
Published performance data
1400
Unfactored landing distance (ft.)
1200
1000
800
-Vref
600 -Max Flaps
-Threshold at 50 ft.
-Sea Level
400
200
0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000
Landing mass (lbs.)
14 passenger turbo prop, no propeller reverse.
32 NLR-CR-2014-030
May 2014